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FACULTY OF LETTERS AND LANGUAGES
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**Investigating Cuban-U.S. Relations from 1961 to 2016:
Moving from Enmity to Normalization**

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Fulfillment of the Requirements of Master's Degree in Anglophone Language,
Literatures, and Civilizations.

Submitted by:

BENNOURI Meryem

BOUDECHICHE Sana

Supervised by:

Mrs. CHELGHOUM Adila

Board of Examiners

Chairman: Mr. ATY Mourad	(MA/B)	8 Mai 1945/Guelma University
Supervisor: Mrs. CHELGHOUM Adila	(MA/B)	8 Mai 1945/Guelma University
Examiner: Mrs. LAYADA Radhia	(MA/B)	8 Mai 1945/Guelma University

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Abstract

This paper spots the light on more than five decades of the Cuban-American history; particularly, the recent mutual convergence of relations. Under the title: “Investigating Cuban-U.S. Relations From 1961-2016: Moving from Enmity to Normalization”; the study tackles the most pressing and complex issue in the Americas. Therefore, one of the present study’s primary concerns is to discuss American domestic and foreign factors in shaping its policy toward Cuba, as an exceptional country case. Generally, it contributes to the re-examination of the effectiveness of the U.S. embargo against Cuba. Besides, the study suggests historical methodological insights on the basis of political, economic and legal journey. Books, Congressional publications, journal articles and reports are analyzed to provide the necessary information and to understand the shift in the U.S. policy toward Cuba; as, successive U.S. administrations continued to intensify the block, while Obama’s administration negotiates for removing it. Results suggest that, how political, economic, and social conditions at play had a hand in prolonging the U.S. embargo; in spite of its failure to bring Castro down and to democratize Cuba; to put it in one word, the U.S.-Cuba ongoing Normalization is still ink on paper without the repeal of Helms-Burton Act, besides, a number of Acts, which require a congressional authorization.

ملخص

هذا البحث يسلط الضوء على أكثر من خمسة عقود من تاريخ العلاقات الكوبية-الأمريكية. وبشكل خاص، التقارب المتبادل الأخير في العلاقات. تحت عنوان: "تحقيق في العلاقات الكوبية-الأمريكية من 196 إلى 2016: الانتقال من العداوة إلى التطبيع". تناولت هذه الدراسة القضية الأكثر إلحاحا وتعقيدا في الأمريكتين. لذلك، واحدة من الاهتمامات الأساسية لهذه الدراسة هو مناقشة العوامل الأميركية: المحلية والخارجية في تشكيل سياستها تجاه كوبا، كحالة استثنائية. هذه المذكرة تساهم في إعادة النظر في مدى فعالية الحظر الأمريكي المفروض على كوبا عموما. إلى جانب ذلك، تقترح الدراسة رؤية منهجية تاريخية على أساس رحلة سياسية، اقتصادية وقانونية. و لتوفير المعلومات اللازمة وفهم التحول في سياسة الولايات المتحدة تجاه كوبا، تم تحليل: كتب، مطبوعات الكونغرس، مقالات وتقارير صحفية. بما أن الإدارات الأمريكية المتعاقبة واصلت تكثيف الحظر، في حين تفاوض إدارة أوباما لإزالته. وتشير النتائج إلى أن، العوامل السياسية، الاقتصادية والأوضاع الاجتماعية كان لها يد في إطالة أمد الحصار الأمريكي. على الرغم من فشله في إطاحة كاسترو ونشر الديمقراطية في كوبا. وبشكل وجيز، لا يزال التطبيع بين الولايات المتحدة وكوبا حبرا على ورق دون إلغاء قانون "هيلمز-بيرتن" إلى جانب قوانين أخرى ولا يكون ذلك إلا بتفويض من الكونغرس الأمريكي.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACP	African Caribbean and Pacific
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
AID	Agency for International Development
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
BTTR	Brothers To The Rescue
CACR	Cuban Assets Control Regulations
CANF	Cuban American National Foundation
CDA	Cuban Democracy Act
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CRS	Congressional Research Services
CW	Cold War
EAA	Export Administration Act
EFCA	Export Freedom to Cuba Act
EIA	Export-Import Act
ELAM	Escuela Latino Americana de Medicina
EU	European Union
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FTCA	Free Trade with Cuba Act
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
HBA	Helms-Burton Act
IEEPA	International Emergency Economic Powers Act
LA	Latin America
LAIA	Latin American Integration Association
LSD	Lyserge Saure Diathylamid
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OAS	Organization American States
OFAC	Office of Foreign Assets Control
PAAMEC	Promoting American Agricultural and Medical Exports to Cuba
Sec.	Section
SOA	Summit of the Americas
TSREEA	Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act
TWEA	Trading With the Enemy Act
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAN	Union of South American Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWII	World War Two
WWIII	World War Three

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Introduction

Cuba-U.S. relationship has its roots when both countries were colonies of European Powers, where the states' system considered the island as an obtainable part. In 1959, Fidel Castro and a group of revolutionaries with the support of the U.S. seized power in Havana, overthrowing the extremist authoritarian Fulgencio Batista. Instead of implementing the Capitalist ideology; Castro's regime increased trade with the Soviet Union as a result of adopting a Communist political ideology; after a nationalization process, Castro's regime owned the U.S. properties and imposed high taxes on American imports; Washington started a ban on almost Cuban exports, which turned to a full Embargo during the term of President John F. Kennedy. In 1961 the United States broke off the diplomatic relations with Cuba and planned to isolate Castro's regime, after the crisis. It is clear that the case of Cuba is extreme, and in many ways unique. Since the late nineteenth century, Cuba's history has a complicated singular relationship with one country i.e. the U.S. Certainly; this work represents a simple contribution to the field as the treated issue remains contradictory at the level of the American authority.

Cuba-U.S. Normalization of relations is one of today's controversial and divisive issues in the U.S. foreign policy. The shift from Enmity to Normalization led by Washington and Havana was genuinely introduced by John F. Kennedy in 1961; who according to many observers was assassinated, due to his reconciliatory approach toward Fidel Castro's regime. Over decades, National Security agents and Bureaucratic personalities delayed the process of regulation between the two nations; however, recent negotiations of Normalization are intended to compensate the damage caused by the previous successive American administrations' decisions, as well as, to prevent the latter from doing the same mistake in the future. It affirms that, the long lasting U.S. policy of

isolation and confrontation is no more an effective tool in regulating the behavior of Cuba. Enmity was often a negative way, which affected both sides: economically, politically, socially and diplomatically. This research project will review Cuba-U.S. historical roots, circumstances of tightening the embargo, and the recent negotiations of Normalization. Reasons of the imposition of the embargo, the coming of Fidel Castro to power and the U.S. plots to defeat him, sanctions as the American most frequent tool to penalize bad mannered leaders, in post-Cold War era, are the events to be studied. As it hypothesizes, sanctions policy, if not failed, is going through its ebbing; in other words, its effectiveness became questionable. This leads to the following questions: is sanctions policy dead? What are the reasons behind the weakening if not the demise of such practice which was initially designed to achieve democracy and to improve human rights that the U.S. constitution highlights?

This study highlights the importance of Normalization of relations between the U.S and Cuba, since, its introduction in 1961 to the present day. The work also analyses different phases of the U.S.-Cuban relations and it clearly clarifies pro and anti-Normalization reactions of the international community at large, and the American continent in particular - whether being Cuban-Americans or native Americans- toward these policies, more importantly how far American foreign policy makers' decisions can go in standing with or against these policies. In addition to that, the U.S. policy toward Cuba was also influenced by moderates and extremists, who represent the two poles of struggle, the former see Normalization as a remedy; whereas, the latter oppose it claiming that, Normalization is no more than a unilateral change i.e. for more than fifty years, Cuba remained a Communist nation headed by the same dictator. Following this idea, this dissertation aims to present the debate over Normalization of relations with Cuba. Results

would be presented as evidence to confirm or to negate the hypothesis objectively, since the topic will be investigated by Algerian Master's students who are not familiar with such exceptional country case.

This study will explore the aim behind the shift of the political climate between Cuba and the U.S. or there are other factors? It also theorizes the existence of rapprochement as a matter of National interests. Then, the progress of this research study will be guided by a number of questions, among which the following will be thoroughly examined: What are the roots of U.S.-Cuban conflict? Why Americans did not leave the embargo; although Cuba is no more a threat to the U.S. security after the Soviet Union's collapse? Why successive U.S. administrations continued to intensify the blockade; while, the U.S. current administration negotiates for lifting the restrictions and re-establishing diplomatic relations? Why has the U.S. continued with the embargo; in spite, of the Normalization between the two countries from one hand, and of the fact that this economic embargo is a failed policy from another? Are there any other factors behind the Normalization? More importantly, if isolation via embargoing Cuba is dead, is it fair enough to look for an alternative? The results will be significant as they will raise additional problems about the topic.

This dissertation is divided into three chapters. The first one is entitled "A Flashback in Cuba-U.S. Relations"; it intends to put the subject into its historical framework, since, it explains the reasons leading to the imposition of the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba and the collapse of their relations, in an attempt to depose Communism. The second chapter "Circumstances of Tightening the Embargo" portrays the squeeze of the U.S. policy towards Cuba at work place. "U.S.-Cuba Recent Normalization" is the third and

the final chapter, and it is concerned with the ongoing restoration of relations between the two countries.

As far as the methodological framework is concerned, the issue in question is closely associated with the history of the American foreign policy. In this regard, the historical method is more than necessary, because, it will extremely help in tracing the origins of the Cuban-American issue, the political background and the development of such complex and contradictory U.S.-Cuban policy. In reading, analyzing, and reporting facts and portraying U.S.-Cuban shift toward Normalization, it is essential to adopt both the descriptive and qualitative methods, as the nature of the topic requires a detailed exploration and deep investigation, to reveal a target audience's variety of positions. Therefore, the use of a mixture of methods is inevitable with the overcome of the qualitative approach.

Opinions have been divided and researches resulted in two different stands, since the current U.S.-Cuba Normalization is trapped between pleasing and resistance. The first stand belongs to officials: President Barack Obama, John Kerry and social groups, who believe that Normalization is the best solution to compensate the historical disadvantages of icy relations. On the other hand, the second stand reflects a completely different vision; it rejects the Normalization action, because, they found that the Executive branch i.e. the President is overstepping his authority; superseding the Legislative power i.e. the American Congress. That being the case, Meagan Hatcher-Mays in a New York Times Article, "Media Erroneously Claim Obama Overstepped his Authority By Restoring Diplomatic Relations With Cuba"; concludes that, the U.S.-Cuba re-establishment of relations can be beneficial for both.

Media and other observers, criticized Obama's plan of restoring diplomatic relations with Cuba, in 2016, Mark P. Sullivan's findings reported in "Cuba: Issues for 114th Congress", Cuba is still one party system, with poor human rights records, because it jumped from one Castro to another; despite the fact that, Raul Castro implemented some economic goals; but with no similar political ones. Published in the paper entitled "Diplomatic Relations Between US and Cuba" (2013), this work holds the idea that, Normalization is beneficial in promoting changes on the island, the evidence, in December 2014, President Obama announced changes in Cuba, since, the Cuban Legislative approved law to attract foreign investors, reduced the number of the Communist Party Congress members, and eased travel. Findings prove that, there is nothing absolute towards Normalization's efficacy; though it appears to be a positive achievement; to put it in one word, Normalization is truly needed and desirable step; yet, it contradicts the U.S. political traditions, since the embargo was placed by an Executive order, which requires a Legislative removal.

Chapter One

A Flashback in Cuba-U.S. Relations

In an analysis of the Spanish American war and Hispanic Division, Spain was the first European power that explored and colonized the Americas; largely, the empire extended from the eastern to the western coast, toward Alaska. After a significant period of time, Spaniards announced the independence of some of their possessions in central and southern America, while, Cuba remained under their control. Therefore, Cuban freedom' fighters were ambitious enough to struggle for independence. At the same line, they formed the Cuban Revolutionary Party in the United States under the administration of Ulysses S. Grant. Most importantly, during the tenure of William McKinley, the United States declared war on Spain, subsequent to the latter's rejection to offer the island, at that point, the counterparts signed Paris Treaty, by which, Spain lost its control over: Cuba, Puerto Rico, Philippines, Guam and other islands. The newly independent island refreshed ancient American ambitions to contain it; yet, under the Teller Amendment¹, the United States promised not to exercise power over Cuba ("The World of 1898...").

Without a doubt, Cuba was a central supplier of tobacco and sugar trade; due to its prolific production; so, economic, agricultural and geographical strategic stimuli, pushed Thomas Jefferson to think to join Cuba into the U.S. system of states, the latter acknowledged: "I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states" (qtd. in Brenner). Moreover, fear from losing great economic opportunities, pushed Americans to settle and to invest heavily in the island; precisely, to prevent any other outsider from having power over Cuba. The United States' motives created a heated debate, and divided Cubans into two camps: anti and pro-United

States, the latter, could pave the way for American business interests. The chapter will go further through history to discuss the confrontation basis, upon which feelings of hatred were set, giving a special attention to the United States actions, as an individual sender country of restriction. One of the major objectives of this chapter is to spot the light on the causes of hostility and harassment; mainly, the American Bay of Pigs operation and the installation of Soviet Missiles; also, the flip-flop in the U.S.-Cuba relations.

1.1. Historical Background about Cuba

The Latin American region, inherited lot of WWII problems, exclusion from world markets in Europe and Asia. Following, the Cold War² progress; Southerners blamed the world superpowers for their economic hardships. In his book entitled *The Penguin History of the 20th Century the History of the World 1951 to the Present*, author J.M. Roberts says that, most of Central American and Caribbean countries were under the United States' pressure, especially after Pearl Harbor incident. For the duration of the American-Korean war, they were dependent economies to Europe and to the United States as well. Therefore, many Latin American countries grouped toward industrialization, to provide an important substitution. Industrialization itself brought not only a kind of release, but it engendered authoritarian political control, mainly in Colombia 1953, and Venezuela 1954 (654).

In fact, the U.S. and Cuba ties go back even before Fidel Castro's seizing of power in Havana 1959. Throughout history, the U.S. influenced Cuba at economic and political levels; sooner, it was enlarged to further interests. Where, Thomas Jefferson deprived the Cuban patriots the right to attend negotiations of Peace Treaty³ in Paris, during the Cuban-Spanish war. For that reason, it kept its occupation over Cuba for another five

years; thanks to the Platt Amendment Act, that defined relations between the two nations, for the coming thirty three years, protected American commercial interests and enabled it to robe Guantanamo Bay, due to the Spanish inability to preserve law and order. On that basis, the United States' economic concerns in Cuba implied its enthusiastic plans to obtain it by all means (Brenner).

In this way, the increasing American threat to Cuba's sovereignty, and its influence over the island's domestic affairs gave birth to internal confrontations, and led nationalist Cubans to revolt and to overthrow the dictator Gerardo Machado⁴; successfully, anti-U.S. actors nullified the Platt Amendment Act. Once more, Cubans faced Fulgencio Batista, who gained the United States' assistance to remain in power for a second term, after a military coup action. Once they agreed upon the Treaty of Relations in 1934, to tolerate the United States' full domination over Cuba's economy ("The United States, Cuba and the Platt..."). That is to say, the United States was still powerful enough to manipulate Cuba's policies.

In an essay discusses the history of Cuban-American relations, critic Ian Chadwick spots the light on the epoch marked by the coming of Fidel Castro and his supporters, who formed a resistance group in Mexico. In an attempt to appear tolerant, Fulgencio Batista offered a Presidential Amnesty⁵ to some political prisoners, as a result, Castro returned to Cuba with 81 men, and started their rebellion in 1958. Batista then, refused the United States' help to stay in office, but one year later he was unable to continue without the American aid, thus, he escaped to Dominican Republic, Miami then Spain. The United States as a result, made it the first step to welcome Fidel Castro to power in Havana of bankrupt nation; and indirectly, the new leader profited from arms and

financial supplies pre-arranged by the United States to Cuba during Fulgencio Batista's years (Suddath).

The United States' policy changed, by the threat of Communism⁶ from one hand, and the growth of Latin American Nationalism⁷, from another; again those events, led Washington to start covert, or sub-version operations against the Cuban leader; selectively and without the Congress approval the U.S. supported Latin American countries. That explains the United States' action immediate resistance, to Guatemalans adoption of Communism as a political ideology in 1954. From an American perspective, Communism often brought poverty and discontent; and in order to limit its spread, the United States started to deliver economic assistance to Latin American countries; yet, the southern continent received only a slight amount of aid that was granted to Europe and Asia (Roberts 655).

1.2. The Coming of Fidel Castro to Power

Forty years ago, the U.S. policy toward Cuba, went through a complex historical context and political conditions, the U.S. policy was centered on punishing Fidel Castro's disobedience or revolution, as a tool at the hands of Soviets, to implement their design i.e. to oppose Americans. Undoubtedly, Castro was responsible for cutting one of the most policy procedures by which, the U.S. defined its place and secured its interests in the western hemisphere. For several decades, American presidential administrations whether: Republicans, Democrats, Liberals or Conservatives' main goal was to remove Castro from power (Pérez JR 227-28).

