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US Stand toward Genocides: The Case of Bosnia

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Dedication

I dedicate my work to my dear family members who supported me throughout this journey and stood by my side.

Abstract

The twentieth century witnessed horrific crimes that ended millions of innocent lives. What differentiates these atrocities from other kinds is the element of intent. This kind of crimes came to be known as “genocide.” In 1948, the UN adopted a new treaty called the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which aims to deter and punish perpetrators of such heinous act. The USA as a superpower and one of the first countries that signed the new treaty, took a controversial stand toward genocide. The dissertation explores and analyzes America’s implemented foreign policy in this matter. In a detailed way, the work also evaluates the US response to three cases of genocide. The first case is that of Native Americans in which the concerned country has always been accused of having committed genocide. The second case regards the Armenians who were the victims of the Ottoman Empire’s policies. The third case deals with the US rival, Russia that planned to kill Ukrainians through mass starvation in the period of 1932-1933. Yet, the major case study of this research project is Bosnia in which thousands of innocent people perished as a result of Serbian heavy attacks and inhumane practices against isolated civilians. The research work concludes that the USA failed in its political reaction and practical response toward these atrocities as it prioritized its own economic and political interests over humanitarian concerns.

ملخص

شهد القرن العشرون جرائم مروعة أنهت ملايين الأرواح البريئة. ما يميز هذه الفظائع عن الأنواع الأخرى هو عنصر النوايا حيث أصبح هذا النوع من الجرائم يعرف باسم "الإبادة الجماعية". في عام 1948 ، اعتمدت الأمم المتحدة معاهدة جديدة تسمى اتفاقية منع جريمة الإبادة الجماعية لردع و معاقبة مرتكبيها. اتخذت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية كقوة عظمى وواحدة من أوائل الدول التي وقعت على المعاهدة الجديدة ، موقفاً مثيراً للجدل تجاه الإبادة الجماعية. تستكشف وتحلل المذكرة السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة المعتمدة في هذه المسألة. بطريقة مفصلة ، يقيم العمل أيضاً رد الولايات المتحدة على ثلاث حالات للإبادة الجماعية. الحالة الأولى هي للأمريكيين الأصليين أين كان البلد المعني متهما بارتكاب جريمة إبادة جماعية. تتعلق الحالة الثانية بالأرمن الذين كانوا ضحايا لسياسات الإمبراطورية العثمانية. وتتناول الحالة الثالثة منافس الولايات المتحدة ، روسيا التي خططت لقتل الأوكرانيين من خلال المجاعة الجماعية في الفترة من 1932-1933. ومع ذلك ، فإن دراسة الحالة الرئيسية للمشروع البحثي هذا هي البوسنة التي قتل فيها آلاف الأشخاص الأبرياء نتيجة للهجمات الصربية المكثفة والممارسات اللاإنسانية ضد المدنيين العزل. ويخلص البحث إلى أن الولايات المتحدة فشلت في رد فعلها السياسي و العملي تجاه هذه الفظائع ، حيث أعطت الأولوية لمصالحها الاقتصادية والسياسية الخاصة على المصالح الإنسانية.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

CPPCG	Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IFOR	Implementation Force
IMT	International Military Tribunal
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
US/USA	United States of America

Introduction

The response of the so-called human rights champion, the United States, toward one of the most heinous crimes is to be placed under investigation in this work. The crime of genocide has existed since ancient times, but the most remarkable instances took place throughout the twentieth century when the term made its beginning in English language. The United States has always been an advocate of human rights. It aspires to spread and honor principles of civil liberties, democracy, and worldwide peace. As a leading superpower, the US reaction to the crime of genocide is of a major importance.

After the end of World War II, the world witnessed horrifying acts of violence that intentionally aimed to destroy a specific group of victims. US decision makers had to choose what stand their country should take. The United States has been active throughout the drafting the law recognizing genocide as an international crime, but it is 40 years later that it would ratify the international treaty. This delay leaves question marks on the commitment of the USA to its own claims.

The Bosnian case is one of the most recognized cases of genocide that took place after WWII. The war in Bosnia unfolded as it declared its independence from former state of Yugoslavia. The neighboring country, Serbia, had its own vision of creating an ethnically pure Serb state. Taking this into account, the Serbs waged war on all other Yugoslav provinces including Bosnia. The fight came to an end after 4 years when the United States finally decided to take the action. It waited for 4 years to show a decisive stand, a period during which massacres were unjustly committed. The USA was present from the beginning of the war as Bill Clinton, a presidential candidate at that time, supported US engagement. Therefore, assessing US stand toward the Bosnian genocide is a failure or a success will be discussed in the current work.

This study is based on the examination of US foreign policy toward the genocidal

wars and how it evolved through time. The US stand toward genocide has been a controversial matter whether it chooses what serves its own interests or honors its own claims of respecting human rights. US foreign policy undertaken by its decision makers toward the Bosnian genocide is a subject of many interpretations. In this view, the work seeks to investigate the reasons behind making such foreign policy decisions.

As a superpower, the USA aspires to spread its ideology. This study then aims at exploring such a claim. It scrutinizes its response to instances of genocide beginning with the one that occurred within its own borders, then moving to the Armenian and the Ukrainian ones. It finally draws a picture on the US position toward genocide by examining the American involvement in the selected Bosnian case.

This study will deeply answer the following inquiries: Did the USA participate in banning genocide? Did it integrate the crime of genocide in its foreign policy? When? How did it respond to instances of genocide throughout its history? What was the response of the USA toward it? Did the USA react similarly to the Bosnian case as it did with other cases? Did the USA make an immediate reaction? What are the reasons that made Bill Clinton change his mind though he promised to intervene, even if it meant to use military force, during his campaign for presidency? What were the consequences of choosing to ignore the Bosnian war? Why did the USA engage itself in 1995 and bring the conflict to an end? Were US efforts based on a humanitarian concern or on practical considerations?

The topic under dissection is quite controversial when it comes to examining US stand toward genocide. US foreign policy is interpreted quite differently by scholars and researchers who are interested in this matter. Some scholars hold the view that the decisions that were made were accurate, others oppose it. It is important to provide the literature review that focuses on some works that dealt with this subject.

“United States Foreign Policies toward Genocide and Crimes against Humanity” is

an article in *Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity*. It exposes the evolution of US foreign policy toward genocides in the aftermath of the Second World, tackling its stance toward the cases of Cambodia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. It also points out the active participation of the USA in the drafting process of the Genocide Convention and the matter of the long delay.

In his book, *The Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis*, John B. Quigley recounts how the term genocide appeared for the first time and provides its legal definition. He also details the process of codifying the crime of genocide and what constitutes it. The book explains how the United States narrowed the definition of genocide and the modifications it made.

Jessica Wang's thesis "Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur: US Involvement in Genocides Worldwide" focuses on the major role the USA plays in the international community and its influence and how its unwillingness costs millions of lives. Wang investigates three cases of genocide one of which is the Bosnian. She provides a summary of the conflict then examines US response to it.

In her thesis "Explaining the Ineffectiveness of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: The Leadership of the Hegemon" Betsy L. Montgomery equally defines the Genocide Convention. She investigates the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides and the response they received from the USA. With the Bosnian case, the thesis scrutinizes US stand in the sense that the United States did not intervene at the beginning of the war but it did when violence escalated than ever before.

To provide a thorough examination of US stance toward genocide, the present research project requires employing qualitative and analytical methods. The data is gathered from various studies and research undertaken by scholars who provided answers to questions on the treated issue.

This dissertation is composed of three chapters. The first chapter, “Identifying the Origins of Genocide,” brushes the origins of genocide tracing it back to very ancient times, and ending with the twentieth century that witnessed a huge loss of innocent lives. The chapter clarifies the difference between genocide and other large scale crimes as it provides the definition of genocide, its components, and its codification. In addition, the different definitions, typologies and the steps of genocide are to be presented in it. Finally, the chapter ends with how the United States integrated the crime of genocide in its foreign policy.

“The Evolution of US Foreign Policy toward Genocide” is the title of the second chapter that examines how the US stand toward genocide evolved through time. The chapter investigates the response of the United States to three cases of genocide that are of the Native Americans, the Armenians and the Ukrainians. It also provides the background of the three cases. The chapter presents for each case the debate launched by genocide scholars of whether these cases amount to be considered genocide or not, in order to give the reader an idea of how disputable is the subject. By the end of each case, the chapter examines whether the USA recognizes these massacres as genocide or not, and if there was any American intervention while the crimes were taking place.

The third and last chapter, “US Stand toward the Bosnian Genocide”, begins with a historical background about the conflict and the prosecution of the criminals. It then explains and analyzes US ratification of the Genocide Convention and why it took it long to do that. Eventually the third chapter explores US response to the case of Bosnia, undertaking the two administrations of George Bush and Bill Clinton with more focus on the latter as he took office in the second year of the Bosnian conflict.

Chapter One

Identifying the Origins of Genocide

The twentieth century witnessed the collaboration of the international community to enact laws that would punish perpetrators of massacres and provide the necessary measures to prevent any future atrocities. Accordingly, one of these crimes was labelled “genocide” and the standards that constitute it were put forward as well. The present chapter identifies the origins of genocide, its emergence and its recognition as crime under international law. Other definitions of genocide, its typologies and stages are also proposed at this level.

This work part denotes the integration of the crime of genocide in US foreign policy. It provides a historical background about the role of the USA in the drafting process of codifying the crime of genocide under international law. Likewise, it indicates US ratification of the new treaty that was adopted by the UN to prevent and punish the crime of genocide.

1.1. Genocide in Prehistory

The pioneer of genocide studies is the Jewish Polish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, who announced at the beginning of his incomplete history of genocide that was recently published “Genocide is a new word, but the evil it describes is old.” The same idea was stated by the sociologist Leo Kuper, who imitated Lemkin, in his 1981 seminal text of genocide studies saying that the term “genocide” is new but its concept is old (qtd. in “The Origins of Genocide” 3). Annihilating enemies is an old concept. Yet, the atrocities of the twentieth-century gave rise to labelling them as “genocide”. It is important to examine genocide origins in order to understand its historical development and the significance of the term itself (Shelton 39). Therefore, it is important to explore the historical background of the concept and how it emerged.

The first written form of genocide is found in the Old Testament. The latter denotes that the destruction of certain groups was the will of God (Blunt). In it, God is depicted as “a

despotic and capricious sadist” and his followers as eager genocidaires (genocidal killers). This is best shown in the Book of Genesis¹ (6:17–19) where God decides to annihilate any living creatures only for Noah and a nucleus of human and animal life (Jones 4). In the Book of Deuteronomy² commands of killing are stated clearly “But thou shalt utterly destroy them-- the Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites, Hivites and Jebusites--as the lord your God has commanded you” (20:17). Another insight of violence is put forward when these same ethnic groups were listed in the Book of Exodus³ to be wiped out (23:23). The Book of Deuteronomy adds more declarations of hatred, extermination, cruelty and mercilessness (7:2, 16) (Kiernan, “Blood and Soil...”). The Old Testament is full of examples that entail that violent actions occurred in ancient times. Genocide can then be traced back to the time of prophets.

According to Kiernan, a professor of history, the first recorded instance of genocide might be the destruction of Carthage (“The First Genocide...” 27). Its destruction was the result of the Punic Wars.⁴ The First Punic War began in 264 BCE because Rome wanted to retrieve Sicily from Carthage. In 241 BCE, Rome was able to defeat Carthage, and consequently Carthage was obliged to give up Sicily to Rome and pay a heavy war reimbursement. Carthage faced the same fate in the Second Punic War that took place from 218 BCE to 202 BCE. The Carthagian general Hannibal lost out to the Roman general Scipio Africanus at the Battle of Zama. Therefore, Carthage had once again to compensate for Rome. Finally, Carthage violated the peace treaty that it made with Rome by attacking its neighbor Numidia. Thus the Third Punic War began in 149 BCE and ended by 146 BCE with the complete destruction of Carthage (Mark). The total destruction of Carthage can be considered as another example of how genocide occurred in ancient times.

