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Understanding United States Ties to the Maghreb before and after the 9/11 Attacks: the Case of Algeria

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Dedication

{وَآخِرُ دَعْوَاهُمْ أَنِ الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ}

To the man whose selfless love knew no bounds, endless as the sea - My backbone, My father. For the woman whose unconditional love knew no boundaries, pure as the sunrise -the wellspring of life, my mother, every achievement bears your fingerprints.

To the two souls who have been integral threads in the tapestry of my life - My confidants, my biggest supporters, through the roller coaster of shared experiences for Dhia and Taqwa.

To my beloved grandparents, pillars of wisdom and love, though you've departed this earth, your cherished memories forever guides my way, forever etches in my soul, a treasure untold, your memories, dear grandparents, I will forever uphold.

To the indomitable spirit within .For the part of me that would not be conquered - The inner fire that burned bright, undimmed by the fiercest winds of adversity. This work stands as a conquering monument. For Oulfa.

To everybody who wanted to know what I would do if I did not win. I guess we will never know.

Batah Oulfa

Dedication

I have the honor to dedicate this work to my dear family, my heaven on earth.

This work is my mother's success, I am only an instrument for its realization.

My sincere respect, love and appreciation to my dear sister.

A personal dedication of this work goes to my two brothers who never took my chosen branch

seriously, yet I am the first one to graduate from my family.

To my father who feels proud of my academic achievement.

To everyone who wanted to see me succeed, your hope was well-placed.

To everyone who did not want to see me succeed, you only made the journey sweeter.

Finally, to me.

Bouaziz Hiba

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the Algerian relationship with the United States before and after the 9/11 attacks. The main focus is to understand how these ties has transformed over different historical periods, and the remarkable results that have arisen from their connection. As their ties has evolved, they have discovered new avenues of cooperation that benefit both nations and have strengthened their ties across various domains to create a new foundation for dealing with the current global situations and threats that the world is witnessing. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, counterterrorism collaboration has become a crucial aspect of fostering relations between the two countries. These ties has been founded on shared experiences and a joint dedication to maintaining global peace and stability. This dissertation offers an understanding of the successes and difficulties resulting from this significant relationship. It also examines Algeria's role in mediating a peace agreement in Mali 2015, the US-Algerian relationship in the Sahelian security crisis, and the 2013 hostage crisis at the Tiguentourine gas facility and how Algeria's strategy resulted in successful outcome.

ملخص

تتناول هذه الأطروحة العلاقة بين الجزائر والولايات المتحدة قبل وبعد الهجمات في الحادي عشر من سبتمبر. هدفها الرئيسي هو فهم كيفية تحول هذه العلاقة عبر فترات تاريخية مختلفة، والنتائج الملحوظة التي نشأت من هذا الارتباط. مع تطور شراكتهما، اكتشفت الدولتان مجالات جديدة للتعاون التي تعود بالنفع على كلا البلدين، و عززتا روابطهما عبر مجالات متعددة لإنشاء أساس جديد للتعامل مع الأوضاع والتهديدات العالمية الحالية التي يشهدها العالم. في أعقاب هجمات الحادي عشر من سبتمبر، أصبح التعاون في مجال مكافحة الإر هاب جانبًا حاسمًا لتعزيز العلاقة بين البلدين. تأسست هذه الشراكة على تجارب مشتركة والتزام مشترك بالحفاظ على السلام والاستقرار العالمي. تقدم هذه الأطروحة فهماً أكثر تفصيلاً للنجاحات والتحديات الناجمة عن هذه العلاقة الهامة. كما تستعرض دور الجزائر في التوسط لاتفاق سلام في مالي عام 2015، والعلاقة الجزائرية الأمريكية في أزمة الأمن في منطقة الساحل، وأزمة الرهائن في منشأة الغاز تيقنتورين عام 2013 وكيف أسفرت استراتيجية الموركية في أزمة الأمن في منطقة الساحل، وأزمة الرهائن في منشأة الغاز تيقنتورين عام 2013 وكيف أسفرت استراتيجية

List of Abbreviation and Acronyms

ADC	Alliance Démocratique pour le Changement (Democratic Alliance for
Change)	
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
ANP	People's National Army
AQ	Al-Qaeda
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
СТ	Counterterrorism
DHS	Department Homeland Security
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa States
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FLTA	Fullbright Foreign Language Teaching Assistant
FSP	Fullbright Foreign Student Program
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organization
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism
GIA	Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Group)
GSPC	Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et
le Combat)	
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IS	Islamic State
ISIS	The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

MNLA Le Movement National de Libération de l'Azawad (The National Movement

for Liberation of Azawad)

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCTC	National Counterterrorism
PLO	Palestine liberation organization
TEA	Fullbright Teaching Excellence and Achievements
TIFA	Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
TSCTI	Tran-Sahara counterterrorism Initiative
TWP	TechWomen Program
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA /US	United States of America
USABC	United States-Algeria Business Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WTC	World Trade Center

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Introduction

The purpose of this research study is to better understand how the relationship between the United States and the Maghreb Region—specifically, Algeria—was and how it has changed over the past few decades. This underwent several stages of development, witnessed changes in priorities, and was impacted by world events.

This dissertation examiness America's past efforts to establish mutually beneficial relationships with the Maghreb Region. The region, including Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, was initially seen as a gateway to Africa. However, the focus shifted of Algeria's relationship with the US shifted, especially after the 9/11. This study is important because it lies in its attempt to comprehend the origins of this dual relationship and its evolution over time. The study examines both the pre-9/11 and post-the 9/11 eras to gain a comprehensive understanding of their ties. The primary objective of this research is to offer an understanding of the ties between Algeria and the United States by analyzing different historical periods and their progression. By doing so, it illustrates the growth of this relationship over time. This study seeks to comprehend the rapport that united both countries before the September 11, 2001, and the alterations that took place in the US and Algeria following that date.

In the period that preceded the 2000's, the United States generally paid a limited attention to the Maghreb Region considering it to fall under the Europe zone of influence. With the decolonization, the American vision was gradually seen to be taking an alternative shape in the area. By the 9/11 attacks that made a whole change in the world, Algeria was among the first countries to denounce the attacks. The United States appreciated the Algerian support because it was out of a common experience with terrorists. This event effected their ties more than any time before and made the two nations take new path in their relations and policies.

According to Hemmer Christopher's work titled "US-Policy Towards North Africa: Three Overarching Themes" (2007), the US has consistently viewed North Africa as a region of

strategic importance due to its central location and potential for economic growth. However, given the tumultuous histories of individual countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, it has been challenging to formulate policies that address each nation's unique circumstances. Despite these challenges, Hemmer notes that US-North African relations have improved gradually over time. Rather than viewing each other as adversaries, both parties are now focused on fostering mutually beneficial ties that promote prosperity and protection. North African nations no longer view the US as an enemy, and the US no longer treats the region as a subordinate to more vital locations.

Algeria is a strategically positioned and capable partner of the United States. The bilateral relationship between the two countries is characterized by robust diplomatic, law enforcement, and security cooperation. The foreign assistance provided to Algeria is designed to strengthen the country's capacity to combat terrorism effectively. According to an article by Ott Zackary published in 2018 titled "How US Relations with Algeria Help Both," both nations are concentrating on boosting the amount of reciprocal trade emissions and maintaining peace in both areas. They also stand to gain a great deal from this cooperation in terms of experience, power development, enhancement in all fields, and even their ability to come together and unify for a positive impact on the world.

Both researchers address and portray the relationship that existed between Algeria and the United States, emphasizing that both countries contributed equally to each other's advantages. However, this research focuses more on comprehending and recognizing the depth of this relationship's success in real life, as well as how far it has come.

This research aims at answering the following question: What was the nature of the United States relations with the Maghreb Region prior the 9/11 attacks? What are the new changes that were brought by the 9/11 attacks to their relationship? To what extent was the cooperation in counterterrorism between Algeria and the United States successful?

Given the nature of the research project, a qualitative methodology is employed to provide a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between Algeria and the United States prior to and following the 9/11 attacks. With the intention of addressing the subject appropriately in every way. Both the historical method and the content analysis method are used in this study. It aims to understand the historical exchanges that occurred between the United States and the Maghreb Region prior to the 9/11 attacks, particularly with Algeria following the attacks, and how the two nation'srelationship evolved over time with regard to fighting terrorism. Another approach uses primary and secondary sources to analyze data from multiple sources connected to the aforementioned study in order to fully understand and unearth details in order to support conducting research.

This dissertation is divided into three chapters. the first chapter aims to understand the ties between the United States and the Maghreb Region. It evaluates the situation by comprehending the nature of the relationship between the two nations throughout different historical periods. Also, it delineates the various reasons for the United States' interest in the region. Following that, it delves into the US relationship with each country within the Maghreb Region. It also comprehends the US connection to the Maghreb during the Bill Clinton administration.

The second explores the development of the relationship between the United States and Algeria after the 9/11 attacks. It discusses the American reaction to the attacks and the support provided by Algeria. The chapter also examines the economic ties between the two countries and their connections with various organizations. Additionally, it explores the concept of soft and hard power in the context of their relationship.

The third chapter discusses the counterterrorism cooperation between Algeria and the United States. It covers the historical foundations of the relationship, the 9/11 attack as a turning point, and the terrorist groups that pose a threat to both countries. It also analyzes the

Tiguentourine gas facility hostage crisis in 2013 and how Algeria's approach led to a successful outcome. Lastly, it mentions Algeria's role in brokering a peace deal in Mali and the US-Algerian relationship in the Sahelian security crisis.

Chapter One

The United States Ties to the Maghreb Region

Prior to 2001, the Maghreb Region which includes Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania was not a leading strategic priority for the United States, compared to other regions in Europe and the Middle East. US policy sought to balance security, economic and ideological interests in the region rather than deepen ties. As a result, the potential for stronger collaboration was limited on both sides by contrasting world view and priorities.

This chapter is divided into four main points, the first tackles the relations between the US and the Maghreb. It reviews the situation in the region, by understanding the kind of the relation between the two countries in different periods of time. Second, outlines the different motives of the United States interest in the region. Next, it discusses the US relation with each country in the Maghreb Region. Finally, it examines the US ties to the Maghreb under the Bill Clinton administration.