Initially, the United States and Cuba relationship was based on trade agreements, then, it turned into a complicated political, economic and military one; ending the friendly

relationship, all the way through the Cuban independence and the rise of Fidel Castro. The understanding of past events, decisions, and actions taken by the United States against Cuba, included even its involvement in the island politics. When, Fulgencio Batista was president in 1952, the U.S. government supported him in spite of his violent actions toward the Cuban people, who were not in favor of him; since, he served the American commerce, more than Cubans' needs. Unlike Fulgencio Batista, Fidel Castro's un-serviceability came to surface, resulting in the cut of diplomatic relations (Holmes 83).

Over the years, the United States provided an economic aid and military training to pro-U.S Cubans, for the sake of creating a hemispheric defense. However, things did not go as they expected to be; where the same aids affected Cuba's internal security. In other words, the United States different helps which were the foundation of good relations, began to be the accelerator of the divorce between neighbors. Unexpectedly, Fidel Castro continued his course of anti-Americanism, because the greater part of the Cuban lands was controlled by American patrons, and strengthened relations with the USSR, although, he knew that such act would antagonize the United States. Within the same context, Castro's alliance with Soviets was the first sign of the mutual disagreement (Chadwick).

Disagreement progressed to the extent that, the United States' officials introduced recommendations to murder Fidel Castro, those implied plots tended to destabilize Castro's regime, also to reduce his ability to serve his people. It is true that Congress has many powers including: foreign commerce, declaration of war ... etc., but the U.S. president has exclusive power concerning foreign relations, since, he is the only representative of the nation, and he automatically became the dominant force in shaping policy and making decisions (Feldman 3). So, it is important to take a closer look at the United States' administrations in order to be able to understand the purposes behind

severing relations, and the end of the use of diplomacy to solve problems; since the United States' recognition of the new Cuban revolutionary government.

1.3. Eisenhower's Attempts to Remove Castro

Divergent view point of the neighbor, challenged the United States, when it was already holding a superior position in dealing with other nations; un-precedent Cuban move, toward an independent set, similar to that of the United States, raised by Fidel Castro, who desired a "full equality" (qtd. in Chadwick). Since day one, Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration opened opposition to Castro, through covert plans to overthrow the Cuban leader. In 17 March 1960, the president ordered Allen Dulles the director of the CIA, to train attackers in order to replace Castro by a pro-United States government (*Cuba Timeline*). Consequently, for the first time, an economic Embargo⁸ was imposed in July 1960, by President Eisenhower who reduced the Cuban sugar quota⁹ (Scanlan and Loescher 117).

With the appearance of Castro's radical nationalism, the United States under Eisenhower's administration firmly shifted to anti-Castro approach; the latter established tied relations with the USSR; while the former favored to support leaders that could serve the U.S. over change brought by Castro. However, the success of Castro, and the U.S. intrusion led to the appearance of anti-American feelings among Cubans who were pro-revolution; the last, clashed with Cubans who were pro-U.S.; since, they considered it as their rescue, more they expected that Cuba would bond with North American values. By the late 1959 and early 1960, Eisenhower initiated an aggressive policy toward the Cuban leader, relying on the CIA and Cuban exiles to bring Castro down i.e. the U.S. officials lacked positivity to work for the best of both nations, to stabilize and to improve the

situation (Rivas 248). In this way, Americans expected that by provocative steps they would defeat Castro, and prevent any future possibility to export the revolution to other Latin American nations.

Explicitly, the first symptom of the two nations' clash, problematic closeness, and disharmony mediation, was when Castro nationalized the American properties, especially oil factories, and restored 75% of the Cuban lands without compensation. So, the United States took punitive measures on commercial exports, excluding food and medicine, more than that, Eisenhower severed diplomatic relations. Simultaneously, Americans initiated implicit attempts to murder Castro; who nationalized Telephone Company and reduced telephone rates. Then, in 1959, Castro unofficially visited the United States, accepting the invitation of American Society Newspaper, to tell Americans that the only possibility of good relation is related to parallel coexistence of both nations (Mendes 6).

Castro met the vice president Richard Nixon in April 1959, during his trip to the U.S., which sponsored by The American Society of Newspaper Editors. This visit impacted the United States' behavior, and marked a turning point in its policy; when Richard Nixon openly declared: "I became a leading advocate for efforts to overthrow Castro" (qtd. in Haney and Vanderbush 14). At the height of the Cold War, Cuba began to import Soviet oil which, United States' companies refused to refine oil came from the enemy; in response Castro nationalized more American properties.

President Eisenhower was an attentive and wise, in dealing with local affairs. Therefore, he won the Congress' approval in raising the defense budget; because, he experienced the United States' most hard times including: the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam War. Fear from the spread of Communism in the western hemisphere, directed the president to deprive some reform movements from social justice, or the right for self-

determination. Therefore, the more time passed by, the more anti-Americanism augmented, in other words, the administration was unable to distinguish between Nationalism and Communism. For example, Eisenhower administration was in favor of even undemocratic rulers in the Caribbean region; since, they were pro-U.S. Later on; this policy was criticized by both: Conservatives, and Liberals who blamed the United States for forcing Castro to the arms of the Soviets (Luxenberg).

In early 1959, for many Americans, Castro was neither anti-Capitalism, nor pro-Communism; he was a nationalist forced to be a Communist due to Eisenhower's hostility. Since, the American president covertly used the CIA to block Castro's rise; as a result of Castro's reduction of U.S. businesses. In response, the Cuban leader's authoritarianism and popularity increased, by signing a trade treaty with the USSR. For this reason, Eisenhower ordered the CIA to prepare for an invasion and assassination plot. At this level, Cuban-U.S. relations reached the climax, when Castro cut sugar quota and nationalized the rest of the U.S. properties. To a large degree, Eisenhower focused more on a global fight against Communism, more than the American domestic affairs (861). Thus, Castro and Eisenhower's reciprocal distrust and suspicious, resulted in the long lasting confrontation, from one side, the President was a Globalist: aimed at reducing Castro's regime power; and from another side, Castro found a kind of refuge in the Soviet Union (Norton et al. 878).

Almost simultaneously, the Cuban government took fearless decisions such: the inclusion in the Eastern bloc, and the exclusion from the Western one. The sign, in February 1960, Cuba and the Soviet Union signed a trade agreement, to substitute the Cuban sugar with Soviet oil (Hufbauer et al. 1). In response, Eisenhower ratified the embargo, and sponsored the military operation known as, the Bay of Pigs¹⁰. Marking a

political confusion in Washington; since, it was neither pro-revolution headed by Castro nor, with violent government similar to that of Batista (Chadwick). Yet, in early 1961, The Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), permitted the president to sever links. Sooner, the United States' embassy in Havana was closed officially (Safferson 61). One year later, in August the Congress passed The Foreign Assistance Act, prohibiting all kinds of aid to Communist nations i.e. Cuba ("The U.S. Embargo..."), at the same year, Cuba was eliminated from the OAS as a result of its behavior (Fiala 488).

The Cuban locked sky was divided into three camps: radicals (Castro and Che Guevara), moderate (Raul Castro) and pro-Americans moderates (members of the older regime), whom the United States worked to keep, or to influence Castro to be one of them. However, persuading a radical revolutionary man was not an easy task for Americans. Apparently, Eisenhower kept moderating with Castro, but, privately he planned for his overthrow. Equally, Castro shifted to rely on Soviets economic and military supplies, while, he continued to appear pro-peaceful coexistence (Kennedy, Cohen and Piehl Ch. 36 638). One may think that, each leader mistrusted the other, but the sole difference was that, Eisenhower's plan to defeat Castro preceded Castro's Communization of Cuba.

Eisenhower's shift from a modest to hostile toward the Cuban leader, from the time when he approved to murder Castro for 38 times (Conrad). However, the vice president Richard Nixon expressed his sympathy to Castro; also, he tried to redirect Castro's adoption of Communism. In 1952, Nixon as cold, manipulative and anti-Communist blamed Democrats for losing China to Communism; that's why, he complained about the U.S. foreign policy and defense, toward Cuba. Despite, belonging to the same political party i.e. Republicans, Eisenhower and Nixon disagreed about politics; but, they were

more alike than was often thought (Frank). Furthermore, Richard Nixon criticized the inclusion of Cuba's issue in J.F. Kennedy's electoral campaign, and recommended to distinguish between democrats and dictators. From Richard Nixon's point of view, the United States containment was a negative strategy in resisting Communism. Simply, Nixon stressed the importance of cultural differences that caused the United States' loss of Cuba (Luxenberg 49).

1.4. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis

In the second half of the 20th Century, Cubans fought a victorious revolution, which produced a major political conflict than any other in Latin America. In 1962, confrontation of the two super powers i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union, was an obvious outcome of the Cold War. Cuba's exceptional strategic position near the coast of Florida is far about 130 miles away, gave it special significance (see fig.1).



Fig. 1. A map presenting the distance between Cuba and the United States by the web site geology.com/world/Caribbean-map.gif

Therefore, the United States established a naval base on the island in 1951, reflecting its strategic thinking, when Cuba was harshly affected by the world's economic depression; Americans were investing a lot in its urban sector. At this level, Castro began to intervene with American businesses, and to report Americanized characters in Cuba i.e. those who were supporting the old regime, and he pushed Cubans to complete the political revolution by an economic one, which was Castro's central idea (Roberts 657).

In an attempt to achieve an economic independence, the Cuban government's agrarian reform law, threatened the American sugar companies, and cost them a loss of one million and a half Acres of land; as being said, a new cold war in the Caribbean began. That's why Americans clearly acknowledged their opposition toward Castro (Roberts

658-59). At work place, John F. Kennedy executed a mission that first planned for the term of Eisenhower (Bay of Pigs), by the incident, John F. Kennedy expected Cubans to aid the invaders in defeating Castro (Jelten). Though, the United States backed this operation, hundreds of invaders trained by the CIA faced a strong Cuban resistance, approximately, over 100 were killed, another 1100 were captured in a major foreign policy disaster (*BAY OF PIGS INVASION*).

Following the Bay of Pigs failure in 19 April 1961, progressively Congress became active in passing a bill on Cuban limitation to enable JF Kennedy to react whenever necessary. Moreover, the CIA gained his approval to engage in propaganda activities in Latin America, especially in Cuba (Haney and Vanderbush 17). Where, American officials thought that, the best way to resist the Cuban threat was via murdering Castro. Yet, it was impossible for Washington to assassinate him, under Article 51 of the UN charter, prohibiting its members from attacking one another. So, Americans went through secret operations: a ballpoint pen with a hidden syringe full of poison, exploding cigar and slipping LSD into Castro's drink (Hrala).

Confidently, the Cuban pressure kept rising, in spite of, the American potential violent reaction. In 22 October 1962, American photographers proved the construction of Soviet missile sites, on the island. Which led J. F. Kennedy to announce a sever isolation on Cuba, to avoid more weaponries; immediately, all maritime and air links were put off with Cuba (Bosch and Ciampptin). Similarly, Castro was uncertain about the peaceful co-existence with the U.S. For that reason, he asked for the Soviets' help; within days, Krushchev raised up the balance of terror i.e. he started installing these missiles to menace the U.S. Next this, Kennedy on a televised speech, rejected the missile project

(see fig. 2) that could carry nuclear warheads, and could target the American capital (Rudin).



Fig. 2. A map presenting the extension of Soviet missiles placed in Cuba, by bbc.co.uk/staticarchive.

Paradoxically, J F. Kennedy criticized the policy of his predecessor toward Cuba, when the latter focused too much on national security instead of regional one; i.e. helping the Cuban people to progress. More, J F. Kennedy condemned the United States' back of Batista over Cubans' freedom; in view of the fact that, the United States planned to destabilize the Cuban regime, known as the Operation Mongoose or the Cuba Project ¹¹, incorporating: psychological propaganda of T.V. and Radio Marti, political harassment of accusing Cuba for terrorism, military sabotage of air force and navy, assassinations attempts and plots, intelligences, hijackings and even attacking American targets (Lansdale).

Tension reached its height, when super powers used nuclear forces to threaten each other, and to protect their concerns. As mentioned previously, after Bay of Pigs fiasco i.e.

there was no Cuban attack on Castro's popular regime. Immediately, Castro declared that, he is a Marxist Leninist; offering a golden opportunity for Soviets to install those missiles in Cuba (Roberts 659); leading to an international and unprecedented crisis. In 1962, Kennedy enlarged the ban to include all trade with Cuba, travel and sponsorship (Fiala 487). Lastly, both superpowers' faces were saved; even they set a direct telephone communication. In reaction to a Soviet's agreement to remove their missiles from Cuba, after President Kennedy promised not to invade it (Jelten).

After Kennedy's assassination, Castro aimed at opening a new page of talks; and from this time, the Cuban leader called for the elimination of the abnormal and needless harassment between the two nations. Though, Johnson promised Kennedy not to involve in attacking Castro; yet, he also supported covert operations, where the CIA employed Castro's ex-girlfriend to introduce a deadly frozen Pill into his drink. To put in one word, during Johnson's term, the CIA secret tries touched 72 tries (Campell). While on the inside, in 1966, L B. Johnson freed Cuban immigrants from general U.S. immigration laws; for those who reached the United States from 1959, they could be permanent residents (Chadwick).

Outwardly, the U.S. foreign policy could be summarized in two words: development and modernization. American officials often believed that, the U.S as the World Power could direct or accelerate the post-war atmosphere, and even to reshape the world, especially, Kennedy's administration. In view of the fact that, both military training and financial assistance were used to recognize who's the U.S. friends, and whose are its enemies (Kirkendall 4-5). Kennedy hoped to construct a new America, based on desirability of economic, political and social equality under Alliance for Progress¹², the last; it was designed due to the need for economic aid in Latin America, which was

initiated by Eisenhower's administration. By the plan of Alliance, Kennedy called for an annual increase of per capita income, also to establish democracies, to reform lands, economies and social planning; yet, at work place the procedure excluded Cuba. After a decade of mixed results, this alliance was disbanded, in 1973 (Best et al. 25). For many critics, the idea of Alliance was recounted as a discrimination tool.

1.5. Richard Nixon on his Predecessor's Steps in Cienfuegos

During his occupation as Vice president in Eisenhower's administration, Richard Nixon was empathetic toward Castro to some extent; nevertheless, on the steps of his predecessor Johnson, he felt that, it is the moment to tie with the government's duty to fulfill the principle of countering Castro (Luxenberg 48-49). Early the president lessened the importance of the Latin American region, i.e. to neglect it whenever possible and to force it whenever necessary; yet, after he scrutinized Cuba-U.S. policy, he stated clearly his unfriendliness to Castro "there'll be no change toward that bastard while I'm President" (qtd. in Haney and Vanderbush 22).

Therefore, in 1970, Nixon and Henry Kissinger the head of Secretary of State admired the revival of covert actions against Cuba; whilst, primarily the CIA suggested Soviets were building a sub-marine base in Cienfuegos, 228 Km south of Havana, indicating the Soviets' nuclear fleet development in the west. Then, the CIA detected that a Soviet armada, arrived at the western coast. The Agency director, Richard Helms confirmed the Soviets' construction at Cienfuegos harbor. Evidently, Nixon and the State Department, avoided another public crisis with Soviets, and went after the peaceful negotiations instead of the aggressive response, despite media and Congress' pressure, to the point; they charged Nixon of trying to gain political benefits. Succeeding this, Nixon considered

the Soviets abandonment of Cienfuegos as a pure success of the American foreign policy (Haney and Vanderbush 23).

1.6. The First Normalization Attempt during Gerald Ford's Term

Gerald Ford was the first American president who tried to normalize relations with Cuba, the last was in favor of Marxist regime in Angola and Puerto Rico; yet, in December 1975 the President ended his scheme (Jelten), and kept adopting foreign policies of Nixon's advisers. In general, he favored Nixon's goals of détente with the Soviet Union, in order to minimize the tension between superpowers that started since the end of the WW II, when both nations started searching for ways to develop collaboration for: national security, and economic goals. The evidence, in 1972 Nixon and Soviets failed to limit the spread of the strategic arms; however, in 1975 Ford stretched détente when he signed the Helsinki Accords with the Soviet leader and other European nations, determining borders of newly independent European countries, and supporting human rights (*Miller Center*).

1.7. Jimmy Carter's Emphasis on Rapprochement

Within the context of political openness, in the mid 1970's, Soviets and Americans took small steps toward normalizing relations, one of these actions, was talks about Anti Hijacking Agreement, under which both countries could share information and promote mutual interests. Five years later, the Treasury Department issued the Cuba Assets Control Regulation Amendment, to release restrictions over additional U.S. companies operating in Third countries from trading with Cuba (Askari et al. 6). One year later, a

collective idea of Carter and his main advisers came to surface; when, the Treasury Department repealed the regulation and replaced it with specific trade permit certificate.

Outstanding to the weak U.S.-Cuba bond, the island re-energized its diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, with the majority of Latin American nations, including the U.S. former ally, Brazil. Equally important, for the first time since 16 years, James Carter was responsible for opening interests sections in Washington and Havana; generally, were used to communicate and to serve Cuban refugees, because nearly 125000 Cubans left home land to the U.S. In the same year, the counterparts were ready to be flexible in some areas like immigration, where, American citizens were allowed to travel to Cuba, likewise; Cubans were permitted to immigrate to the U.S. (Platt 4-5). Meanwhile, both signed Maritime Boundary Treaty, an agreement over their aquatic borders, concerning the fishing rights, which was never ratified by the U.S.