More outstanding examples of incidents of genocide that took place throughout history includes the Mongols’ invasion under the ruling of Jinghiz Khan. He was able to destroy large

parts of Persia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Russia and China. Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 13 % of the world's population, as many as 30 million people, perished by his hands (Rummel, "Genocide"). Another illustration is the destruction of the Chinese population that resulted in the death of tens of millions. This was the consequence of their rulers' decisions and as one imperial war took place. For instance, more than forty million people died in the Taiping Rebellion⁵ (1851-1864) alone (Rummel, "Genocide"). There is equally the case of Native Americans that resulted in the death of 13 million or so (Rummel, "Genocide"). Slavery eventually ended the life of about 17 million African blacks (Rummel, "Genocide"). These examples reflect how genocide was committed throughout history. This is another proof that the concept of genocide is old.

Less remarkable cases were, for instance, the murder of Christians by the Romans, the Christian Crusades, the Aztec sacrifices, the Spanish Inquisition, the witch hunts, and so on. These cases were less deadly than the precedent ones because the casualty was lesser (Rummel, "Genocide"). Pre-twentieth century death toll is estimated to range from 89000000 to slightly over 260000000 people (Rummel, "Pre-twentieth Century Democide"). Low death tolls still indicate that lives perished and that genocide seems to be a new concept even though it has always existed.

1.2. Genocide and the UN Genocide Convention

Nineteen forty-four was the year when the term "genocide" appeared for the first time (Mayersen). Lemkin coined the term in his book that is entitled *Axis rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation - Analysis of Government - Proposals for Redress*. In his book he defines genocide as "the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group." Genocide is formed through the combination of the Greek word *genos* (race, tribe) and the Latin *cide* (kill). Genocide means the premeditated plan that makes use of different actions to annihilate a nation or an ethnic group. The plan aims at destroying all aspects of the victims' life. Genocide targets the group as a whole

and the actions target the individuals because they constitute that group (79).

Many resolutions and drafts were adopted by the UN General Assembly to affirm that genocide is a crime under international law. In 1948, the UN succeeded in doing so when it adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG). Yet the treaty entered into force only in 1951 (Mennecke 148; Quigley 8). This codification took place when 20 states agreed to sign this new treaty (Chambers 23). As a result, the Genocide Convention became a legal instrument that would be applied in its member states. However, cases of genocide that occurred before the implementation of the Convention were not legally sued (Mennecke 148). For example, the cases that were tackled under the previous title “Genocide in Prehistory” would not be concerned.

The UN Genocide Convention is made up of 19 articles (See Appendix A). They deal with how to punish perpetrators, how to protect the rights of specific groups listed in the treaty, and the states’ responsibility to protect (Mennecke 148-149). It defines genocide in its second article as follows:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- a. Killing members of the group;
- b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (UN General Assembly)

1.2.1. Strengths and Weaknesses of the UN Genocide Convention

The UN Genocide Convention is a legal instrument that can punish perpetrators of the crime of genocide. Such ability stems from its *jus cogens* status⁶ (Oh). As the latter is a set of norms that cannot be contradicted or declined, they cannot be overridden under any circumstances (Kamrul 73). The *jus cogens* status of the crime of genocide allows practicing justice in three ways. First, all member states of the Genocide Convention are legally obliged to try anyone accused of genocide (Oh). By the same token, the emeritus professor of law, Cherif M. Bassiouni argues that the member states must try anyone suspected of committing genocide even governors (qtd. in Oh).

No matter what circumstance under which genocide is committed, be it time of war or peace, member states cannot grant immunity to defendants of genocide. Second, not only all member states, but also states that did not ratify the Convention, must punish those who would be found guilty of genocide. Lastly, Article VIII of the Convention declares that all states must act to stop genocidal acts from happening (Oh). The other strength the UN Genocide Convention has is the large punishable number of acts that are mentioned in Article II (Bailey 4). Whether these acts are direct or indirect, still they can lead to the destruction of a group (Oh). The UN Genocide Convention has four aspects that solidify its status as an international law that cannot be overridden.

Although the UN Genocide Convention is a legal instrument that punishes the perpetrators of genocide once convicted and protects the lives of the innocent, it has few drawbacks. One of which is that the Genocide Convention requires the specific intent, that is stated in article II, to be proved. Only when a judge proves that the accused intended to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group in whole or in part, they would be charged of genocide (Oh; Mayersen; Lesko 18; Mennecke 152). One clear weakness of this Convention is that it is very difficult to prove the intent of the perpetrator. Therefore, it is

up to those who bring charges to prove it otherwise the criminal gets free or gets charged of another crime.

Another shortcoming of this convention is that it includes few groups to be protected; it only protects four groups: national, ethnic, racial, or religious (Mennecke 150). Particularly the political groups and social classes were omitted. The political groups were included in the first drafts of the Convention, yet the Soviet Union ensured their exclusion (Bruun 206-207; Mayersen). As for the social classes, countries of West Europe removed them. Therefore, crimes against political groups and social classes are not considered genocidal (Mayersen). Superpowers like Russia prioritize their own interests rather than providing protection to the needy.

The UN Genocide Convention does not indicate preventive procedures to deter genocide (Bruun 208). Article I of the UN Genocide Convention urges member states to act to punish genocide (Mennecke 153) but the Convention does not have universal jurisdiction (Bruun 207). Although the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide entails the duty of member states to prevent and punish genocide, still implementing prevention and punishment, as the Convention demands, is quite problematic because the Convention does not provide preventive procedures and cannot be executed in all the countries of the world.

1.2.2. Genocide vs. Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes, and Ethnic Cleansing

Genocide differs from other kinds of large-scale crimes in the sense that the element of intent is required, as it is stated by the professor of law John B. Quigley “Thus, genocide encompasses a dual mental element: one directed against the immediate victims, and a second against the group” (10). The actions must have the specific intent that aims at exterminating the victims because they are the individuals who constitute the targeted group, and aims at destroying the group as a whole because it is either a national, ethnic, racial, or a religious group.

One kind of these serious offenses is crimes against humanity. Dissimilarly to genocide, crimes against humanity firstly appeared in 1915 in a declaration made by the Allied governments (France, Great Britain and Russia) to describe the atrocities that were committed against the Armenians by the Ottoman Empire. Yet, only in 1945 that crimes against humanity were sued at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg, Bavaria in Germany. But they are not recognized as an international law. Crimes against humanity mean that acts must be committed with the intent of the perpetrator and these acts are part of a systematic or broad annihilation of any civilian population (Wald 623; Coalson).

Crimes against humanity target any civilians whatever their identity is. Another dissimilarity is the acts that constitute a crime against humanity that are “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment, torture, grave forms of sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance of persons, the crime of apartheid, and other inhumane acts” (“Crimes against Humanity”). Last but not least, unlike genocide, crimes against humanity are sued in international penal tribunals where the perpetrators are within their jurisdiction (Quigley 13). Crimes against humanity differ from genocide in its emergence, codification, meaning, acts and it targets civilians whoever they are unlike genocide that aims at destroying a specific group.

Another type of these serious offenses is war crimes. Genocide and war crimes differ in their emergence. The concept of war crimes developed in the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Such development took place alongside the codification of the law of armed conflict. War crimes are “those violations of international humanitarian law.” The acts that constitute war crimes vary from those of genocide. The first act is violating the 1949 Geneva Conventions under an international armed conflict. The second act is when the perpetrator breaks the laws and customs that are applicable in international armed conflict and the third act is violating these same laws and customs but in a non-international conflict.

Finally, transgressing Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions under a non-international armed conflict (“War Crimes”). War crimes may take place in either an international or a non-international armed conflict (Cassese 66; “War Crimes”). Finally, war crimes are intended to be committed against civilians or soldiers (“War Crimes”). War crimes are different from genocide in its emergence, definition, acts and war crimes are always related to armed conflict.

Ethnic cleansing is another serious offense that overlaps with the crime of genocide. Still there are many differences. The term ethnic cleansing appeared for the first time in April 1987 when Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic described the violence perpetrated by Kosovar Albanian commanders toward the Serbs (Blum et al. 1). Additionally, ethnic cleansing has not been codified as crime under international law like genocide (Quran). Another distinctive feature is that genocide uses cruel methods like mass killings, while ethnic cleansing forcibly deports or transfers the targeted group (Ariaratnam). Finally, the prominent genocide legal scholar William Schabas believes that ethnic cleansing can never be genocide. He defends his view by arguing that the intent of ethnic cleansing is to forcibly relocate the victimized group, while genocide is committed with the intention to destroy the targeted group (qtd. in Blum et al. 3). So, genocide and ethnic cleansing differ in their emergence, codification, acts that constitute them and the element of intent.

1.2.3. There is No Common Definition for “Genocide”

After the criticism the Genocide Convention received, scholars in the field began to provide their own definitions (Jones 18). In 1981, the sociologist, Leo Kuper, agreed with the definition of genocide put forward in the UN Convention. He claimed that such definition and its convention have a well established international status that would result in making some change (qtd. Jones 18). However, he pointed out to the exclusion of the political groups. He stated that many cases would have been condemned as genocide if political groups had been included

(qtd. in Jonassohn and Frank 10). Therefore, the list of protected groups of the Genocide Convention should be enlarged to include political groups to have a better definition.

In 1990, Frank Chalk, a professor of history, and Kurt Jonassohn, a professor of biology, defined genocide as “a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator” (qtd. in Rummel, “Genocide”). According to their definition, the perpetrator that is a government or other authority identifies the victimized group and intentionally destroys it. This makes genocide take the form of one-sided mass killing.

In 1993, sociologist Helen Fein, interpreted genocide as the planned action that a perpetrator uses to physically destroy a group directly. The perpetrator uses authority to prohibit biological and social reproduction of group members. The persecutor of genocide implements the plan regardless of whether the victimized group poses no threat or gives up (qtd. in Jones 18). This sociological view claims that genocide is an on-going plan that aims at eradicating the victimized group by prohibiting births within it.

In the following year, Israel W. Charny, a psychologist and genocide scholar, contended that “genocide in the generic sense is the mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the course of military forces of an avowed enemy, under conditions of the essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims” (qtd. in Andreopoulos 75). Genocide may occur in time of peace and result in the annihilation of large number of defenseless victims.

The political scientist, Rudolph Joseph Rummel, gives three definitions of genocide. The first one is the “legal” definition of the UN Genocide Convention. The second is the “common” definition that states that genocide is the intentional extermination of a particular group by the government because of its identity. This definition includes the political groups. While the third

definition that is the “general” definition which declares that genocide is any intentional killing of defenseless people by their government with or without regard to their group membership (“Genocide”). Therefore, Rummel defines genocide in three ways and in the same Kuper’s way, he hints to include the political groups.

All of these scholars agree on the element of intent in their definitions with the exception of Charny who focuses on the number of victims. Both scholars Kuper and Rummel include the political groups in their definitions. Finally, Fein and Rummel define genocide from a sociological view.

1.2.4. Types of Genocide

Lemkin offered three types of genocide. In the first type, he made the difference between genocide and other atrocities by the element of intent. In other words, a crime is considered genocide when its perpetrator has the intention to exterminate a specified group. The second type of genocide concerns the destruction of the targeted group’s culture without placing any physical harm upon them. The third type combines the two former ones in the sense that some victimized groups are to be annihilated immediately while others are to be ethnically assimilated within the dominant group (qtd. in Morton and Neil 48). Lemkin’s types focus on the intent of the perpetrator and the destruction of the victimized group from a cultural perspective.