1. Review of the US-Maghreb Region Relation

The relationship between the United States and the Maghreb Region is a complex and multifaced one that has evolved over centuries. From early trade relations to the Cold War era alliances, the US has played a significant role in shaping the political and economic landscape of the region.

The US, which gained independence after a fierce war with the British Empire in 1776, exerted diplomatic and military pressure on the Ottoman Regencie's Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunisia, as well as the Kingdom of Morocco, in order to ensure the safety of ships crossing the Mediterranean, it succeeded in escaping Ottoman suzerainty. While preparing for violent maritime attacks on the so called "Pirate coast", the United States felt the need to sign friendship treaties with North African countries (Iratni 12).

In 1786, two years after the US Independence, Thomas Jefferson, the third US president

signed a treaty of friendship and commerce with Morocco, which established trade relations between the two countries (225Yrs & Counting). In 1797, the US recognized Tunisa as Sovereign state (US Embassy), and in the early 19th century, diplomatic missions were exchanged between the US and the Maghreb Region.

1.1 During World War Two

During World War Two, the United States ties to Maghreb Region were not as significant as they would become in later years. The Maghreb Region, was not considered a unified regional entity by American policymakers, who instead maintained bilateral relations with each individual state (Zoubir 1).

Over a year prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States Army had initiated efforts to reach North Africa. The Axis and Allies shared a lack of clarity regarding the significance of the Mediterranean Sea zone. The Americans, in particular, did not view it as a crucial national concern or an ideal path to Berlin. However, the fall of France in June 1940 added a fresh perspective to the area.

The memo drafted by the US National Security Council in 1946 for President Harry Truman highlighted the strategic importance of the Maghreb region and the southern shore of the Mediterranean. It emphasized the significance of French North Africa for US security, especially after the military events of WWII, where the African base played a crucial role in eliminating the German enemy. The memo stressed that the shores of North Africa are linked to Atlantic Europe and Mediterranean Africa, making it imperative to prevent these regions from falling under hostile control to safeguard political stability. This awareness among American leaders laid the groundwork for future US military policy in various parts of the world, including the Maghreb region (Goufi qtd. in Hadhri 14).

1.2 The Decolonization Period 1950s and 1960s

The American position on the French occupation of Maghreb Region is not known, raising

questions as to why? The answer lies in the implementation of a new American policy called the policy of isolation, which was established by Monroe in 1814. The policy's slogan, "America is for the Americans and Europe is for the Europeans," implies that Europe should not interfere in American affairs, as if the continent had become an American protectorate. In return, the United States of America does not interfere in anything related to European politics outside the American continent (Lounissi 21).

However, American politicians were ambivalent about the struggle for self-determination and often supported French claims that the Algerian War was more of an internal matter than a struggle for independence. Despite this, American opinion gradually changed due to figures such as senator John F. Kennedy and the propaganda campaign of the Algerian National Liberation Front. As independence movements gained momentum, the US recognized Tunisia's sovereignty in 1956, established diplomatic relation with Libya in 1954, and recognized Mauritania's independence in 1960. Relations with post-colonial Algeria remained tense initially, with president Ahmed Ben Bella criticizing US imperialism during a stopover in Cuba on his way back from meeting with president Kennedy.

1.3 During the Cold War Era

During Cold War era, the US became more involved in the Maghreb Region as part of its global strategy to counter Soviet influence.

Morocco emerged as a strong ally in the fight against Communism in the region, which further solidified the relationship between the United States and Morocco as they both shared similar ideological objectives. In a world that had grown hotter in Africa during the Cold War, the two nations fostered their relationship through a series of visits by high-level government officials from both countries (Jowiya). Tunisia, on the other hand, decided to adopt a nonaligned stance and became a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It chose to pursue a policy of "positive neutrality" while simultaneously maintaining cordial relations with the United States (Zoubir 24). However, relations between the two nations became tense when Tunisian leaders suspected the United States of potentially being involved in the bombing of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in 1985.

Libya, was the country that presented intractable "swamp and its darkest nightmare" since Gaddafi came to the power in September 1969. Historical evidence confirms that the United States government did not oppose the military coup in 1969, which brought Gaddafi and his "Free Unionist Officers" to power in Libya. This acceptance was primarily due to the regime's strong anti-communist stance and clear popular support. Some commentators have even suggested the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) may have supported the officers' movement in secret, enabling them to seize power and overthrow the constitutional monarchy (Saleh 1). Since achieving independence in 1960, Mauritania has consistently maintained a cordial relationship with the United States. Nevertheless, there have been intermittent periods of tension, such as when diplomatic ties were severed following the Arab-Israeli War in 1967(Iratni 21). Not with standing these disagreements, the United States has extended economic aid to Mauritania, amounting to approximately \$130 million during the 1980s.

Throughout the Cold War era, Algeria found itself in the Soviet camp, but that did not prevent the nation from maintaining a working relationship with Washington. Despite its apparent alignment with the Soviets, Algeria had a unique diplomatic stance that allowed it to play an important role on the world stage. In 1980, the North African nation successfully mediated the end of the Iranian hostage crisis, which had gripped the world's attention for over a year. The crisis began in November 1979 when Iranian militants stormed the US embassy in Tehran, taking 52 American hostages. For 444 days, the hostages were held captive, causing tensions to rise between the United States and Iran. The situation was fraught with danger, and many feared that it would lead to a full-blown war. However, Algeria stepped in as a mediator and helped bring the crisis to an end. President Jimmy Carter praised the Algerians for their role in the negotiations, and their efforts were recognized worldwide. The resolution of the crisis was a major diplomatic victory for Algeria, and it cemented the country's reputation as a skilled and capable mediator (Riedel).

Algerian position in the Middle East have caused tension with the United States. Algeria supports the Palestinian cause and has deployed troops in Arab-Israeli wars. The US attempted to gain Algeria's support for resolving the conflict but was disappointed when Algeria joined a hard-line group opposing Egypt's reconciliation with Israel. Relations improved when Chadli Benjdid came to power. The US also lifted its arms embargo on Morocco, despite Algeria's objections regarding the Western Sahra conflict (Iratni 22).

2. Motives Behind the United States' Interests in the Maghreb Region

At the end of the Cold War, the United States maintained strong interest in the Maghreb region not solely because it serves as a portal to Africa and the Middle East, but also due to its close geographic proximity to Europe. This strategic location has made the Maghreb critical for addressing security issues and economic prospects. Additionally, the area provides the United States with the opportunity to exert influence and counter the growing reach of great power rivals like China and Russia. It also enables the US to collaborate or compete with traditional European allies.

There are various factors that have attracted the attention and interest of the United States in the Maghreb region, these two nations have effectively advocated for their concerns at various level which are:

2.1 Geo-strategic Motives

The Maghreb, which means "the land of the setting sun" in Arabic, is a vast region in northwestern Africa, covering an area of nearly 6 million square kilometers and home to 100 million people. Its five countries - Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia - share a large degree of common history, culture and language. All Maghreb countries are maritime economies, strategically located between the advanced economies of Europe across the Mediterranean in the north and the high-potential developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa in the south.

Prior 2001, the United States military and political leaders have long recognized the importance of the Maghreb region as a hub for international trade and a bridge between Europe and Africa. According to US Central Command, the unified combat command under the US Department of Defense, "The Maghreb's proximity to southern Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Middle East makes it a region of strategic importance." Therefore, from a geopolitical perspective, few regions are as relevant to the United States as the Maghreb. To this end, the United States continues to work to build strong bilateral and multilateral relationships in the Maghreb.

The Maghreb Region, an extension of Europe's security perimeter, holds increasing significance for American policymaker due its numerous connections and partnership with the European Union (EU). Although the American presence in the Maghreb is primarily established through bilateral arrangements, it is important to note that American interests in the region are comparatively weaker than in other areas such as the Middle East (Rakah22).

The unique characteristics of the Maghreb region, as previously mentioned, have made it an exceptional location for western superpowers especially the United States, leading to the establishment of relationships with each country in the region, to pursue political and economic benefits.

2.2 Economic Motives

The Maghreb region holds economic significance for the United States due to various factors. The region's strategic location, Algeria has the largest economy in the Maghreb Region and is a major exporter of natural gas and oil. Similarly, Libya is also a key oil and gas producer in the region. Mauritania is a lower-middle income nation that plays an

important role as an iron one producer. The second biggest regional economy is Morocco. It has achieved more economic diversification than other Maghreb countries with notable activities in agriculture, automotive, fertilizers and other areas. According to Tunisia, it has been an important regional manufacturer of electrical parts, light industrial machinery. (Alexei et al.1). This all give the region strategic relevance for US economic interests, but the region is less integrated economically with the US compared to Europe or the Middle East.

The Maghreb region, holds significant importance in driving economic growth in Africa. It was recognized as a promising market for American investors, as well as their European counterparts. This assertion was echoed by Madeleine Albright, who served as the US secretary in 1997, during her visits to certain North African countries, she made it known that one of the US` key foreign policy priorities were to establish economic alliance alongside military once. This approach was evident in the objectives of the American economic endeavors in North Africa, as outlined in a report published in mid-1997 by an independent group of experts appointed by the Council on Foreign Relations. The report, titled "Promoting the Economic Relations of the United States with North Africa", suggested that the United States should be at the forefront of major industrial countries to gain from new opportunities in North Africa. Consequently, the United States has undertaken substantial effort to incorporate the North Africa region into the global economy through, fostering an environment that motivates countries in the Maghreb region to adopt prosperous economic strategies, resulting in enhance trade prospects. Also, by the implementation of North African Growth and Opportunity Act which was passed by Congress in alignment with the new American perspective on Africa (Arbia 93).

Before the events of September 11, America's interests were primarily economic. The most obvious symbol was the Eizenstat Initiative, or economic alliance between the United State and North Africa. The plane launched in 1999 and later renamed the American

Economic Program for North Africa, aimed to strengthen trade and investment ties between the United States and the three central countries. The purpose was to better support trade between two countries, encourage more US companies to invest in the region, create goodpaying jobs, and promote the reduction of internal barriers between North African countries (kat 67).