Carter administration was trapped, either to fulfill previous administration's gaps or to draw a new framework for its own policies (Pastor). As soon as, Carter came to office, he hoped that the Congress would end the ban, and work on free trade; in order to, stimulate Cubans, as well as to democratize the island; that being said, only the democratic solution could bring change to past mistakes. Later on, the leader states man took his own way of rapprochement, and worked to transmit Cuba to democracy; equally, he was respected by Castro and Cubans as human rights advocate. After leaving office, Carter unofficially visited Havana University, and delivered a speech concerning Cuba-U.S. complex relations. Likewise, multifaceted situation required not simple solutions like: lifting the embargo or deposing Castro. For that reason, there was no possibility in lifting the penalty (Winter and Everton 5).

Though, the U.S. embargo was the severest in the world history, with the Carter administration, it was depicted as worthless; because, it went beyond the target territory, to penalize innocent people rather than unelected rulers (Winter and Everton 5). Failure to democratize Cuba went along 40 years; despite, Carter's apparent openness and the CIA 64 plots to kill Castro (Hrala). Furthermore, by the discovery of Soviet military elements in Cuba, a new version of Cold War emerged in the region, and relations collapsed again. What is worse, Cuba started expanding and sending its troops to Africa, which invited the U.S. to reinstate Travel Restrictions in 1982 (Askari et al. 8). As can be deduced, at the end of Carter's term ties were declining.

1.8. Ronald Reagan and the First Steps toward Normalization

In the beginning, the Reagan administration adopted severe efforts to topple the revolutionary government through, containment and overthrow (Hufbauer et al. 3). The President reestablished the travel ban, and prevented Americans from trading with Cuba. Nevertheless, in the last months of his administration, there was slow but steady improvement in U.S.-Cuba ties, manifested in a long delayed immigration accord in 1987 (15); also, the Cuban acceptance of Human Rights Organizations to visit prisoners, in one hand. In the other hand, a great sign of change at the level of: sport, art and religious rapprochement with fewer examples of hostility and harassment (16). So, both nations lobbied for Normalization of relations, under the formation of National Council on U.S.-Cuban Relations, by a number of former ambassadors and Congressmen seeking a profound reform. Another sign of the U.S. geopolitical shift was the failure of isolating Cuba, in the hemisphere (Platt 18).

Views and moves to improve relations with Cuba were set up in early Reagan's administration; yet, it halted as a consequence to Cuba's intervention in Latin America, via its aid to rebellious movements in Angola ("Rethinking Cuba" 5). President Reagan's foreign policy was based on ending the CW, guarantying the U.S. security through the use of military force i.e. in 1983; he ordered to invade Grenada, not only to secure 500 Americans who were on the island, but also, to inform Cubans and Soviets about the U.S. military superiority. Reagan overtly insisted: ". . . when action is required to preserve our national security, we will act . . . it is a weapon that we as Americans do have" (qtd. in Pindar 4). For that reason, one could mediate that, the presidential power was not limited to internal affairs, yet, it extended to external ones.

1.9. The Cuban Contribution beyond its Territory

After the WWII, the U.S. emerged as the world's strongest and richest economy, while, the USSR was struggling, unable to provide consumer goods and military technology; Eastern-European countries started dissolving from the union and the Warsaw Pact¹³ (17). Closely, in 1991 the USSR became Russia Federation, in addition to a group of independent countries. Coming to the Cold War, Containment was the basic feature of the U.S. foreign policy i.e. it was willing to join any country, which was opposing Communism whatever its political structure. Hence, the end of the Cold War brought a New World Order; historically, it was related to the U.S. plan as the world's designer; therefore, new events, besides new threats were affecting the whole world and changing the general atmosphere (Best et al. 73).

Through past years, not only the USSR challenged the U.S. sovereignty; but also, the Cuban revolution antagonized its local supremacy in the western hemisphere. Although,

the U.S. worked to isolate the rebellious regime, and tried to bring order and stability to the region, its policy makers were afraid about Cuba's Communization that might influence other Third World and Latin American countries. After the end of the Cold War, Cuba's behavior turned out to be crucial conditions to normalize relations with the U.S., for instance: withdrawing Cuban troops from Angola, ending the export of revolution to LA, reducing its military security ties with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Washington's global policy overtly insisted on the eradication of dictator and authoritarian rulers all around the world. Yet, in Cuba things did not go as they expected to be, Castro gained more popularity and became strong enough to confront the counterpart (Morley and Gillion 1-2).

Largely, the late 1980-90's, was characterized by a dramatic turning point in the history of world's relations, and even Cuban-U.S. affairs. The evidence, the Cuban government's concerns shifted from domestic issues to conflicts related to other countries. The Cuban-Soviet ally encouraged the island to install its troops; first, to support movements against the U.S. counter-revolutionary policies in LA; second, to aid negotiated political solution to the conflict in Angola. Indeed, the Cuban troops contributed to elevate the Cuban position, and to the shift in the structure of the international order. South African negotiations, between the U.S. and Cuba were part of the process that led to the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and Namibia (Dominguez, Hernandez and Barberia). So, Cuba's extra-continental interference in 1989-93, played a significant role in shaping the CW in Africa: resulted in the freedom of Angola, and in the birth of Namibia, more it drove the weakening of Apartheid System¹⁴ in South Africa (Kirkendall 10).

Cuban-U.S. clash over Angola was a clear sign, for the competition between Americans, and Soviets to contain Third World countries. Angola's civil war, produced an international conflict, where, Cuban troops were backed by Soviet weapons, fought against South African troops and American arms, within these circumstances, covert operations were planned by the CIA advisers and South African military instructors. From an official American perspective; any American strategic success in Angola could bring back the U.S. shacked prestige by the Vietnam War. (Glejjeses 120-22). In May 1991, Cuban troops reached a total withdrawal from Angola, followed by Soviets' announcement to remove their troops from the island. Therefore, President Bush established a direct shipment' line of humanitarian goods which previously, was passing through Mexico (Hufbauer et al. 5-6).

John Lewis Gaddis, in the book entitled *the United States and the Cold War Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations*; author tackles the consequences of the American foreign policy's style on the rest of the world. In the 20th century, Americans were stimulated by: power, interests and threats, with those motives, the U.S. was neither wholly innocent nor, wholly blamed for what happened out of its territory. Taking into account, the U.S. officials in the previous century were convincing their people that the nation's policy is above old ways of using power, politics, espionage or covert actions (14-15). Theoretically, in 1991, the U.S. called for maintaining global peace stability, respecting countries' sovereignty and fighting global problems human rights. Practically, the 20th century, witnessed violence and enmity.

On that basis, one can hardly pose the question did the U.S. actions in Cuba enhance or affect its stated interests? More did the U.S. acts used to preserve or to degrade the island sovereignty as it promised during the new world order.

End Notes

1. The Teller Amendment. Proposed by Republican senator Henry M. Teller of Colorado, it was added to the congressional resolution calling for war with Spain on 19 April 1898. The Amendment stipulated that the U.S. would not take possession of Cuba as a colony if and when American forces liberated the island from Spanish control. It passed narrowly in the Senate and overwhelmingly in the House of Representatives (*Nikola 197*).
2. The Cold War. Intense economic, political, military, and ideological rivalry between nations, short of military conflict; sustained hostile political policies and an atmosphere of strain between opposed countries (*dictionary. Reference.com*).
3. Peace Treaty. Treaty concluding the Spanish-American war. It was signed by representatives of Spain and the United States in Paris on Dec. 10, 1898(*Britannica.com*).
4. Gerardo Machado. Was the youngest Cuban General in the war of independence that ended with U.S. occupation (in 1898) when he was 27. During the occupation he served as Mayor of Santa Clara, where he was born. Shortly after taking office as Mayor in 1899, a mysterious fire burned the records of his criminal past, hiding from the Americans the fact that prior to the war of independence, Machado and his father were cattle robbers (*historyofcuba.com*).
5. Presidential Amnesty. The action of government by which all persons or certain groups of persons who have committed a criminal offense-usually of a political nature that threatens the sovereignty of the government (such as Sedition or treason)-are granted Immunity from prosecution (*legal-dictionary. the freedictionary.com*).
6. Communism. Economic and social system in which all (or nearly all) property and resources are collectively owned by a classless society and not by individual citizens. Based on the 1848 publication 'Communist Manifesto' by two German political philosophers, Karl Marx (1818-1883) and his close associate Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), it envisaged common ownership of all land and capital and withering a way of coercive power of the state in such a society, social relations were to be regulated on the fairest of all principles: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs (*businessdictionary.com*).
7. Nationalism. Patriotic feeling, principles, or efforts. An extreme form of this especially marked by a feeling of superiority over other countries. Advocacy of political independence for a particular country (*oxforddictionaries.com*).
8. Embargo. Official suspension of import and/or export of some specific or all goods, to or from a specific port, country, or region, for political health, or labor related reasons, for a specified or indefinite period. The United States of America has a long standing embargo in place with Cuba which was meant to penalize the country for their communist beliefs (*businessdictionary.com*).

9. Quota. Proportionate share or part, such as a sales quota. Limitation on the quantity that must not be exceeded, such as an import quota (*businessdictionary.com*).

10. Bay of Pigs Invasion. In 1961, an unsuccessful invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles, supported by the U.S. government. On Apr. 17, 1961, an armed force of about 1,500 Cuban exiles landed in the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) on the south coast of Cuba. Trained since May, 1960, in Guatemala by members of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the approval of the Eisenhower administration, and supplied with arms by the U.S. government, the rebels intended to foment an insurrection in Cuba and overthrow the Communist regime of Fidel Castro (*infoplease.com*).

11. Mongoose Operation. In 30 Nov. 1961 the United States will help the people of Cuba overthrow the communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace, Cuban History Archive (*marxist.org*).

12. Alliance for Progress. A program of foreign aid presented by President Kennedy to help solve the economic and social problems of Latin America (*slovar-vocab.com*).

13. Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), also referred to as the Warsaw Pact, was created on May 14, 1955, by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Officially known as the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, it was a Soviet-led political and military alliance intended to harness the potential of Eastern Europe to Soviet military strategy and to consolidate Soviet control of Eastern Europe during the Cold War. The organization was used to suppress dissent in Eastern Europe through military action. It never enlarged beyond its original membership, and was dissolved in 1991, prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself (*encyclopedia.com*).

14. Apartheid System. Racial segregation and white supremacy had become central aspects of South African policy long before apartheid began. The controversial 1913 Land Act, passed three years after South Africa gained its independence, marked the beginning of territorial segregation by forcing black Africans to live in reserves and making it illegal for them to work as sharecroppers. Opponents of the Land Act formed the South African National Native Congress, which would become the African National Congress (ANC) (*history.com*).

Chapter Two

Circumstance of Tightening the Embargo

Lots of evidences indicated that, the policy and the program of sanctions were implemented in more than one continent; as a reaction to mass killings and clashes in Africa, violation of human rights and weaponries race in North Korea, and shifted to be imposed by Americans Europeans. But, it remained the most applicable policy, in the LA area; due to, the absence of free market economy and democracy from one side, from another, poor human rights records called for the need to impose either, total or, partial sanctions: the former targeting the country's whole economy, while, the latter exclusively punishing economic, military and political leaders, in order to protect civilians.

Conventionally speaking, the idea of embargoing countries came as a set of restriction practices, mainly based on three pillars: changing regimes, protecting sovereignty and keeping global peace; yet, those preset goals still to be unreachable, in both Cuba and North Korea. For this particular reason, embargoes are viewed as a controversial policy inflamed an American heated debate. On that account, this chapter is attempting to present a deeper knowledge on such discussion, via a set of pro and anti-arguments.

2.1. The U.S. Foreign Policy Style

Commonly, the most vital American goal was to confront potential hostile powers. In discussing the current superpower foreign policy style, one actually may ask the following questions: to what extent did the U.S. enhance its stated interests? And, did the U.S. contain real threats over past decades? (15). It is appropriately enough to say that,

Iran, South Vietnam and Cuba widened the U.S. foreign focus, for being annoying cases (16). Since, Castro in Cuba and Kim II in North Korea remained the only believers in international Communism (30). Returning to the Cuban-American crisis in 1962, Bipolarity¹ avoided a probable disaster, due to the little number of parts, unlike in 1914 European war's actors (143). Once more, North Korea and Cuba's exceptional and obvious resistance, even after the USSR dissolving, symbolized the U.S. foreign policy's failure (Gaddis 144). In few words, North Korea and Cuba's long lasting absence of Political Correctness², and openness, lies at the very heart of the U.S. foreign policy's disappointment.

2.2. Cuba Foreign Policy Style

After being completely isolated, in 1990's, Cuba continued to develop relations with Bolivia, China, Venezuela, Russia; and having formal relations with 160 nations in general. Currently, Cuba is a member in the UN, non-Aligned Movement and a partner in Anti-American organization, known as "Bolivarian", as an alternative to LAIA (58); despite that, Cuba improved relations with the EU countries, and welcomed African leaders; yet, it remained one of the terrorism' sponsors from an American perspective. In December 2000, Castro surprised the whole world for being a member of the ACP group; this position without an active role quickly declined, because, the EU was frequently pro-U.S. policy. Till then, Cuba's foreign policy calls for: Respecting to the others' sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, peoples' self-determination, equality between states and peoples, opposing to interfere in others' domestic affairs, internationalism, solidarity and unity for third world countries, rejecting of

discrimination, racism aggression and terrorism; mostly, anti-imperialism (International Business Publications). In short, Cuba's foreign policy style was more open on the world as a complete free and an independent country.

2.3. The U.S. Foreign Policy toward Cuba in Transition

After 1991, the U.S. core focus was the pursuit of interests, especially durable ones. Interests are powerful enough in transforming the U.S. former allies into its enemies and vice versa. Survival, security and preservation of balance of power, shifted to globalize trade and investment concerns (194), to some degree, contradicting its old style of foreign policy toward North Korea and Cuba, as Lord Palmerstone claims, "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies", and "our interests are eternal and those interests it is our duty to follow" (qtd. in Gaddis 193). As mentioned previously, geopolitically, the U.S. broader ambitions split the world into democratic and tyrannical; automatically, requiring a defeat of totalitarianism³, and promotion of democracy (Gaddis 196).

For Peter Kornbluh, and William M. LeoGrande, history is more complicated than it appeared, in their work *Back Channels to Cuba*; authors find that, it is important to understand that, the U.S. desire shifted from punishing Castro to promoting a democratic change in Havana. The evidence, during these years, there were no American military threats to Cuba; U.S. officials started discussed traffics, and they even controlled anti-Castro propaganda, the latter, was appreciated by Cubans who really recognized this change. However, Robert Dole, the Senate majority leader felt that, it was the moment to tighten the embargo, so he passed the legislation cosponsored by Jesse Helms and Dan

Burton, attacking the President's authority and disrupting any chance of transition in Cuba. In 1995-96, the BTTR⁴ continued their violation of Cuba's air space and its national security, until Castro warned the U.S. to break down any future flights; though, FAA advised Basulto to stop such sabotage, whereas, the BTTR's director kept resisting FAA and Cuban authorities, believing that, such action would produce a military clash between Washington and Havana.

2.3.1. The U.S. Post-Cold War Policy

Sanctions' history started pre-CW with Italy in 1935-36, by the League of Nations; yet, the CW's, sanctions were used as coercive strategy, seeking political and economic goals. As an alternative, the U.S. under the UN authority imposed economic sanctions against: Cuba in 1960-70 and Rhodesia in 1981-83. Nevertheless, Iran, Iraq and Libya were classified as post-CW restrictions, often mixed between success and failure. A debate over sanctions started between: those who find sanctions as effective tools of regulations, and those who, do not believe in their efficacy. For this reason, it is possible to say that economic sanctions do not work. To put in other words, the debate over embargoes' success or uncertainty, became more problematic after the CW. Some went through a unilateral role such the U.S.; others included multilateral role, like the UN and other organizations, to be useful means of: resolution, management and disagreement preventer. Paradoxically, challenges of post-CW political economy⁵, raised doubts about sanctions' theory and practice (Jentleson 125-26).

Washington political processes shifted all over the world; after the dissolving of the USSR, and the end of the Cold War. New gates were opened for the U.S. since, the LA

countries, except Cuba went through a democratic choice. In other words, each country in the region elected a civilian leader and left the authoritarian ruling that dominated the political scene for 25 years. The evidence, the LA democratization⁶, went hand in hand with free trade, and private investment, the last allowed the U.S. to reform its policies toward the South (Palmer 9). For that reason, Cuba's difficulties and hardships emerged; only humanitarian aids avoided a real disaster, often caused by the Cuban Democracy Act (1992), and, Helms-Burton Act (1996) that tightened the embargo on Cuba.

2.4. Cuba and the Double Squeeze Play under the Special Period

In 1990's, Cuba witnessed a free fall of its economy mostly the peak oil; making its participation in the world's economy a hard process due to its difficulty to receive external support that resulted in poor living standards and low economic development (Luis 316); all in all, pushed Fidel Castro to declare a "special period in time of peace" in late September 1990, which was the severest economic crisis in the 20th century. The island was the victim of such hardships, due to the shift of former socialist countries toward market economies i.e. the disappearance of socialist regime in Eastern-Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989. Around mid-1994, the Cuban National Bank declared a collapse of 30 % in 1990, 10, 7 % in 1991, 11, 6 % in 1992 and 14, 9 % in 1994. Under the same crisis, nearly all economic sectors were paralyzed (Perez-Lopez 386-89).

