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**The Clash between Muammar Qaddafi's Policies and American
Interests**

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Dedication

First and foremost, I thank Allah, the almighty who gave us the strength and courage to fulfill this work.

I lovingly dedicate this dissertation to my parents **Beyarassou Abd al Wahab** and **Boudechiche Fatma** for their endless support and love, my siblings Sarra, Nadia, Seif, and especially my sister Selma.

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the conflict between Muammar Qaddafi's policies and American interests. It focuses on the relations between Libya and the United States during Qaddafi's rule, exploring the historical context of Libya before and during his presidency. The study investigates Qaddafi as a political figure, his ideologies including Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism, and the establishment of his presidency and ruling regime in Libya. It highlights Qaddafi's support for terrorism and his attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, which conflicted with Western principles and led to enmity with the United States. The research analyzes key incidents that heightened tensions between Libya and the U.S. and scrutinizes the American response to Qaddafi's policies, ranging from sanctions to military action. Additionally, it examines Qaddafi's strategies to maintain his power and protect his country. This dissertation traces the evolution of Libyan-American relations, detailing the path to normalization despite prolonged hostility, and concludes by discussing the U.S. role in Qaddafi's downfall during the Arab Spring.

ملخص

هذه الأطروحة تدرس الصراع بين سياسات معمر القذافي ومصالح الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية. تركز الدراسة على العلاقات بين ليبيا والولايات المتحدة خلال حكم القذافي، مستكشفة السياق التاريخي لليبيا قبل وأثناء رئاسته. تحقق الدراسة في القذافي كشخصية سياسية، وفي أيديولوجياته بما في ذلك القومية العربية ومكافحة الإمبريالية، وفي تأسيس رئاسته ونظام حكمه في ليبيا. تسلط الضوء على دعم القذافي للإرهاب ومحاولاته للحصول على أسلحة الدمار الشامل، التي تعارض مبادئ الغرب وأدت إلى العداء مع الولايات المتحدة. تحليل الأبحاث للحوادث الرئيسية التي زادت من التوترات بين ليبيا والولايات المتحدة وفحص الاستجابة الأمريكية لسياسات القذافي، بدءًا من العقوبات إلى العمليات العسكرية. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، تفحص الدراسة استراتيجيات القذافي للحفاظ على سلطته وحماية بلاده. تتبع هذه الأطروحة تطور العلاقات الليبية الأمريكية، مفصلة المسار نحو التطبيع على الرغم من العداء المستمر، وتختتم بمناقشة دور الولايات المتحدة في سقوط القذافي خلال الربيع العربي

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

CIA	Central Intelligence, Section 6
EU	European Union
IEEPA	International Emergency Economic Powers Act
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MI6	Military Intelligence, Section 6
NTC	National Transitional Council
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
UN	United Nations
WMD	Weapons of Mass destruction
WWII	World War Two

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Introduction

Libya, also known as Al Jamhuriyahha Libyahha, or the Libyan Republic, a country located in North Africa, and is the fourth largest country in Africa. The country borders the Mediterranean Sea to the north, Tunisia and Algeria to the west, Niger and Chad to the south, and Sudan and Egypt to the east. In December 24, 1951, Libya officially gained independence, with King Idris as its first leader and its only king.

King Idris successfully maintained strong relations by developing a diplomatic relation of goodwill with other countries, especially with the United States of America. Relations between Libya and the US remained positive under King Idris reign, until Colonel Muammar Qaddafi came to power and overthrew him in a bloodless coup.

Colonel Qaddafi assumed power as the leader of Libya, bringing about substantial transformations in both internal governance and foreign relations. Conflicts between Libya and the United States have persisted since the early 1970s due to differing interests, views, and aims. The bilateral relationship between the two nations became progressively tense throughout Qaddafi's regime as a result of his distinct ideology and aspirations, which exacerbated the tensions between the countries.

There have been few wars in modern history that have been as intense as the one between Muammar Qaddafi's administration and the United States. This conflict had a profound impact not only on Libya but also on world affairs, fundamentally reshaping international relations. The dispute originated from basic disparities in views, philosophies, and interests. Muammar Qaddafi, espousing radical ideologies, aimed to confront Western hegemony and enhance Libya's global standing. Qaddafi's leadership, which began with a sudden takeover in 1969 and ended with his removal in 2011, was characterized by stringent control and ambitious goals of Arab unification, anti-imperialism, and social justice. Therefore, the conflict arose due to an intricate interaction of multiple elements.

This dissertation provides an analysis of the historical context that led to the rise of the conflict between the United States of America and Libya, by delving into the background of the conflict, exploring its historical roots and key events. Therefore, the problem addressed by this study is the need for a historical approach to examine the complex relationship between Libya and the United States, analyzing the major challenges, turning points, and factors that have shaped their interactions. By addressing this gap in the literature, this research aims to provide a deeper understanding of the historical dynamics between the two nations and contribute to a more comprehensive comprehension of their complex relationship.

To underscore the importance of this study, it is crucial to acknowledge that the topic of the clash of Qaddafi ideologies with American interests, has generated significant discourse beyond the existing literature review. In addition to the extensive academic works dedicated to this subject, it is worth noting that experts, journalists, and politicians have actively engaged in discussions, offering diverse perspectives and opinions.

Numerous books and articles have explored the clash of ideologies between Qaddafi and American interests, as well as the relations between Libya and the United States. One such author, John Wright, was an American architect who attended the University of Wisconsin for two years. In his book *Libya: A Modern History* (1981), he provide a historical background of the relationship between Libya and the United and States, highlighting the period after Libya's independence. Wright focuses on how Libya's initial monarchical constitution, influenced by the UN Commission, managed to endure until the military coup of 1969 and explores the factors and the reasons that made the relations between the two worsened, including conflicts over territory, support for terrorism, and ideological disagreements.