The relationship between America and Algeria has experienced a significant increase. In July of 2001, the countries committed to a framework agreement on trade and investment that would create a procedure for consultation. This led to a formal agreement on investment, trade and double taxation, which facilitated the access of corporations to Algerian oil and natural gas resources. The purpose of the accord was to increase the volume of transaction and made American companies more involved in the Algerian market (Zoubir 5).

Briefly, the US has demonstrated interest in the Maghreb region because of its distinguished economic and energy pole, its economic motives were intertwined with promoted stability and enhanced regional cooperation, and tapped into the economic potential of the area through increased integration and development initiatives.

3. The US Relations with the Maghreb Countries Before the 9/11

Before 2001, The United States maintained bilateral relations with each individual state in the Maghreb region, its relation with each country was as follows:

3.1 Mauritania

Since Mauritania's independence on November 28, 1960, the United States has been one of the first countries to acknowledge it. For over 60 years, the two nations have enjoyed an excellent relationship, characterized by mutual respect and a focus on development in various fields. Top officials from both sides have exchanged visits to strengthen ties and tackle global challenges together. Throughout the decades, Mauritanians and Americans have worked hand in hand to improve the human condition. Together, they have made significant progress towards a brighter future (Mauritania/USA).

However, during the June 1967 Middle East war, Mauritania broke diplomatic ties with the US Relations were restored two years later but faced challenges due to disagreement over the Arab-Israeli issue. Since 1981, the US has provided around \$130 million in economic and food assistance. Relations worsened in 1989 when Mauritania deported its own citizens to Senegal, and further strained during the 1991 Gulf war due to perceived support of Iraq. The US halted aid and military assistance in response to human rights abuses in 1991.

Additionally, The United States government employed several tactics to pressure the Mauritanian government into recognizing Israel. These included utilizing US assistance programs, leveraging loans from international financial institutions, and issuing annual country reports on human rights. Prior to establishing a connection with Israel, US-Mauritania relations were limited to traditional bilateral and multilateral tracks, such as those offered by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Breton Woods institutions. However, once Mauritania established diplomatic relations with Israel, it gained a unique status in both US and Israeli diplomatic circles. As the third Arab country to forge diplomatic relations with Israel, and the first member of the Arab Maghreb Union to do so, Mauritania's position became highly regarded (Bullard 754).

3.2 Libya

Prior 2001, relations between the United States and Libya had a complicated trajectory, undergoing several phrases that included both strained relations and collaborative ties at different times.

In 1951, the United Stated lent its support to Libya's quest for independence and forged diplomatic ties with the nation. During the early 1960s, the US extended humanitarian assistance to Libya amidst a severe famine. However, in the late 1970s and 1980s, relations between the two countries soured due to series of conflicts and incidents, including the assault

on the US embassy in Tripoli.

Tensions between the US and Libya endured through most of the 1990s stemming from Libya's alleged role in 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland. In the early 2000s, there were occasional attempts at diplomacy between the US and Libya. For the first time in nearly two decades, a US delegation visited Libya in 2000. Despite this efforts, significant disagreements remined, as Libya refused to accept responsibility of the Pan Am 103 bombing or provide compensation to the families of victims. Consequently, tensions between the two notions continued.

3.3 Tunisia

The United States has had a strong relationship with Tunisia for over 200 years. Although there have been some brief periods of tension. The first agreement of friendship and trade was signed in 1799, and the first American consulate was established in Tunisia in 1800. Over the years, there have been several visits and messages of friendship exchanged between the two countries.

During Tunisia's fight for independence, the United States established good relations with the national liberation movement. The US recognized Tunisia as a sovereign state in 1956 and provided economic and technical aid through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In 1961, Tunisia become the first Arab country to request and receive Peace Corps Volunteers, leading to 34-years partnership between the two countries (Examining US 1).

In 1985, tensions arose between the United States and Tunisia due to Israeli attacks on PLO headquarters in Tunisia. However, relations quickly improved after the US distanced itself from these actions. Despite some cooling of relations following the assassinate of PLO leader Abu Jihad in 1988 and the Gulf War in 1990, overall, the US continued to support Tunisian's democratic path and provided financial assistance and cooperation in various areas such as economics, security, culture and education (Iratni 20).

3.4 Morocco

Morocco and the United States have shared a strong and amicable bond since the time of the American Revolutionary War. As early as 1777, Sultan Sidi Muhammad Ben Abdullah of Morocco expressed his wish for friendship and sought diplomatic relations with the US. The Treaty of Marrakech, signed in 1786, further cemented this enduring alliance, making it the longest unbroken relationship in US history.

In 1942, the United States and its allies landed forces in Morocco to prevent the Axis powers from invaded North Africa. President Franklin Roosevelt praised Sultan Mohammed V for his cooperation and expressed hope for peace and prosperity in the region after the war. After Morocco gained independence in 1956, the United States promptly established full diplomatic representation, elevated its envoy to Ambassador status. Similarly, Morocco dispatched Ambassador Aboud to the United States. Formal relations were further cultivated over subsequent decades through mutual friendship and respect demonstrated in high-level exchanges (Migdalovitz 5-6).

3.5 Algeria

The United States of America and Algeria have a lengthy and congenial history that dates back to the signing of their Treaty of Amity and Peace on September 5, 1795. Algeria was one of the first countries to recognize America's independence, and has since been devoted to enhancing the friendship and peace between the two nations.

Despite disagreements between Algeria and the United States, particularly in the multilateral context, the two countries were able to resume diplomatic ties in 1974. The US administration gradually began to recognize that Algeria's economic and political significance could not be ignored. In fact, during the 1970s, Henry Kissinger asserted that Algeria's involvement was crucial for the success of the Arab-Israeli peace process (Quandt qtd. in

Zoubir 4). In addition, Jan. 20, 1981, was an unforgettable and momentous occasion in the relationship between the two countries. Algerian diplomats were able to secure the release of 52 Americans who were being held hostage in Iran on that day. The American Administration and US Congress were impressed by Algeria's mediation, and expressed their gratitude to the Algerian negotiators for successfully resolving the hostage crisis (Brief Presentation).

However, the Western Sahara issue emerged during the height of the Cold War, and ultimately put an end to the possibility of strong relations between Algeria and the US. Even after the armed conflict between the Sahrawis and Moroccans ended in September 1991, Algeria's resentment toward the US persisted (Zoubir 4).

3. The US Ties to the Maghreb Under the Clinton Administration

During the Clinton administration, there was a focus on developing ties with North Africa which includes the Maghreb Region. Led officials announced that Africa would assume a new central role in US policy. They said it was the time to build a new "new relationship" with Africa.

In June 1994, president Clinton addressed a White House conference on Africa, called for greater attention to the entire African continent, not just South Africa.

In 1998 during Clinton administration, and after decades of

marginalization and confinement to mentality of ideological polarization of the Maghreb region, president Clinton renewed US Maghreb policy and shifted attention to economic and trade partnership. This shift can be explained from two angles:

- First, the arrival of a Democratic administration to the White House under Clinton presidency (the Clinton Doctrine) it was known that Democratics were more inclined to economics and trade than the major strategic issues.
- Second, the ruled regimes in the Maghreb region greatly welcomed the new American approach towards the Maghreb region based on "partnership" it was looking for a

strategic partner the size of the United States of America. The Maghreb countries also considered that the American partner could be a balance, within the framework of their diversification of their strategic options. (Al-Zubaie 66).

Moreover, for most of president Clinton's two terms, the US policy of neutrality remained virtually unchanged and did not recognize Western Sahara as Moroccan territory. However, towards the end of president Clinton's second term, there was slight reversal, as Washington realized that diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict could fail and risk renewed violence, destabilized the region. This instability could negatively impact Southern Europe and threaten US interest (Al-Manar Slimi).

Overall, during the Clinton administration, there was a concerted effort to engage with the Maghreb region economically and diplomatically while maintaining a neutral stance on certain regional conflict.

In conclusion, the United States' relationship with the Maghreb region has been marked by a complex and evolving dynamic over the past century. Prior to 2001, the region was not a top strategic priority for the US, as policymakers maintained more limited bilateral ties with individual countries rather than viewing the Maghreb as a unified geopolitical entity. However, the region's pivotal location between Europe and Africa, as well as its economic significance as a hub for trade and natural resources, have increasingly drawn American attention and involve.

During pivotal eras like World War II and the Cold War, the US sought to counter Soviet influence and secure the region's strategic maritime position. Overall, the United States has worked to cultivate political, economic, and security ties across the Maghreb, though the specific focus and depth of engagement has shifted in response to evolving global dynamics. As the region's geopolitical and economic importance continues to grow, sustaining constructive US relations with the Maghreb will likely remain a key priority for American policymakers going forward.

Chapter Two

The United States Ties to Algeria after the 9/11 Attacks

During the presidency of George W. Bush, there was a shift in the relations with the outside world, particularly Algeria. At the beginning of his presidential term, the relationship between the United States and Algeria has advanced more than ever before, with Abdel Aziz Bouteflika as the Algerian president whose start was in 1999; he worked for the Algerian external openness on the world and established bilateral ties with the United States. In 11 July 2001, the first meeting between the two presidents took place since 1985 at the time of president Chadli Bendjdid and president Reagan between the two countries. Abdel Aziz Bouteflika arrived at the White House, couple of economic, national affairs were discussed, not focusing a lot on the internal situation of Algeria at that time to let things be discussed calmly in the future (Zoubir 4).

The second chapter focuses on understanding the development of the bilateral ties between the United States and Algeria after the 9/11 attacks. In order to achieve this, it is important to start with an overview concerning the 9/11 events itself, to understand the intentions behind such cooperation between the two countries. This will include the American reaction to the attack, in addition to the Algerian support and what importance did this tragedy brought to the two countries. Then, it dives more into economic ties between Algeria and US, mentioning its growth over time starting from 2001. Also, an important element that this chapter discusses is the connection of the two countries with different organizations in fields such as finance, health, political and security interests. Finally, it shifts to understand two types of powers that tied the two countries in many occasions. It examines the soft and hard power with their different forms.