Following Lemkin’s lead, Vahakn Dadrian, another sociologist and historian, proposed five types of genocide. The first type is the cultural genocide in which the perpetrator aims at assimilating the victimized group within its culture. The second one is the latent genocide which indicates that the destruction of a group is accidental and not planned. The third type of genocide is the retributive genocide that punishes a part of a minority who challenges a dominant group. The fourth type that is the utilitarian genocide uses force to take over economic resources. Lastly, the fifth type is the optimal genocide which implies the total elimination of the targeted group

like the Armenian case that will be discussed in the following chapter (qtd. in Jonassohan and Frank 9).

In 1979, Fein suggested two types of genocide. The first kind of genocide is intended to exterminate members of another faith. The annihilation of other tribes that refuse to be subjugated or assimilated is the other type of genocides (qtd. in Jonassohan and Frank 9). She believes that the victimized is exterminated either because he has a different faith or refuses to assimilate within the dominant group.

Leo Kuper, in 1985, presented two types of genocide. The first one that is the “domestic genocide” has four sub-categories; genocide against indigenous peoples; genocide against hostage groups; genocide that follows a decolonization; and genocide that results from conflicts between ethnic, racial, and religious groups, for instance, for power. The other type, he proposed, is the genocide that emerges due to an international conflict (qtd. in Morton and Neil 49).

Four categories of genocide were provided in 1990 by Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn. A genocide that is committed to eliminate an enemy. In addition, a genocide that aims at acquiring economic gains. Moreover, a genocide that aspires to terrify the victims. Finally, a genocide that resolves to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology (“A Typology of Genocide and...” 12). Chalk and Jonassohn classify genocide according to its aims.

1.3. Causes of Genocide

Like any phenomenon, genocide has causes and reasons that trigger it. Sociologist Ben Kiernan proclaims that genocide stems from “racism, religious, prejudices, revivalist cults of antiquity...and idealization of social classes” (qtd. in Bertaux). In addition, professor of Holocaust and genocide studies James Waller argues that nationalism is among the reasons that cause genocide (qtd. in Bertaux). The professor of psychology, Ervin Staub, states that genocide is the result of stereotyping and disrespecting other races (qtd. in Bertaux). The

three scholars view that the reasons of genocide are cultural.

When the economic or political situation is unstable, problems and conflicts would unfold. The weak group would be blamed for the difficult situation. Usually the killing group is led by a dictator who desires to implement genocidal plans. This works especially when the political bodies of the government share the same ethnicity while the targeted group is just a minority (McMorran and Norman). Similarly, the President of Carnegie Corporation, David A. Hamburg, explains that economic crisis provokes people to blame the “them” or the other group, and the tendency to eliminate the targeted group rises (qtd. in Maritz). Political instability or economic crisis pushes people to put the blame on the weak and therefore they become targets of genocide.

Another reason that causes genocide is war. Paul R. Bartrop, Martin Shaw and many other scholars view war as one of the main reasons that causes genocide. These two researchers assert that when a war takes place, it affects people. This effect is manifested by the high tendency people would acquire from war to kill others (qtd. in Maritz). War paves the way for genocide to be committed.

Social psychologist M. B. Brewer claims that in any society there is the dominant group and the undesired group that is treated as the other. Accordingly, discrimination and devaluation exist. Alongside difficult life conditions, resentment feelings would develop. The targeted group may face cultural devaluation, yet it is rare when the rest of the society would make an action to change the situation (qtd. in Staub 793). The reasons that lead to genocide are sociological. When the victimized group is discriminated and devaluated and life conditions become hard, genocide is on the road.

1.4. The Stanton Hypothesis: The Eight Stages of Genocide

Gregory H. Stanton who is a professor of genocide studies and prevention states that genocide is a process that develops in eight stages. These stages are predictable, not easy to

stop, and overlap but earlier stages must precede later ones. These stages are classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination, and denial (see Appendix B). Alongside each stage preventive measures are provided, yet he declares that the real solution for genocide is to practice justice fairly (“The 8 Stages of Genocide”).

This model was developed by Stanton in 1996. He would later add two more stages. The eight-stages model can be viewed as a road societies usually go through, in the case when genocide takes place in them. The model has been applied to many cases like that of Rwanda, Burma, Syria and so on. Yet, it cannot apply to all cases and predict the future (Pensky and Nadia).

1.5. Integrating the Crime of Genocide in US Foreign Policy

Based on a constitution and a bill of rights that pleaded freedom and individual liberties, human rights have always played an important role in US foreign policy (Cohen 2). At the time when the notion of forbidding genocide started to emerge, the USA played a significant role in advocating it (Lesko 19). The USA is a superpower that seemingly promotes its beliefs of respecting human rights and urges the rest of the world to follow its lead. One case of humanitarian concern is genocide.

The USA actively participated in the drafting process of the Genocide Convention. It supported codifying genocide as a crime under international law and adopting an international treaty that is the Genocide Convention. Its diplomats made significant contributions. They negotiated important compromises on debatable issues concerning the definition of genocide. They successfully defended including the article that urged the creation of a permanent international court that would try defendants of genocide. In addition, They were able to defend the role for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that concerns the matters of state responsibility for genocide (*Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity*). The

USA was one of the first countries that signed the Genocide Convention (Lesko 20).

The United States provided its own definition of genocide. It modified the definition by adding the adjective “specific” to “intent” and the adjective “substantial” to “part” (Quigley 19), genocide is:

(a) Basic Offense. Whoever, whether in time of peace or in time of war and with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such:

- (1) kills members of that group;
- (2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group;
- (3) causes the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of members of the group through drugs, torture, or similar techniques;
- (4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part;
- (5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; or
- (6) transfers by force children of the group to another group;

shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) (which denotes death punishment, life imprisonment, and/or a fine up to 1 000 000 \$) (“18 US Code § 1091–Genocide”).

Although the United states played an active role in the drafting process, it took long to ratify the Convention. In 1949, President Harry Truman transmitted the Genocide Convention to the US Senate for its advice and consent to ratify it. Yet, the ratification only took place in 1988 when President Ronald Reagan signed the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (Backes). One reason for such delay was the fear that the USA would be accused of genocide because of the controversial matter of Native Americans that will be discussed in the following chapter (“United States Ratification of the Genocide Convention”).

This chapter has identified the origins of the genocide as it dates back to the violent incidents the Bible recounts. It has also put forward many instances of genocide that occurred in prehistory such as that of the Mongols, those genocides against indigenous people and the like. Then, it has tackled the emergence of the term and the implementation of its convention. The chapter likewise has provided more definitions of genocides according to scholars in the field, types of genocide, and causes that lead to it. The current work has identified eight stages that genocide goes through.

As it is a focus of this work and a leading advocator of human rights, the United States played a major role in the drafting process of the Genocide Convention. However, the ratification of the Convention took forty years to be realized. Such delay entails the commitment of the USA to banning genocide and prioritizing humanitarian concerns.

With regard to the integration of the crime of genocide in US foreign policy, one may question how well is the USA ready to commit itself to its own claims. To answer such query, the following chapter will examine US response to three incidents of genocide. One out of these three cases took place on its own lands.

Endnotes

1. The Book of Genesis is the first book of the Bible. The word genesis literally means “in the beginning”. This Book was written by Moses about 1450-1410 BC. It recites how god created everything. In addition, it retells the birth of the Israeli nation and that they are God’s people. However the book ends by displaying God’s people as lost and looking for the promise land. (Smith, “Genesis”). *Bible Hub*. Online Parallel Bible Project, n.d. 22 May 2018.

2. The Book of Exodus was written by Moses around 1450-1410 BC. It talks about how Israelites were freed from slavery in Egypt and the laws that god has provided to follow when worshipping Him. (Smith, “Exodus”). *Bible Hub*. Online Parallel Bible Project, n.d. 22 May 2018.

3. The Book of Deuteronomy was written by Moses about 1407-1406 BC. The word means the Second Law. The Book is a reminder for Israelites to follow God’s commands of worshipping Him, loving Him, and the laws that regulate human relationships. As well as, disobeying God’s commands would be met by punishment (Smith, “Deuteronomy”). *Bible Hub*. Online Parallel Bible Project, n.d. 22 May 2018.

4. Punic Wars are three successive wars that took place from 264 BCE to 146 BCE. The conflicting countries were Rome and Carthage. The result of these wars was the total destruction of Carthage (“Punic Wars”). *Britannica Encyclopaedia*. Britannica Encyclopaedia, Inc, n.d. Web. 22 May 2018.

5. Taiping rebellion took place from 1850 to 1864. It was an uprising against the Qing Dynasty in China led by Hong Xiuguan who claimed to be a prophet. Therefore, the motive behind such a rebellion was religious rather than economic. This rebellion however failed (“Taiping Rebellion”). *History*. A&E Television Networks, n.d. Web. 22 May 2018.

6. Jus cogens is a latin word that refers to particular essential international laws which can never be overridden. To illustrate there are prohibition on the use of force, the Genocide

Convention, crimes against humanity (“Jus Cogens”). *Legal Information Institute*. Cornell Law School, n.d. Web. 22 May 2018.

Chapter Two

The Evolution of US Foreign Policy toward Genocide

The present chapter explores the evolution of US foreign policy toward genocide. It examines whether the USA lives up to its own principles of democracy or simply chooses what serves its own interests. This part shows how US responds to committed genocide by investigating three cases beginning with the debatable matter of Native Americans, then moving to the Armenian case, and ending with the Holodomor or the man-made famine of Ukraine of 1932-1933.

2.1. The Genocide of Native Americans

About 12000 years ago, 50 million people moved from Asia to what is now the United States and settled there. By 1492, Christopher Columbus reached the Caribbean and named its people “Indians” because he assumed that he had been sailing in the Indian Ocean (“Atrocities against Native Americans”). Ward Churchill who used to be a professor of ethnic studies at the University of Colorado stated that in 1500, there were twelve million North American Indians, but the number shrank by 1900 and barely 237000 Indians were left (qtd. in Lewy 77). One may raise the question of what happened to Native Americans.

David Stannard, a professor of American studies, claims that “Columbus personally murdered half a million Natives” (qtd. in “Genocide of Native Americans: A Sociological View”). After his return to the Caribbean in 1493, Christopher Columbus initiated his plan of enslaving the Natives and exterminating them. In a period of three years, five million Caribbean Tainos perished (“Genocide of Native Americans: A Sociological View”). Columbus was greedy and had the ability to dehumanize others because they simply belonged to a different culture (Eaglewoman 429). As the medieval historian Robert Lerner, stated the hero became a genocidal criminal (qtd. in Lewy 78).

This did not end with Columbus; European colonizers played a major factor in the decline of the population. European contact brought destruction to the indigenous people,

primarily through waves of disease, annihilation, military and colonialist expansionist policies (Brave Heart and Lemyra 2). In fact, the Spanish obliterated huge numbers of Natives (Hinton et al. 44). English puritans wanted to civilize and Christianize Indians. However, this meant the destruction of the Indian culture. The Pequot tribe refused to comply (Lewy 85). The Puritan settlers reacted by launching an extermination campaign (Jones 114).

European colonizers did not only massacre Indians, they also perpetrated them with diseases. According to the demographer Russell Thornton, disease was “without doubt . . . the single most important factor in American Indian population decline” (qtd. in Jones 114). The number of the population declined due to contagious diseases that the Natives had no immunity to. “Virgin spoil epidemics” is the spread of an epidemic disease among a population that had no former exposure to. Brenda Baker, a Bio-archaeologist, explained that it is assumed that 75% to 90% of all Indian deaths were the result of an epidemic disease (qtd. in Lewy 81). An important point Karen O. Kupperman, an American historian, mentions is that various diseases were delivered to Indians by Europeans, including measles, influenza, whooping cough, diphtheria, typhus, bubonic plague, cholera, scarlet fever and syphilis (qtd. in Lewy 81). Such diseases were not intentionally spread to Indians. But “smallpox” was inflicted in blankets that were given out to the Natives by an order from Sir Jeffrey Amherst, commander-in-chief of British forces in North America in 1763 (“Atrocities against Native Americans”; Jones 114).