A report by Christopher M. Blanchard, an analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, entitled *Libya: Background and U.S. Relations*, explores the historical background of Libya and its relationship of with the US and the historical interactions between them. The report also delves

into the history of Libya before and during Muammar Qaddafi's rule, and explores the reasons behind this conflict.

The main aim of this research is to find answers to the following questions: How was Libya before Qaddafi came to power? Who is Muammar as political figure and what were his political ideologies? Why did the US clash with Libya during Qaddafi's era? What are the key historical events, challenges, and factors that have shaped the complex relationship between Libya and the United States? What were the significant turning points and pivotal events that have affected the bilateral relations between Libya and the United States, and how have they contributed to the complexity of their relationship over time? What specific actions by Qaddafi that led to the US's strong response, and what was the reaction of Qaddafi?

For a better understanding of the topic, this dissertation is divided into three chapters in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. The first chapter entitled "Libya before Qaddafi and 1969 Military Coup", briefly provides comprehensive overview of Libya historical background leading up to the rise of Muammar Qaddafi and 1969 military coup, explaining his ideologies and thoughts, in addition to his relationship with the United States.

The second chapter, under the title "The United States Claiming Libya as the Major Enemy", gives the reasons why America considered Libya as an enemy, and delves into the specific incidents and confrontations that escalated the tensions between the two.

The third chapter "US Response to Qaddafi's Support of Terrorism" looks into the actions taken by the United States in response to Muammar El Qaddafi's support of terrorist activities. The chapter provides a detailed analysis of the strategies employed by the US government to address the threat posed by Libya's involvement in sponsoring terrorism and the response of Muammar El Qaddafi to the US, what did he do to overcome the isolation imposed by the US, and how he successfully normalized relations with the United States.

The research necessitates the utilization of historical approach to comprehensively explore the various dimensions of the phenomenon under study and track the evolution of events over time. Additionally, the descriptive approach provides a comprehensive understanding to the subject matter. Third, the analytical approach is essential to analyze data including graphs.

Chapter One

Libya before Qaddafi and 1969 Military Coup

Introduction

Libya which is located in North Africa, was home to a variety of tribes each of which added cultural diversity to the country. These tribes have always had significant power over political dynamics and socioeconomic structures. From the Ottoman Empire, the direction has been greatly influenced by different clans. The rule of Ottoman Turk marked a significant cultural as well as economic exchange in the country until their departure in 1853.

Libya was occupied by the Italians in 1912, Italy's colonization made a lot of efforts intended to gain control over Libya's territory and resources, resulting in decades of opposition and struggle till they lost Libya during the World War II in 1943.

After the World War II, Libya got independence, and the United Nation appointed King Idris to become the first leader and the only king of Libya. Until 1969, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi took power in a military coup and became the new leader. Under his rule, several significant changes occurred. These included shifts in leadership, governance style, and foreign relations especially relations with the United States of America.

The first chapter gives an overview of Libya's history before Muammar Qaddafi came to power and his 1969 military coup. This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part talks about tribalism and the most influential tribes in Libya. The second part, explores the period of the Ottoman's and Italian occupation. The third part, analyzes the period after independence with the reign of King Idris, while the last part talks about the 1969 military coup that brought Qaddafi into power and his relation with the United States of America.

1.1 An Overlook about Libyan Prior to Qaddafi's Rule

The region now recognized as “Libya” lacked a unified culture; instead, it was characterized by division, sparse population, and extensive deserts, leading to the formation of distinct tribes rather than a sense of national identity. Among the various tribes in Libya were the Zuwaya, Qadhafa, Warfallah, and Tebo, who sustained themselves primarily through goat and sheep herding, relying on these animals for sustenance, shelter, and clothing (“Ancient Libya History”). Libya fell under Ottoman rule in 1551, later becoming an Italian colony until 1947. Finally, in 1951, Libya gained independence following a decision by the United Nations.

1.1.1 Tribalism in Libya

According to Mouhamed Ben Lamma, Doctor in Political Science, former Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Zaytouna University (Libya) and specialist in strategic issues around a regional and tribal system, Libya was constructed for better or for worst. The tribe plays a fundamental role in the lives of Libyans. Indeed, the structure of Libyan society is tribal (3). In other words, Libya is highly affected by these tribal connections. With many tribal enclaves, Libya is rich with many tribes throughout the country. It is worth mentioning that the name of Libya originates from the millinery tribe of Libu (“Ancient Libya History”). The country is a home to many tribal groups contributing to its rich cultural diversity.

In Libya, Tribalism or “Qabiliya” dictates how people organize themselves socially based on their shared ancestry and family connections; it is about and how they identify with each other through lineage and how families are linked together (Lamma 4). Moreover, tribalism refers to the modes of social organization by compacts and by bloodlines between members of the groups (Cole and Mangan 6). At the simplest level, this definition holds its truth in the Libyan society.

Additionally, although the term “tribe” has continued to be utilized to refer to a group of people whose members share bloodline, tribes evolved to become actors in politics (Pack 2). In this sense, tribes emerged to become politically influential through leading figures of that tribe, “notables” (Cole and Mangan 6). Tribes have always been crucial in the Libyan society, affecting everything from its structure to its politics. Despite the changes over time, they managed to play a fundamental role in the nation’s organization and identity.

1.1.1.2 An Overview about the Most Influential Tribes in Libya

1.1.1.2.1 The Warfallah Tribe

Consisting of 52 sub-tribes and counting at around one million individuals, living in the regions of Bey, Beniwalid, Sirte, Zamzam, Dernah, Sabha, and lately the Misurata district, the Warfallah tribe is considered being one of the largest tribes in Libya (“Libya Country” 97). Due to its number and geographical spread, the Warfallah tribe played a significant role. Indeed, it has played a fundamental role in the area. Transforming itself into a preeminent force, the Warfallah and Qaddafi tribe gained a new tribal alliance. However, this force was short-lived as a division took place, splitting them into two camps. This division arose due to disagreements among the Warfallah Sheikhs, who felt overly involved with Qaddafi (Lamma 12). Despite its primary emergence as a dominant force through a newfound tribal alliance, internal divisions led to an uprising between the two tribes that ultimately ended in failure.