1. The 9/11 Attacks

On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists from Al-Qaeda leaded by Osama Bin Laden hijacked

four American airplanes destined for the West Coast and intentionally crashed them. Two airplanes crashed on New York's World Trade Center North & South Tower resulting with their collapse. A third plane crashed into the Pentagon, for the final plane crashed in a field in Shanksville, after passengers stormed the cockpit and tried to subdue the hijackers. This attack left behind it nearly 3,000 dead people with high number of wounded people (Benchikh and Khenous 12-13).

The terrorist- attacks on September 11th prompted significant modifications to the intelligence operations of the United States. These adjustments included the formation of various initiatives and the expansion of certain organizations, like the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the War on Terror, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Additionally, the US reached out to other nations to improve global cooperation in the fight against terrorism, as it became evident that this was a problem that transcended borders, this attack made a big emphasis on the importance of international collaboration in combating terrorism (Homeland Security).

1.1 The American Reaction to the 9/11 Attacks

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 caused a change in the geopolitical map of the world, leading to a series of world events including the invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and the war in Iraq (2003). The attacks elevated terrorism to the top of many political agendas. The same day the attacks happened, the American government declared that Al-Qaeda was responsible for the attacks and that same evening a "War Cabinet" was formed. The meeting that was held at the White House ended up with the decision that the "War on Terrorism" should be launched. The US government counter-terrorism war decision was made to prepare for the American war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The following morning on September 12, there was propagation for the war in the media which called for military intervention against Afghanistan. It was only few weeks later that Afghanistan was bombed

1.2 The Algerian Reaction to the 9/11 Attacks

Right after Abdel Aziz Bouteflika's initial encounter with the American leader, the World Trade Center (WTC) and Pentagon were attacked on September 11. Algeria was among the first to condemn the attack and provide aid to the United States. This prompt response was not only a display of diplomacy and compassion, but also stemmed from Algeria's own history with terrorism and its impact on both the country and its people (Bekrouk). President Bouteflika stated "better than anyone else, can understand the suffering and the pain of the families of the victims of the attack on September 11th." (Allen), especially with the Algerian position for the call of establishing an international collaboration in what it dubbed 'the War on Terror', the US was one of the countries to change its sentiment towards the Algerian warning. This was followed by a second meeting by the Algerian president in November 2001, issues concerning security, safety of civilians and fighting against terrorism was tackled in the White House, during his speech, President Bouteflika emphasized the importance of not only combating terrorism but also addressing its underlying causes. He recognized that poverty and inequality often serve as breeding grounds for extremism and that neglecting these issues would only lead to a never-ending cycle of violence (Zoubir 13). The American Ambassador David Hume declared that Bouteflika is the first Arab president to condemn the attack, the 9/11 events opened the way to very important changes in the US-Algerian relations.

1.3 The Impact of the 9/11 Attack

The US had planned to offer anti-guerrilla equipment to Algeria before the devastating terrorist attacks on the WTC and Pentagon. The condition of the offer was that it wouldn't be used against neighboring countries. After the attacks, Algeria joined the US-led international coalition and condemned the attacks. They believed that a military coalition under the United Nations (UN) was the way forward, instead of targeting specific countries, religions, or cultures (Zoubir 77).

From Algeria's perspective, the September events vindicated the government's decadelong position on the global nature of terrorism and its capacity to threaten states. Officials argued that Algeria had been at the forefront in the struggle against terrorism, suffered the loss of 100,000 lives and massive destruction without anyone's help. Hence, the fight against terrorism should be worldwide and call for an international cooperation. The 9/11 attacks gave Algeria an opportunity to place itself in the right camp and reap some benefits, i.e., eliciting assistance in eradicating terrorists in their country. The authorities handed Washington a list of 350 suspected Algerian militants on the run in Europe and the United States and offered their cooperation in security and intelligence matters, and the same thing was reciprocated (Zoubir 78).

Algeria's strategic location in North Africa, coupled with its historical experience combating terrorism during the Algerian black decade in the 1990s, positioned it as a key player in regional security. The United States recognized the importance of Algeria's role in addressing shared challenges, particularly those related to counterterrorism and countering violent extremism (Carlone).

The US's top Middle East diplomat, William Burns, is advocating for stronger economic and political ties between the United States and North African nations, like Algeria. Burns believes that both parties can benefit from their combined resources and a collaborative effort to combat terrorism through increased information-sharing. He also expressed his support for Algeria's economic reforms and emphasized the importance of mutual economic growth. Starting his five-day tour of North African countries in Algeria, Burns met with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to discuss a potential free trade agreement and economic ties between the US and Algeria, as well as with the surrounding region. Such ties could have a significant impact on the region's economic and political stability, and Burns is eager to explore all the possibilities (Algeria:US).

In light of the 9/11 tragedy, efforts were made to strengthen counterterrorism measures against Al-Qaeda globally and specifically in the Islamic Maghreb region. According to a former CIA official, Algeria proved to be a valuable ally by providing the US with crucial intelligence on Al-Qaeda. In light of ongoing extremist threats faced by several Sahel countries bordering southern Algeria, both Algiers and Washington aim to collaborate further to contain and defeat these groups (Aftandilian).

2. US-Algeria Trade and Investment Ties

Algeria and the United States have developed a strong economic connection in recent years, with a particular emphasis on the Bouteflika and George W. Bush presidencies. In July 2001, the two nations signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) during their inaugural official visits. This agreement established a process for addressing economic hurdles and identifying opportunities for expanded commercial interaction. It paved the way for a bilateral treaty on trade, investment, benefits, and taxation, with the aim of doubling trade volume between the two nations. This was especially important given Algeria's significant role in the oil sector, with the US now being the largest investor in this industry. At the first meeting, President Bouteflika expressed his hope that US investment in Algeria would double by 2005 (Zoubir 20-21).

The US has expressed interest in diversifying their economic ventures by investing in various fields like finance, banking, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and computers. As a result, the US has made notable investments in these areas. Additionally, the trade relationship between Algeria and the US has experienced consistent growth (Zoubir 21); statistics from the Department of Commerce show that the volume of exchanges has surpassed \$12 billion. Within the framework of the US-North African Economic Partnership,

the United States provided about \$1 million in technical assistance to Algeria in 2003. This program supported and encouraged Algeria economic reform program (US Department of State). Algeria is the United States 3rd largest market in the Middle East/North Africa region. Mentioning also the US-Algeria Business Council (USABC) that was founded in 2002 that aims to promote active bilateral business associations operating in Washington, DC. It expanded its operations in August 2004, significantly increasing its membership and services to address different sectors (US- Algeria Business Council).

3. The United States and Algeria under the Same Organizations

The joint membership of Algeria and the United States to several of the same international organizations, strengthened their ties more with time because in this way both countries stand, support, fight for the same goals and reasons concerning all fields. Even way before the 9/11 attacks, with the urgent situations to establish organizations for different nobel goals.

3.1 The United Nations (UN)

Established in 1945, the United Nations is a global organization created to promote international relations and maintain peace and security among its 193 members (Fomerand, Lynch & Mingst). The United States became a charter member on October 24, 1945, joining the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Algeria joined on October 8, 1962, and both countries are dedicated to upholding international legality and the principles of selfdetermination and sovereign equality of states. They also prioritize peaceful conflict resolution, good relations among nations, and non-interference in internal affairs (Welcome to the United Nations).

During difficult times, such as the 9/11 attacks, the UN and its members play a crucial role. In response to the tragedy, the UN passed a resolution declaring terrorism a threat to global peace and security. Members were called upon to cooperate and share operational information, which the United States and Algeria had already done (Crawford).

3.2 The International Monetary Fund

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an intergovernmental organization comprised of 190 countries, dedicating to promote global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade and promote high employment and reduce poverty around the world. As the first countries to join the organization is the United States in 1945 and considering its economic power it is one of the most providers, for Algeria it officially joined in1963. This bond between Algeria and the United States that paved the way to many possible agreements through time, arriving to 2001, with the 9/11 attacks, terrorists financing was added as a major issue in the IMF that the included members should work to stop by establishing a legal department and restrict actions. Even after that period, the International Monetary Fund has acknowledged Algeria's progress in achieving macro-economic stability and expects to have future contributions, especially for a bilateral relation between Algeria and the United States (Arieff 18).

3.3 The US African Command (AFRICOM)

It stands for African Command that is established by the United States on February 6th, 2007, it included countries of the Maghreb region which began operations in 2008 for good aims of both regions. After 9/11 attacks the interests between countries to enlarge their cooperation took place, particularly the United States and Maghreb region area especially considering their forces to the global fight against terrorism, it is composed of civilian and military personal from United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and officers from the State Department (Volman 2-6). Under the Bush administration this step considered crucial to strengthen ties between Algeria and US, the Commander of US. Africa Command Carter Ham pointed in his visits the importance of bilateral cooperation, taking into account respecting both regions freedom and decisions without imposing views even when it comes to opposing points (Arieff 9).

3.4 The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)

The Global Counterterrorism Forum serves as an informal and political platform for multiple countries to collaborate on counterterrorism efforts. Policymakers and practitioners from around the globe come together to exchange knowledge and create practical tools and strategies to prevent threats. Algeria and the United States were the first countries to join this initiative in 2011, out of the 30 members in total. (Global Counterterrorism).

4. Soft and Hard Power Ties between the United States and Algeria

In today's global landscape, achieving a balance between soft power and hard power is paramount to maintaining healthy international relations and promoting the best world order. Soft power is primarily exercised through cultural diplomacy, educational programs, and other means of positively spreading a country's influence. Conversely, hard power involves the use of coercive measures, such as military intervention, force, and powerful organizations that are willing to use strength, if necessary, as well as economic leverage (Drew). Both the United States and Algeria rely on a combination of these approaches to strengthen their ties and ensure a prosperous future, let's delve deeper into this topic.

4.1 Soft Power Ties

The Algerian-American bilateral relations focus on more than one aspect for the aim of enlarging the scope of interaction especially after the 9/11 events, one of the means to achieve this is soft power.