Not only disease, but also massacres upon Native American tribes were a major cause in the decrease of the number of their population. According to Thornton, although direct slaughter was a secondary cause of demographic decline, it enormously decreased the size of some Indian tribes. As an illustration there is the Pequot War (1636–1637) (Jones 114). 20000 Yukis inhabited a territory in northern California. When California and other Mexican territories were seized in 1847, the Yuki fell under US control. The following year, the

California Gold Rush began. The number decreased to about 3500 in 1854, and 168 by 1880 (115).

Forced relocations took the form of genocidal death walks. For instance, there are the “Trails of Tears” of the Cherokee nation and the “Long Walk” of the Navajo. These death walks executed between 20 % and 40 % of the deportees. Those who survived these marches reached “tribal reservations” in which they died out of malnutrition and disease (Jones 117). Another well-recognized massacre is the Wounded Knee (“Wounded Knee”). In 1890, a huge uprising took place in Wounded Knee that is located in the Lakota Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. The reason was that federal officials tried to arrest Chief Sitting Bull. They ended up killing him. A serious skirmish between US government officials and Natives occurred and resulted in the death of hundreds of Natives and 25 US soldiers (“Atrocities against Native Americans”).

Several acts were enacted to seize the lands of the Natives in favor of white settlement. The Dawes Allotment Act of 1887 reduced the tribal lands, divided them into individual allotments and the rest was open for white settlement (Brave Heart and Lemyra 3). The Dawes Allotment Act condensed federally recognized Natives’ lands by about 90000000 acres (Madley 99). Subsequent assimilationist policies included the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act (Brave Heart and Lemyra 3), and in 1940 another act that officially recognized them was the Nationality Act. Many states like New Mexico and Arizona rejected to allow Indians to vote (Ojibwa). Other assimilationist policies that took place were the termination policy and the Voluntary Relocation Program of the 1950s (Brave Heart and Lemyra 3).

The question whether genocide took place or not is quite controversial. American studies scholar David Stannard debated that Europeans initiated genocidal acts once they set their feet on the Natives’ lands. Historian Richard White replied that the committed acts

targeted particular Indian tribes. Similarly, Russell Thornton pointed out that the natural circle of life of births and deaths would enlarge or diminish the population size (qtd. in Madley 105). A conclusion has not yet been drawn.

2.1.1. US (non-)Recognition of Native Americans' Genocide

American Indians view the United States as the culprit of their holocaust (Brave Heart and Lemyra 4). The newly established United States needed lands for white settlement. The first president, George Washington, began the process of depriving the Natives of their lands (Eaglewoman 432). President Thomas Jefferson did likewise. He continued the confiscation of Indian lands in order to pave the way for his agricultural plan (433). President Andrew Jackson also seized the lands of the Natives. He was known for killing Indians (434). Another president who followed the lead of his ancestors was Theodore Roosevelt. He enacted assimilationist policies that broke Indian family ties by taking away their children into Boarding schools. Like his precedents, he took the lands of the Natives (436). The US government prioritized whites over the Natives. It made life very difficult for them by depriving them of their lands. As family is the core element of Indian life and culture, depriving them of their children meant their destruction.

Differing views of whether the USA should be condemned for genocide or not exist. Some scholars claim that to convict this country of genocide, a federal government policy to physically destroy all (or most) Indians should have existed first. Whereas opponents state that there was not a systematic commitment by the USA to annihilate the Natives. US policymakers, in exchange for civilization, demanded the confiscation of the Natives' lands. This does not mean they would not approve physical annihilation. For instance, in 1790 Secretary of War Henry Knox ordered US army to destroy the Indian Confederacy because it rejected the demand of the USA to cede their lands. Another example is when President Thomas Jefferson faced the same situation; he stated that he would opt for extermination

(Ostler).

Native Americans would receive some federal recognition. In 1984, President Reagan approved the Genocide Convention and ratified it in 1988. The reason behind such action was that scholars had begun to use the term “genocide” to describe what had happened to the Natives (Madley 104). In 1989 and 1990, the Congress passed the National Museum of the American Indian Act and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act. These acts dictated that federally funded organizations protect Native American gravesites and give back human remains and objects taken from Native Americans (102). By 1994, six US senators and a congresswoman introduced “A joint resolution to acknowledge a long history of official depredations and ill-conceived policies by the United States government regarding Indian tribes and offer an apology to all Native Peoples on behalf of the United States” (102-103). Their resolution was not approved until President Barack Obama signed it in 2009, but it does not recognize the acts perpetrated against the Indians as genocide (103).

2.2. The Armenian Genocide

From the first millennium BC Armenians lived in a mountainous plateau in Asia Minor (Adalian 60). They were the first to recognize Christianity in 301 AD (Charny 63). They had a strong nation that fought many invaders. Turks were the only ones to make permanent settlement. The Ottoman Empire had a hierarchical social system that treated non-Muslims as second-class subjects. Armenians had a decent life (Adalian 61).

Like any empire, the Ottoman Empire came to its downfall. A new political party came into power in the belief it would revive the empire. This party was labeled the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) or shortly Unionists. Its leaders were Ismail Enver Pasha, the Minister of War, Mehmed Talaat Pasha, the Grand Vizier (prime minister) and Minister of the Interior, and Ahmed Jemal Pasha, the Minister of the Navy. They were known as the Young Turks (Adalian 53-54). In 1908, they revolted against the sultan and demanded the reinstatement of

the 1876 constitution and restraint of the powers of the sultan. In July 1908 their demands were granted (Murray 52-54). Thus, the sultan of that time reigned but did not rule. Later in 1913, the sultan was totally overthrown due to the outcome of the Balkan Wars¹ that is the loss of 60% of the territories of the Ottoman Empire (55). As a consequence, the Young Turks took charge.

By 1914, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turks feared that Russia would try to seize two provinces, Erzerum and Van, which shared borders with it on the basis that Turkish Armenians would side with Russian Armenians out of ethnic sentiments. Once war broke out Turkish Armenians sided with their fellows in Russia, not only that but also the secret alliance the Turkish state made with Germany was revealed (Murray 56-57). The Young Turks simultaneously formed an organization called *Teskilati Mahsusa*, or the Special Organization as stated by Adalian (63), that executed their orders to plan and carry out the Armenian genocide (Frey 79).

At the beginning of the war, no policies were enacted that targeted specifically Armenians. When the Turkish army was enormously defeated by the Russians, the Young Turks shifted their policies toward the Armenians. Atrocities against Armenians occurred on April 17, 1915 and resulted in the death of 10000 Armenians according to Bloxham, a professor of modern history (qtd. in Murray 57-58). On April 24, 1915, the symbolic date of the beginning of the genocide, many of Armenian cultural leaders, political leaders, and intellectuals were arrested (Adalian 57).

The triumvirate came up with a three-part plan: deportation, starvation, and execution to solve the Armenian matter. Their plan was elaborated for many reasons, one of which is the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the increasing demographic and economic pressure upon non-Muslims. Young Turks viewed Armenians as traitors because they sought aid from European countries. The government opted for violence to suppress internal matters, especially

those who had to do with non-Muslim minorities, to cover up for military weakness. Armenians formed political organizations that sought emancipation but when massacres began they lost hope. Muslims resented Armenians because of the rapid modernization they experienced. They were more open to European concepts of progress through education than the rest (Adalian 55-57). Last but not least, the Young Turks were paranoid because they feared that a small group, like they used to be, would overthrow them and seize power (Bloxham and Goçek 358).

The plan was premeditated and carried out systematically. It targeted the Armenian nation as a whole whether its people were combatants or civilians, old or young, male or female. In her book *Genocide and International Justice*, Frey states:

First, Armenians serving in the ottoman army were separated from their units and murdered in batches. Next, Armenian households were disarmed and weapons confiscated. Third, schools were closed and such community leaders as teachers and priests were arrested. Fourth, Armenian civilians in the towns were summoned by town criers to central locations for assembly. There they were told that they had between a day and a week to gather clothes for their deportation and to sell the rest of their possessions. When the deportation caravans were formed the adult and adolescent males were separated from the women and children. (80)

The deportees were not allowed to drink. They were robbed of their properties, food, and clothes. They were killed by criminals released from prison. Eventually at their arrival, the deportees were sent to concentration camps where they died out of epidemic diseases (Frey 80).

In 1919, a new Turkish government was formed and accused the Young Turks regime. This led to the establishment of special courts-martial. Consequently, 400 CUP officials were

arrested and their charges ranged from unconstitutional seizure of power, overthrow of the government, to planning to annihilate Armenians under the cover of war. Most of the CUP officials who were guilty of the Armenian mass killings escaped justice. The three Pashas were sentenced to death in absentia. Many others joined a nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In 1922 the last Armenian community in Anatolia (Asia Minor) perished and the nationalist forces continued the atrocities. In 1923, Turkey was declared a republic and denied that genocide took place (Charny 72-73). The death toll of the Armenian genocide is quite high. It is estimated that over one million and a half Armenians died (Adalian 69).

History is quite controversial in the sense that different versions of the same historical events exist. These massacres are going to be presented from the viewpoint of the Ottoman regime. The plan that was executed was for the sake of protecting Armenians. Orders issued by Talaat Pasha were directed to protect and not massacre (Henham and Behrens 22).

Guenter Lewy, a political scientist, stated that the large loss of Armenian lives does not necessarily mean that the Turkish state had planned to annihilate them. The death toll, that is high, of Turkish civilians, soldiers, and British prisoners of war are an example of how a high death toll would take place without the element of intent. The Young Turks would be criticized for their corruption and misrule as well as the carelessness they showed toward their own population during WWI (25-26). In the case of Armenians, the high death toll was not intentionally planned and it had been a result of difficult circumstances.

Many uprisings like those that took place in Van, Zeytun, and Bitlis resulted in the death of many Muslims (Henham and Behrens 22). The Van uprising is viewed by Armenians as a defensive action to prevent the deportation process. Whereas Turkish authors believe that the rebellion was designed and timed to facilitate Russian advance. When the uprising ended, the Turks had been defeated and Muslims of Anatolia were forced to leave due to the advance

of the Russian army that received help from Armenians (Lewy 118). The Muslim population became very aggressive toward the Armenians and the Ottoman Empire charged them of treason (128).

Many archives contain orders and warnings issued by the Young Turks regime to protect and take care of Armenians. The Key Government Decree insisted on the comfort, protection of life and property, the availability of food and shelter, and the financial situation of the deported Armenians. It also emphasized that the deportation should be executed in a manner that would maintain peace between the two peoples. Talaat Pasha issued an instruction dated June 1915 to make use of every possible precaution to safely deport Armenians. In July 1915 Talaat Pasha issued a second instruction that insisted on protecting the lives of deportees (Henham and Behrens 22).

Another view about the deportation is that the relocation sites in Iraq and Syria, at the time, were part of the Ottoman Empire. So, technically, it is wrong to speak of deportations but rather of forcible transfer. The Mass Relocation Act did not aim to harming Armenians in any way or was specific to Armenians. The relocation can be justified by referring to the security of the state (Henham and Behrens 25).

2.2.1. US Stand toward the Armenian Genocide

Many Armenians were saved due to American missionaries and diplomats. Henry Morgenthau, an American ambassador, stationed in Constantinople, was the one who publicized the Armenian cause back in the United States (Adalian 69). A charity organization, Near East Relief, was founded. It established over 400 orphanages, refugee centers, hospitals, clinics, and vocational schools (Armenian National Committee of America/ West Region).