2.4.1. Cuba's Responses to the Special Period

After the crash, the Cuban government surprised the U.S., in surviving and carrying on even with problems in leadership, economic exclusion and the absence of the USSR's aid; relying on economic reforms to pass over its hard times, and to approach more accommodative economy. Primarily, in 1993, Cuba legalized Cubans foreign currency earning, to improve the Cuban people's living level. Secondly, it enhanced energy and mineral fabrication, via: corporation between its ministries, state's enterprises and foreign investors. Thirdly, the government delivered the state's owned lands to farmers, opened markets, and boosted up the agricultural making. Fourthly, it developed the tourism sector, substituting the income of sugar and oil traffic, by introducing money and jobs to the island, so, accelerating the economic recovery. Finally and most importantly, Havana banned monetary support to state's big enterprises because, of their uselessness, and permitted small businesses, and self-employment in over 150 occupations (Ribas 5-7)

2.5. Sanctions Inclinations after the Cold War 1990-99

Though, the U.S. reduced the adoption of sanctions, it did not end their use. Interestingly, in post CW era the U.S. was more dynamic in imposing unilateral sanctions⁷; because of, new events and challenges like: African armed conflicts and globalization's impact on economic bans; the diffusion of power between: France, China, the UK, in addition to Moscow and Washington. In other words, old players were faded and new players were emerged such as Congress' role, sub-federal voices and NGOs. As example, advocacy and lobby groups often succeeded in mobilizing Congressional

support for sanctions (see fig.1), resulting in tightening embargoes against: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, Burma, Nigeria and Sudan (Hufbauer, Elliott and Schott 128-130).

Table1

The evolution of U.S. sanctions policy.

Policy goal	1914-44		1945-69		1970-89		1990-2000	
	Success cases	Failure cases	Success cases	Failure cases	Success cases	Failure cases	Success cases	Failure cases
Modest policy changes	2	0	5	4	7	10	8	7
Regime change and democratization	0	4	7	6	9	22	9	23
Disruption of military adventures	2	4	2	2	0	6	0	3
Military impairment ^a	3	0	0	6	4	10	2	4
Other major policy changes	0	1	2	13	3	4	5	5
All cases	7	9	16	31	23	52	24	42
All US cases	3	5	14	14	13	41	17	33
Unilateral US cases ^b	0	3	10	6	8	33	2	9

a. Military impairment failures for 1990-2000 include the 2002-06 phase of Case 93-1: US, UN v. North Korea.
b. Cases where the United States is the only sender and international cooperation is nonexistent or minor (1 or 2 on our index of cooperation).

Source: Peterson Institute for International Economics (Hufbauer, Elliott, and Schott).

Within the same context of sanctions' policy, in post-CW, democracy, trade and investment became more important than the hemispheric security; as a result, an elevated pressure to eliminate the Cuban embargo came to surface, especially, with the growing competition from: Japan, China and Europe. However, the U.S. policy was interrupted by the Cuban revolution in 1959; what lead the U.S.-LA relations to remain almost the same before and during the CW, which was based on 1940-60's ideology i.e. the use of military power to achieve goals in resisting Communism, whenever necessary (Dominguez 1-47).

2.5.1. Sanctions Types

Sanctions are tools used by either, countries or international organizations, to persuade a particular group or government, seeking a change via restricting: trade, investment or other commercial activities. Mainly, those restrictions were placed against: developing weapons of mass destruction, violating human rights or trading illegally. Where, the severity of the breach, determines the degree of limitation (Kolodkin). All world sanctions are fixed in larger context; yet, sanctions differ from one sender part to another: the UN, the EU, or individual country like the U.S., firstly, invariable implementing sanctions, are collective in nature, imposed under the authority of the UNSC. Secondly, substitutive measures, additionally used to back up the UN sanctions, in fact, this type can make a difference in keeping negotiations, taking the example of Iran; thirdly, autonomous bans lack serious negotiations and take decades, similar to the U.S. unilateral sanctions against Cuba (Biersteker and Portela 1-4). Recently, when it comes to sanctions policy, disagreement over the issue of their extraterritoriality became a dominant theme among the targeting partners, since the EU accepted to ease the ban, in case the target regime started to implement partial steps toward correctness; unlike the U.S.' requirements of full regulation.

2.5.1.1. Economic Sanctions

In fact, economic sanctions are the most common types; toughly, designed to isolate the target country's economy. Those procedures may include trade embargoing, boycotting, assets freezing, restricting: ravel, cash, as well as technological transfer. Within the previously mentioned standards, the U.S. placed sanctions against Cuba, North

Korea and Iran...etc. Basically, under the Treasury Department's authority, the OFAC was responsible for administrating and enforcing economic and trade prohibitions on the basis of two criterions: the U.S. foreign policy and its national security goals (Kolodkin).

2.5.1.2. The Procedure of New Sanctions

In request for human rights' respect and protection; the U.S. succeeded to embargo a number of countries, after an exceptional pressure, in which, regime change⁸ was the chief goal of sanctions. In Africa or in LA, measures against targets increased from one fourth prior WWII, to nearly half in 1990's. Moving to post 2000, where Iraq, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Afghanistan, Libya, Angola, Rwanda, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eretria, Sierra Leon, and Cot d'Ivoire, each of which had the same destiny of being the U.S targets. That is why, a number of attempts of regime change coupled with military involvement, making it not very different from CW experiences. Which is to say, the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions, by different policies of UN members; often, focused on global security and peace, leading the UNSC in 1990's to place more vigorous bans, harsher than, during 45 years ago (Hufbauer, Elliott and Schott 132).

The first criterion in sanctions chapter is breaking regimes into episodes in order to evaluate their efficacy: purpose, change, to add or to suspend measures. Further, sanctions have multiple purposes; they can be coercive, constrain or signal a target. Back to penalties' effectiveness, it was mainly determined by the contribution of UN prohibitions to the outcome, and the outcome itself. The Procedure was deliberated to protect civilians and to punish bad-mannered leaders through the coming measures: Travel Bans for individuals and groups, aviation to and from, arms bans to reduce conflicts and mass

killing, assets freezing, commodity sanctions, diplomatic restrictions, proliferation of sensitive goods -recently jumped to reach 91%- and finally, financial restriction (Biersteker and Hudakova 1-7).

2.5.2. Challenges of New Sanctions

Under the UN instructions, the proliferation of sanctions came along two epochs: during the CW, such Cuba's case; and after the CW. A procedure for the most part sent by: the U.S., Western European countries, and regional organizations against target economies. At work place, the act of penalizing: Russia, Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq and Libya diverged from its pre-set objectives. What's more, sanctions led to the emergence of a number of problems like: the impact on extra-territorial trade, human rights, medicines and investment. To sum, sanctions' implications had an effect on both senders and receivers, even they generated legal challenges ("International Sanctions: Legal..." 124). That explains, embargoing countries did not remain an exclusive American subject, but also, other states and organizations' one.

Even after the WWII, "Regime Norms" still exist as the most recurring and leading factor in the area of international economic policy. For this particular reason, GATT/WTO, took charge to free trade all over the globe; by declaring the right of all nations, including Cuba to be parallel partners in international negotiations and norms settings. That explains; giving each nation one vote, even the world's super power, in the process of decision making, this means equalizing the position of Cuba and the U.S., and threatening the American foreign policy to a large degree. In post-CW era, the system of Multilateralism¹⁶ was challenged only by the U.S. as the world's sole power; since, the

organism limited its authority in worldwide political economy. Driving, the U.S. to re-evaluate its interests and foreign policy objectives, and liberal institutions to reach the fact that, no authority can make it obligatory to draw the norms and rules of regimes (Falkner). Within these conditions, “Regime Norms” controlled the world economies for a significant period of time; yet, rebellious institutions such: WTO and GATT called for a liberation wave to equalize all nations, without being restricted by their political structures.

Over the years, sanctions touched innocent people rather than intended government officials. Often, a trade embargo affects a farmer who could not sell his products or, a worker in a factory, who could not receive raw materials. In most cases, embargoes deprived needier and ordinary people from having basic goods, in practice, the U.S. punished the same civilians whom it wanted to democratize and to relax. Also, it halted people-to-people contact, the evidence, in 1980, President Carter cut off the Moscow Olympics, in reaction to Soviets invasion of Afghanistan. In other words, sanctions went even beyond the economic deprivation (Kolodkin).

2.6. Clinton vs. the U.S. Philosophy of Tightening the Embargo at Workplace

From the first day in the White House, Clinton cared about the domestic affairs more than foreign ones; like intensifying democracy, realizing economic growth, and eliminating poverty and discrimination. Although, restoring relations with Cuba was one of the Administration’s objectives discussed in Miami in 1994 (SOA); yet, President Clinton failed to realize them during his eight years in office, mainly due to the

Congressional pressure, in addition to the American intervention in international environmental forums and treaties in developing the hemisphere (Palmer 1-14).

At this level, it was too difficult for American foreign policy makers to stop or, even to lessen the penalty, since, the U.S. programs, policies and practices in effect continued to pursue the already designed goals, which embraces two elements: (a) promoting a democratic change in Cuba, and (b) limiting the foreign investment with it. Pointing out, actions which, were intended to solve Cuba's internal problems. More, they found it necessary to pay attention to chaos caused by Castro's long lasting disobedience. Yet, looking back to the history of both sides, one may question the possibility of getting in touch with this end?

Each attempt to normalize ties between the U.S. and Cuba was interrupted by the other's misbehavior. So, within this situation it is difficult to halt the embargo on Cuba. Taking 1996 incident as an example, after secret talks headed by Clinton administration, Havana bombed two U.S. planes. As a reaction, the Congress made it difficult on any future president to leave the ban individually. On that account, it is possible to say that, the process of Normalization could be easily achieved, if both parts focused on their mutual areas of interests; avoided evaluating things from a purely pessimistic vision. And why not to modernize their policies toward each other's, based on the understanding and the acceptance of different and primary needs (Kornbluh and LeoGrande).

2.6.1. The Cuban Democracy Act 1992 Resurrected American Old Habits

As a legal document, the CDA, was intended to control the democratic behavior in Cuba, especially when, Cubans started to take risky ways to reach the U.S. and other

places. By the placement of this Act, the U.S. aimed at bringing a peaceful transition to the island (under Sec. 6006.), boosting the economic growth via a controlled embargo, targeting Castro's government, and helping Cubans (under Sec. 6004.), looking for foreign collaboration and reinforcement of sanctions' policy (under Sec. 6003.). This Act implies that, the U.S. would not exclude the other nations' opinions in taking anti-Cuba decisions. More, it was trying to find short cut to end any lasting military or technical aid from both: former Soviet countries and non-Soviet ones to Cuba, by which, seeking a halt of Cuba's violation of human rights, forcefully, to keep the embargo on Castro as he stick to non-democratic behavior, to show the possibility to moderate the embargo as a reply to Cuba's optimistic progress; also boosting free trade and organizing fair elections in Cuba, regulating its political future; therefore, planning for direct development of the U.S. policy toward Cuba in the post-Castro era ("Cuban Democracy Act...").

In 6 April 1992, the Cuban Democracy Act was introduced by the U.S. policy makers; then, it was amended in 24 September 1992. The Act witnessing that, the President should encourage countries to limit their trade and credit with Cuba, especially, exports to the island, except medicines and telecommunication services; by establishing a direct mail services to and from Cuba, from one side. From another, the Act prohibiting the production of certificates for deals between the U.S. and Cuba, also, punishing vessels which entered Cuba to engage in doing business in the U.S. within 180 days after their exit from Cuba, as well as, vessels carrying goods or passengers, excluding those authorized by Secretary of Treasury; another worth mentioning, the Act reducing American-Cuban payments to their relatives inside the U.S. On the outside, the CDA still authorizes the president to inflict sanctions against countries aiding Cuba. Evidently, any assistance to Cuba was considered as ineligible under FAA (1961), and AECA. To sum,

earlier penalties could be nullified only when the Cuban government would meet: human rights, democracy, free markets economy, and halt its broader involvement. If the American president presents a report to the Congress, including Cuba's full regulation, then, he would encourage: (1) the island's admission to international organizations and financial institutions, (2) offering an emergency recovery to Cuba while, transforming, most importantly, (3) ending the embargo ("H.R. 5352 Cuban Democracy ...").

In 1992, the U.S. fear from the growing European investment with Cuba, led to the CDA's codification; after, Havana developed formal relations with the EU. The latter, manifested through an economic exchange of 84% of imports and 29% of exports. Again, the Cuban-European advancement encouraged the Cuban-American Democrat and Congressional representative, Robert Torricelli, to present the Cuban Democracy Act, sooner it turned into a law; squeezing not only the economic denial on Cuba, but also, cost the EU and Canada a loss of approximately 600 million dollars. Hereafter, the law was directed to international American subsidiaries doing business with Cuba (Ribas 7).

Going profoundly, the American Congress under (Sec. 6001.) shed the light on: Cuba's opposition of the visit of the UN investigators, and its oppression of freedom of speech, assembly and press...etc. From a humanitarian side, the Congress was paying attention to Cubans' non organized flights to foreign destinations, due to the Cuban economy's fatigue, caused by Castro's broad military interventions in El Salvador. At that time, findings show that Castro's imprisonment, exile, and terrorization, proved no Cuban step toward democracy. Therefore the U.S. attempted to overcome Cuba's food and oil shortages; the evidence, after the collapse of the USSR, the Communist Party Congress, stated Castro's weak contribution in solving domestic problems, requiring an urgent reforms. With a collapsing prestige in the Caribbean region, Cuba was giving an

opportunity to the U.S. and others to ensure its change, similar to, U.S.-EU successful collaboration in democratizing Eastern Europe, making it something possible for Cuba too (CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT Ch. 69). On the same pathway of the CDA, the U.S. policy makers completed the squeeze against Cuba, and its potential supporters via Helms-Burton Act.

2.6.2. Reviving the Iron Curtain by Helms-Burton Act 1996

It is true that, the embargo was placed by an executive order during Kennedy's term (1962); however, up till HBA it turned to be a legal one ("Helms Burton Act: Resurrecting..."). In 1996 the Congress passed Helms-Burton Act, or what is called LIBERTAD, against Cuba, Iran and Libya; thus inserting sanctions on an extraterritorial basis. Three years after, with the same superiority the Congress gave abandonment authority to the American president. Where, leaders almost escaped and innocent people paid for their front-runners' policies. For that reason, the U.S. moved toward "alternative sanctions", by which targeting specific officials or governments without attacking the whole country's economy; the North Korean leader was exposed to such kind of stoppage to protect North Korean civilians. Yet, alternative methods requires detailed and exact statistics about targeted individuals and governments, unlike traditional ones (Hufbauer, Elliott and Schott).

Within the same space, President Clinton and Congressmen' major goal was to push Cubans to obtain an elected leader; thus, the U.S. signed the bill into a law to target Castro's non-elected government; by which restricting the flux of hard currency to Cuba; more, the U.S. denied Cuba's trade partners from entering its territory, unless, they

disassociate themselves from the U.S. nationalized properties. At work place, HBA punished the Mexican Grupo Domos¹⁰, and the Cuban Sherritt International¹¹ companies; for their violation of trade accords from an American perspective; while others considered it as an abuse of their sovereignty. That's why, Mexico, Canada and the EU, pointed the finger on the Act's two last Titles, in the UN and OAS assemblies. While, under WTO's power, the European Community was able to take legal actions against the American Act; this move could rob the U.S. from its main trading partners, and weakening HBA's authority (Lopez 41-42). The unexpected expansion of the U.S. tightening of the embargo, against the socialist island impacted not only, the U.S-Cuba relations, but also, raised the world's opposition toward the American foreign policy.

2.6.3. Helms-Burton Act 1996 between Reception and Criticism

In his Policy Report entitled U.S.* CUBA Vol.1, No.1, Editor Ralph J. Galliano states that, in 1995 Senator Jesse Helms became the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee replacing Claiborne Pell, who proposed the lifting of the embargo against Cuba; while, overtly Helms insisted that, the embargo should be highly tightened. Moreover, Helms promised to totally reshape the already existing and future potential treaties such: the UN peace keeping, AID, NATO, and WB. That explains Helms' swear to limit any foreign aid to the American source of trouble i.e. Cuba. More importantly, to prepare for Castro's lifting plan. Ironically, before attending Miami Summit, President Clinton called 103rd Congress to vote for the passage of GATT, WTO; ironically, Clinton supported the CDA (1992) in his presidential campaign. Not to forget that, GATT and WTO would give the U.S. only one vote without a veto power, by which, threatening the

American sovereignty and challenging its laws' international effects. On that basis, the WTO's principle of equalizing and freeing trade all over the world deprived the U.S. a position it used to hold in the UN General Assembly (2-4).