4.1.1 Cultural Diplomacy

As previously stated, cultural diplomacy is a tool used to enhance a country's soft power. This involves a government's efforts to promote the international dissemination and exchange of ideas, knowledge, and beliefs, as well as various aspects of its foreign policy (Mark qtd. in Zemmouri 8-11).

For the US and especially after the events of the 9/11, president George W. Bush wanted

his foreign policy strategy to reform democracy, cultural exchange was one of the main aspects that Bush used, especially in the middle east and this led to a two-way influence between countries.

4.1.2 Exchange Programs Between the US and Algeria

Participating in exchange programs is an excellent method to broaden one's worldview by experiencing the lifestyle, culture, history, language, and people of another country. Algeria and the United States endorse such programs, with the US Embassy in Algeria providing a diverse range of educational and cultural activities. These programs can span up to half a year, enabling learners and apprentices to share their own culture with their host country while also learning from others to bring their experiences back to Algeria (Djedouani and Zemali 57).

US exchange programs offer to Algerians a new experience to develop, learn, explore all the new in the higher levels of the American education and adding to the American society during their stay. Some of the well-known and that last for a longer period than others are five.

4.1.2.1 Fulbright Foreign Language Teaching Assistant (FLTA)

Fullbright Foreign Language Teaching Assistant was established in 1946 it lasts for 9 months, a program for Algerian teachers who are required to teach Arabic in American universities, high school. They can take graduate English courses that will help them develop more their communicative skills.

4.1.2.2 Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program

Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship program was launched in 1978 and it is a 10 months nondegree program for graduate- level study. Algerians are expected to accomplish mid-level professional study in various fields and have the ability to attend special enrichment activities throughout their program and even to be introduced to other foreign people.

4.1.2.3 Fulbright Foreign Student Program (FSP)

Fullbright Foreign Program (FSP) was launched in summer of 1946 enables graduate Algerian students to pursue their master s degree in the United States for 2 academic years.

4.1.2.4 Fulbright Teaching Excellence and Achievements (TEA)

In 1946, Teaching Excellence and Achievements (TEA) was established. Algeria has since participated in this six-week program, which is not a degree program, and offers Algerian teachers an exclusive opportunity to enhance their teaching abilities, develop expertise in their particular subject, and increase their understanding of American society. Out of 168 participants each year, Algerian students are among those that have the privilege to attend.

4.1.2.5 TechWomen Program

Tech Women Program (TWP) that was launched in 2011 connects women leaders in Science, Technology, Engineering and Math, Algerian women take part in this program that last for five weeks, they travel, participate in workshops before the period of concluding the program.

In addition to this, more programs and collaborative projects over the years are being established in order to build bridges between Algeria and the USA such as.,

Algerian American Foundation for Culture, Education, Science & Technology in 2010. The Youth Leadership Program with Algeria.

4.1.3 The Role of the Exchange Programs in Strengthening US-Algeria

Ties

Algeria has a big chance to have contribution and a seat in these programs, and so does the United States for benefiting from the knowledge and Algerian talents in different fields and even sharing everyday practices to attract more people to have an insight on these two cultures, people who already been part of any of these programs they keep spreading the mentality of interaction between the two cultures which pushes other people to take the chance as well. The success of this ongoing programs between both sides guarantees future collaborations and closure of relationships in all domains. It is more of people-to-people diplomacy between the United States and Algeria to raise understanding.

Soft power can take other shapes between Algeria and the United States in both tangible and non-tangible forms.

4.2 Hard Power Ties between the United States and Algeria after the 9/11 Attacks

Even prior to the tragic events of the 9/11, Algerian security services had already established strong bonds with similar US agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Security Agency. Both nations recognized the significance of global collaboration in promoting peace and combating terrorism. Due to Algeria's extensive expertise in this field, the United States found it advantageous to partner with them beyond simply condemning the 9/11 attacks. They joined forces to establish a hard power coalition, comprising military and security cooperation to tackle national and international threats from terrorists. This resulted in various hard power connections, all aimed at achieving their common objective of ensuring safety and security (Zoubir 13).

4.2.1 Bilateral Military and Security Cooperation

The formation of ties between the United States and Algeria happened through various means over a long period of time. One such instance took place in 2002 when the US agreed to sell weapons to Algerian security forces (Zoubir 14). In October 2003, William Burns, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, graced Algiers with his presence for two days. During his visit, he made a remarkable observation - that the relationship between the US and Algeria was stronger than it had been in the past 40 years since Algeria gained independence.

Burns also went ahead to laud the continuous and stable growth of military cooperation between the two countries. He made a point of mentioning that the US had provided nonoffensive military equipment to Algeria, which was a clear indication of their commitment to strengthening their bond. It's impressive to see how much these two nations have come together to foster mutual interests (Zoubir 230).

In 2003, Powell's visit proved that Algeria was a reliable partner in the region. The 9/11 attacks brought geostrategic changes that greatly influenced the dimensions of US-Algerian security relations. These relations started multilaterally when Algeria joined the North Atlantic Treaty Ogranization (NATO)'s Mediterranean Dialogue in 2000. Bouteflika visited NATO's headquarters in Belgium in 2001 and 2002, further reinforcing Algeria's commitment to the alliance (Zoubir 230).

Hard power ties can be also as form of programs, especially after the 9/11 attacks and the Algerian experience to defeat the threat on its lands in the black decade by benefiting from mutual experience, some of these efforts can be seen in real life through:

4.2.2 Intelligence Sharing

As part of its wider national security strategy, the United States has identified the need to strengthen its relationships with allies in the intelligence community. In particular, the US is looking to cooperate with countries in Africa, such as Algeria, in order to gather accurate and timely information about potential threats in the region. One of the key benefits of intelligence-sharing is that it allows countries to pool their resources and expertise in order to achieve a common goal. In the case of the US and Algeria, this goal is to counter the threat of terrorism in neighboring countries such as Libya and northern Mali. The US recognizes that it cannot tackle these challenges alone, and is therefore seeking to establish a cooperative framework with Algeria and other African nations. This framework will enable the US to obtain the information it needs without raising alarms among international stakeholders. At

the heart of this cooperation is the importance of regular communication. The US places great emphasis on maintaining open channels of dialogue with Algeria, in order to ensure that both countries are able to respond quickly and effectively to any emerging threats.

In addition to intelligence-sharing, the US and Algeria are also working together on a range of other security issues. For example, the two countries have collaborated on efforts to combat human trafficking and drug smuggling, which pose significant challenges in the region. Overall, the ties between the US and Algeria is a vital component of the wider international effort to promote peace and stability in Africa. By working together, both countries are able to take a more coordinated and effective approach to tackling the complex security challenges that they face (Gherieb). Algeria has established a strong knowledge of Islamic terrorist networks worldwide and has shared the information with US security and intelligence agencies (Berkouk).

4.2.3 Training and Equipping of Security Forces

Exchange of expertise play valuable role in strengthening the US-Algeria law enforcement and security partnership. Programming from the State Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) enables both countries to partner. Since 2008 the US has spent approximately 1 million dollar per year with the aim of training Algerian military officers in advanced military education in institutions and academies in the US (Boulter). In order to achieve stability in Africa and address the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the United States initiated the Tran-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which eventually evolved into a partnership with countries such as Algeria, Chad, Mali, Morocco, Niger, and Tunisia. The main goal of the initiative is to enhance the region's counterterrorism capabilities and establish a framework for collaboration among security forces (Zoubir 18).

To sum up, the connection between Algeria and the United States has a rich history of solidarity, complex diplomacy, and modern collaborations. This relationship is a dynamic

tapestry that mirrors the ever-changing landscape of international relations. From Algeria's fight for independence to the shared challenges of the present day, the diplomatic ties between these two countries have endured and evolved. The path of US-Algeria relations highlights the significance of mutual respect, comprehension, and teamwork in addressing global challenges and seizing chances for shared prosperity. As both countries navigate the intricacies of the 21st century, the US-Algeria relationship serves as a symbol of the resilience of diplomacy and the potential for joint efforts to shape a more interconnected, secure, and stable world (Carlone).

Chapter Three

US-Algeria Counterterrorism Partnership

The bilateral ties between Algeria and the United States had witnessed considerable development through the years more than any other time before. The intentions of both countries covered many areas of mutual work, cooperation against terrorism offered Algeria and US an opportunity for a political rapprochement; this relation is dynamic, multidimensional and integrative in geo-security terms (Berkouk).

This chapter, which addresses the counterterrorism cooperation between Algeria and the United States, is organized into three main sections. It begins by addressing the historical foundations of these relationships and recognizing the developmental phases that enabled both nations to attain such fruitful cooperation. This section is divided into sections that cover a general understanding of terrorism in relation to this particular situation, as well as defining counterterrorism and the specific ways in which these two nations chose to collaborate. The 9/11 attack is also mentioned as a major event that shaped the change. This point is concluded by listing some terrorist groups that pose a global threat, particularly to Algeria and the US.

The second section focuses on comprehending the Tiguentourine gas facility hostage crisis in 2013 by discussing the incident's events and providing information about the terrorist attacks' purported causes. The conclusion includes details about how the Algerian style of taking control of the situation worked, as well as how it was ultimately a successful point of peace between the two nations. The final section discusses Algeria's role in brokering a peace deal in Mali and the US-Algerian relationship in the Sahelian security crisis.

1. Terrorism as a Concept

Although there is no universally accepted definition, terrorism generally refers to a method of coercion that uses or threatens violence to spread fear and achieve political or ideological objectives. The key difference between terrorist violence and ordinary violence is that the

former involves a "triangle" where A attacks B to convince or coerce C into changing their stance on a particular policy or action desired by A. This type of attack creates fear by targeting innocent victims, which puts pressure on third parties like governments to change their policies. Modern-day terrorists use various forms of violence and indiscriminately target civilians, military facilities, and government officials, among others (University Module Series 7).