During the Armenian genocide, the United States had more opportunities to intervene than any other nation. Yet it considered humanitarian concerns as a secondary matter. Secretary of state Robert Lansing listed the practical considerations to the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee. First, the United States did not have military force on the eastern front. Second declaring war on Turkey would endanger American missionary and educational interests. The Congress likewise was reluctant to get America involved in foreign lands. As a result, no military intervention took place (Chapman 1-2).

Economically speaking, US private businesses wanted to maintain good relations with the Turkish state. As the USA is based on individualism and with respect to the Armenian situation, both US government and its trade enterprises chose to ignore what was happening within the Ottoman state (Payaslian 7). Turkey is considered an important economic partner, which in 2016 the USA was its fourth partner in terms of imports, and the fifth in terms of exports (“Turkey”).

For geopolitical and economic reasons, the USA goes hand in hand with Turkey in denying the Armenian genocide. Most US political leaders recognize the Armenian massacres only before they hold administrative offices, which is the case of candidates running for presidential offices like George W. Bush and Barack Obama. As for the US president at the time of the Armenian genocide, Woodrow Wilson did not intervene to stop it. He was reluctant to make any move because he wanted to be reelected (Zarifian 75-95).

The Congress received many resolutions to recognize the Armenian genocide but none was admitted because the executive branch refused to pass them. It feared that if the USA condemned other countries for genocide, they would do the same with regard to the indigenous people’s matter. US officials claim that recognizing the Armenian genocide would affect the reconciliation process between Turkey and Armenia and it would not serve the Armenian interests. Last but not least, Turkish officials would threaten Armenia with sanctions if the USA acknowledged the genocide (Zarifian 75-95). The USA did not recognize the Armenian case and prioritized its own interests.

2.3. The Holodomor: The Famine-Genocide of Ukraine

Makuch and Markus, professors of law, stated that the term “Holodomor” derives

from “moryty holodom” which means to kill by means of starvation (qtd. in Stark 23). This was the third step of Stalin’s “five year plan”. Ukraine that is located in the southeastern part of the USSR and inhabited by 30 million people (Lemkin), witnessed in 1932-1933 “moryty holodom” under the regime of Stalin for his policy of “collectivization” (Stark 23). The Holodomor resulted in the death of five million Ukrainians (29). The rate of deaths reached its peak as 25000 Ukrainians were dying every day (Alekseyenko et al.; Stark 26). What is more is that children constituted more than one-third of the estimated death toll of this famine (Stark 29).

Why did the famine take place? Firstly, it occurred because of the unproductive collectivization policy that Stalin implemented to speed up industrialization. Ukrainians suffered a lot. They were required to reach unrealistic quotas by the Central Committee. They were also left with barely anything to eat. Millions were deported or executed. The rest were forbidden to leave the villages, consequently they died out of starvation. Another reason that is out of human control was the drought of the early 1930s (Cheng 212). Besides, Ukraine at that time was independent and its people were so patriotic. For this reason, Communist leaders feared that their goal of spreading Communism would be endangered and worked to sovietize Ukrainians (Lemkin). Ukraine was considered the “bread basket” of the USSR because it produced more than one-fourth of Soviet agricultural output (Alekseyenko et al.). Ukraine provided grain, considerable amounts of vegetables, meat and milk to other Soviet regions (Stark 24). The USSR could not afford to lose Ukraine.

In 1929, Stalin aimed at speeding up the process of industrialization and spreading Communism. He implemented dekulakization and collectivization (Stark 24). Dekulakization means the liquidation or the elimination of Kulaks (middle-class and private farm peasants) (28). While, Collectivization is a policy adopted by the Soviet regime that transformed private farms into Kolkhoz (large farms ran by the government) (“Collectivization: Agricultural Policy”).

Such policies resulted in the death of one and a half to two million kulaks who were systematically murdered by firing troops or deported to Siberian concentration camps (Kuryliw). Resistance broke out. Peasants slayed their livestock, sold stock and machinery, and worked with low motivation (Stark 24).

Several measures were taken to ensure the success of the process of collectivization. High quotas were imposed. In 1932, Stalin raised grain procurement quotas by 44 %. Consequently, the peasants barely had anything to feed themselves with (“Ukrainian Famine”). Any resistance was met with brutal force. The Central Committee stationed 25000 communists who were accompanied by armed troops (Stark 24). Then, Stalin issued an order to seize all the grain if the quotas were not met. A new law in August 1932 was enacted. It was labeled “five ears of corn law” which imposed death penalty or 10 years imprisonment if a peasant caught having any tiny amount of grain. The following year, the borders of Ukraine were sealed to make sure that starving Ukrainian peasants would not flee the country in search for food (Alekseyenko et al.). Even at the local level, it was forbidden to travel from one village to another. Many Ukrainian villages were put on a “black list”, leaving their inhabitants starve and eventually die, because they afforded to get some grain (Kuryliw).

What can be noticed is that though Ukrainians were dying out of starvation every day during 1932-1933, they received no help from other countries. One might ask the question why? The answer is that the Communist Soviet regime hid the famine. In her article “How Stalin Hid Ukraine’s Famine from the World”, the Pulitzer-Prize winning historian Anne Applebaum shows how the press played a significant role in covering up the famine. Within the Soviet regime, the famine matter was not mentioned at all. The Soviet regime repressed the Western press by censoring the use of the word “famine” and be replaced by the following phrases only that are acute food shortage, food stringency, food deficit, diseases due to malnutrition (Applebaum).

The Pulitzer-prize winner Walter Duranty sided with the Soviet in its cover up of the famine. He was the Moscow correspondent of the *New York Times*. He concealed what was happening for the sake of money, fame, and meeting Stalin. He published many works which distorted what was actually happening (Sally). Yet a young Welshman named Gareth Jones managed to obtain permission to visit Ukraine. After his journey throughout the country, he became aware that a famine spread out in Ukraine. Consequently, on March 30, 1933 he held a press conference in Berlin in which he revealed that a major famine was taking place. Jones was a novice journalist in comparison to Duranty who was famous, and had high rates of readability and credibility. Alongside US recognition of Russia, the cover up was successful (Applebaum).

The 1932-33 famine was officially acknowledged in Ukraine only in December 1987, on the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the Ukrainian Republic. Since then, many concealed documents were disclosed. These documents helped to analyze and better understand the reasons, the role of the Soviet regime, and the results of the famine (Werth).

As any case of large-scale crimes, historians differ in whether the tragic events constitute genocide or not. The Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko, with support of Ukrainian nationalists and a number of scholars have argued that the Ukrainian famine should be acknowledged as genocide (Stark 21). Some historians argue that the famine was artificially organized and planned since 1930 by Stalin's regime. It aimed at breaking the specifically strong resistance of the peasants to the collectivization policy. It aimed at eradicating Ukrainians as a national group because they were a serious threat to his goal of Sovietizing the USSR (Werth). This view is held by Raphael Lemkin (Lemkin; Stark 28). By the end of 1990s the Holodomor was described by a majority of Ukrainian scholars as a crime of genocide against their people (Antonovych 332). It was not only Ukrainians who condemned the famine as genocide, but some Russian scholars did, too. A Russian professor

named Viktor Kondrashin acknowledged the famine as genocide (“The Holodomor of 1932-1933...”).

There are historians who do not condemn the famine as genocide. They believe that it did not only unfold in Ukraine but rather it swept the USSR as a whole (Werth). They claim that the famine was due to the drought of the early 1930s (Cheng 212). Another argument brought to the floor by these historians is that the collectivization policy did not target particularly the Kulaks; it was just an economic policy that was designed to speed up the industrialization process (Werth; Lemkin). The majority of Russian historians hold such a view. They contend that there is no decree issued by the Soviet government or the Central Committee that gave an order to eliminate Ukrainians by hunger (Stark 27; Antonovych 340). They also believe that the death toll of the famine is exaggerated (Antonovych 341). Similarly, the Russian government agrees that a famine unfolded in Ukraine, but denies the Holodomor (Johnson). In the belief that the Holodomor means that Stalin’s policy targeted the Kulaks specifically to obliterate them, while the famine was a general peasant crisis that was caused by Stalin’s policy (“The Holodomor of 1932-1933...”).

2.3.1. Does the USA Recognize the Holodomor?

The US government knew about the famine from the beginning but it hid the information and made no reaction. Likewise, individuals from American press participated in the cover up (Commission on the Ukrainian Famine 151). Such a response was undertaken by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s desire to establish and maintain good relations with the USSR. He anticipated that acknowledging the Soviet Union would serve US strategic interests by limiting Japanese expansionism in Asia. He hoped that full diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union would serve American trade interests there to aid the USA overcome the effects of the Great Depression (“Recognition of the Soviet Union, 1933”). Long before diplomatic relations were established with the USSR, the USA received many reports that manifested the difficult situation

in the Soviet Union. It even received letters from starving Ukrainians to which it replied with the claim that what was happening in the Soviet Union was just difficult circumstances (Commission on the Ukrainian Famine 181).

The USA became more active toward the Ukrainian matter. It established the US Commission on the Ukraine Famine on December 13, 1985. This commission aimed at uncovering the role of the Soviet regime in the Holodomor or “dearth by hunger” to the American public by conducting a study about the famine. Its findings were delivered to the US Congress on April 22, 1988 (“Findings of the US Commission”). One of the findings states, “Joseph Stalin and those around him committed genocide against Ukrainians in 1932-1933”. Although this statement condemned the famine as genocide, it did not have the legal weight of congressional resolutions to be passed and approved (“Reference, Government Reports...”).

Four resolutions were passed to recognize the famine as genocide by both Houses. The first resolution was passed in the House of Representatives on 2003 “Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the man-made famine that occurred in Ukraine in 1932–1933” (H. RES. 356 [108th]). The second one was introduced by the Senate “a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the genocidal Ukraine Famine of 1932-1933” (S. RES. 202 [108th]) but did not pass. The third resolution (H. RES.1314 [110th]) was passed in the House of Representatives in 2008 (H. RES.1314 [110th]), which refers to US commission findings and portrays the genocidal nature of the famine (“Reference, Government Reports...”). None of these resolutions was approved by the Congress. Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States, Valeriy Chaly announced that the draft resolution dedicated to the 85th anniversary of the Holodomor-Genocide in Ukraine was presented in the US Congress on November 7, 2017. He believed that the resolution would take several months and hopefully in 2018, a vote in the Congress would take place (“US

Congress Presents Draft...”). The USA has not yet officially acknowledged the man-made famine of Ukraine as genocide.

All the presidents who ruled the USA from its establishment until the presidency of Ronald Reagan showed no interest in preserving the life of the Natives. They all sought to seize the lands in favor of white settlement. Even the assimilationist policies that were implemented to help Indians assimilate within the American society caused more damage to the Natives’ life style. Using force against Indians was not that difficult choice to opt for. This is clear if President Thomas Jefferson is taken as an example. Moving to a more recent time, President Barack Obama signed an apology that addresses the trajectories that were committed against the Natives. But it does not acknowledge what happened as genocide. In addition, many resolutions were presented at the Congress yet they were disapproved. Therefore, the United States does not recognize the atrocities committed against the Natives as genocide.

On the basis of what has been presented on the case of Armenians, US stand is quite clear. The United States sided with Turkey in denying the Armenian genocide. It placed economic and political gains over humanitarian concerns. Despite the fact that when genocide was taking place American citizens made lots of efforts to help the Armenians, the USA as a government did nothing and it continues to do so.

The third case that has been discussed in this work is the Ukrainian man-made famine in which the perpetrator is the US rival that is Russia. Although the USA knew about the man-made famine from the beginning but it concealed it and commented on what was happening as a difficult situation. The United States placed its own political and economic interests at the top of the list. Some efforts were made by the USA with regard to the Ukrainian case but they barely amounted to make any effect.