In reaction to a mass Cuban immigration to the U.S., President Clinton tightened more travel boundaries in 1994, (CRS-2); though, he tried to ease some of them; to democratize Cuba and to encourage free circulation of ideas. But, after the Cuban regime shoot down two American civilian planes, which violated the Cuban air space; Clinton halted flights for an opened duration. Following the visit of Pope John II to Cuba, Washington announced changes in its policy toward the island; therefore, the OFAC permitted nine direct flights between Miami and Havana, next departure extended to New York and Los Angeles, hoping to develop people-to-people exchange. In October 2000, Clinton signed the TSREEA (Title IX of P.L. 106-387), which banned travel related deals for touristic aims, and shrinking the old authority of the OFAC in passing particular travel permits (Sullivan, Cuba-U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Legislative Initiatives CRS-3). Based on the already stated events, one may summarize that, the U.S. tightening of travel restrictions and legislative projects was nourished by Cuba's behaviors, to the extent that, the U.S. permitted only travel for very specific purposes.

In 104th Congress, under the Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms announced his entire opposition concerning the lifting the ban on Cuba. But, he prioritized to free Cubans from 36 years of violence under Castro's rule. The tightening of 33 years of the embargo against Cuba could be summarized into three titles: Title I: Strengthening International Sanctions against the Castro Government. Then, Title II: Support for Free and Independent Cuba. Lastly, Title III: Protection of American Property Rights Abroad

(Galliano, *U.S.* CUBA Policy Report* Vol.2 No.1 1-2). Supporting HBA, also, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich in 6 March 1995, asserted that:

But I would say to those businessmen, before you sign a deal, visit a Cuban prison, learn what a police-state dictatorship is like, and ask yourself, do you need the money bad enough to get it off the backs of the people who are imprisoned because all they seek is the freedoms that you enjoy? And I would beg every American business leader, be patient, let us get rid of the Castro brothers, let us get rid of a handful of presidential advisers, let us free the Cuban people. (Galliano, *U.S.**

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Based on the already mentioned argument, HBA was a humanitarian legislative in nature, tried to find solutions, and to refine the Cuban people oppressive social conditions; more, to free them from dictatorial rulers; even at the expense of American businessmen profits.

In 24 February 1996, the Cuban action of shooting down of two planes belonging to an anti-Castro illegal group (BTTR) over Florida's straits; confirmed Castro's antagonism to Washington; resulting in the incorporation of the embargo on Cuba into a law. Despite, HBA contradiction of the international law, in 12 March 1996, President Clinton signed it and confessed that "nobody in the world agrees with our Cuban policy now" (qtd in. Leo Grande 214). HBA as a new "Iron Curtain" revived the most punitive measure on Cuba, thus, breaking down any possibility of re-establishing relations, whenever it is in effect. In reaction, the European Union, Canada and Mexico allied against the Act's violation of

NAFTA principles, and threatened to retaliate if Washington went through enforcing the law's extraterritorial provision (LeoGrande, "Enemies Evermore..." 211-14).

Theoretically, the U.S. policy toward Cuba was conceived to improve human rights; but rather to realize its objectives. It is true that, HBA came with a moral taste; nevertheless its essence is purely economic. Many in the embargo's lobby have a lot of business interests in the ban itself (Ratliff and Fontaine 43). It means that, the 1996 legislation, retarded human rights there, denied the whole population's the right of self-determination, violated Cuba's sovereignty, as well as, the international law; making it reasonable enough to receive rejection from various parts, mainly the International Community; since, there was a clear difference between: improving human rights, and establishing trade union, over economic, cultural and social rights (318). What began as a punishment to the nationalization of the American properties; unpredictably turned to reinforce Castro's resistance to the American imperial design (Lopez-Levy and Abrahams 320-22).

Therefore, American officials would think about different aspects for their future, amongst human rights and immigration, they would focus on public and international community's interests instead of those of special interest⁹. For those moderates, Normalization with Cuba is the most profound step; since, there are a number of non-democratic, dictatorial and Communist states sharing normal relations with the U.S. such: Bulgaria, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua. The best example, though, Saudi Arabia and China do not implement the American democratic standards; yet via normal diplomacy, the U.S. kept protecting its concerns there (Bagchi 62-63). For this particular reason, one may question why the U.S. kept trying to remove only one regime case sharing the same political structure with its dictatorial and communist allies, in Asia and the Middle East?

And for what purpose, the U.S. delayed to apply the same principle of breaking the ice with Cuba?

2.6.4. Major Objectives of the Cuban Democracy Act and Helms-Burton Act

Cuba's loss of 85% of its extraterritorial trade pushed it to start reforms for the sake of welcoming foreign investors and capitals. Moving to, HBA or the LIBERTAD which was introduced to isolate Cuba's economy and to bring Castro down, from one side. From another, the Act negatively labeled Washington's international image. Therefore, Representative Charles Rangel, suggested "Trade with Cuba Act" to leave the ban and to re-establish connections; it means to confront LIBERTAD the latter plot was neglected by Congress ("Helms-Burton Act: Resurrecting..."). The debate over HBA seems to be never ending, because, the bill continued to damage the U.S. foreign policy, economy and to alienate its allies.

Both the CDA (1992) and HBA (1996) came with an aggressive tone toward the Cuban regime, and as powerful tools in squeezing the ban, and even in superseding the U.S. executive authority. Another worth mentioning, HBA was the second American step to reinforce Torricelli law (1992); to help in a nonviolent change, and to reconstruct the country, via a set of democratic efforts, including: grants, cooperative agreements concerning human rights (Kerry 1). To be questioned now, is whether these laws have helped the Cuban people or not? Or to what extent the CDA and HBA managed to improve Cubans' situation at work place?

Similarly, the whole process of democratizing Cuba, via the CDA and HBA was judged by both American and Cuban officials. For Jimmy Carter, the Act was a barrier to

the democratic transition in Cuba, in the same way, Carl Johan Gorth, former investigator for Cuba, of the UN Human Rights Commission, reported that, the embargo aggravated more the human rights situation in Cuba. Also, for the Cuban dissident, Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, the U.S. could promote democracy on the island, through a policy of investment, better than punishment. Obviously, for more than three decades, the U.S. hostility did not bring any positive variation to Cuba. That's why, Western Europeans, went through a policy of dialogue, normal international relations and commercial openness with Cuba (Lopez 42).

2.7. George W. Bush Emphasized the Tightening of the Embargo

During Bush's years, the political atmosphere was in between Integration¹² and Fragmentation¹³. First, Integrationists were seeking one world or multi-nationalism at economic, security and intellectual level; inspired by the proposal of Woodrow Wilson¹⁴, for the League of Nations (197). Backing the last option, Bush administration, saw that, the NATO collectiveness was more beneficial for the ex-isolationist power, at work place. Since, the approach helped in the transfer of the American ideas, not less important than its military and economic influence. Positively, the transfer of American ideas raised awareness about the value of education in authoritarian countries, to question the legitimacy of those unelected leaders, such: Chinese, Russians. The second founded by the sense of favoritism, and nationalism (198), in: Ireland, Canada, Japan and Cuba (199). Noting that, Integration' actors were and still trying to fulfill material goals (prosperity and profits). So they were and still in need to break frontiers for the technological exchange or the so called Smith's Theory i.e. the more products are exchanged, the more

Integration occurs. While, Fragmentation' actors were and still working on unworldly desires and un-exchangeable products, for instance, Cuba and Venezuela's model of freedom (Gaddis 201). Based on the already stated facts, one can summarize the whole scenario of the American-Cuba conflict, as a competition between Integration and Fragmentation curators.

For forty years, travel restrictions continued to be one of the U.S. tools to isolate Cuba; excluding the period from 1977-82, in which, Washington minimized such kind of limits. After that, there was a debate between: optimistic advisers who believed through lifting the embargo they would influence Castro to change Cuba's political structure; for the others, tourists' travel to Havana would sponsor the Cuban leader. Within this context, 107th Congress had multiple powers: to eliminate or, to ease travel control to Cuba, yet, sessions ended with no decisive decision. Therefore, President Bush called the Treasury Department to enlarge the capacities of the OFAC, in an attempt to create more than one body in licensing travel to Cuba. Since in 2001, the OFAC opened a reform to the conditions of TSREEA (in October 2000, Congress passed and the President signed the TSREEA, banning travel related exchange for touristic aims, this Act shared the OFAC's authority in permitting specific travels) (CRS-4). By the coming of 2003, the American administration also relaxed the stoppage on family visits, and nullified penalties on educational exchange out of the academic framework. In the same year, 108th Congress threatened to veto the former measure, if it would continue to lessen the embargo (Sullivan). As usual, a human rights regress in Cuba redirected the legislative plot, when, Castro's government arrested 75 protesters (Kerry 8-10).

During Bush's years the process of tightening the embargo was also, shaped by the Congress' prominent role; in 2001, the House of Representatives voted for further

restrictions of travel to Cuba, while, key Senators worked to repeal the sanctions; yet, 11 September attacks hindered any step toward Normalization with Cuba; besides, Fidel Castro's open condemnation of the U.S. "War on Terror"¹⁵. In the same year, the U.S helped Cuba after it was damaged by Michelle's storm; consequently, the Cuban government started to discuss an all cash food purchase under the U.S. legislation. This deed revived the debate over the U.S. policy toward Cuba, among anti-Castro who called for further measures; and normalizers who want to reestablish economic and diplomatic infrastructure with Cuba (Erikson 65-66).

The 9/11 attacks, led the U.S. Department of State to classify Cuba as a "state sponsor of terrorism"; firstly, because of Cuba's support of rebellious movements in LA, and international terrorists at large. Moreover, since 1960, Cuba trained Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and National Liberty Army, one decade after; it did the same with Nicaraguan and El Salvadoran. Secondly, Castro's development of biological warfare agents, since it had eleven biochemical plants, half of the quantity was devoted to military use. That is why, the U.S. classified Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism (3); yet, it did not classify Mexico as a terrorist one; despite its use of violence to achieve political goals (Johnson 4-5).

2.8. Signs of the Failure of the Embargo against Cuba

Academics, opinion leaders, and diplomats seek to improve the U.S. policy, and better survival of its interests in the hemisphere at large, and Cuba in particular; found that, the U.S with supportive policy objectives could guide Cubans to determine their political and economic future. Merely, via democratic means taken by Cubans themselves not imposed

by Americans. More precisely, to emphasize constructive goals and to reach peaceful democracy, not an overnight metamorphosis, with special regard to Cuba's behavior and cooperation. However, lot of obstacles emerged from time to time, delayed the process of rapprochement between the counter parts (Pascual).

After the long-established sanctions' option, the UN members reached tiredness, so, limitation of arms, restriction of travel and freezing assets became an adequate alternative; especially when, old ways deviated from their goals, to target innocent people rather than intended regimes. Within the same context, embargoes proved their ineffectiveness to achieve coercive aspirations, such adjustment. A set of Acts TWEA (1917), EAA (1969), and IEEPA (1977), enabled the American president to enjoy an extraterritorial authority, boycotting trade and financial transaction with foreign individuals and groups; in addition to this power, the executive branch could delay aid and deny Export-Import under FAA and EIA in 1945 (Hufbauer, Elliott and Schott 133-34). To put in one word, Congressional involvement in imposing sanction, reached a high number of episodes in 1990-99.

The embargo was often criticized since its imposition in 1960's; simply because, the Communist party leader remained in power for a long duration, by the passing of time, international organizations, were still making efforts to improve human rights and to promote regime change. Most importantly, in 10 November 1996, Castro signed "Vina del Mar" declaration, at Chile for: (1) the reaffirmation of democracy and political pluralism; (2) freedom of speech and association; (3) free, regular and transparent elections, and (4) respect of human rights. Yet from Cuba, Castro's disobedience resurrected by declaring the Communist party as a necessity, and any attempt of changing it was seen as a foreign intervention in Cuba's domestic policies. One might argue that,

efforts of tightening the economic denial from 1992-96, resulted in increasing the Cuban opposition rather than fulfilling American interests (Lopez 46-51). The irony, for thirty years ago, the U.S. worked to reform Cuba's policy, however, the U.S. policy shifted instead of the Cuban one.

Also, Castro's resistance to American attempts to defeat him put Americans into a very sensitive situation, in view of the fact that, Castro's government has regular diplomatic and trade relations with 110 countries among which some NATO members. What is worse, HBA isolated the U.S. itself not Cuba and failed to pull others' sympathy toward the ban on Cuba (Bagchi 63-64). Similarly, Chairman and CEO of multinational agricultural commodities company, Dwayne Andreas says that: "this is the only country in the world that doesn't trade with Cuba. So the embargo is against us, against the United States. It's an act of our government against its own people because Cuba can buy anything it wants anywhere else in the world" (qtd in. Galliano, *U.S. * CUBA Policy Report* Vol.2 No. 5 6).

In the Caribbean region, the U.S. embargo on Cuba was placed to blockade the spread of Communism; but by the absence of such danger, it is reasonable enough to be lifted. Yet, a strong Cuban-American lobby continued to manipulate American officials to impose new measures in removing it. Cuban-Americans were the main supporters of the embargo, from one side; from another, they were its first violators: by way of sending 600 millions of American Dollars annually, almost equal to tourism and sugar amount of the Cuban income (51). However, Castro's rejection to conform to the U.S. requirements, led to the squeeze procedure via the CDA and HBA; and making it too difficult to stimulate Cuba's change. So, the U.S. allowed those pressure groups to affect Washington and Havana possible convergence. The ban glorified and gave Castro a memorable image in

menacing U.S.' Imperialism¹⁷, and in gaining more sympathy for his country's economic collapse. For this reason, Americans appeared inflexible in front of Castro's lengthy fossilization, where he spent forty years convincing his people that any coming government would deprive them from jobs, houses and lives (49). Lastly, the lifting of the ban needs more than a friendly relationship, based on the respect of democracy or human rights, which are hard to achieve within the Cuban circumstances (Ratliff and Fontaine 10).

To sum, the U.S. embargo against Cuba remained to be the most lasting embargo in the world's history. Though, for long decades the embargo was largely denounced for being a violation of the sovereign equality of states. What is worse; it is still in effect and American foreign policy makers instead of implementing an alternative solution; they worked for further tightening. Yet, things did not go as they expected to be; because, Castro's government succeeded to maintain normal trade and diplomatic relations with the rest of the world. This clarifies that, sanction's policy affected not only Cubans; but even Americans themselves. So, one might say that, this comprehensive policy proved to be an inadequate tool to regulate Cuba's behavior and to defeat Castro's regime.

End Notes

1. Bipolarity. Having two poles, as the earth, relating to, or found at both Polar Regions. Characterized by opposite extremes, as two conflicting political philosophies (*dictionary.com*).

2. Political Correctness. A term used to describe language, policies, or measures which are intended not to offend or disadvantage any particular group of people in society. The term had only scattered usage before the early 1990s, usually as an ironic self-description, but entered more mainstream usage in the United States when it was the subject of a series of articles in The New York Times (*wikipedia.org*).

3. Totalitarianism. Is a political system where the state recognizes no limits to its authority and strives to regulate every aspect of public and private life wherever feasible? Totalitarian regimes stay in political power through an all-encompassing propaganda campaign, which is disseminated through the state-controlled mass media (*citelighter.com*).

4. Bothers To The Rescue. Is a Miami-based activist nonprofit organization headed by José Basulto. Formed by Cuban exiles, the group is widely known for its opposition to the Cuban government and its former leader Fidel Castro. The group describes itself as a humanitarian organization aiming to assist and rescue raft refugees emigrating from Cuba and to "support the efforts of the Cuban people to free themselves from dictatorship through the use of active nonviolence".[1] Brothers to the Rescue, Inc., was founded in May 1991 "after several pilots were touched by the death of" fifteen-year-old Gregorio Perez Ricardo,[2] who "fleeing Castro's Cuba on a raft, perished of severe dehydration in the hands of U.S. Coast Guard officers who were attempting to save his life." (*wikipedia.org*).

5. Political Economy. The theory or study of the role of public policy in influencing the economic and social welfare of a political unit (*merriam-webster.com*).

6. Democratization. Introduce a democratic system or democratic principles to: public institutions need to be democratized (*oxforddictionaries.com*).

7. Unilateral. Involving only one group or country. Constituting or relating to a contract or engagement by which an express obligation to do or forbear is imposed on only one party (*merriam-webster.com*).

8. Regime change. The replacement of one administration or government by another, especially by means of military force (*oxforddictionaries.com*).

9. Interest groups. An organized group that tries to influence the government to adopt certain policies or measures. Also, called pressure group (*dictionary.com*).

10. Mexican Grupo Domos. It was one of the United States targets in foreign business executives, that was obliged to choose between Fidel Castro and Uncle Sam;

during the Clinton administration, trying a new economic weapon against the durable Cuban dictator, is about to go after executives of foreign companies doing business in Cuba (*articles.chicagotribune.com*).

11. Sherritt International. Is one of the world's largest producers of nickel from lateritic sources with operations in Canada, Cuba and Madagascar. We pride ourselves on being a leading low-cost producer that generates sustainable prosperity for our employees, investors and the communities in which we operate. We are also the largest independent energy producer in Cuba, with extensive oil and power operations across the island (*infomine.com*).

12. Integration. Is defined as mixing things or people together that were formerly separated (*yourdictionary.com*).

13. Fragmentation. The disintegration, collapse, or breakdown of norms of thought, behavior, or social relationship (*dictionary.com*).