Terrorism is a multifaceted concept that extends beyond its basic definition. Fernandi Reinares explains that international terrorism has a deeper meaning. It aims to disrupt the existing power structures of entire regions and even the global society. The individuals and groups involved in international terrorism carry out their activities in many countries, based on their objectives. International terrorism shares similarities with other forms of terrorism, but it is transnational by definition. However, not all forms of transnational terrorism are equal to international terrorism. Today, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, along with self-generated cells, constitute international terrorism. Their ultimate goal is to establish a caliphate, and they have spread to various countries in and out of the Muslim world. Nevertheless, there are Islamist groups that systematically carry out attacks but are not affiliated with the global neo-Salafist Jihad linked to international terrorist networks (Reinares).

2. Counterterrorism as a Concept

Counterterrorism in a basic definition is all the practices that governments and organizations take to stop terrorism or to stop people from becoming terrorists and work on these complex topics to find solutions to ensure global security (Irfan). Does a consistent and a coherent strategy will be able to stop the terrorist's threat? If the study of terrorism is confusing and continuous, should the study of counterterrorism be even more frustrating? With what the whole world have seen from attacks and actions, the notion of counterterrorism became more important in past few years, mentioning the September attacks that was a



changing point on many levels in the world, Ronald Crelinsten included a dichotomy:

Figure1: Seeing counterterrorism through ideological filters: the polarized discourse revolving around the 9/11 attacks.

Source: Crelinsten, Ronald. "Counterterrorism." Polity Press, 2009, pp. 8.

"September 10 thinking" and "September 12 thinking" are two different approaches to counterterrorism. The former prioritizes the rule of law, international cooperation, and understanding the causes of terrorism, while the latter focuses on military action and the use of force (Crelinsten 8). The choice between these approaches depends on the specific situation and a country's goal of ensuring stability and safety for its people.

The fight against terrorism involves more than just military and security measures. Governments allocate significant amounts of money towards counterterrorism programs, including the National Intelligence Program. While counterterrorism organizations primarily focus on preventing terrorist attacks, they may also have responsibilities for other areas such as natural disasters. In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security takes charge of counterterrorism efforts, but also oversees other areas like crime prevention. The FBI, for example, monitors both terrorist activity and criminal behavior (Crenshaw and Lafree 166).

Counterterrorism brought together many countries for the same goal which is to end any risk of terrorist attacks and to limit any damage following a possible attack. Post the 9/11

period, the United States took the major part of leading, combating and raising awareness about this danger that can threaten a country's stability; In the same league, Algeria as one of the countries that gained a harsh experience for several years and its ability to take control again over the situation on its land, these two countries saw that the best deal to have a counterterrorism partnership.

3. The Evolution of the Relationship after the 9/11 Attacks

Algeria was one of the first countries to support the United States after the 9/11 attacks. Despite being a primarily Muslim country, Algeria denounced the attacks and reminded Western nations of its longstanding stance against terrorism. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika met with US President George Bush twice in 2001 and publicly pledged Algeria's full cooperation with the coalition campaign against terrorism. However, Algeria made it clear that they would only cooperate on the condition that no country would be attacked until it was proven to be involved in terrorist acts. As part of their cooperation, Algeria increased their sharing of information with the US and actively worked with European governments (Benchikh and Khenous).

The relationship between the United States and Algeria has been a complicated one for many years. Though some progress was made in the late 1990s, it was not until the September 11th attacks that Americans began to view Algeria differently. The Algerian government's fight against terrorism, which was previously seen as a domestic issue, became a major global concern. This shift allowed for increased bilateral military cooperation and the inclusion of Algeria in two security systems. Since the 9/11, creating cooperation has been a top priority, with a focus on information exchange, military cooperation, and monitoring of fund transfers. Overall, the attacks of the 9/11 served as a catalyst for improving the American Algerian relationship, particularly in matters of security (Dissi 28).

4. Terrorist Organizations

4.1 Al-Qaeda (AQ 1979)

4.1.1 History

Al-Qaeda was created in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The US and Saudi Arabia supported the fighters with arms and funding during the Cold War (Beauchamp). Al-Qaeda went through four phases of activity, with its peak in 2001 marked by the September 11 attacks. After a decline due to the capture or killing of many fighters, a second phase began in 2003 with high-profile attacks. However, Al-Qaeda was weakened in Iraq by 2006. The rise of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula led to a third phase of instability in Pakistan from 2007 to 2009. Al-Qaeda made a public announcement in January 2009 that their Saudi and Yemeni fighters had joined forces under one group in Yemen. This era ended with the loss of top commanders such as passing of Osama bin Laden and other key members in 2011 (Kerry 4-6).

The Arab Spring paved the way for Al-Qaeda's fourth phase of activity, where they took advantage of the uprisings in the Arab world and the escalating conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and Afghanistan. During this time, Al-Qaeda faced competition from ISIS. Nonetheless, in September 2014, jihadist leader Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that Al-Qaeda would expand its network and establish a regional affiliate in the Indian subcontinent, relying on local organizations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (Vasiliev and Zherlistyna).

4.1.2 Goals

The dominant ideology espoused by groups such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and others reflects the notion that violent jihad is the only way to protect the Islamic world. In declaring jihad to the United States, Osama bin Laden argued that the West, and the United States in particular, is openly hostile to Islam and that the only way to respond to this aggression is to use force, the only language America understands (Gunaratna).

4.1.3 Areas of Operation

Based in South Asia (core members in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan) Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (North Africa and the Sahel) it was set up in 2006 to expand operations and to establish a brand throughout North Africa. However, even in 2013, almost 90% of AQIM's operations were still taking place in Algeria and 80% of its attacks were directed against state security forces in its home country (Soulages 7).

4.2 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM 1998)

4.2.1 History

AQIM came into being in 1998 in Algeria when it broke away from the Armed Islamic Group (from french: Groupe Islamique Armé /GIA) under the leadership of Hassan Hattab. Initially known as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC/ Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat), it declared its allegiance to Usama bin Ladin in September 2006 and changed its name to the "Organization of Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb." AQIM is a militant group that follows Salafi-jihadist ideology, and it is designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) by the United States. Operating in the Sahara and Sahel regions, the group evolved from a nationalist jihadist organization to an Al-Qaeda affiliate with regional ambitions. Despite being the primary transnational terror threat in North and West Africa, AQIM and its offshoots are not expected to launch attacks in the United States or Europe, according to US officials. However, the migration of battle-hardened militants from the Sahara and Sahel to Syria and Iraq is a cause for concern as they may return to their relatively stable home countries (Laub and Masters).

4.3 The Islamist State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS 2003)

The origin of the Islamic State can be traced back to Iraq, where a number of jihadist groups emerged after the US invasion in 2003. These groups eventually aligned themselves

with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian jihadist who had connections to Afghanistan and who initially refused to join Al-Qaeda, despite receiving seed money from Bin Laden. After some negotiation, Zarqawi pledged his loyalty to Al-Qaeda, and his group became known as "Al-Qaeda in Iraq." This partnership allowed Zarqawi to gain Al-Qaeda's prestige and contacts, and he led attacks against US and western military forces until his death in 2006 (Bayman). The group was renamed the Islamic State in Iraq in 2006 and later became known as Daesh in 2013 (Elbaum).

5. Tiguentourine Gas Facility Hostage Crisis (2013)

The recent spate of terrorist attacks in Algeria has reached its climax with the significant and noteworthy event at Ain Amenas. This particular attack stands out as the most remarkable among a series of acts carried out by different terrorist organizations.

The plant, located 800 miles from the capital of Algeria, Algiers, and 35 miles from the border of Libya, it employed a diverse workforce of Algerians and foreigners it had roughly 700 Algerians and 130 individuals from different nationalities. It considered to be the most significant wet gas production facility in Algeria, it has an annual production of over nine billion cubic meters of natural gas, accounting for 10% of Algeria's total natural gas output (Nemeiry 43).

On the morning of January 16th, 2013, an unexpected crisis unfolded. A group of 32 Islamist terrorists, some Algerians and others from different countries including Tunisia, Egypt, Mali, Niger, Canada, and Mauritania, launched an attack on two buses that were carrying employees on route to Ain Amenas airport. The terrorists had entered Algeria through Libya and northern Mali and were traveling in three vehicles. In the early hours of the morning, armed militants stormed the plant, targeting the residential quarters before moving into the main facility. With intentions to cause devastation, the terrorists strategically placed explosives throughout the plant and issued a chilling warning against any attempts to rescue the hostages. However, amidst the chaos, guard Mohamed Lamine Lahmar bravely activated a comprehensive alarm system, alerting everyone on the site to the ongoing terrorist attack. Thanks to Lahmar's quick thinking, some individuals were able to find shelter, while others managed to halt critical operations, potentially preventing the catastrophic detonation of the planted explosives. Tragically, Lahmar was fatally shot by the terrorists immediately following his heroic act. In addition, many died from gunshot wounds to the head. For hours, gunmen went door-to-door searching for foreigners, dragging workers out from under beds and from behind cupboards, beating some who refused to leave and shooting others who tried to escape. Some foreigners had their hands tied behind their backs, and some had their mouths taped shut. The gunmen placed Semtex bombs in the necks and waists of some of them (Tomolya 47).

The hostages were from at least eight countries, including citizens from Malaysia, Japan, Norway, the US, and the United Kingdom (UK) and five foreign workers are still unaccounted for. The Prime Minister Sellal stated that armed militants had planned the attack for two months and that the attackers came from northern Mali and intended to return there with the hostages (Bhatti qtd. in Zerrouki 41). On January 19th, the Algerian Special Forces made a final, decisive move against the terrorists who had already murdered hostages in cold blood. The operation resulted in the elimination of 11 terrorists, the liberation of 792 hostages (136 of whom were from other countries), and the arrest of three more terrorists. Tragically, 37 hostages lost their lives in the operation. Belmokhtar, the leader of the group responsible for the gas facility attack in Algeria, threatened to carry out more attacks in Mali if military involvement continued. The group claimed the attack was planned in advance and they had tried to negotiate with various parties. Britain did not comment on claims of contact with the hostage taker. Belmokhtar later claimed responsibility for the attack and offered to negotiate to stop military intervention in northern Mali (the "In-Amenas"4).