Overall, the USA has not recognized any of the three cases. It chose such stand to

preserve good relations with the countries where it had economic and political interests. The following chapter will deal thoroughly with another case of genocide. Alongside this case, US response will be inspected as well. Whether the USA would again side with what serves its own interests or take the lead and halt such instances from taking place once more.

Endnotes

1. The Balkan Wars are two consecutive military wars. The first Balkan War took place on 8 October 1912. The states of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia formed the league of Balkans. The latter with Russian support fought the Ottoman Empire to take Macedonia. The result was in favor of the Balkan league because under a peace treaty that was signed in London on May 30, 1913, the Ottoman Empire lost almost all of its remaining European territory, including all of Macedonia and Albania. Albania got its independence and Macedonia was to be divided among the Balkan allies. The reason of the second Balkan War, that began on the night of 29/30 June 1913, was the division of Macedonia. Serbia and Greece formed an alliance and fought against Bulgaria. The result was the defeat of Bulgaria and a peace treaty was signed on August 10, 1913. Under this peace treaty, most of Macedonia was divided between Greece and Serbia. While Bulgaria was granted a small part ("Balkan Wars"). *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc, n.d. Web. 19 Apr. 2018. The casualties of these wars were high. The Bulgarians lost around 65000 men, the Greeks 9500, the Montenegrins 3000, and the Serbs at least 36000. The Ottomans lost about 125000 soldiers (Hall, Richard C). "Balkan Wars 1912-1913." *1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War*. Freie Universität Berlin, 8 Oct. 2014. Web. 19 Apr. 2018.

Chapter Three

US Stand toward the Bosnian Genocide

As the previous chapter examined US response toward three cases of genocide in which it chose not to respond to any of them, the current part deals with another instance of genocide that took place after the USA had ratified the Genocide Convention. It is the Bosnian case which, in a detailed way, will help draw a picture on why the US decided to shift from non intervention to intervention.

One may question why of all genocide cases the Bosnian one is chosen as a case study? The answer to such inquiry lies primarily in the different course the US response took. Moreover, the history of Bosnia is quite interesting and complex. The current work begins with a historical background about the conflict that swept Bosnia until it ended with crimes that amounted to be considered genocidal. This work ends with the response of the United States toward this case.

3.1. The Bosnian Conflict (1992-1995)

In 1992 the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence from the former state of Yugoslavia (Mennecke and Eric 415-416). Bosnia was made up of many ethnicities. The population was composed of about 40 % of Muslims, 33% Serbs and 12 % Croats. These three ethnic groups used their armed forces against each other and killed, raped and destroyed the villages and cities. Alongside them, there were some armed forces from Croatia and Serbia, UN troops, and NATO soldiers (416). According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the end result of such conflict was the death of 200000 people among whom 12000 were children (qtd. in “Statement by H. E. Dr. Haris...”). The Bosnian conflict of 1992-1995 began because Bosnia got its independence from Yugoslavia. The estimated-death toll may seem small in comparison to the cases that have been tackled in the former chapter, yet the fact that innocent lives had perished is worth investigation.

In February 1992, a referendum for independence took place. Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Bosnian Croats were in favor of independence. However, the Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote (“The Bosnia Crisis: Serbs, Croats...”). Bosnian Serbs who were supported by Serbia and Montenegro attempted to divide the republic among the ethnic groups, by the use of force, and unite with the other Serbs who constituted a majority in the Bosnian cities to form a “Greater Serbia” (“Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina”). This idea of creating a “Greater Serbia” or having an ethnically pure Serbian state was promoted by the former president of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic (“Obituary: Slobodan Milosevic”). The ethnic group that offered resistance to the independence of Bosnia was the Serbian in the belief that its independence from Yugoslavia would affect their plan of establishing a “Greater Serbia.” President Milosevic aimed at expanding the Serbian territories by using the Serbs who lived in the neighboring Bosnia.

Soon after the vote for independence, the capital city of Bosnia, Sarajevo, was under siege until the war was over by the end of 1995 (Mennecke and Eric 416-417). Serb forces, led by the two generals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, were unable to capture the city. Hence, they surrounded it from its mountains. The Serb forces intentionally killed Sarajevo citizens. The estimated death toll is 10000 people including thousands of children (“Veterans: The Siege of Sarajevo”).

Bosniaks and Croats living under the Sarajevo siege suffered from the lack of essential life requirements such as food, water, and electricity (Demick). Bosniaks and Croats remained alive because they managed to construct a tunnel which connected them with an airport that was controlled by the UN and the Bosnian held-areas (“Veterans: The Siege of Sarajevo”). On the mountains of Sarajevo, Serb forces, specifically snipers, shot any non-Serb. Not only the people of the city were attacked but many parts of the city and its monuments were destroyed as well (Mennecke and Eric 417). Life under the siege was very difficult, neither the city nor its people

were spared.

The situation was getting worse for the Bosniaks and Croats as the Serb forces were determined to cleanse Bosnia of non-Serbs. Serb forces managed to seize 70% of Bosnia's territories ("Chronology: What Happened during the War in Bosnia?"). They used brutal methods to accomplish their aim of ethnically purifying Bosnia. They burned or bombed houses after forcibly deporting their owners, and stripping them of all their money and valuables, in order to ensure that non-serbs find no home to go back to (Greenberg and Margaret 46). They specifically targeted non-Serb intellectuals or political leaders. Serb paramilitary units attacked cities, like Bijeljina and Zvornik, that were at the border between Serbia and Bosnia. The UN Commission of experts declared that trucks were used to carry dead bodies and dump them in hidden sites in Zvornik (qtd. in Mennecke and Eric 417). This campaign of "ethnic cleansing", according to ICRC, forced 2200000 people to leave their country (qtd. in "Statement by H. E. Dr. Haris..."). Serb forces aspired to ethnically cleanse Bosnia of non-Serbs using destructive methods so that Bosniaks and Croats leave the country permanently.

3.1.1. Establishment of Concentration Camps: The Ideal Spot for Ethnic Cleansing

More horrifying images of the "ethnic cleansing" campaign resides with detention camps. The most memorable detention camp is the Omarska that is located in Prijedor city ("Bosnia 1992: The Omarska Camp"). The latter contains at least other three concentration camps, each of them had its own function. Alongside the Omarska camp there were Keraterm, Trnopolje, and Manjaca. The Omarska and Keraterm camps worked as centers of torture and murder. While the function of Trnopolje camp was to detain women, children, and old men with the intention of being deported. The detainees there got raped and killed. Last but not least, the Manjaca camp was supposed to detain prisoners of war but most of the time it imprisoned citizens ("Remembering Concentration Camps..."). Serb forces used firearms,

knives, steel rods, electric cables, and batons to kill the non-Serbs (Basic 4). These killing centers ended the life of over 3200 Bosniaks and Croats (“Bosnia 1992: The Omarska Camp”) among which more than 200 women and 100 children perished as well (Basic 2). Serb forces showed no hesitation to use cruel methods to accomplish their goal. These four concentration camps are just an example among many others used by the Serbs in the conflict period.

Rape was another mechanism deployed by the Serbs to carry out their plan. Allen G. Johnson, an American researcher in sociology and gender studies, proclaimed that President Milosevic used three forms of rape. First, militias entered a non-Serb village and raped women publicly in order to terrify the rest. Then official Serb soldiers would offer a safe passage for the non-serbs only if they promised to never return. Second, Serb forces forcibly relocated non-Serb women to concentration camps where they got raped and usually killed after the barbaric act. Third, Serb forces imprisoned women and kept raping them until they got pregnant (qtd. in Kepkay 73). The Serb forces systematically and specifically raped women to humiliate and destroy the non-Serb societies. Many women testified that they were raped in front of their male family members to increase humiliation (Crider 21). According to the United Nations, around 20000 to 50000 women were raped (qtd. in Mikulic).

3.1.2. The UN Involvement to Stop the Massacre: A Serbian Fall on Deaf Ears

In an attempt to halt the atrocities committed by the Serbs against Bosnian Muslims and Croats, the UN imposed economic sanctions on Serbia. These sanctions included a severe trade embargo, no flights from or to Serbia, and freezing Serbia’s foreign bank accounts (“UN Lifts Sanctions against Former Yugoslavia”). It established no-fly zone over Bosnia (Greenberg and Margaret 37). More efforts were made as the Vance-Owen plan was presented in January 1993. It aimed to divide Bosnia into 10 provinces, however, it failed because Bosnian Serbs rejected the UN proposal (Price 58). During the same year, the UN Security Council declared Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Zepa to be “safe

areas". The responsibility to protect the people living in these areas was assumed by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although these six cities were supposed to be safe, they were under constant attacks by Bosnian Serbs (Young 799). The efforts made by the UN could not put an end to the Serb attacks.

By 1994 the situation started to change. NATO declared that it would respond by an air strike if Bosnian Serb forces would not withdraw their armory from the safe areas. Such an announcement came as a reaction to the Bosnian Serb attack in Sarajevo marketplace that ended the life of 68 people (Collier and Nicholas 194). In March of that year, the USA intervened to end the Bosniak-Croat war in which it succeeded by establishing the Muslim-Croat federation ("Chronology-What Happened during the War in Bosnia"). The newly established federation and the Serbs were asked to approve a new plan that was the Contact Group plan. The latter was developed by the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany which would grant 49 % of Bosnia's territory to the Serbs and the remaining 51% to the federation. However, President Milosovic rejected it because he sought to obtain more lands and a recognition of a Bosnian Serb government to take place (Sudetic). The collaboration of the superpowers with UN support somehow decreased the tensions and hostilities between the conflicting sides.

3.1.3. The Srebrenica Massacre

In July 1995 the UN safe area, Srebrenica, became the most recognizable atrocity in Europe since the 1940s. At that time, the Serb forces attacked as the defense forces of the city were removed. They separated women and children from men and in a period of a few days, the Serb forces killed around 8000 people. The massacre of Srebrenica was carried out under the authority of the two Bosnian Serb Generals Radislav Krstić and Ratko Mladić, and the Serb political leader Radovan Karadžić (Gibbs 2). The mass killings that took place in this city were

executed against defenseless people and not during a battle. The UN protection forces that were stationed there changed their objective of protecting the people of the city to protecting themselves (H. RES. 161 [114th]).

3.1.4. The US Visible Intervention in Bosnia

The United States and its allies intervened militarily in August 1995. The Croatian forces were able to defeat the Serbs until they reached western Bosnia where they joined with the Muslim forces. From August to October 1995 the Muslim-Croat forces could conquer Serb forces and regain the territories they lost previously in the war. The United States and other NATO nations aided the Muslim-Croat forces by undertaking two weeks of air strikes against the Serbs. After the military intervention, the United States managed to get the three conflicting sides to sign the Dayton Accords of December 1995 which ended the war (Gibbs 11). At last the Bosnian conflict came to its end when the international community, under the leadership of the USA, decided to implement the necessary concrete actions.

The Dayton Peace Accords took 21 days of negotiations at an American Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio, between the three Bosnian leaders to be approved. The agreement was officially signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. It contained a peace agreement and 11 annexes. The most important outcome of this agreement was that the state of Bosnia would exist as a single nation but divided. 51% of the territory went to the Muslim-Croat Federation with Sarajevo under its control, and 49% to the “Bosnian Serb Republic” (Erlanger).

3.2. Condemning the Criminals

The former president of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic was tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) of 66 counts for the crimes that were executed in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. Since the focus of this work is Bosnia, only the charges that concern Bosnia are to be presented. He was charged of 29 counts which involved 2 counts for genocide, 10 counts of crimes against humanity, 8 counts for grave breaches of the Geneva

Conventions, and 9 counts for Violations of the laws or customs of war (“Charges Faced by Milosevic”). On March 11, 2006 Milosevic was found dead in his cell in the detention centre at the Hague, the Netherlands (“Chronology-What Happened during the War in Bosnia”). The plan of Milosevic with the assistance of Bosnian Serbs to ethnically purify Bosnia was a failure and ended up by convicting him of large scale crimes especially the crime of genocide. His death meant that the case was dismissed.