14. Woodrow Wilson. The 28th U.S. president served in office from 1913 to 1921 and led America through World War I (1914-1918). An advocate for democracy and world peace, Wilson is often ranked by historians as one of the nation's greatest presidents. Wilson was a college professor, university president and Democratic governor of New Jersey before winning the White House in 1912. Once in office, he pursued an ambitious agenda of progressive reform that included the establishment of the Federal Reserve and Federal Trade Commission. Wilson tried to keep the United States neutral during World War I but ultimately called on Congress to declare war on Germany in 1917. After the war, he helped negotiate a peace treaty that included a plan for the League of Nations. Although the Senate rejected U.S. membership in the League, Wilson received the Nobel Prize for his peacemaking efforts (*history.com*).

15. War on Terror. "Global War on Terror" is the term used to describe the military, political, diplomatic, and economic measures employed by the United States and other allied governments against organizations, countries, or individuals that are committing terrorist acts; that might be inclined to engage in terrorism; or that support those who do commit such acts. The Global War on Terror is an amorphous concept and a somewhat indistinct term, yet its use emphasizes the difficulty in classifying the type of nontraditional warfare being waged against U.S. and Western interests by various terrorist groups that do not represent any nation. The term was coined by President George W. Bush in a September 20, 2001, televised address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress, and has been presented in official White House pronouncements, fact sheets, State of the Union messages, and such National Security Council (NSC) position papers as the National Security Strategy (March 2006) and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February 2003 and September 2006 editions). Since 2001, the Global War on Terror has been directed primarily at Islamic terrorist groups but has also been expanded to include actions against all types of terrorism (*search.credoreference.com*).

16. Multilateralism, process of organizing relations between groups of three or more states. Beyond that basic quantitative aspect, multilateralism is generally considered to comprise certain qualitative elements or principles that shape the character of the arrangement or institution. Those principles are an indivisibility of interests among participants, a commitment to diffuse reciprocity, and a system of dispute settlement intended to enforce a particular mode of behavior. Multilateralism has a long history, but it is principally associated with the era after World War II, during which there was a burgeoning of multilateral agreements led primarily by the United States. The organizations most strongly embodying the principle of multilateralism are to be found in trade (the World Trade Organization [WTO]) and security (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]). Numerous multilateral environmental institutions also exist (www.britannica.com/topic/multilateralism).

17. Imperialism. Is the practice of a larger country or government growing stronger by taking over poorer or weaker countries that have important resources? An example of imperialism was England's practices of colonizing India. Imperialism, the policy and practice of seeking to dominate the economic or political affairs of underdeveloped areas or weaker countries (www.yourdictionary.com/imperialism).

Chapter Three

U.S.-Cuba Recent Normalization

For decades, ‘Embargo’ was the American key to regulate the behavior of totalitarian regimes or bad mannered leaders and those who were not cooperating with the U.S. Whereas, changes in the political and economic circumstances, called for the need to bring or to restore relations to normal conditions between target and targeting countries. After a long period of isolation, regulation between countries came as an expected product. Moreover, the Americans were and still in need to normalize relations with their former enemies; though it was emphasized by many American presidents; yet, it was unfortunate that normalization was delayed for decades due to a number of causes; that had its place in both parts. That explains why, hostility and confrontation continued to dominate different phases of the American foreign policy, to the extent that policies were almost backed off by groups of special interests, resulting in recurring cycles of disagreement. Lastly, the motivation of getting normal relations drove the U.S. and its adversaries to cooperate and to compensate the historical disadvantages of times of icy relations.

3.1. The Exceptional Case of Normalization with Cuba

In the report entitled “Cuba-United States Relation in the Age of Obama”, the New York University’s teacher Elsada Diana Cassells asserts that, before 1959’s, the U.S. was Cuba’s main trading partner; after a significant period of time, Cuba found itself in a relation of “Master-Servant” with the U.S. especially during Batista’s years; due to the

gradual integration of its economic, agricultural, touristic and industrial sector into the American commercial life. By Castro's adoption of Communism and by the placement of the economic embargo, more, Americans pushed Castro to the arms of Soviets; sooner, relations were totally frozen. Therefore, Cuba's exceptional embargo, as the severest since Italy's embargo in 1935, required an exceptional move toward rapprochement which would offer both parts economic opportunities. For Americans, only free market trade could provide Cuba with the intended economic growth; yet, facing the obstacle of which type of economy to be adopted after opening relations with the U.S. Plus, the lack of Cuba's economic transparency: will the island adopt a Free Market¹, hybrid or to continue its central plan of State Economy² model!

Cuba was a special example in post CW era; where, Castro remained a true Communist leader who seized power in Havana for more than a half century; despite all kinds of the American pressure that he was exposed to: the American Congress's role, ideology, and its trade policy with Cuba. A combination of factors that are at play; in keeping Cuba an isolated island; though, it shed the same political structure with former communist states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; each of which was granted membership, and restored normal diplomatic relations with the U.S. Also, the U.S. normalized relations with Vietnam and China. Nevertheless, its policy toward a tiny island remained dead and locked for a long period. Another worth mentioning, Cuba's exclusivity and uniqueness is related to Castro stretched authority, and the CANF lobby tactics in the U.S. Lastly, the U.S. opened free trade and policy window with its former communist enemies; so, it is fair enough to do the same with Cuba (Schena 1-30).

Also, Cuba's "exceptional-ism" is related to the nature of its process of metamorphosis that could not be classified with the world's three major experiences of conversion: first,

Eastern Europe countries who witnessed the most rapid transformation after the fall of Berlin wall; second, the external involvement of the West in Tunisia or the Arab Spring³ as a whole; and third, Cuba did not conform to the democratization of LA countries (1980's); though, they embraced different political systems better than any other place in the world, reaching a remarkable level of political maturity. So, the difference between Eastern Europe and Cuba is in its slow and steady transition. In addition to, Castro's long resistance and monopolization of power, Fidel and Raul Castro did not allow any foreign intervention in the Cuban internal affairs, since they experienced its dangerous impact at the Bay of Pigs invasion, in bringing political unrest, similar to that of the current situation of the Arab world i.e. Egypt. But, Cuba still not exposed to such uprising despite the same economic difficulties (Hirst 2).

3.2. History of the U.S. Normalization Experiences

Thanks to the constitutional authority, that allows the American President to re-establish normal diplomatic relations with foreign countries, as the Chief of the Executive Branch (Feldman 3). For this particular reason, Normalization's notion between Washington and Havana dates back to Kennedy's years. Similarly, every American President initiated "back channels" toward Normalization with Cuba; despite, all the pressure they were exposed to (Goll 125). President Kennedy and Castro's agreement to release Bay of Pigs' prisoners was the first sign of convergence; plus, the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's prioritization of détente⁴ (French 5); besides, the release of approximately 400 to 800 prisoners (Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America 117), the Carter administration established the U.S. Interests Sections in the

Swiss Embassy, in 1977 to facilitate communication between the counterparts (Feldman 3). successively, each of which focused on Cuba's foreign policy's behavior: the military alliance with the USSR, as well as, its support to external revolutionaries. Yet, Cuba's remaining ally with the USSR hindered initiatives and obstructed the process of Normalization (LeoGrande, "Normalizing U.S.-Cuba relations..." 475).

In June 1987, the International Center for Development Policy formed the National Council on U.S.-Cuba Relations, aiming at solving the Cuban-American dispute, as well as, to compensate the failure of efforts to normalize relations between the two nations; since, the process of normalization was always cut off, by many obstacles and difficulties. However, full restoration of regular diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana was not an easy; for this particular reason, it required massive measures set by an active and optimistic American group; the latter, would take into consideration different sectors, in order to achieve a full agreement, and to convince the U.S. foreign policy makers about the necessity to restore relations with Castro's government. Subsequently, in 1 May 1988, the process of Normalization started to attract other high rank officials, the evidence; membership of the National Council reached 91 members including: 19 former U.S. ambassadors, 13 U.S. Congressmen and 25 academic specialists on Cuba (National Council on U.S.-Cuban Relations 106).

The American foreign policy's history witnessed three cases of Normalization with its former Communist enemies; the first American step toward Normalization was with China during the 1979's (11-12). Next, in 1995 the U.S. fully restored its diplomatic ties with Vietnam (13-14). From 1961-2013, no part could be ready to restore diplomatic relations with the other, because each time negotiations between Washington and Havana were interrupted either by Cuba's behaviors or American requirements; despite, there

were a number of attempts from both sides; yet, none effort was purely fruitful. Remarkably, Obama and Raul Castro initiated secret talks that lasted for 18 months in 2013; consequently, the U.S. and Cuba agreed to reopen discussions, by means of changes in the U.S. policy, and the emergence of other players such: (a) EU, Canada, Mexico's pressure, (b) Cuba's internal reforms, (c) the U.S. economic interests in the island, (d) Cuban Diaspora changing attitude, (e) Venezuela's changing conditions; all in all, pushed the American foreign policy makers to negotiate, instead of using: the CIA covert operations and isolation. In few words, the American Normalization with Cuba which was announced in 17 December 2014, is still an ongoing episode (Zawatsky and Gemma 15-23).

3.3. Barack Obama's Efforts for Lifting the Embargo on Cuba

Throughout decades, the U.S. kept following one policy model toward Cuba i.e. different administrations regardless of their political belongingness or vision embraced the same policy of prohibition, via a restricted American foreign policy design. In other words, the sole focus of successive American administrations was to bring Castro's regime down. However, Obama's administration awakened more supporters calling for the removal of the embargo between the two nations, in an unprecedented way. It was argued that, security, domestic pressure and economic motives led to the current openness, making Obama's administration exceptional enough to break the ice between the two nations (Lambrecht 3).

Recently, the U.S. was seeking a new start with Cuba; yet a long journey should be voyaged in order to correct past mistakes and mistrust's decades. As a result, in 2004,

Senator Obama rejected the embargo openly. For this ambitious Senator the embargo squeezed more innocent people rather than the intended dictator. Therefore, leaving the ban on Cuba was highly expected; having the same perspective, in 2009 Barack Obama and 111th Congress favored either small or large policy adjustments to reach a total Normalization with Cuba (French 2-46). Following, President Obama removed travel restrictions, remittances and opened possibilities of investment; but, Cuba's political system is still frightening and interrupting foreign investors from doing business there, due to its former nationalization of American properties in 1960's. Therefore, a full opening should be based on a solid platform. For Americans, only a democratic Cuba could prevent past mistakes from reoccurrence (Lambrecht 20).

Going deeply, within the frame of Normalization, American delegations, after they visited Cuba, they succeeded to organize the possibility of restoring normal relations between the two nations. Paving the way for President Obama and Raul Castro to shake hands in Nelson Mandela's funeral, in 2013. The gesture was considered as the first step toward a needed reconciliation; the evidence, President Obama announced that: "I do not believe we can keep doing the same thing for over five decades and expect a different result" (qtd in. Lambrecht 20). Then, Obama's proposal turned to be an official call for openness; once both countries sent formal messages to each other; the move produced a historical agreement between the two nations; when Obama's administration liberated three imprisoned Cuban agents, since 1998. As a reply, Cuba freed Alan Gross; USAID servicer who was accused of espionage since 2009. Within the same arrangement, the US announced an ease of the embargo; such individuals' travel (Fregosi 2).

3.3.1. American Internal Factors that Led to the Normalization of Relations with Cuba

Now not before, President Obama is working on lifting the embargo on Cuba, due to a number of reasons: the Cuban-American lobby changed its attitude toward Cuba. In 1980's, the lobby opposed the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the island, more the CANF controlled the domestic debate over the Cuban issue, via CDA 1992 and HBA1996, which codified the embargo. After a significant period of time, the lobby supported the ease of the ban (3). Not less important than the Cuban-American lobby; LA Presidents had a role to play in shaping the American policy toward Cuba, after the 9/11 attacks the U.S. emphasized the Middle East region; yet, the LA unification restored the American attention. The sign, at the Fifth Summit of the Americas in 2009, President Obama announced the U.S. would restructure links with Cuba; sooner, the 1962 resolution that excluded Cuba from the OAS was canceled at the OAS General Assembly (LeoGrande, "From Hard Power to..." 4).

Now, the American policy of hostility and isolation against Castro's government is no longer working. The proof, Americans recognized the failure to bring Castro down or to influence him to embrace Capitalism (105). Second, the ban's growing opposition, mostly coming from the U.S. allies, who maintained normal trade and diplomatic relations with the island. For the reason that, the embargo on Cuba was a direct contradiction of the American basic values of: peace, diplomatic resolution of conflicts, pluralism and tolerance. That is why; the elimination of the ban on Cuba would grant Americans the credibility among Southern countries (National Council on U.S.-Cuba Relations 106-107).

3.3.1.1. The U.S. Foreign Policy in Shift: The Focus on Opportunities

Fertile land opportunities in Cuba represent a golden occasion for the American economy. However, to execute such plan the Congress is in need to remove the ban on Cuba, from one hand; from another, the Cuban regime is also in need to be dismantled for trade goals. Rich island could provide its neighbors with: (1) Health care and Pharmaceuticals, since, Cuba is well known of its health care system, even it has the ability to produce and to be the U.S. partner; yet, the latter was waiting for more political stability to start serious investment; (2) Energy, as the majority of LA countries, Cuba suffers from energy shortages, while the U.S. has a growing production of oil, gas and renewable; (3) Tourism, as the most prolific sector for economic profits, again Americans are the first candidates to travel to Cuba ; and (4) Cuba's extra ordinary agricultural capacities, requires equipment, energy and capitals, which only the U.S. could provide (Rosetti and Holland 6).

The U.S. officials turned to focus on political windows with Cuba, in order to fulfill first policies' gaps. Through discussing maritime borders, violation of air space, security, sovereignty, and most importantly the Guantanamo naval base. While negotiating, Cubans and Americans worked to preserve internal peace and security, and to achieve full Normalization as well. Where, the American part emphasized security concerns related to the island from one hand, from another; the Cuban part stressed the American military operations in the Caribbean region. Within this framework, the counterparts felt the need to cooperate and to re-integrate Cuba into the Caribbean region at large and inter-American forums in particular i.e. OAS (Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America 114-15).

During her Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on 15 January 2009, Senator Hillary Clinton confirmed that the new administration would lift constrictions on family travel and remittances. Indeed, Obama's words were followed by deeds, in view of the fact that, on 11 March 2009, President Obama signed into a law a congressional spending bill known as The Omnibus Appropriations Act⁵, which covered two main provisions: the first, lessened limitations on family travel to Cuba; while, the second, eased some economic restrictions on the island such as: marketing, and the sale of agricultural and medical products. Following, in 25 February, this action was approved by the House, later on by the Senate on 10 March. Besides, the damages brought by major storms, many Congress members, called for a short term reduction on limitations of money transfer and family travel on Cuba (Sullivan, "Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances" 1).

In February 2009, the Democratic Congressman "William Delahunt of Massachusetts" introduced a legislation that would permit Americans to travel to Cuba; the bill remained in between pleasing and rejection at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. On the same path, President Obama suggested an international money transfer to Cuba from Cuban-Americans, also a lifting of travel restrictions; which he formally eased in April. In 2011, the U.S. Treasury relaxed telecommunications and travel restrictions for religious and educational purposes, to facilitate travel to Cuba. Likewise, the Cuban government eased travel limitations to the U.S.; followed by President Obama's instruction in December 2014 to re-establish relations, permitting travel and trade with Cubans. Next, the American President announced a clear change in Cuba's policy; while the Cuban legislative approved a law to pull foreign investors. One year later, law makers introduced a bill to end travel limits on Cuba (Streets).

So far, significant Congressional bills were introduced to lessen the Cuban embargo. The most recent one was referred to as: The United States-Cuba Normalization Act, which was introduced by the Congressman Bobby Rush of Illinois in 2013, for a complete removal of limitations on the island. Within the same context, in January, the Congressman Serrano of New York proposed a resolution, which amended the FAA of 1961. Following, in February 2013, the Congressman Rangel of New York introduced three complementary bills, to promote agricultural exchange, as well as to lift trade and travel restrictions, which is to say, the FTCA, the EFCA, the PAAMEC were set up to remove all trade limitations on Cuba (Safferson 64). More, in late 2013, the UN General Assembly approved a Resolution⁶ that condemned Washington economic embargo on Cuba, which was backed from 188 member countries, and opposed only by the U.S. and Israel (Lee 5).

Since 1928, no American president could be able to visit Cuba; just after gradual economic and political variations in both countries, the Treasury and Commerce Departments opened the fourth round of amendments to the Cuban sanction including: travel, trade, banking, and commerce; especially financial services when, the U.S. administration allowed its broad banking system to help in money transfer to Cuba; drawing the way for President Obama, Cuban entrepreneurs and civil society members to take a historical step ever on the road to visit Cuba, since 88 years no American President visited Cuba, in 21 and 22 March 2016, since, Raul Castro announced his government's date of expiry (2018); declaring that, he would focus on progress, economic sector's growth, to ease the country's economic tight. In 2014, Obama announced the lifting of old ways to engage in Normalization talks; resulting in: re-establishing embassies; officially, the U.S. removed Cuba from the list of states sponsor of terrorism in 29 May

2015; while the rest of penalties could be removed only with congressional approval, or Cuba's democratization via fair and free elections (Sullivan, "Cuba: Issues for...").