5.1 The Perpetrators

The attack was carried out by a faction of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, who go by the names Katibat al Mulathameen ('The Masked Brigade') and al-Muwaqqi'ūn bi-d-Dimā' ('Those who Sign with Blood'). The attack is led by an experienced Algerian jihadist, Mokhtar Belmokhtar (also known as A.k, A Khaleid Abu Al-Abbas). Belmokhtar has a significant background in extremist activities in the area and is responsible for leading the offense.

According to reports, the group consisted of 32 terrorists who may have been divided into smaller task-based groups. This suggests a level of international coordination and planning that is concerning. The attackers used vehicles during various phases of the operation, but there is no evidence to suggest that they were used for anything other than transportation and logistics. This indicates that the group was focused on carrying out their mission and did not have a secondary agenda. The weaponry used by the attackers was extensive and included assault rifles, MMG, LMG (PKM variants), and RPG-7. The Algerian news media visually confirmed the spectrum of weapons recovered from the site, which suggests that the group was prepared for a violent and prolonged battle with any forces sent to resolve the situation. Additionally, anecdotal reporting suggests that the group deployed a range of antipersonnel obstacles during the later phases of the operation. This included victim-operated booby traps, such as rudimentary tripwire detonated fragmentation grenades, and AP Mines on likely approach routes and entry points to the site (Tomolya 48).

On the 16th of January, Belmokhtar's group issued a statement claiming responsibility for the attack on Ain-Amenas. They declared that the attack was a response to the French military's intervention in Mali and the Algerian government's permission for French military aircraft to fly over its territory. However, this claim is not true, as the assault occurred only a few days after the French intervention in Mali. An attack of this magnitude would require weeks of planning and organization, especially if it was carried out in Mali, as claimed by the attackers. The Algerian authorities have confirmed that the operation had been planned for nearly two months and that the group entered Algeria from Mali through the borders with Niger and Libya (In-Amenas 6). The attackers in this situation had two options: confrontation or retreat. In a state of confrontation, they would respond with explosives and missiles, attempting to eliminate the enemy. In a state of retreat, negotiations would be successful and the hostages would be gradually released. The attackers considered attacking military living quarters but decided against it to avoid harming Muslim workers and prevent the distortion of their goals, which were to damage the interests of Western countries involved in the French invasion. But the Algerian authorities declared that there would be no negotiations with the kidnapers.

5.2 Algeria's Response to the Attack

The Algerian armed forces reacted promptly to the attack on the Tiguentourine gas plant, eliminating 29 of the militants who had taken control of the facility. Additionally, three of the attackers were apprehended alive. The response of the People's National Army (ANP) Special Forces was swift, robust, and unexpected by foreign governments, particularly Britain, which collaborates with Algeria in the gas production facility. The ANP's immediate reaction demonstrates the Algerian leadership's firm stance and determination to address its domestic challenges, and that the country is resolute in not compromising with terrorism (Quarty qtd.in Zerrouki 48).

Many countries paid attention to these events due to the presence of their nationals, including technicians and engineers, at the gas base. This process, in which many of the major powers tried to make the authorities aware of the necessity of negotiating with the terrorists, but the Algerian government strongly refused the principle of negotiation with these people and used military force to protect the base from terrorists and preserve the safety of lives. Despite the pressure exerted by the international group, the conflict was decided in favor of the Algerian army (Nemeiry 43-44). Certain foreign nations have attributed fault to the Algerian security for the recent attack on the living quarters of employees. They have alleged that the site was inadequately protected by the Algerian guard arms, who arrived only after the terrorists had already surrounded the main compound. Despite the fact that numerous casualties were inflicted by the Algerian army, several nations have extended their support to Algeria for their response and have held the terrorists accountable for the incident.

The recent operation carried out at the gas facility in Algeria has had significant economic repercussions, as this gas basin is the largest in the world. The reduction in gas production by 4% has led to a decrease in exports by 8%, which accounts for 16% of the country's gas and 12% of its total national production. This decline has resulted in a substantial loss of revenue for Algeria's economy and financial resources. Moreover, many workers and employees have returned from the gas facility to their home countries due to Algeria's refusal to negotiate with the terrorists. This decision was intended to demonstrate Algeria's autonomy and sovereignty in decision-making. It also showcased the capabilities of the Algerian army to confront such crises, which was an important message to the international community (Nemeiry 44).

In summary, the recent operation in Algeria has had significant economic and political implications. The decline in gas production has resulted in a substantial loss of revenue for the country, and Algeria's decision not to negotiate with the terrorists was intended to demonstrate its independence and sovereignty in decision-making.

6. The Algerian Assistance in the Malian Crisis (2012-2015)

Algeria has been put in the spotlight due to the complex situation in Mali, resulting in a fractured state and dividing the country. This has brought attention to Algeria's role in maintaining stability in the Sahel region. Given its position as the most dominant military power in the area, and its efforts to be a leader in the fight against terrorism, Algeria is expected to take charge of the global response to the escalating turmoil along its unstable

southern border (Arieff 01).

Algeria follows its core belief of military non-intervention, barring its army from engaging in any military undertakings beyond its borders, and has declined to take part in any military operation in Mali. Rather, Algeria has been striving to resolve the Malian conflict through peaceful dialogue (Chikhaoui). In another hand, Gilles Yabi, the West Africa Director of the International Crisis Group, has noted that Algeria is reluctant to support military action in the south due to concerns that it could lead to instability within its own borders (Tinti).

6.1 The Malian Crisis

When Mali gained independence from France in 1960, it faced the challenge of asserting its authority over a vast territory that included desert regions inhabited by Tuareg and Arab communities who defied its control. The task was complicated by the resentment of Malian state officials towards certain sections of the northern populations, whom they saw as an obstacle to national unity. The southern elites chose to concentrate their attention on the 'useful' south of Mali, while gradually sidelining the north of the country and imposing military rule on those regions. This led to four uprisings by Tuareg and Arab groups in 1963, 1991, 2006, and 2012, fueled by a deep-seated and long-standing distrust. Despite numerous peace agreements and demobilization programs, none of them succeeded in normalizing the relationship between the north and Bamako. One reason for this failure is the Malian government's strategy dividing the northern 'front' and exploiting interethnic and sectarian tensions to maintain control and prevent any group from gaining too much power. One aspect of this approach involved manipulating the electoral districts to benefit specific Tuareg factions while disadvantaging other groups and the Arab population (Chauzal and van Damme 8).

During the 1970s, the Tuareg people suffered from devastating droughts in their native region. These droughts caused their livestock to perish and made it impossible for them to

support themselves. As a result, many Tuaregs migrated to Libya, where they could find work in the oil industry or other employment opportunities. It is noteworthy that in 1982, Gaddafi declared Libya to be the ancestral home and birthplace of all Tuaregs. Consequently, thousands of Tuaregs were enlisted in Gaddafi's military force. As the result the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s sent many Tuaregs back to their homes in Mali (Atallah 68).

Despite not being a unified movement, the Tuareg rebels proved to be more effective in combat than the Malian forces in 1990. Iyad Ag Ghaly was one of the most skilled commanders during the rebellion, which resulted in significant casualties for the Malian troops. Following negotiations mediated by Algeria, the Tamanrasset Accord was signed on January 6, 1991. This interim agreement established a ceasefire, required the evacuation of army bases in northern Mali, and created a formal peace commission. Additionally, the accord formed a provisional defense force made up of both Malian troops and rebels, which was responsible for supplying military units in the north (Atallah 68).

Tuareg militants, members of the Democratic Alliance for Change (Alliance Démocratique pour le Changement – ADC), led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga were responsible for many attacks in the region that resulted in tens of deaths. Algeria mediated the signing of a peace agreement by representatives of the government and ADC in Algiers on July 4, 2006. A faction of the ADC led by Ibrahim ag Bahanga rejected the ceasefire agreement. Algeria mediated the signing of a disarmament agreement between representatives of the government and ADC on February 20, 2007, even after that a series of killings here and there happened until Libya mediated the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the government and Tuareg militants led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga on April 4, 2008. The deal as its past attempts did not knew full success, and for another time Algeria mediated negotiations between representatives of the government and the ADC in Algiers on July 18-21, 2008, and the parties signed a ceasefire agreement on July 21, 2008. Others members of Tuareg militants shooted some shoots after

the agreement and this was ended when Tuareg militant leader, Ibrahim ag Bahanga, fled to Algeria. Some 700 Tuareg militants surrendered to the Malian government on February 17, 2009 (chair).

The 2012 uprising was different from previous ones, largely because regional environment changes, AQMI's influence becomes stronger in the north, Gaddafi's regime collapsed. Although Tuareg dissatisfaction grew, and in late 2011 the national liberation movement launched occasional attacks against Malian forces in the north, the insurgency ended in 2012 due to the return of Tuareg fighters who had fought in the Libyan war to Mali, starting in January, involved more than 1,500 heavily armed Tuareg fighters returned to northern Mali in a convoy following the fall of Gaddafi's regime. These Tuareg people were mobilized and better prepared than ever for the uprising (Caparini 6-7). The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), created in October 2011 by former Tuareg exiles in Libya, succeeded in gathering all the rebellious factions that had been divided and weakened by political disputes over time. By the end of April, the northern cities of Aguelhoc, Lere, Tinzaouatene, Tessalit, Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao were controlled by the rebellion. However, the MNLA was not able to preserve Tuareg and Arab unity. A few days after the first military operations, a new Tuareg group called Ansar Dine was created, led by Iyad Ag Ghali. The nature of the rebellion changed and the MNLA began to lose its influence and his movement sought to implement sharia law and to rehabilitate the authority, and contrary to the MNLA's military and political commanders, Iyad Ag Ghali had a long and varied role in Mali's history of rebellions, of particular note is his alleged collusion with the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) movement. The MNLA progressively became the enemy of Iyad Ag Ghali's new coalition (Chauzal and Van Damme). From the beginning of the Tuareg rebellions and the first casualties suffered by the Malian military, southern soldiers fighting on the northern front protested against the poor condition of the military. Poorly equipped,

badly trained and irregularly paid, Malian soldiers – mostly southerners – had always feared fighting in the north. In February 2012, Algeria mediated negotiation between the Malian government and the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC) and this negotiation calling for peace were rejected by MNLA, and this failure led to continuous fight. Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) condemned the MNLA rebellion on February 17, 2012 and appealed for an immediate ceasefire on March 19, 2012. The UN Security Council condemned the MNLA and demanded a cessation of military hostilities in northern Mali on April 4, 2012 and the MNLA agreed on the demand. Many other deals and agreements of cessation and ceasefire were abandoned by the parties of conflict which resulted with clash and death of hundreds.