Another notorious figure in the Bosnian conflict is the former general Radovan Mladic who was convicted of 11 counts. They included genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. He was charged of committing genocide in Srebrenica, besieging Sarajevo, forcibly transferring the non-Serbs and the list goes on. His trial required 530 trial days, around 600 witnesses and about 10000 proofs on his acts (Gadzo). Eventually, the ICTY found him guilty and sentenced him a life imprisonment (Masters). Under the authority of Milosevic and in the name of creating a “Greater Serbia”, Mladic committed many atrocities against the non-Serbs. Though it took long but justice found its way.

Radovan Karadzic, another former general, was charged for the first time in July 1995. After that he managed to keep hiding from the international justice for 13 years. But on July 21, 2008 he was arrested in Belgrade and then transferred to The Hague in ten days (“Radovan Karadzic Judgement...”). He was accused of 2 counts of genocide, 5 counts of crimes against humanity, 4 counts of violations of the laws or customs of war. On March 24, 2016 he was sentenced 40 years imprisonment (“Radovan Karadzic Case...”).

Condemning criminals by life imprisonment or sentencing them 40 years seems like some justice had been practiced. But that does not change the fact that thousands of people perished, women became widows, children became orphans and ultimately a whole nation was destroyed. The aim of imprisoning perpetrators whether of genocide or any other crime could help prevent future atrocities. However, the UN and the organizations that deal with such crimes

better implement the necessary procedures from the beginning and keep an eye on multiethnic countries like Bosnia to avoid such tragic results.

3.2.1. The US Related Response to the Case of Bosnia

The long Bosnian conflict ended when the United States took the lead and got the three leaders sign the Dayton Accords agreement. Earlier the USA made a significant action that had long been placed at the Congress floor for so long. As already stated in the first chapter, the Genocide Convention was implemented in 1948 but the USA ratified it after 40 years. Under this title a discussion of how and why the ratification was delayed for such long period is to be presented as an introduction to the main concern that is scrutinizing US stand toward the Bosnian case.

The Senate created a subcommittee from the Committee of Foreign Relations. The function of this subcommittee was to hold hearings about the ratification of the Convention. Many hearings were held during the 1950s, 1970s, and 1980s (Buell 11). On February 19, 1986 the Senate voted 83 to 11 giving its advice and consent to such ratification (44). Two years later, the present ratification took place as President Reagan signed the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (Backes).

The ratification of the UN Genocide Convention in the USA took forty years to be put into practice, despite the fact that US Presidents such as Truman, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan acknowledged and supported the ratification (Buell 4). US Senator William Proxmire, a determined supporter, made lots of efforts to push the Senate to ratify the Convention. He was so devoted to realizing this ratification. In 1967, Proxmire vowed to deliver a speech everyday on the Senate floor until ratification would be realized. He called the Senate's failure to ratify the Convention "a national shame". Proxmire presented 3211 speeches over 19 years (Backes).

Such a long delay was the result of many reasons. The US Senate argued that

Article II was unclear. The Senate debated over issues concerning the specific intent, how much part of a group has to be destroyed to consider it an incident of genocide, and the inclusion of political groups under the list of the protected groups (Buell 13). Besides, the Senate feared that the ratification would result in accusing the United States of committing genocide during its history (the case of the Natives) (“United States Ratification of the Genocide Convention”). The United States likewise refused to allow any interference with its decisions; ratifying the UN Genocide Convention meant that the USA would be tied in making the decisions of when and where an action would be carried out (Montgomery 3).

As indicated above, the ratification took place in 1988 with the signature of President Reagan of the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987. This act amended the Federal criminal code to establish the criminal offense of genocide. It imposes punishment upon anyone who commits or tries to commit any of the acts that constitute genocide by a fine of 1000000 US Dollar and/or imprisonment for up to twenty years, and life imprisonment if group members are killed. It imposes punishment of five-year imprisonment and/or a fine of 500000 US Dollar for directly, and publicly demonstrating an act of genocide (H. R. 807 [100th]).

The United States had its own reasons for taking so long to ratify the Genocide Convention. Nevertheless, Senator Proxmire presents an example that there are those who keep fighting for the right cause. The ratification of the convention shows the strong commitment of the USA to deter and forbid genocide. With the Bosnian conflict that shortly took place after the ratification, the US stand toward genocide is to be placed under examination.

3.2.2. The USA did not React

During the presidency of George H. W. Bush, the conflict in former Yugoslavia arose. The Bush administration did not respond to what was happening there. It chose to ignore the conflict because, at that time, the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed. The USA considered the crisis there as a European matter that only European countries should take care of (Maseidvag 34). Bosnia was part of Yugoslavia and its independence was one of reasons

that caused the conflict there. As the Bush administration ignored the conflict in Yugoslavia as a whole, it means they ignored the Bosnian one as well.

The Bush administration focused on the Gulf area instead. The difference between how the USA responded to the Gulf War and to the Yugoslav conflict lies in the fact that the Gulf had oil while Bosnia did not (Passage 54). Samantha Power, an American political critic and diplomat, argued that the USA sent its troops to check how much control Iraqi forces, under Saddam Hussein's regime, were able to achieve. The USA also wanted to maintain its access to cheap oil. In an operation called "Operation Provide Comfort" the USA established a safe area for the Kurds which was not for the sake of the Kurds themselves rather for Turkey. The latter wanted to get rid of Iraqi Kurdish refugees (qtd. in Wang 6). In a comparison between the two cases, the United States chose to get involved in the Gulf War to protect its political and economic interests. Likewise it was motivated to aid the Kurds not out of humanity but to help its strong economic partner.

President Bush's team of advisers consisted of National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. They advised President Bush not to opt for military action in former Yugoslavia because they feared that history might repeat itself and the result would be like that of Vietnam (Knott). The most advocate for non-military intervention, even a limited one, was Powell. He defended his stand saying that military forces should only be deployed when victory is certain. He also claimed that before choosing a military intervention, a political objective should be set first (Gordon). Members of the Bush administration sought to preserve the life of American soldiers rather than risk it in a battle its victory was not guaranteed.

The decisions of the Bush administration to ignore and not intervene militarily in the Bosnian conflict had an effect on the results of the 1992 presidential elections. Power stated

that the other candidate Bill Clinton used the case of Bosnia in his favor. He pointed out to the passive response of the Bush administration. Clinton made promises throughout his campaign that he would handle the issue and consider military intervention to fix it if there would be no other option. Clinton won the elections by 1993 (qtd. in Overmier 48-49).

President Clinton, as the American political journalist and author Elizabeth Drew explained, insisted on taking the lead in this matter so that the USA would not lose its stand as the leading superpower (qtd. in Power 9). Therefore, he approved the following policy:

- Support efforts to find a political solution by working closely with key allies, particularly with Russia, and appointing a special US envoy to participate in negotiations;
- Reject imposing a settlement that was not voluntarily accepted by all parties;
- Contribute directly to humanitarian relief efforts by taking additional measures to facilitate the delivery of aid (such as air-dropping food from US military transport aircraft);
- Enforce the no-fly zone as an effort to forestall further bloodshed;
- Tighten sanctions on Serbia, repeat the Bush administration warning against disruptive action in Kosovo, and strengthen the international presence in Macedonia to discourage the further spread of conflict; and
- Offer US troops to help implement and enforce a peace agreement that was acceptable to all parties. (Power 9-10)

The Clinton administration did not directly demonstrate its refusal to the peace plan of that time which was a Vance-Owen undertaking, but the administration did it in an implicit manner by adopting this policy. The plan was developed by the UN and EU mediators, Cyrus Vance and David Owen (Power 10). It was the first international peace plan for Bosnia. It aimed to divide Bosnia into 10 semi-autonomous regions to please all the conflicting parties so that

the conflict would come to an end. The Vance-Owen Peace Plan got the support of the EU. However, President Clinton refused to implement it because he viewed the plan as “flawed.” In case the Vance-Owen plan would fail, its full responsibility would be assumed by President Clinton that was the reason why he rejected it (Maseidvag 41). The Vance-Owen Peace Plan which worked to end the conflict failed because it was rejected by Croats and Serbs. The reluctance offered by the USA and its UN allies to opt for military intervention only made the situation get worse and encourage the Serbs to continue their plan (Wert 41).

The Congress was against fully involving the United States in the Bosnian matter. It supported lifting the arms embargo to rearm Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats to be able to fight back the Serbs. The Congress wanted to use this policy to show that the USA was reacting to Bosnia and in the same time it would not be obliged to deploy American troops there (Schmidt 59). The United States tried to discuss this “lift and strike” plan with its NATO allies. But in May 1993 France and Britain rejected such policy. They believed that since the USA was not willing to place its troops on the ground to support their military option, lifting the embargo would increase the risk of intensifying the conflict and the NATO air strikes would endanger the lives of their troops in Bosnia (Barthe and Charles-Philippe 6). The USA chose a diplomatic approach to deal with the Bosnian conflict at this level which indicates its unwillingness to fully commit itself to the conflict.

Since the “lift and strike” did not work out, the USA chose to contain the Bosnian conflict (Power 15). The United States, Russia, Spain, Britain, and France agreed on a new policy which was known the Joint Action Plan. They agreed to Protect the six “safe areas” using force if it would be necessary and the USA would only provide air support; establish an international war crimes tribunal; observe the Serbian border to make sure that Belgrade was respecting the international embargo placed on the Bosnian Serbs; and intensify the international presence in Kosovo and Macedonia to ensure that the conflict would not spread

to them. This plan barely had an effect on what was going on there as the atrocities continued to take place (Power 19).

Clinton's foreign policy was shaped by many factors. During Clinton's presidency, the public opinion played a major role in the decision that concerned whether the USA should respond to the Bosnian problem or not. American citizens believed that what was happening there was not an issue the USA had to react to. In January 1993, the *New York Times* reported that 67% of the public held such belief while a minority of 24% thought the opposite (qtd. in Kohut 11-12). By November 1994, nearly the same results appeared; the *Times Mirror Center* announced that 62% of the public said no and only 30% said yes (qtd. in Kohut and Robert 6). Rejection by the public increased in June of the following year. The *New York Times* declared that 69% of Americans refused the involvement of the USA while 24% said it should (qtd. in Kohut and Robert 6). Throughout the Bosnian conflict, Americans strongly rejected any kind of interference.

Clinton's policy toward Bosnia was affected by external and internal factors. European countries disagreed with the USA on the "lift and strike" policy because they did not want to risk the lives of their soldiers. Clinton shifted his attention from the Bosnian case based on the advice of his political strategist Dick Morris because he believed that the risk of fully involving the USA in the Bosnian matter would get in the way of the President to proceed with his domestic agenda. Clinton's main concern was domestic policy and not foreign policy. Generally speaking, he did not pay much attention to foreign policy and more precisely to the Bosnian case (Barthe and Charles-Philippe 6). Ivo H. Daalder, the president of Chicago Council for Global Affairs, claimed that the Clinton administration was divided between two methods to solve the problem. For example in the "lift and strike" policy, there were those members who advocated the use of force while there were those who wanted to opt for a diplomatic solution (qtd. in Barthe and Charles-Philippe 7).

3.2.3. The US Shift to Reaction

Andrea Kathryn Talentino, an associate professor of international relations at Drew University, believed that the United States recognized that its containment policy was no longer efficient as the Serb forces overran the UN safe areas. They managed to break through and enter UN depots taking the weapons that had been seized by the UN and holding UN peacekeepers hostages (qtd. in Montgomery 32). The Clinton administration shifted its policy toward Bosnia as the Srebrenica massacre took place. The United States figured out that European countries were unable to settle the conflict which encouraged it to take the lead (Marleku, Bejtush, and Valon 43). The United States realized that it failed in its response toward the Bosnian case as more atrocious mass killings occurred but that changed.