1.1.1.2.2 The Qadhafa Tribe

The Qadhafa Tribe, to which Muammar Qaddafi belonged, originates from a desert town approximately 50 miles south of Syrte. Qaddafi’s tribe consists of six sub-tribes, with members living mostly in Libya’s largest cities, Benghazi and Tripoli to the Fezzan area near Sabha (Lamma 13). However, despite the tales of bravery, the Qadhafa tribe was lacking influence and

perceived as weak, consistently overshadowed by more powerful groups such as the Awlad Sulaimn tribe (Pargeter19). According to Stratfor, “The Qadhadfa tribe is not a historic force in Libya, in part because it is not very populous. The majority of its members had not played an important role in the war against the Italian occupation, for example. Nor did the tribe have much influence under the monarchy, with focus shifting to livestock farming” (qtd. In Lamma 14). This indicates that the Qadhadfa tribe did not play an important role in Libyan history. Furthermore, the majority of its members did not contribute significantly during the battle against Italy. Even when Libya was ruled by a monarch, this tribe held little power. Instead, they focused on caring for animals such as cows and lambs.


1.1.1.2.3 The Zuwaya Tribe

The Zuwaya tribe is the most influential and extensive in eastern Libya; Cyrenaica predominately found in Ejdabiyah, Benghazi, Kufra, Tazerbu, and the surrounding areas (“Libya Country of Origin Information” 98). Due to its strategic location, the Zuwaya tribe holds significant influence. Its members are spread through the area of Cyrenaica, covering regions from near oil export facilities in the Gulf of Sidra to areas containing oil reserves and the Al-Kufra oasis. Its people are known for their aversion and fierceness towards outsiders; the Zuwaya tribe historically operated without a hierarchy or centralized state, prioritizing freedom above everything (Lamma 17).

1.1.1.2.4 The Tebo Tribe

The Tebo also (Tibbo, Tibboo, Tibu, Tibo, Tubu, Toubbou, or Toboos) situated in the east of Fazzan. The Tebo are a collection of tribes, near to the mountain of Tibesti, the mountain name comes from this area, and it has been linked to several Chadian presidents, including Hissene Habre and Goukouni Oueddei (Nesmenser). The Tebo ethnic group is divided into two subgroups, the Daza and the Ted; the majority of them belong to the group of Teda. They

primarily settle in regions such as Rebyana and the Kufra oases in southern Libya, as well as the Murzuq areas and Qartoon in the southwest (Taha 3). The Tebo language, while clearly Saharan in nature, shares resemblances with the languages spoken in Niger. It consists of two primary dialects that are mutually understandable. The Teda dialect, spoken by the Teda subgroup, and the Daza subgroup language is Dazaga (“Libya-Chad: Cultural Factors” 5-6).



Source: “Distribution of Libya’s Major Tribes”. Worldview Stratfor.com

Worldview Stratfor.com. "Distribution of Libya’s Major Tribes." Worldview Stratfor.com. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/>.

Figure 01: Geographical distribution of Libyan tribes

1.1.2 Libya under Ottoman and Italian Control

As a country, Libya is situated on the African Coast, and its territory is largely occupied by the Sahara desert. It has borders with Egypt and Sudan to the East and Southeast and Tunisia to the West, and Niger and Chad to the South. Libya has a coast line of 1200 miles, which contains most of cultivable and fertile lands. As time passed by, Libya’s climate became drier,

resulting in the gradual expansion of the Sahara towards the north (Collins 3). Since antiquity, Libya has always been characterized by being occupied by foreign power (Laurea 2). Foreign rulers came either to exploit the productivity of the coastal regions or the agricultural resources, or to control and monopolize its profitable trade caravans (Collins 3). Before Libya became independent in 1951, it was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1551 to 1835, then it was captured and controlled by Italy from 1912 to 1947.

1.1.2.1 Ottoman Era (1551-1853)

The Ottoman Empire expanded into North Africa when there was a clash between Europeans and Muslims after Muslims were forced out of Spain. This was during the Iberian Crusades, when Europeans tried to take over North Africa. Back then, the Ottoman Empire needed to collect tributes, so they took over new lands as part of making tributary states. In 1551, the Ottoman navy took over Tripoli from the Knights of Saint John of Malta, who were working with Spain. This made Tripoli a part of the Ottoman Empire. However, the Ottomans could not control the inland areas because of the harsh desert conditions, not enough money for big desert expeditions, and the presence of another state called Awlad Muhammad in Fezzan (Ahmida 20-22).

Tripoli played a crucial role as the first African land conquered by the Ottoman Empire, impacting the rapid expansion of the empire throughout North Africa. The conquest continued for more than 350 years (Ndahetwa 969-979). At first, the Libyan tribes welcomed the Ottomans, even though some rebelled, such as Tajura and some tribes in the south. Many Libyans thought the Ottomans protected them from European Christians. Before the Karamanli family, the Ottomans counted on support from the tribes (Ladjal).

In 1711, the special army in the Ottoman Empire known as the Janissaries, made up mostly of former slaves, rebelled against the governor of the Ottoman Empire. One of their soldiers, Ahmad Karamanli, assassinated the governor and subsequently declared himself as

the new governor (Zainal 3-4). After Tripoli came under the rule of the family of Karamnli starting with Ahmed al-Karamanli, who became the ruler, they continued to govern Tripoli until 1835 as representatives of the Ottoman Empire, when the Ottomans took over direct control (Mukhtar), but by the late 1700s, Tripoli faced challenges as Ali Karamanli, who had ruled since 1754, found it increasingly challenging to lead effectively due to his advancing age and declining energy.