In July 2014, the Algerian government facilitated negotiations between the Malian government and Tuareg rebel groups. A roadmap agreement was signed on July 24, 2014, and hostilities between the rebel groups ended on August 28, 2014. Negotiations resumed in September and a third round began in November 2014, but no agreement was reached. Finally, a ceasefire agreement was signed on February 19, 2015. In July 2014, negotiations were mediated by the Algerian government between the Malian government and Tuareg rebel groups in Algiers. An agreement was signed on July 24, 2014, and hostilities between the rebel groups ended on August 28, 2014. Further negotiations took place in September and November 2014, but no agreement was reached. Finally, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Algiers on February 19, 2015 (Chair). Algeria has committed to strengthening and utilizing the following factors to maintain its role in guiding the inter-Malian dialogue and negotiation process:

- Its solidarity with neighboring countries
- Its close geographical distance and historical connections
- Its military doctrine of non-intervention

• The insecurity that poses a threat to the wider North Africa and Sahel region (Chikhaoui).

6.2 Algeria as a Key Mediator in Malian Crisis

Algeria's political and diplomatic efforts have been crucial in resolving the Malian crisis. By objectively considering the perspectives of all parties involved, Algeria was able to create an environment conducive to resolution and prevent further violence along its borders. Algeria's mediation has played a pivotal role in this historic event (Chikhaoui).

Algerian citizens express concern regarding the potential for foreign interference in Mali. They believe that such interference may exacerbate the already fragile situation in the Sahel region. Algerians stress the importance of distinguishing between legitimate Tuareg movements and terrorist groups. They advocate for initiating a dialogue between Ansar Dine, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, and the Bamako central government. Algerians argue that this approach would effectively isolate terrorist organizations and their allies. They also emphasize the need to maintain the unity of Mali's territorial estate and urge the Malian authorities to prioritize solving internal issues (Zoubir).

6.3 The American Disclosure Regarding the Algerian Initiative in Mali

It is anticipated that the Biden administration will uphold the US government's recent announcements and endorse Algeria's actions in mediating political solutions and advancing peace in the area. This is in line with the Obama administration's recognition of Algeria's active involvement in resolving the situation in Mali, as recognized during visits to Algiers by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in October 2012 and Secretary of State John Kerry in April 2014. This demonstrates the global community's recognition of Algeria's significant role and impact in the Sahel region (Chikhaoui).

Overall, the shared threat posed by the armed group that was once confined to Algerian borders but has now pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), has prompted a need for closer cooperation between the United States and Algeria. Algeria's firsthand experience in dealing with this rival group makes it a valuable partner, capable of providing the United States with crucial insights on how to effectively confront this evolving challenge.

Similarly, the common ground created by this security concern, the collaborative efforts between the two countries can be truly capitalize on this partnership, both nations must demonstrate a commitment to strengthening their relationship through tangible and substantive support measures, expertise and resources, the United States and Algeria can forge a more robust alliance in the face of this shared adversary (Gherieb). Given its extensive counterterrorism expertise and abundant resources, Algeria possesses the capability to wage an assertive campaign against terrorist threats while simultaneously maintaining a prominent leadership position in coordinating regional counterterrorism initiatives (Chikhaoui).

In recent years, Algeria has demonstrated a reinvigorated commitment to African affairs, asserting its presence on the continental stage through active participation in global summits. Notably, the nation has undertaken diplomatic mediation efforts to resolve disputes within Africa, exemplified by its role in the Tuareg conflict with the central government in Mali from 2006 to 2012. Algeria's endeavors extended to sponsoring the peace and reconciliation agreement in Mali, underscoring its dedication to regional stability. Concurrently, the United States has signaled its readiness to strengthen ties with Algeria, acknowledging the country's pivotal position as a formidable partner in counterterrorism efforts across the African continent (Gherieb). This convergence of interests highlights Algeria's strategic significance and its potential to foster enhanced cooperation with global powers in addressing the challenges facing the region.

Conclusion

This dissertation aims to understand the evolving relationship between the United States and Algeria, with a particular focus on how it has been shaped by the events of September 11,2001. The bilateral relationship covered several areas, including political, financial and mainly military joint efforts of both countries to counter terrorism, which is the primary focus of this work. Their ties are founded on a mutual commitment and shared experience and challenge.

The origins of US-Maghreb ties date back to the early days of American independence, but it was not until the turn of the 21st century that the region became a top strategic priority for US policymakers. In the years leading up to 2001, the US maintained limited, bilateral ties with individual countries in the Maghreb region, instead of pursuing deeper engagement. This approach was primarily focused on balancing security, economic, and ideological concerns. However, perceptions of the region's importance began to shift during World War II and the Cold War era. This was a time when the US National Security Council drafted a memo in 1946, underscoring the strategic significance of French North Africa for American security interests. The memo highlighted the region's pivotal location and its potential to provide vital military bases and access to resources. Similarly, the US became more involved in the Maghreb as part of its global strategy to counter Soviet influence during the Cold War period. This involvement meant that the US was eager to establish stronger ties with countries in the region, including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, in order to bolster its strategic interests. This heightened focus on the Maghreb Region came as a result of the US recognizing the importance of the region's geographical location and resources, and its potential as a key player in the global political landscape. As such, the US began to take a more active role in building relationships with the Maghreb countries, laying the groundwork for a more robust and meaningful ties.

The United States implemented a series of diplomatic and economic measures aimed at maintaining a balance of power in the Maghreb Region while protecting its own interests. To achieve this, the US engaged in various diplomatic efforts, including establishing official diplomatic relations with several Maghreb countries. These efforts were bolstered by economic assistance packages that were selectively provided to certain countries in the region. This approach aimed to foster positive relationships between the US and Maghreb nations while also promoting stability and security in the region. To achieve these goals, the US government worked tirelessly to establish diplomatic channels with key Maghreb countries. This involved sending high-level officials to engage in talks with their counterparts in the region, and establishing official diplomatic missions in select countries. These efforts were critical in fostering trust and mutual understanding between the US and Maghreb countries, which in turn helped to promote peace and stability in the region.

In addition to diplomatic efforts, the US also provided economic assistance to select countries in the Maghreb Region. This assistance was aimed at promoting economic growth and development in those nations, which in turn helped to strengthen their stability and security. The US government provided aid in a variety of forms, including grants, loans, and technical assistance. This approach helped to build positive relationships between the US and Maghreb countries, while also promoting economic development and regional stability.

Overall, the US approach to the Maghreb Region was multifaceted, combining diplomatic efforts with economic assistance to achieve its goals. Through these measures, the US aimed to promote stability and security in the region, while also advancing its own interests and building positive relationships with Maghreb nations.

The recognition of the Algerian status and the primary shift in the relationship between the two countries was catalyzed by the events of 9/11. A series of transformations, beginning with Algeria's position in the aftermath of the attacks, followed by an increased focus of the United States in the region and their desire to build stronger ties than before, facilitated the path for future collaboration. This process encompassed a deep understanding of the challenges facing both Algeria and the United States, and examined how it fostered an effective partnership.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Algeria swiftly emerged as an unequivocal country, condemning the events and expressing solidarity with the United States. This development has altered and expanded the scope of the relationship between the two countries, leading to advancements in areas such as trade, to enhance mutual benefits. The establishment of reciprocated programs has also highlighted the importance of focusing on security interests, as a result of the emerging global threats.

Prior to this, the relationship between the two nations was cordial but lacked depth. However, in the aftermath of the attacks, both countries recognized the necessity of joining forces to combat the global threat of terrorism. Algeria, having endured its own struggles against extremism, became a valuable ally to the United States, sharing intelligence and expertise in counterterrorism efforts. This collaboration paved the way for a multifaceted tie encompassing various domains. Economic ties were strengthened through trade agreements and increased investment opportunities. Cultural exchanges and educational programs facilitated a deeper understanding between the two nations. Moreover, their joint membership in international organizations like the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund provided platforms for cooperation on global issues.

The counterterrorism partnership between the United States and Algeria has proven to be a mutually beneficial and effective collaboration in combating the transnational threat of terrorism. Algeria's unique positioning as a regional power with extensive first-hand experience in neutralizing extremist groups has rendered it an invaluable country for the United States. The Algerian government's firm stance against negotiating with terrorists, as demonstrated during the Ain Amenas hostage crisis, coupled with its military prowess and decisive action, has yielded successful resolutions to high-stakes situations. Additionally, Algeria's commitment to intelligence sharing and facilitating the training of security forces has fortified the partnership's operational capabilities. Furthermore, the shared ideological opposition to extremism and the collective pursuit of regional stability have solidified the foundations of this counterterrorism alliance. Algeria's active mediation efforts in resolving conflicts, such as the Malian crisis, have been lauded by the international community, including the United States. This diplomatic approach, complemented by a robust security framework, has proven instrumental in addressing the root causes of terrorism and preventing the escalation of violence. The convergence of strategic interests between the two nations has facilitated a comprehensive and multifaceted ties that transcends military cooperation.

Looking ahead, the longevity and sustained success of the US-Algerian counterterrorism partnership hinge on a continued commitment to mutual trust, transparency, and the exchange of intelligence and resources. By capitalizing on their respective strengths and aligning their counterterrorism policies, the two nations can fortify their joint efforts against emerging threats. Moreover, an emphasis on capacity-building initiatives, such as training programs and technological collaborations, can further enhance operational effectiveness. Ultimately, This partnership is long-lasting. It has the ability to be an example for how countries work together to fight terrorism worldwide. This shows how important it is to create strategic alliances based on shared beliefs and goals.

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