The United States sent 20000 soldiers who were a part of the 60000 NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). This force's main objective was to ensure the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords (Covington III 97). This work has explained how the Bosnian conflict came to an end when the USA got the three conflicting parties sign the Dayton Peace Accords. As well as the United States and the NATO began a two-weeks air strikes on the Serbs. The role of the USA at such time was decisive for Bosnia. Taking the lead and ending the conflict meant that no more lives were to perish and stability would resume.

Madeleine Albright who is an American politician and diplomat used to be US ambassador to the UN during Clinton's presidency. Albright argued that Clinton was willing to take action to stop the war. She and the National Security Advisor Tony Lake provided an "End Game" strategy which advocated sending US troops and at the same time use diplomatic procedures. She proclaimed taking an action otherwise US stand as a leading power in the world would be jeopardized. President Clinton agreed on the "End Game" strategy and made it clear that it was time to take concrete action and intervene militarily (qtd. in Schumann 45). The willingness of President Clinton to react to Bosnia was fundamental to put an end to the conflict

but it appears that it took him long to obtain it.

There were many more reasons that pushed the USA to react. The case of Bosnia became problematic for President Clinton as the presidential election was to take place in the following year (1996). He had to risk to solve the problem otherwise his image would be damaged and he might have lost the election (Schmidt 66). The USA had to respond because it did not want the problem to spread to the rest of Europe which would endanger its NATO allies, and containing this kind of multi-ethnic conflicts was supported (Passage 58). The Bosnian conflict, in a way, was beneficial for the USA to spread democracy in former communist areas. It sought to prove that democracy was the right system of government to adopt since its advocator was able to end the conflict (Montgomery 34). The United States was motivated to end the conflict not for the sake of Bosnians themselves but for its own benefits.

The United States knew about the conflict in former Yugoslavia but there was no response to the case in hand from the Bush administration because it sought to intervene in the Gulf War where it had political and economic interests, and turned its back to Yugoslavia where there was nothing to be offered. As Bill Clinton took office, the USA got engaged. As it has been presented, many peace plans were undertaken in an attempt to end the war. These peace plans barely amounted to make any effect on the course of events.

Earlier before the Bosnian conflict, the United States made a significant step toward banning genocide by ratifying the Genocide Convention. However, the case of Bosnia shows the real motives of the United States and how it chooses its stand toward cases of genocide.

The United States failed in its response toward the Bosnian case as it allowed genocide to happen. The long delay for deploying troops and only opting for peace talks resulted in the continuous loss of innocent lives. Once a combination of military and diplomatic procedures took place, the aim was achieved. The USA took the lead and brought the war to an end, yet it

was for its own sake to preserve its credibility, its status as a leading superpower and the spread of its principles.

Conclusion

The United States is known for its promotion of respecting and honoring human rights, but its credibility would be put to the test when a crime like genocide takes place. Genocide is one of the most destructive crimes as its perpetrator intentionally tries to eliminate a specific group because of its nationality, race, ethnicity, or religion. American foreign policy decision makers has to decide whether the USA commits itself to what it claims for or chooses what serves its own interests when a genocide occurs.

For political and economic reasons the United States chose not to act in the previously discussed cases. It preferred to maintain good relations with the countries where it had such interests. Although, it is known that, Russia is the rival of the USA but the United States sided with it by recognizing it as an independent state and by being an accomplice in denying the starvation policy adopted against the Ukrainians. The same for the cases of the Armenians and Bosnians, these interests came at the top. Acknowledging the Armenian massacres as genocide by the USA would threaten its economic relations with Turkey which from the time of the Ottomans to the nowadays Turkish state is considered a strong economic partner. Moreover, the United States ignored what was happening in Bosnia and focused its attention and efforts on the Gulf area where economic gains (oil) were present.

Militarily speaking, the United States showed a strong reluctance to deploy its troops to solve other nations' conflicts while simultaneously urging UN states to do so. As it has already been presented, the USA refused to opt for military intervention for the sake of preserving the lives of its soldiers and deploying them only when it meets its interests. With the case of Native Americans and in the Gulf area the military option was easily considered. From its establishment until Reagan's presidency, US presidents did not hesitate to use force against Native Americans. In the Gulf area where the USA wanted to get access to cheap oil, sending US troops was not that difficult decision to make in comparison to the other cases.

The Bosnian case is a clear example of America's dishonesty. Shortly before the conflict had begun, the United States took a major step in banning genocide by ratifying the Genocide Convention. This ratification took place during Reagan's presidency. The following administration was that of President Bush the father, which sought to act in the Gulf region because of oil and keeping an eye on Saddam Hussein's moves paying no attention to the war that arose in former Yugoslavia as there was nothing Yugoslavia could offer to the USA. The Clinton administration replaced the Bush administration with the promise to respond even by the use of force. Once in office, Clinton failed to fulfill his promises. The deployment of troops took place only after nearly four years of continuous failing peace policy. The military option was primarily the result of the fear that if the United States did not act properly, it would lose its status as a leading superpower and save its credibility. The commitment to banning genocide was not fully fulfilled as when the time came to put it into practice, the USA took so long. This allowed genocide to occur in Bosnia.

Depending on the case, US presence or absence during such conflicts reflects its commitment of respecting human rights and deterring genocide. With the Native Americans case, the USA is the accused side of committing genocide. Accusation derives from the violent perpetrated actions with the benediction of successive US presidents. Concerning the Armenian case, the US government did nothing to halt what was happening there. Its involvement in the Ukrainian case was the opposite of what is expected to be. Both US government and a segment of its people worked not to stop the crimes and actually helped in hiding them with regard to the fact that they knew about the famine from the beginning. In the Bosnian conflict, the United States was present. But its presence barely made any changes but in its one exception that ended the war between Muslims and Croats. The US presence or absence was based on many factors remarkably on what the perpetrator and the victimized of the conflict could offer.

The investigation of the US response showed that some action took place to recognize the atrocities already tackled throughout the dissertation. In an attempt to facilitate the life of Indians, assimilationist policies alongside many acts were enacted. Moreover, American citizens made lots of efforts to save the Armenians. Many resolutions were placed at the Congress to acknowledge the massacre perpetrated against the Armenians and the Ukrainians as genocide. Finally, the USA tried to end the Bosnian conflict by adopting several peace plans. Yet, its actions were of a tiny effect if not a failure to achieve their goals. The assimilationist policies ended up causing more damage to Native Americans. US citizens' efforts saved many Armenian lives but did not save the Armenian cause to be condemned as genocide. The resolutions were disapproved. Each time the peace plans proposed by the USA to solve the Bosnian matter failed for one reason or another.

The inaction of the United States toward genocide stems from many reasons. By analyzing the stand of the USA toward the discussed cases, it can be noticed that candidates running for presidential elections use these instances of genocide in their favor. They either ignore them or support intervention to win votes. For instance, President Woodrow Wilson disregarded the Armenian genocide because he wanted to be reelected. Similarly for the sake of winning the office, candidate Bill Clinton advocated interference in the case of Bosnia, and once again when the following presidential elections took place he firmly supported solutions to the conflict in order to win the elections.

In the same context, the responsibility of the US inaction did not fall on its presidents only. The Congress was not in favor of fully involving the USA in foreign affairs. It kept rejecting the involvement of the USA especially by deploying US troops, and disapproving resolutions that concerned recognizing the crimes as genocide. Furthermore, American citizens played a major role in US response. They either rejected interference in foreign conflicts or helped denying the committed crimes.

It can be concluded that the USA failed in its response toward genocide. In all of the previously mentioned cases it refused to act or took long to do so. It chose to ignore the crimes perpetrated against the thousands of victimized groups. It never condemned them as genocide. The leading champion of human rights opted for what serves its own political and economic interests, at the expense of the humanitarian concerns.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948

Entry into force: 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII

The Contracting Parties,

Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world,

Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity, and

Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required,

Hereby agree as hereinafter provided:

Article I

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

Article II

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- a. Killing members of the group;
- b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring

- d. about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- e. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- f. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article III

The following acts shall be punishable:

- a. Genocide;
- b. Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- c. Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- d. Attempt to commit genocide;
- e. Complicity in genocide.

Article IV

Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.

Article V

The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.

Article VI

Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

Article VII

Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not be considered as political crimes

for the purpose of extradition.

The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.

Article VIII

Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.

Article IX

Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.

Article X

The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948.

Article XI

The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article XII

Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is responsible.

Article XIII

On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited, the Secretary-General shall draw up a proces-verbal and transmit a copy thereof to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in article XI.

The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.

Any ratification or accession effected, subsequent to the latter date shall become effective on the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.

Article XIV

The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the date of its coming into force.

It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period.

Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article XV

If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective.

Article XVI

A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any

Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General. The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.

Article XVII

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and the non-member States contemplated in article XI of the following:

- a. Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with article XI;
- b. Notifications received in accordance with article XII;
- c. The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance with article XIII;
- d. Denunciations received in accordance with article XIV;
- e. The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with article XV;
- f. Notifications received in accordance with article XVI.

Article XVIII

The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.

A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in article XI.

Article XIX

The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force. (UN General Assembly. "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948." United Nations, Treaty Series. 1021. (1951): 277-322. Web. 24 Apr. 2018.)

Appendix B

Classification

Classification denotes categorizing the society into a dominant group and an undesired group that is treated as the other. An example of such society is the American one when segregation laws were applied. To stop genocide at this level, it necessitates unifying the society under one language, nationality. Also, neutralizing institutions which their actions has great impact, in societies with two dominant ethnicities, because if these institutions side with one ethnicity it would lead to genocide.

Symbolization

Symbolization is to use symbols that indicate classifications (Christians and Muslims). These symbols include skin color, customary dress which is imposed by a group on its members, and wearing distinctive outfit to facilitate identifying the victimized group. Deterring such a phase requires the use of the power of law by forbidding the use of any symbols. However, such solution would only succeed when the citizens enforce it.

Dehumanization

The two former stages become phases of genocide only when they are combined with dehumanization. As its name indicates dehumanization means to treat others as less than humans. Fighting dehumanization requires stopping it whenever it appears and by legally forbidding any reference to genocide.

Organization

Organization is the fourth stage. A perpetrator must organize the genocidal plan. Whether this plan is highly organized like death camps or a simple one such as killing with swords. To prevent this stage, organizations that commit genocide must be prohibited.

Polarization

Polarization is the systematic elimination of moderates who would slow the process

of genocide. Usually moderates of the killing group are the first to be killed, so that no opposition that would slow down the genocidal plan takes place. Stopping polarization requires aiding moderates and at the same time fighting the perpetrators of genocide, for instance by taking away there is as for international travel.

Preparation

Preparation includes four phases. The first phase is identifying the victims. The second one is expropriating their properties. The third stage is concentrating the identified victims in, for example, concentration camps. Lastly preparation is made up of transportation which means relocating the victims to killing centers like concentration camps. Preventing such a stage needs diplomatic pressure, military intervention, and securing the lives of the identified victims

Extermination

At this level victims are not considered humans; rather they are viewed as rats, vermins, or cockroaches. Since they are not considered as human beings, their bodies are mutilated, buried in mass graves or burnt like trash. The only solution for extermination is armed intervention.

Denial

Denying genocide is the phase that always comes after committing genocide. Mass graves, historical records, anything related to genocide is to be concealed so that no proof can be used against the perpetrators. Minimizing the death toll, proving the intent of the perpetrator and proving the authenticity of the historical reports that would condemn perpetrators are some of the many forms of denial. To fight this stage, public trials, truth commissions and enrolling the facts of the genocide in the curriculum are required.

(Stanton, Gregory H. "The 8 Stages of Genocide." Web. 15 May 2018.)