This led to a breakdown in Tripoli's economic and political systems. One notable consequence was the weakening of Tripoli's naval forces under Ali's faltering leadership. This decline in authority signaled a period of instability and uncertainty for the city-state as it struggled to maintain its position (Hhana 72). Yusuf Pasha Karamanli was the last important leader of Tripoli, ruling from 1795 to 1832. Before him, Tripoli faced problems like wars and natural disasters under his father Ali. Yusuf seized power by eliminating his older brother and sending him away. Yusuf Pasha's leadership was characterized by a complex blend of authoritarianism and charm. However, he couldn't adjust to the changes happening around him, and his big plans for Tripoli did not happen. Yusuf Pasha preserved Tripoli's independence for close to forty years, despite challenges from foreign powers. Yet, he could not cope with the new political and economic realities that emerged after the Napoleonic era (Wright).The Karamanli family's control over Tripoli ended after governing themselves for 120 years. Tripoli once again came under Constantinople's direct control until the Italian invasion in 1911.

1.1.2.2 The Italian Colonization (1911-1943)

After achieving unity, Italy realized that it needed colonies to grow. Here, Italy agreed to accept Tripoli, especially after France took Tunisia and Britain took Egypt and Cyprus. Italy and the Ottoman Empire started a clash for Libya (Tripoli) during the Italo-Turkish War (1911-1912), which was home to 1.5 to 2.5 million individuals (primarily Muslims, Berbers and Arabs), with some Italian citizens .The Ottoman army there consisted of 5000 infantry and 350

cavalry (Simon). The war started because Italy thought it had the right to rule lands that used to belong to the Roman Empire, like Libya.

Libya was the only area that Italy could control because it was the only part of the Mediterranean that was not owned by another European power. Italy considered Libya as its “Fourth Shore”, and thought that the problem of not enough jobs and immigration would be solved by putting the poor Italians there. At first, Italy tried to get Libya without clashing, but when that did not work, it said its people were being neglected and used this as a reason to control Libya by force. Italy made deals with other European nations that gave her complete authority over Libya. Italy was worried things might change globally, so it started the war (Simon).

On September 29, 1911, Italy initiated the war on Tripoli with the promise to make it more developed, they did not wait for the response of the Ottoman Empire before attacking. At that time, the Ottoman Empire was not ready for war because they were already facing problems and isolated diplomatically. Italy sent soldiers to Tripoli and then to other cities like Derna, Benghazi, and Homs (Durgun 135). Italy was willing to negotiate agreements with the Ottomans to finish the war but did not want to lose Libya. As a result, while negotiations were happening in Europe, Italy kept attacking the Ottomans to make them agree. In May 1912, Italy took control of the Dodecanese islands and Rhodes (Simon). European countries tried hard to stop the Ottoman-Italian conflict in Tripoli, yet Italy wanted to make the war bigger by helping the Balkan countries to put pressure on the Ottoman Empire to accept peace terms (Durgun 143).

Italy and the Ottoman Empire were in crisis until Italy won a major war in North Africa from July to October 1912, making Turkey afraid of the Balkan countries and wanting peace. In the Treaty of Lausanne on October 18, 1912, Turkey agreed to give up Tripoli and Cyrenaica to Italy (“Italo-Turkish War | 1911–1912”). At that time, Libya’s territory was called the Italian

North Africa. It was split into two areas: Italian Cyrenaica and Italian Tripolitania, controlled by an Italian governor. Despite severe opposition from Libyan leaders known as the Sunussi, Italian colonialists wanted to increase their power in the region (Zainal 5). The Italians began settling in Libya by establishing colonies in the countryside.

However, settlement did not work well at first .In the 1930s, when the fascist government took power, they became determined to make Libya profitable. They established a special authority to promote agriculture and, in 1934, appointed Italo Bablo as governor. Mussolini, Italy's leader, visited in 1937 and pushed for more Italians to move there. Italy had declared Libya part of its own territory. By then, over 120,000 Italians had relocated in Libya, accounting for approximately 13% of the country's population (Vidotto 40). The Italians controlled Libya until they lost in World War II in 1943, until then French took over Fezzan for a while, and the British controlled Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Libya became independent in 1951 (Kulkarni 2).

1.1.3 Libya after Independence

1.1.3.1 King Idris Era (1951-1969)

On December 24, 1951, Libya gained independence from the colonial rule, which became the United Kingdom of Libya, led by King Idris the first and the only king of Libya. King Idris worked hard to rescue Libya from the Italian dominance following World War I, and fought alongside the Allies against the Axis powers during World War II (Kullkarni 2).Libya was the first African nation to attain independence from European colonial authority. Notably, it is the only country that has gained its liberation through the support and intervention of the United Nations General Assembly (Zainal 6).


Libya gained its independence from colonial domination without the support of a broad movement or a unified ideology. In contrast to neighboring nations where independence was achieved after long struggles that united people, Libya's freedom came suddenly and caught

many off guard, this change happened without much input from the people but changed their lives forever. Libya's new political system at that time centered on the Sanusi tribe and related groups (Vandewalle 43 "A History of Modern Libya"). King Idris stayed in power by using special and personal political networks and creating social bonds with certain tribes and important people who supported him, Idris was able to hold onto power because of the financial and military support from the United States and Britain since both countries built big army bases in Libya (Witter and Bell 16).

Libya, characterized by its extreme poverty and limited arable land, faced significant challenges following independence, with a small literacy rate hindering its development. The country depended on aid from post-World War II victors for survival (Sullivan 18). However, the discovery of oil in 1959 transformed Libya into a major oil-producing nation within a short span, bringing substantial financial gains from this newfound resource. This sudden wealth changed the country, allowing King Idris to rule largely within his own territory without following typical political procedures (Vandewalle 44" A History of Modern Libya"). It suddenly shifted from relying on foreign help and making money from air bases to becoming really rich because of oil, they found a lot of oil in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. This led to big improvement in the government services with numerous buildings being built, and people having more money but also life getting more expensive (Fowler and Buru).