3.3.1.2. The Unique Power of the Cuban Diaspora

Exceptionally, the Cuban Diaspora was 'premiums in pairs' comparing to other hyphenated groups in the U.S.; as they had an important role in shaping the U.S. domestic issues and its foreign policy toward Cuba. That explains their many-sided power to impose the ban against Castro's regime in 1961, from one side. From another, younger generations are the main advocates for normal relations with Cuba i.e. post 1980's groups are less ideological and more liberal when it comes to the U.S. restoration of relations with their mother land. While, pre1980's generation was pro-U.S. embargo on Cuba, and up till then, they were and still against any openness' efforts. By the installation of embassies in both capitals, and the desire to normalize ties; however, only the voting box would influence the Congress to leave or to keep the ban on Cuba (Cassells).

Florida's Cuban-American exile community was one among other important factors that accelerated the process of American-Cuban Normalization. Being the only immigrants' group that enjoyed nearness to their home land; most of these exiles were pro-Batista's regime; which was in favor of the American political and economic standards. More importantly, they were highly educated and prosperous coming from middle and industrial classes. This community fled to the U.S. with only one ambition, to live in post Castro Cuba, with a superior position. Cuban refugees used to act as Cuba's representatives in the U.S., as well as its foreign policy tool: literate and skilled aware enough to reflect the abusive nature of Castro's regime; and as paramilitary force i.e. used

by Democrats to provoke a popular uprising against Castro. However, Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco of 1961, led the majority of Cuban exiles to join the Republican Party in its fight against Communism (Lambrecht 21-22). The issue was that, by Cuban immigrants' auto-exclusion, exiles gave Castro the chance to remain in power with less level of antagonism.

Exiles came to the U.S. through two waves; the first was highly pushed by political reasons, while the second was pulled by the U.S. economic opportunities, so they were not sharing the same level of anti-Castro feeling. The former was old persuasive and capable elite to redirect the U.S. process of passing bills, in more than one occasion. The proof, in 1992, Torricelli or the Cuban-American founder of the CDA received donation from the CANF, by which the ban on Cuba was tightened. Enjoying the same power in 1996, the Cuban-American's pressure pushed President Clinton to approve the Helms' bill. Under the same pressure, Obama's project of Normalizing relations with Cuba, received a lot of criticism from the Cuban-American Senators: Ted Cruz (Texas), Marco Rubio (Florida) and Robert Menendez (New Jersey) (Lambrecht 24-27).

3.3.1.3. The Role of the American Public Opinion

Normalization' perception dates back to 1986; however, it started to be implemented at work place in 2008. According to an opinion poll (1986), the majority of the public (53%) supported the opening of negotiations with Cuba; while the minority (35 %) opposed the rapprochement, the rest remained neutral (Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America 120). Recently, in 2008, the University of Miami carried out a survey on Cuban-Americans' issues; where results confirmed that: besides the war

on Iraq⁷ the community was concerned with the U.S. policy towards Cuba. Following, in 2011, the Cuban Research Institute conducted a poll about Normalization of relations, findings proved that, 44% of respondents were pro-lifting the blockade on Cuba; while, 65% of them favored food exportation to the island. One might deduce that, the Cuban-American community shifted to accept political openness with the island, the proof, in 2012 Presidential elections Obama won a half (50%) of the Cuban-American votes (Safferson 65).

3.3.2. The Emergence of other Players in the Latin American Region

The lengthy and the exceptional case of Normalization with Cuba is the direct outcome of the American policy, and the Cuban-American failure to change it; plus, the emergence of other players out of Washington's surroundings i.e. the LA countries' unification restored the U.S. attention after a long period of military involvement in the Middle East area, after the 9/11 attacks, also Cuba's internal reforms are considered as an element in redirecting the U.S. foreign policy, since the latter adopted a hybrid economic system, Venezuela's political and energy perturbation and finally, China's economic competition in the American's backyard. For these reasons one may deduce that, all the above mentioned factors pushed the U.S. and Cuba to rethink about the two nations' future.

3.3.2.1. The Pink Tide Politicization

The post CW era engendered a new and an influential balance of power in the LA region, which is not invisible for Washington. The rise of “pink tide⁸” governments required the inclusion of Cuba into LA activities; even they threatened to not organize any OAS Summit without its participation. More, these countries increased China’s investment, shaking the U.S. influence over the region in a way. Therefore, President Obama moved toward regional cooperation in Trinidad and Tobago Summits. It is true that cooperation did not immediately create closer ties; yet, “pink tide” states appreciate Obama’s promise of equality in their relations, there would be only a space for respect and common interests; where, American officials recognized the end of “Monroe Doctrine⁹”. Southerners also had no military power to threaten the U.S.; so, they lobbied culturally, economically and agriculturally, to form: South American Common Market, the Union of South American Nations, and Community of Latin America, ELAM the regional school of medicine, Caribbean States as an alternative to OAS (Cassells).

According to interviewees, local governmental officials and NGOs, Havana faced a lot of challenges and opportunities during its openness’ journey due to a causality relationship between Cuba and the rest of Southern countries; where Changes in the LA region pushed the Cuban regime to adopt a mass of reforms. That explains, years ago left-oriented governments in LA (including Havana) shared the same principle of anti-Americanism against the American anti-Castrism, that dominated Washington and Havana relations (1). Through time, Cuba and LA deepen and better restored relations. The evidence, Fidel and Raul Castro were invited to all LA Presidential Inaugurations of electoral candidates, without regard to inviter’s political structure i.e. LA a political maturity, which was never experienced before. For this particular reason one may deduce

that, Cuba's ally with a unified LA; would lead Americans to recognize the birth of a strong group of countries; and the need to have full and normal relations with each member (Hirst 2).

Within the same frame, LA is a critical region for the American security; for decades the lack of communication with Cuba weakened the U.S. ability to have good relations with the rest of the Southern countries, since, the majority of LA countries opposed the ban on Cuba. So, the opening of talks with Cuba would help Americans to secure its southern borders and, to establish business there. The choice of isolating Cuba cost the U.S. to lose the whole southern region; accordingly, Americans found that the reopening of relations could bring better opportunity for Cuba's political change. Most importantly, the building of normal relations would reduce risky investment to ensure to have safe start. Though it was shaped by the CW atmosphere; but security, drug trafficking, illegal migration, transnational crime and ecological issues linked more the U.S. with the LA region (Rosetti and Holland 1-3).

3.3.2.2. Cuba's Economic and Political Reforms under Raul Castro

From one hand, Senator Barack Obama paid attention to the improvement of the U.S. interests, via the opening of talks with Cuba. From another, Fidel Castro himself supported negotiations between Washington and Havana; with special emphasis on the Cuban sovereignty. Likewise, Raul Castro saw that, Senator Obama could initiate his first effort toward Normalization, without threatening the Cuban borders or independence. For that reason, in 2006 Raul Castro as a Vice President and Defense Minister suggested to meet Obama at Guantanamo Naval Base, and to tackle the Cuban-American affairs like:

political prisoners, human rights, freedom of press, immigration policies and security collaboration. Raul's agenda prioritized "normal trade"; this meant that, he would stress all problems of the economic ban. Also, this dialogue might cover the issue of the U.S. terrorism, and efforts to withdraw the Cuban government (French 6-7).

After he entered office in 2008, Raul Castro eased travel restrictions and strengthened the island international position and some of its domestic variations (1). Also, he liberalized markets and parts of the Cuban owned-state economy. Then, the Cuban leader dissolved the agricultural sector, and turned it to small businesses, making it possible for the Americans to re-establish a commercial relationship with Cuba. Besides, Raul Castro moved toward capital market this move could be seen as a good foundation for Americans to scaffold upon chance to improve ties. Although, the Cuban reforms under the command of Raul Castro confirm to American successive administrations' aspirations. But, the current American administration did not take a decisive decision to end the ban on Cuba. In addition, in late 2013, Raul Castro called for "civilized relations" with the U.S. on the basis of mutual noninvolvement, and he rejected the American plan to change Cuba's political structure. Therefore, the recent changes that marked the Cuban economy might be the best opportunity in the direction of a political change. Meanwhile, in November 2013, President Obama acknowledged the island's changes as a useful tool to start over (Lee 5).

Within the same context of the Cuban adjustment under Raul Castro's rule, the Cuban leader prioritized the economic reforms over political ones. Yet, from Cuban intellectuals' perspective, this economic move is going to be coupled with an inevitable political change (Hirst 2). In addition, Cuba's recent election was a clear sign of its willingness on the way to political openness, which was seen as important feature for

democracy in the island. Even small exposure to the Western culture, either political or economic values might allow an easy change in Cuba (Rosetti and Holland 4).

3.3.2.3. Threats Brought by Venezuela's Changing Conditions

After a long period of isolation from the U.S., Cuba energized its relations with other countries, especially those who held the same principle of Anti-Imperialism¹⁰. More, in 2000, both Venezuela and Cuba tied with oil Agreement and a reciprocal support at many levels. The same year, under "Integral Cooperation Accord" Cuba provided Venezuela with: goods, services and ten thousands of medical professionals, and teachers. Then, the Accord was prolonged to be valid till 2010; in return, Venezuela delivered 9000 barrels of crude oil daily, as partners in the ALBA. Unfortunately, by the death of Hugo Chávez in 2013, Venezuela's internal problems and its near collapse of energy cost Cuba the loss of its main supplier and its largest trading partner (Lee 7).

It is true that, Venezuela was Cuba's saver after the collapse of the USSR, where both nations collaborated to create: trade, military assistance and a high level of political dialogue, all in all manifesting through ALBA union (2004): a group of leftist guerillas. But, views will not change the fact that, Cuba could be harshly damaged after Venezuela's crackdown; as a result, Havana started to look for other alternatives to avoid 1990's crisis. (Hirst 3-6). On the basis of the above analysis, it is true that Cuba started slow changes; but, the Cuban government is in need to look for ways to compensate the potential collapse of Venezuela's energy.

3.3.2.4. China, the New Competitor in the Americans' Backyard

Within the same context of lobbying against the U.S. dominance, China's infrastructural projects in Cuba and in the LA at large confirmed the real shift in power in the Southern region. Havana and Beijing had a long time that both bound with the same political ideology, which is Communism. In other words, China's progress deprived the U.S. from its prestige, status of influence and most importantly the economic dominance; so, interrupting the U.S.-Cuban rapprochement (Cassells). The irony is that, the U.S. isolated Cuba to block the spread of Communism; recently, Americans are working to contain it.

3.4. Is Cuba-U.S. Normalization Trapped between Pleasing and Resistance?

Obama's offer of normal relations with Cuba, inflamed the debate between the Congress majority of Republicans and Democrats. Republicans as strong opponents of Obama's decisions; resistance headed by Florida's Senator, as a Cuban-American Marco Rubio, possessed a high level of hatred toward Castro. At the level of Congress, Rubio promised to block Obama's proposal by all means. Similarly, for other representatives Obama's plan was erroneous requiring halt. However, it was impossible for President Obama to initiate the process of normalization without being confident from the real will and the support coming from the Congress' majority. In 2015, John Kerry, Dick Durbin, Jim McGovern and other Senators reflected 56% of Americans who are in favor of lifting the embargo (Fregosi 7).

Media criticized Obama's plan of restoring diplomatic relations with the island; since, the embargo was a presidential application. For many Americans, Obama overstepped his authority; the 2014's announcement was the outcome of 18 months of secret talks between Havana and Washington, with the help of the pope Francis. Obama minimized nine miles of water and fifty years of mistrust. For some, Obama did not care about the rule of law, Congress or even public opinion. While, other Americans considered the 2014's move as a unilateral change of policy; also, the codification of the embargo into a law, made its removal by an executive order something difficult. So, the lifting of the embargo requires the same procedure that followed in its placement; neither Obama, nor any other authority, except Congressional approval could free Cuba from its economic penalty. 1992's law banned trade with Cuba and 1996's formalized it, in addition to, TEWA (1917), TSREE (2000). So, without stimulating the majority in 2016 elections, even the Obama's authority is granted by Congress. Although he announced an ease on trade and travel to Cuba, but none was implemented; yet, it was a platform for doing so. Another striking, HBA removal needs an elected government and a Congressional approval, legislative power not presidential one (Hatcher-Mays).

3.4.1. Hinders of the Process of Normalization

Uniquely, lobbies were and still very strong and influential bodies in Washington's policy making. Pressure groups were powerful enough to direct American domestic and even foreign policies. The evidence, factions' symptoms of such influence could be seen in Israel's ongoing attacks on Palestine. Belonging to the majority i.e. Americans or to the minority i.e. Diaspora. Often, they were controlled by the same special interests, or worse

than before. Ironically, “lobbying” succeeded in supporting Zionists’ attacks on Gaza Strip 2009-14; yet, it opposed an almost identical violence of Germans against London during WWII dispute. Another striking, through the years guns proliferation cost American families a number of lives, injuries and terror cases; yet, National Rifle Association under the term “freedom” justifying, without such freedom Americans cannot be free. On that basis, it seems that the U.S. officials cannot liberalize themselves from small addicted groups of special concerns (Cala). Additionally, the Cuban long lasting embargo was also the subject of lobby groups.

Future negotiations would involve different matters, since; there were many obstacles that challenged the process of Normalization including: the imprisonment of the American USAID contractor “Allan Gross”, who visited Cuba in 2009 to provide the Jewish community there with access to internet, and communication materials. Then, the Cuban government sentenced him to fifteen years of captivity, justifying that he wanted to destabilize the Cuban internal security through USAID program (Safferson 61). Furthermore, restoration of relations between Washington and Havana was also delayed by the arrest of Cuban nationals in American jails (Lee 1).

Besides, the Presidential power to recognize foreign governments and affairs diplomatically, it should be kept in mind that, the Congress has an exclusive power to cut off restoration of relations between the U.S. and Cuba (2). That explains, in 2008, President Obama asked the Congress to remove the economic embargo on the island; however, the majority of Congressmen claimed that, there would be no lifting of the embargo; unless, the Cuban government shifted to democracy (4). Afterward, in a Latin-Caribbean summit on 28 January 2008, Raul Castro introduced new conditions toward the process of rapprochement, most importantly, he emphasized on the restoration of the

Guantanamo Naval Base, plus the end of the embargo, compensation to Cubans, and the halt of pro-democratic broadcasts to the island. By contrast, the White House refused to offer the Base (Noriega 5).

One might say that, by the coming of Raul Castro to power, the Cuban government adopted a series of economic adjustments; yet, there were difficulties that postponed the process of Normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba. According to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's report of 2009, the island does not correspond 100% to the international political and economic standards. What is worse, the government was charged of murdering human rights activists (Safferson 61). In addition, Human Rights Watch's report of 2013 demonstrated that Cubans were suffering from poor human rights conditions (Lee 4).

3.5. Did the American Pursuit of Economic Concerns Devalue Democracy in Cuba?

The Cuban-American round of formal negotiations of the 18 February 2015, was highly economic, discussing tourism and agriculture rather than politics; as, they focused on which economic style would be adopted by the Cuban government after a full restoration of links (Fregosi 4-5). American commercial interests in the island came as an alternative to the security ones; from the time when, Cuban troops came to no intervention in broader zones. Another factor, Cuba was very important destination for many American investors since 1700's. The U.S. lost this chance by the Cuban revolution and by placing a semi-permanent embargo on Cuba (Lambrecht 29-30).

On the basis of what was mentioned before, it is true that after more than five decades of harassment and hostility the clash between Cuba and the U.S. attained its near closing stage. The indicator, in 17 December 2014, one of the remaining CW tensions reached its lowest level; where both nations re-opened embassies. Whereas, an entire Normalization of diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana has a lot of avenues to pass through; although, President Barack Obama visited Cuba in 26 March 2016; the latter will not change the fact that, the process of Normalization could be accelerated more, or hindered by: economic, social, security and other factors not less influential. Also, attention should be paid to the Congress majority's voices, plus 2017's Presidential election. For this particular reason, one may question the nature of this procedure under this number of implications!

End Notes

1. Free Market. Is an economy in which the allocation for resources is determined only by the supply and the demand for them? Put another way, the profit motive

combined with individuals' preferences combine to direct resources in a free-market economy. This stands in contrast to most other economic systems where the government plays the role of central planner to varying degrees and organizes the flow of resources to the production of various goods and services. In most scenarios, capitalism can be thought of as a synonym for free-market economic system. In practice, a pure free-market economy is mainly a theoretical concept as every country, even capitalist ones, places some restrictions on the ownership and exchange of commodities (*economics.about.com*).

2. State Economy. An economy structured to balance growth with environmental integrity. A steady state economy seeks to find equilibrium between production growth and population growth. The economy aims for the efficient use of natural resources, but also seeks fair distribution of the wealth generated from the development of those resources (*investopedia.com*).

3. The Arab Spring. Was a series of anti-government protests, uprisings and armed rebellions that spread across the Middle East in early 2011. But their purpose, relative success and outcome remain hotly disputed in Arab countries, among foreign observers, and between world powers looking to cash in on the changing map of the Middle East (*middleeast.about.com*).

4. Détente. Is a relaxing of tension, especially between nations, as by negotiations or agreements (*dictionary.com*).

5. The Omnibus Appropriations Act. The federal budget process occurs in two stages: appropriations and authorizations. This is an appropriations bill, which sets overall spending limits by agency or program. (Authorizations direct how federal funds should or should not be used.) Appropriations are typically made for single fiscal years (*govtrack.us*).