The independence of Libya in 1951 and economic growth brought it closer to western countries because they helped it grow, especially the United States of America, which became influential in the oil industry (Vandewalle 44 " A History of Modern Libya"). Libya began earning significantly more money per capita due to the oil. With the time of its independence in 1951, the average annual income was thirty dollars, but it had increased to two thousand dollars annually by 1969. The government of King Idris received studies and recommendations from western specialists to help the country's economy. European countries and the United

States gave a lot of information during that time, when Libya was getting ready to grow economically (Sullivan 20). Libya had transformed into a nonparty state (without political parties) at the end of first year of independence, and with too much power in the hands of the king and his supporters, the constitution which was meant to help the king ended up restricting it (First 79). In April 1963, king Idris declared that instead of having two governments in different places, one big government is enough and it will be in charge of everything (Zuber). This meant eliminating all the local governments and courts, also giving money and oil incomes to the big government.



Source: OPEC (2008), Annual Statistical Bulletin

Figure 2: The development of oil production during 1961-2007

Figure 2 indicates, Libyan oil production averaged approximately 4-14 percent of total OPEC oil production over the period 1961-2007. This contribution is expected to increase as Libya has the potential to raise oil production significantly in coming years, given its proven oil reserves of 47 billion barrels in 2007.

During Idris's reign, the army was entirely under the king's command and he had considerable influence over the parliament. Rich city dwellers and powerful tribal chiefs, who supported the king and shared important administrative responsibilities, made up the

government. Idris gained control of the central government's operations with the aid of his devoted tribes and Western allies (“Idris I | Libya”). Under the direction of King Idris and his conservative government, Libya found itself in an unstable position in the 1960s as it continued to retain strong ties with Western countries. Idris was more loyal to Cyrenaica, one of Libya's historical regions, than to Tripolitania, the capital region, despite efforts to promote a national identity based around the monarchy. This geographic separation emphasized a more general feeling of alienation between the emperor and some sections of the populace. The pro-western stance of King Idris and the alignment of conservative Arab factions faced growing opposition from an increasingly politically aware urban elite. This group pushed for Libya's nonalignment and wanted to keep the country free of outside influence. Meanwhile, the people's discontent grew as they saw that the majority of Libyans were not benefiting from the country's enormous natural resources, but rather a privileged few were reaping the rewards. Corruption in the government added fuel to the fire of discontent, in particular among young military officers who were influenced by the pan-Arab nationalist ideology promoted by Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. As a result, despair and frustration spread throughout Libyan society, especially among those who felt excluded by the existing power structures. King Idris fled to his palace in Darnah, which is near a British military base, as he felt increasingly alienated from urban centers and the younger generation. His absence from the center of the country's political and social life worsened the sense of detachment between the monarchy and the populace. In June 1969 king Idris left Libya for medical treatment in Greece and Turkey, leaving the monarchy to Hassan ar Rida as temporary ruler (Metz 41–42). His absence would be an occasion for his opponents to put an end to his rule. Until September 1969, Libya was still under King Idris power, but at that time there were people inside the monarchy who were not happy and did not like how things were going, especially 27 young military officer named Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar Qaddafi, who was discontent with the situation and wanted changes. They were

irritated that King Idris has good ties with the United States of America and Britain; they wanted their country to concentrate more on the Arab Nationalism. Qaddafi and some other military officers made a decision to take an action, they put plan to take over the government and they successfully seized power while King Idris was away. Fortunately, Qaddafi and his clan did not struggle at all because most of the king guards surrendered quickly (Witter and Bell 16). After gaining control, Qaddafi would become the new leader of Libya.

1.1.4 Military Coup (1969)

During World War Two, Qaddafi was born in a traditional tent in the desert, his family who belonged to the Qaddafah tribe made living by raising camels and goats in what was then one of the world's poorest countries. Muamar attended a school where he studied the Quran and later he went to high school in Sebha, in Fezzan region, which is the southernmost province. At the age of 15, he became fascinated by the radio speeches of the Egyptian president Gamal Abd Nasser. At that time Qaddafi memorized his speeches and passionately recited them to his classmates, whom he had gathered into a group aiming for revolutionary change (Black 7). His admiration to Nasser meant that the man would be highly influenced with his ideas and principles once in power.

Because the protests that he led in Sirte and was active in political activities, he was expelled from Sebha School and he stayed in mosque since his family was unable to pay for his living costs then, he went to the University of Benghazi to continue his studies, but he did not finish due to his political commitment. Later, he attended the military academy in Benghazi and in 1965 he became an officer, the following year he travelled to England for training. While he was student in the academy, he established a group called the Free Unionist Officers Movement (Olivier 87). The aim of the group was to plan for future coup.

Qaddafi was widely known by his deep and strong religious beliefs, from very young age, his father introduced him to the lessons found in the Quran, since then the Quran and Islam

became the foundation of his life influencing every aspect, especially his political views and thoughts. Because of his deep belief in Islam, he enforced strict rules within the movement, like he banned going to nightclubs and drinking alcohol. On September 1, 1969 he successfully staged a coup, after years of planning. Qaddafi, who was only 27 years old, removed the old king's government (King Idris) and set up a new group called the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) (Olivier 87). Muammar's plan for the coup went smoothly without incident and major bloodshed.

The military group immediately caught army chief of staff and the head of security and King Idris who was not well and left to Greece for treatment. A lot of people went to the streets to express their backing for the coup and many were glad because they perceived the coup as a reaction to Arab pride being harmed by Israel's defeat in the Six Day War in 1967, as well as dissatisfaction with the monarchy's relations to the West and corruption ("1969: Bloodless Coup in Libya"). Overall, Qaddafi's early life experiences and ideological views created a foundation for his rise to power and his long-term control over Libya.