6. Resolution. It is a firm decision to do or not to do something. A formal expression of opinion or intention agreed on by a legislative body or other formal meeting, typically after taking a vote. The action of solving a problem or contentious matter: the peaceful resolution of all disputes (*oxforddictionaries.com*).

7. Iraq war. A protracted military conflict in Iraq that began in 2003 with an attack by a coalition of forces led by the United States and that resulted in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. US combat troops were withdrawn in 2010 (*thefreedictionary.com*).

8. Pink Tide. A term economists used during the 1920's to refer to the spread of Communism and/or Socialism (*urbandictionary.com*).

9. Monroe Doctrine. Is a foreign policy statement that created separate spheres of European and American influence? It was written by President James Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, and Monroe delivered it to Congress in his seventh annual congressional speech on December 2, 1823 (*study.com*).

10. Anti-Imperialism. One who is opposed to imperialism, or to the spirit, principle, or methods of empire; specifically, in United States politics, one who is opposed to the acquisition and government of dependencies beyond the seas by the arbitrary will of President or Congress, without regard to the rights of the people to self-government; in use especially since the Spanish-American war of 1898 (*wordnik.com*).

Conclusion

Indeed, the U.S. is known with its emphasis on life, liberty, individualism and democracy; but, confrontation continued to shape the U.S. foreign policy under the pressure of the spread of Communism, which threatened its authority. Generally, the U.S. fighting of Communism, democratizing people and protecting human rights, in third world countries, implied American open or covert support of its favorable candidates that paved the way for its businessmen' benefits. The proof, Gerardo Machado and Fulgencio Batista were the best examples of the Americans supported Cuban leaders who served the U.S. concerns over their people's needs. Unlike his predecessors, Fidel Castro's opposition toward the U.S. exhaustive exploitation of the Cuban resources, engendered more hostility and disagreement between Havana and Washington; since, the more Castro seized power in Havana, the more Americans lost their control over the island. For Americans Castro's divergent viewpoint or revolution was a sign of independence coming from within Cuba, not imposed by an outsider.

Undeniably, the American post-CW foreign policy came to be based on the strategy of confrontation and open hostility, that is why, the roots of the Cuban-American enmity dates back even before 1959's, once the U.S. was Cuba's main trading partner. By the passing of time, Cuba found itself in a relation of "Master-Servant", due to the gradual integration of its different sectors into the American commercial life, especially during Batista's years. Whereas, Cuba's contemporary history changed by the coming of FidelCastro to power, whose revolution annoyed the U.S., by the nationalization of American oil refineries, sugar companies and the restoration of thousands of Acres of the Cuban lands; in response, the U.S. placed an economic embargo on Cuba, which pushed

Castro to Soviets' arms and accelerated their ally; sooner, Cuban-U.S. relations were totally frozen. Therefore, Cuba's exceptional and severe case of embargo required an exceptional move to leave it.

The Soviet Communist expansion was to be limited and trapped through the threat of force in Asia, Europe, Africa, and LA, and eventually throughout the world. Therefore, the Americans strategy was to eliminate the Soviet Union and its allies of countries, chiefly Cuba in the LA region. Views will not change the fact that the post CW era witnessed global commitments that intended to halt the spread of the USSR's power; from building a military attack i.e. WWII; containment of Soviets was to be accomplished chiefly by nuclear military force. The U.S.-USSR confrontation tended to be fought more over hearts and minds in the LA region at large and Cuba in particular; within these circumstances the U.S. relied on: coups, assassinations, counter-insurgency and the use of paramilitary actions.

The American desire to confront Communism, as well as, to remove Castro and his regime was nourished more by the installation of Soviet Missiles in Cuba during 1961; that is why, American attempts of toppling Communism were equipped with the use of the CIA covert operations, media propaganda and hundreds of assassination plots. Following, the Cuban-American relations were often deteriorated; since, the Missile Crisis and Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Cuban regime missed more than one American occasion of rapprochement during Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations, mainly because of its support of revolutionary movements in the LA region and Africa, where Cuban troops backed by Soviet weapons fought against South African army, the latter often supplied by Americans; yet, the Cuban victory contributed to the birth of Angola and Namibia 1977-78.

Threats to the American National Security led successive American administrations to inherit the same policy of hostility toward their potential enemies i.e. Cuba. Moreover, each American administration, regardless of its political belongings: Republicans, Democrats, Liberals or Conservatives felt that it is their duty to fulfill the principle of punishing Castro's nationalization of the American ex-properties without compensation. The last events or decisions were widely shared among major U.S. officials, even if they held different perspectives concerning Cuba, more and more, National Security temptations interrupted any good will to normalize relations with Cuba.

After WWII and the CW, National Security agents emerged and focused on fighting Communism, and often redirected Legislative decisions, rejections and approvals. That's why; the logistic war was widely shared among major U.S. officials in different administrations; where, traditional vision of atheism remained the dominant theme of the American foreign policy more than fifty years; despite some noticeable achievements. Within the same context, the Soviet-Cuban ally contributed to a growing sensitivity of confrontation. However, old views will not change the fact that, efforts to promote a post-CW policy met a considerable resistance mainly through the National Security Bureaucracy, lobbies, and other players, that all American presidents faced when they entered office, especially if the newly elected presidents want to generate a policy that is far from the American Bureaucracies' expectations.

Moving to Cuba's foreign policy style which was based on Anti-Imperialism, principally Anti-Americanism, which cost Cubans a regress of 54 years; by the placement of a number of Acts, TWEA 1917, FAA 1961, CACR 1963, the CDA 1992, HBA 1996 and TSREEA 2000; the CDA works to keep the ban as long as the Cuban regime do not adopt fair and free elections and do not stop its abuse against Cuban civilians. The Act

squeezed the embargo against Cuba, and deprived the Cuban people from food, medicines; where only aids avoided a human disaster there. The tightening of the ban created Cuba's hardships or the so called "the special period" in 1990-99. Yet, new challenges in the American sanctions policy engendered the failure of the American embargo on Cuba, evidently, the CDA and HBA severed the ban, and were designed to bring Castro down and to promote a democratic change in Cuba; but they did not achieve the already mentioned goals.

WTO and GATT criticized the U.S. Acts for their extraterritoriality as a direct threat to the sovereignty of Cuba's trading partners, because the latter is a member in the WTO. For that reason, HBA or the U.S. could not block Cuba's trade with third countries, since both WTO and GATT took charge to free trade all over the world; without denying any member the right to be part in negotiations and norms setting. Then, it is appropriate to say, the U.S. cooperation in relations with its neighbor is more helpful than competition; for many followers there is no reason to carry on a time consuming and failed policy. More, it is time to resist temptations that were present in using military force against Cuba. So, it is fair enough to end the American long lasting economic embargo against Cuba. To put it in one word, the American foreign policy which was based upon containment is more helpful than isolation.

As an exceptional country case, Cuba's revolution produced a transnational tension never experienced before in the LA region; moreover, the U.S. Normalization with Cuba does not share any feature of Normalization experiences with its former enemies i.e. China 1970's and Vietnam 1990's, since, the American embargo against Cuba is still considered as the severest stoppage in the modern history ever since the ban on Italy 1935. Moreover, it is true that Cuba remained a true Communist country, which is

governed by a Totalitarian regime, with poor human rights record, the absence of economic transparency and the lack of democratic participation; yet, all in all will not change the fact that, the U.S. restored normal relations with former Communist nations such: Eastern Europe, China and Vietnam. Likewise, the U.S. has normal ties with countries sharing almost Cuba's political structure for example, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; further, the U.S. has normal links with Arab countries, which lacked fair and free elections for decades.

By the coming of Obama's administration, the American traditional vision of control turned to Normalization, also, the American awareness about the failure of the embargo against Cuba, which was neither a pushing nor a pulling factor to overthrow Castro. Furthermore, the U.S. policy toward Cuba shifted to focus on opportunities rather than past mistakes. Therefore, fertile land opportunities in Cuba could provide its neighbors with health care, pharmaceutical products, touristic sites and most importantly great agricultural capacities. Plus, the changing attitude of young Cuban Diaspora that play a central role in shaping the U.S. domestic and foreign policy; besides the role of the American public opinion, in which the majority are in favor of lifting the ban on Cuba.

Out of the American homeland, a set of factors helped in the Normalization of relations between the two countries. Chiefly, the LA countries unification re-attracted the American attention toward the Southern region, plus economic and political reforms implemented by Raul Castro, threats brought by Venezuela's collapsing energy capacities, in addition to the emergence of a new competitor in the Americans' backyard, China started to invest and to construct Cuba's internet infrastructure; all in all, accelerated the Normalization process between Havana and Washington.

Early American interests, threats and power pushed it to isolate some countries; yet, a time consuming and a failed policy redirected American policy makers to contain those former enemies instead of isolating them. Evidently, the American-Cuban Normalization is the result of bilateral interests; before the Cuban revolution the U.S. had benefits in the island, nowadays Cuba is in need to gain industrial and developed capacities from the U.S. What's more, regional interests as well as the growing regional unity against the ban mobilized the American policy makers to think about the ineffectiveness of the Cuban embargo; without neglecting about the global pressure of Europe, Brazil, China and the UK.

However, interest groups with special purposes whose members were and still hostile to Castro's regime, strengthening anger and confrontation among Washington's groups; making it a golden opportunity for the American hardliners to penalize Cuba, and to delay any attempt of reconciliation; plus, Cuba's fear from the U.S. old domination; kept its process of transformation slow and steady one. To sum, through the study of the Cuban-American relations from 1961-2016, findings suggest that, the shift from enmity to Normalization is a superficial one without a Congressional authorization to remove: TWEA 1917, FAA 1961, CACR 1963, CDA 1992, HBA 1996, TSREEA 2000.

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
Appendices

Appendix 1

Platt Amendment 1901 page one



Platt Amendment 1901 page two



Source: history.state.gov

App endix 2

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 500
Washington, DC 20009
Tel: 202-612-4321
Fax: 202-612-4333
Email: hrwdc@hrw.org

AMERICAS DIVISION

José Miguel Vivanco, *Executive Director*
Daniel Wilkinson, *Deputy Director*
Maria McFarland, *Senior Researcher*
Tamara Taraschuk, *Researcher*
Fernando Delgado, *Fishberg Fellow*
Kavita Shah, *Associate*
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Washington, D.C., March 30, 2009

Ambassador Jorge Bolaños
First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Cuban Interest Section in Washington
Washington, D.C.



www.hrw.org

Dear Ambassador Bolaños,

I have the honor of writing Your Excellency to request a meeting to discuss the Cuban criminal system as it currently functions. In particular, we would like to discuss the application of articles 72, 73 and 74, which classify the offense of dangerousness (*peligrosidad*), as well as article 144, which covers the crime of contempt (*desacato*). Your remarks on these regulations and their application would be most helpful to us.

Human Rights Watch is the largest institution in the United States dedicated to the promotion and defense of human rights throughout the world. Our organization was founded in 1978 with the goal of promoting the respect of human rights in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, with offices in Washington, D.C., New York, Los Angeles, London, Brussels, Hong Kong, and Moscow, among others. Since 1978, Human Rights Watch has published numerous reports about the situation of human Rights around the world.

We would be interested in the opportunity to meet as soon as possible. My assistants will be in touch with your office in order to confirm the requested meeting.

I would like to take the opportunity to thank you for your attention to this request and to express my most distinguished regards and esteem.

José Miguel Vivanco
Executive Director
Americas Division, Human Rights Watch

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

3630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 500
Washington, DC 20009
Tel: 202-612-4321
Fax: 202-612-4333
Email: hrwdc@hrw.org

AMERICAS DIVISION

José Miguel Vivanco, Executive Director
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Marie McFarland, Senior Researcher
Tamara Tarasick, Researcher
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Paola Adriasola, Associate
Kavita Shah, Associate

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James Ross, Senior Legal Advisor
Joe Saunders, Deputy Program Director
Wilder Taylor, Legal and Policy Director
Jane Olson, Chair, Board of Directors

Washington, D.C., 28 de abril de 2009

Embajador Abelardo Moreno
Representante Permanente de Cuba ante la ONU
315 Lexington Ave.
New York, NY 10016

HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH

www.hrw.org

De mi mayor consideración:

Tengo el honor de dirigirme a usted con el fin de solicitar autorización para que una delegación de especialistas de Human Rights Watch viaje a Cuba. El propósito de dicha misión sería realizar una investigación en materia de derechos humanos, con énfasis en el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión y del derecho de reunión, así como la situación de los presos políticos.

Tal como lo hacemos en todos los países donde realizamos misiones de trabajo, quisiéramos tener la oportunidad de reunirnos con autoridades del gobierno, del poder judicial, y del poder legislativo. Así mismo, nos reuniríamos con miembros de la sociedad civil, en particular periodistas independientes, familiares de presos y defensores de derechos humanos. La delegación visitaría Cuba idealmente durante la primera quincena de junio del presente año.

Human Rights Watch es una de las principales organizaciones independientes a nivel mundial dedicada a la defensa y la protección de los derechos humanos. Desde 1978, Human Rights Watch ha publicado numerosos informes sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en todo el mundo, incluyendo sobre los Estados Unidos (nuestra página web es www.hrw.org).

Nuestra oficina se pondrá en contacto con su despacho para verificar si requiere más información. En todo caso, no dude en contactarnos con cualquier duda o pregunta por teléfono al 1-202-612-4330 o por fax al 1-202-612-4333.

Agradezco la atención que usted se sirva prestar a esta solicitud.

Atentamente,



José Miguel Vivanco
Director Ejecutivo
División de las Américas de Human Rights Watch

Appendix 3


Foreign Investment in Cuba		
Country	Company	Industry
Argentina	The government of Argentina	Money lending through banks
Brazil	Petrobras, Gov. of Sao Paulo, Busscar	Oil exploration, otus, buses
Canada	Sherrill International/CPM Group Homer Gold Mines, Wilton Properties, Genol Beau Canada, MacDonald Oil	Exploitation of natural resources Tourism, power generation Oil exploration
France	Persea, Alliance Francaise, Campari Socedel S.A., Total, Pemex/Ricard	Tourism, cultural, oil, alcohol
Holland	Holland-Cuba Line, ING Bank, Curof	Shipping, tourism, banking
Israel	EM Group of Israel	Agricultural
Italy	Vinci/Faribini	Wire production, tourism
Jamaica	SuperClubs of Jamaica	Tourism
Japan	The government of Japan	Educational, laboratory testing
Mexico	Mexicana de Aviacion, Grupo Domo	Tourism, telecommunications
Russia	Government of Russia	Nuclear reactor, power plant
Spain	Sol Media, Caja Madrid	Tourism, development, banking
U.K.	British Airways, Heath Group, Premier Oil	Tourism, insurance, oil

Source: publicpolicy. Pepperdine.edu


Appendix 4

Latin Americans Express Strong Support for U.S. Restoring Relations with Cuba and Ending Trade Embargo

Overall, do you ___ of the U.S. re-establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba?



Would you ___ the U.S. ending its trade embargo against Cuba, which would allow U.S. companies to do business in Cuba and Cuban companies to do business in the U.S.?




Note: Results for Peru not included due to administrative error.

Source: Spring 2015 Global Attitudes survey, Q138 & Q139.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Appendix 5

Q: Overall, do you support or oppose the United States ending the trade embargo with Cuba? That would allow U.S. companies to do business in Cuba and Cuban companies to do business here.



Source : *motherjones.com*

Appendix 6

Appendix A: Countries That Have Self-Identified as Having Laws That Apply Extraterritorially			
Total List of Member States with ET according to Member		30 countries subject to in-depth research	
1. Albania	25. Indonesia	• Albania	• Ecuador
2. Argentina	27. Italy	• Argentina	• Estonia
3. Armenia	28. Jordan	• Armenia	• Singapore
4. Australia	29. Latvia	• Australia	• South Africa
5. Austria	30. Liechtenstein	• Austria	• Sweden
6. Azerbaijan	31. Lithuania	• Azerbaijan	• Switzerland
7. Belarus	32. Mauritius	• Belarus	• Thailand
8. Belgium	33. Mexico	• Belgium	• UAE
9. Bolivia and Paraguay	34. New Zealand	• Bolivia	• United Kingdom
10. Botswana	35. Norway	• Botswana	• USA
11. Brazil	36. Poland	• Brazil	
12. Bulgaria	37. Romania	• Bulgaria	
13. Canada	38. Saudi Arabia	• Canada	
14. Chile	39. Singapore	• Chile	
15. Czech Republic	40. South Africa	• Czech Republic	
16. DAC	41. Sri Lanka	• Denmark	
17. Denmark	42. Sweden	• Estonia	
18. Estonia	43. Switzerland	• Finland	
19. Ethiopia	44. Taiwan	• France	
20. Finland	45. Thailand and Hong Kong	• Germany	
21. France	46. Turkey	• Hungary	
22. Germany	47. UAE	• Iceland	
23. Hungary	48. UK	• India	
24. Iceland	49. US	• Ireland	
25. India	50. Uruguay	• Italy	
		• Latvia	
		• Lithuania	
		• New Zealand	
		• Norway	

1 Ireland (has its jurisdiction in the course of its extraterritoriality. The website identifies in the introduction, however, Ireland only as Irelander Ireland.

Source : *gstatic.com*