The government performed symbolic actions such as burning Western books and closing nightclubs. They supported traditional Libyan dress, turned churches into mosques, and followed Islamic law. They even modified the calendar. Oil helped Libya achieve its objectives and allowed it to confront the West. Libya sought ties with other Arab countries to reclaim cultural and political power. This was not only to gain support at home but also because Qaddafi believed he could follow in the footsteps of Gamal Abdul Nasser as a leader in the region (Vandewalle 31 "Libya since 1969"). It is worthy to mention that even before the coup, the Revolutionary Command Council set up the Central Committee of the Free Unionist Officers. Qaddafi was eventually appointed defense minister and the leader of the state. He was Libya's President from March 1977, he held the position of Prime Minister, and also he was part of the

Presidential Council of the Federation of Arab Republics and was promoted to major general in January 1976, though he still preferred being called Colonel (Olivier88).

The new Libyan leaders (Qaddafi and RCC group) were different from those in the past, they spoke in way that attracted the common people and emphasized revolution, and they did not come from rich and powerful families like the previous leaders did. Rather, the majority of them were from less prestigious tribes and middle class, many were raised in rural regions and nearly all of them had graduated from the military academy in Benghazi just few years before the coup. Some were still junior officers at the time, including Muammar Qaddafi. These Free Officers, as they were called together, went to the Military Academy mainly because of the severe regulations of the monarchy which prevented them from fulfilling the requirements for university, which required a special certificate (Vandewalle 10 “Libya since 1969”).

After gaining independence in 1951, Libya established a federal government with three provinces: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan, each with its own authority. However, when Muammar Qaddafi took power in 1969, he eliminated this structure with the intention of a more centralized government (Yahya 580). Muammar Qaddafi's government adopted Islamic law, while forming relationships with Arab countries to increase regional power. Qaddafi and his group of military officers were primarily from ordinary backgrounds, and they changed Libya's government to be more controlled by one central authority. In 1969, Qaddafi stated some essential principles to Libya's ruling authority, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). First, he underlined the significance of removing all foreign military bases from Libyan soil, particularly those belonging to the United States and the United Kingdom, reflecting his anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist views. Second, he claimed for a policy of positive and full neutrality, which means Libya will not support any particular side in international wars. Third, Qaddafi emphasized the significance of maintaining Libyan national unity and coherence among its diverse population. Finally, he advocated for worldwide Arab unity, with the goal of

strengthening relations and solidarity between Arab states (Olivier 88). These concepts were the foundation of Qaddafi's early governing strategy, which shaped Libya's foreign policy.

Qaddafi created a system in which citizens could engage in government through committees and a congress, despite the fact that the country remained a one-party state. This system allowed people to express their problems and suggestions. By 1979, there were no formal ministries, only committees, secretaries, and one political party: the Arab Socialist Union (Olivier 88). Under Qaddafi leadership, the constitution was repealed and replaced by new book called "Green Book" with new rules to make the country better. He wanted Libya to have no debts and improve people's income (Amaral).

The Green Book established Libya's political system, known as the Jamahiriya. In 1977, Qaddafi proposed direct democracy where people have the main power. This strategy is based on Popular Congresses and Popular Committees. Since 1998, 381 Basic People's Congresses have been held at the local level, with all citizens participating. Each local unit has a committee that manages communal responsibilities and reports to the People's Congresses (Vandewall 108 "Libya since 1969"). Regular Libyan people were directly involved in deciding on foreign, domestic, and economic issues. Unlike in western democracies, where individuals elect representatives, Libyans participated directly in decision making through a variety of committees. Libya's system allowed everyone to participate, not just a few leaders. This distinguished Libya because ordinary residents participated in decision-making, making it more democratic than traditional institutions. Despite criticism, Libya was regarded as Africa's most prosperous democracy under Qaddafi, rather than a military dictatorship (Yahya 581).

Qaddafi appreciated his close relationship with the Libyan people. He was good at persuading them to embrace policies that others may disagree with, he was aiming to create a society in which everyone is treated equally, guided by Islamic principles, he believed that religion brought stability and prevented despair, and he struggled for equal access to political

and economic resources in order to improve people's lives. In addition, he implemented laws such as making Arabic the official language, prohibiting alcohol sales in accordance with Islamic principles, and introducing compulsory military service (Olivier 89).

Qaddafi's primary objectives were to promote Arab nationalism and unity. He believed in glorifying Arab history and culture, and viewed the Arabic speaking world as a single nation. According to him, Libya was super important in keeping this Arab identity safe. He considered himself as following in the footsteps of Gamal Abd Nasser, who had handed on the responsibility of Arab nationalism to him (Berween 51). Nasser backed the notion of Arab states banding together to achieve common goals.

Nasser believed that by uniting together and feeling like one big nation, Arabs could distance themselves from Western influence and alliances, which he saw as similar to past colonization and control by Western nations. Nasser believed that by working together, Arab countries could assert their independence and pursue their own interests (Sullivan 23). Qaddafi as well wanted Arab countries to unite, and soon after assuming power, he took steps to make this happen, even offering Libya as an instrument to help Nasser achieve his dream of pan-Arab unity. He believed that Arab countries needed to work together to confront difficulties such as Zionism and colonialism. He believed it was critical to preserve Arab achievements. He made fourteen attempts to unify Libya with other Arab nations. He stated that Arab unification was essential, and no Arab state could avoid it (Berween 51).

Qaddafi also attempted to make Arab countries closer by backing revolutions such as the 1958 Iraqi revolution and the 1952 Egyptian revolution and strongly opposed imperialism and colonialism (Hissein). Thus he supported independence movements in other nations as well. Qaddafi's big ambition was to bring Arab nations together politically and economically with the ultimate goal of establishing a "United Arab Republic".

This union would involve adopting a common Arab currency, strengthening trade relations, stimulating mutual investment, and implementing cooperative economic policies. His goal was to promote more collaboration and unity among Arab nations in order to achieve shared wealth and freedom. Following Nasser's death in 1970, Qaddafi attempted to become the primary leader of Pan-Arabism. In 1971, he met in Benghazi with Egypt's new leader, Anwar al-Sadat, and Syria's leader, Hafez Assad. They discussed establishing a federation. Their fundamental philosophy was democratic socialism, and they intended to support Palestine and stand united against Israel. Egypt and Libya decided to join entirely, while Syria did not. They had certain contrasts, such as Sadat's preference for taking things slowly and Qaddafi's desire to move quickly. As a result, they were unable to form the intended union (Hissein). Qaddafi felt left down by other Arab leaders, so he began focusing more on Africa in the 1960s. This was a significant adjustment for him, he intended to stand against imperialism and shared his ideas from the Green Book, believed in a system known as the Jamahiriya, which he thought could benefit African countries. During a special meeting in Sirte in 1999, Qaddafi proposed establishing a new organization known as the "United States of Africa". Many politicians liked the title "African Union". This idea, which Qaddafi had discussed since the 1960s, became a reality at a summit in Togo in 2000, and thought that borders should not limit individuals, so he attempted to remove them. The African Union was formally established in 2002 at a summit in South Africa. It is similar to the European Union and the United Nations, but it gave more power to individual countries. It follows the ideas of the Monrovia Group, which has been influencing African politics for a long time (Hissein).

1.1.5 Qaddafi and the United states

Libya and the United States have disagreed since the early 1970s due to disparities in interests, views, and aims. Muammar Al Qaddafi, a strong nationalist leader, has resisted the US throughout the Middle East and Africa due to his pan-Arab and pan-Islamic beliefs. He

opposed US military bases in the region and blamed America for supporting Israel, which he believed the cause of problems for Palestinians and Arab lands captured by Israel in 1967 (El-Khawas 45). Qaddafi's actions have consistently shown his dislike of US policies and his willingness to challenge Western interests and allies in the area.

This confirms that Libya and the United States have been in conflict because they wanted different things and have different beliefs. Muammar Al Qaddafi, was a firm believer in Arab and Islamic unity and clashed with the United States over it. He opposed American military bases in the region and attempted to turn other Arab countries against the US. He blamed America for supporting Israel too much, which he thought caused problems for Palestinians. Basically, Qaddafi opposed US policies and did things to challenge them. Qaddafi did not get along with the West from the beginning. In 1970, he forced the United States of America to leave an airbase before its rental agreement expired. Things got worse when he took control of some American oil companies. This irritated the United States, so they stopped selling Libya \$400 million worth of military equipment. In 1977, the United States even declared Libya to be an enemy. Then, in 1982, Reagan prohibited the United States from purchasing oil from Libya, pitting both commerce and politics against Libya (Vandewalle 161 "Libya since 1969"). In the early 1980s, there were conflicts between Libya and the United States of America. Libya attacked the US ships, and the US destroyed Libyan navy ships and planes while bombing their coastal bases (Zunes).

Conclusion

Libya before Qaddafi lived in tribalism society, and did not have single shared culture. Libya's history reflects a transition from tribal society to Ottoman rule in 1551, followed by Italian occupation in 1912. Despite these challenges, Libya gained independence through the efforts of the United Nations. King Idris ruled as Libya's first and only monarch until Muammar Qaddafi's bloodless coup in 1969. However, Qaddafi's leadership brought significant changes

in the country. His ideologies, ideas and support of terrorism made clashes with US interests and goals, marking a new chapter in Libya's relationship with the international community and the U.S in particular.

Chapter Two

The United States Declares Libya as the Major Enemy

Introduction

The reign of Muammar Qaddafi, spanning over four decades, was characterized by a complex interplay of inadequate governance, intricate international diplomacy, and covert operations that left an indelible mark on global affairs. Among the myriad of challenges and controversies that defined Qaddafi's regime, few issues elicited more global concern and scrutiny than his support for terrorism and relentless pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). This chapter embarks on a detailed exploration of the complex and interconnectedness between Qaddafi's regime (internal governance, terrorism, and the quest for WMDs) and the profound intentions of U.S interventions influencing global security dynamics.

Throughout his rule, Qaddafi's regime maintained close ties with various terrorist organizations, providing them with funding, training, and sanctuary. This support not only destabilized the region but also posed a direct threat to international security. Concurrently, Qaddafi's relentless pursuit of WMDs, including nuclear and chemical weapons, raised alarm bells within the international community. Libya's clandestine efforts to acquire such capabilities, often through illicit procurement networks, underscored the regime's determination to bolster its military arsenal and assert its influence on the world stage. The ramifications of Qaddafi's actions reverberated far beyond Libya's borders, with U.S interests frequently coming under threat.

The regime's support for terrorism fueled anti-Western sentiment and posed a direct danger to American citizens and assets abroad. Similarly, the specter of Libya acquiring WMDs

raised the stakes in regional security calculations and prompted robust counter proliferation efforts by the United States and its allies.

By unraveling the complexities of Qaddafi's regime and its engagement with terrorism and WMD proliferation, this chapter aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the challenges posed by rogue states and non-state actors in the modern era. Through a comprehensive analysis of historical events, diplomatic maneuvers, and intelligence revelations, we endeavor to shed light on the intricate dynamics shaping global security and US foreign policy in the face of evolving threats. Through the US, documentation on the terrorist attacks and horrific events affected by in the 80s and the 90s there was one and only suspect "Libya". Western leaders especially U.S officials believed that there was a direct implication of Qaddafi's influence and ideologies in the continuous violence against America. Muammar Qaddafi was convicted of adopting terrorism as part of his foreign policies as stated in the 1986 state department report. Moreover, expressing his ambitions exposed his willingness to expand out of the territory of the state resulting in turning the blaming fingers to the Libyan leader as the responsible for these attacks and extempore decisions. His ideologies were recognized as anti-west (anti-imperialism), breached international rules and rogue actions. The U.S investigation was essential to acknowledge the elements that contributed to provoke actions.

Muammar Qaddafi, faced charges exposing a high rate of violence and terror when he was presented to the UN. The western world saw Qaddafi as an international terrorist due to his support of numerous terrorist organizations globally. His support ranged from providing financial backing to training militants to execute attacks. Concurrently, Qaddafi pursued a covert program to acquire weapons of mass destruction including chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities. This dual strategy of sponsoring terrorism while seeking WMDs not only posed a direct threat to regional stability but also raised profound concerns within the international community about the proliferation of deadly weapons and the potential for

catastrophic violence. It was viewed as a compelling argument to convince other countries to be allied in order to stop Qaddafi's Ideological development.

1. International Confrontation

1.1 Historical Context

The relationship between Libya and the United States has been recognized as a turbulent and complex history with periods of confrontation, tension, and conflicts. The dynamics of this relationship has not only influenced the bilateral relations but also had a significant effect on the stability of the surrounding area and worldwide safety (Cudworth and Hobden). The roots of the relation can be traced back to the Qaddafi's coup and his time as the state's leader. During the Cold War, Libya pursued different policies such as anti-western movements and ideologies. This stance brought Libya into direct confrontation with the United States, particularly following incidents such as the 1986 bombing of a Berlin discotheque and the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, for which Libya was held responsible (Brian 64). These events not only strained bilateral relations but also led to international isolation and sanctions against Libya.

1.2 Qaddafi's Ideologies and US Interests in the Surrounding Area

The confrontation between Qaddafi and the United States was a fueled combination of geopolitical, ideological and strategic forms. Dealing with Libya under Qaddafi evidently has been challenging. It was clear that Qaddafi's regime was likely to persist in defiance regarding matters that ran counter the Libyan interest in Africa and approximate regions while it faced American interests (Little 89). Libya's defiance of international norms, support of terrorism and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction were the key diversities of tension.

Qaddafi intended to contribute for African (economic and political) unity, avoiding any foreign interference in the continent. He envisioned a similar work frame as the EU, which is the African Union, and to have the same currency, militant and governmental institutes shared

by African nations. His ideology was that a unified Africa would be strong and have a global impact (Ogunbadejo 33). Qaddafi's African policy in the eyes of the west was controversial, full of infidelity and motivated by his personal ambitions to reach regional influence and power. U.S diplomats, concerned of Qaddafi's influence, engaged in significant efforts lobbying African states to censor Qaddafi and stop his ideological expansions.

Another key point of the instability of relation was the sturdiness of the Libyan leader. Qaddafi resisted any probable change and firm in reaching his goals either in Libya or across the borders in Africa, the state which raised concern. There was a total refusal for any western implication or suggestion in Libya's territory and regions where Libya is seeking benefits. It was clear at the time that the U.S relations with Libya was in constant tensions and it was important for America to stay vigilant as long as Qaddafi's adventurism was present and considering Libya as a rogue state as labeled by the US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. This state pushed the U.S officials to reach an agreement after considerable efforts since the view was clear that the political structure of Libya was backing Qaddafi's present and futuristic approaches and ideologies. It was not necessary for the West to take the same path since there was always faith for the relations to be fixed while avoiding any potential escalation in the continent (Moss 61).

Qaddafi's ideologies shaped Libya's foreign policies, and was characterized by supporting revolutionary movements and opposition groups against the western influence by offering financial and diplomatic help to support anti-western and anti-colonial groups and Likeminded regimes (Hicks 16). His confrontational stance against the west, blended with allegations of state sponsor of terrorism, led to the state's isolation on the global stage.

Qaddafi's ideologies did not only shape Libya foreign policies, but also set the stage to international confrontation with the United States and western powers. His steadfast

commitment to anti-western and African unity clashed with U.S interest in the regions contributed to period of tension and conflicts.

1.3 Geopolitical Dynamics

Qaddafi's activism in Africa was perceived as a threat to the west particularly the U.S. which exerted maneuvers on African conservative states to obstruct his aspirations to host an African summit in Libya 2010. Qaddafi's ambitions and policies in the continent were seen by the west as a model of soviet expansionism, which had to be foiled ("Humanitarian Intervention in Libya").

Qaddafi's implication towards the neighboring regions appeared to be opportunistic, reckless and did not follow a specific political agenda. The U.S officials point to his interventions as non-calculated actions and lack of restraint, benefiting only his favor, and resulting in catastrophic outcomes (conflict, displacement, instability). This state worsened the situation in an already fragile region (Cohen 12).

In sum, the United States saw Qaddafi seeking monogamous interests and did not take into consideration the consequences of his actions, and the U.S back to back with the west took important measures to make him responsible for his actions.

2. Libya as a State Sponsor of Terrorism

Internationally, Libya was considered as a threat since it was declared a state sponsor of terrorism, particularly from the viewpoint of Western nations. Global security and stability were threatened by the Libyan state's active support for various extremist groups and has been perceived as a problem to be solved in the near future.

Libya was involved in sponsoring terrorism through financial assistance, training, and the provision of arms to extremist organizations across the globe. These groups, fueled by Libyan support, have shown acts of violence and destabilized regions far beyond the borders of the North African nation. According to the conclusions of the Attorney General of the United

States Congress in Title 22, Chapter 61, the PLO, or Palestinian Liberation Organization, was labeled as a terrorist organization and was supported by Libyan arms and finance to destabilize the country. In addition, Libya's support for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) during the Troubles in Northern Ireland aided the group's terrorist acts, such as bombs and assassinations, which caused a loss in many lives and prolonged the conflict ("Libya Semtex Link to IRA Terror"). From the perspective of Western powers, Libya's sponsorship of terrorism crossed the lines of the principles of peace and security upon which the international order is built. The support provided by the Libyan state to groups deemed as terrorist organizations by the West have raised alarm bells among policymakers, punctuating for a decisive action to counter this threat.

The Western perception of Libya's role in sponsoring terrorism was further underscored by specific incidents that have drawn international condemnation. These include high-profile acts of terrorism, such as the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, which claimed the lives of hundreds of innocent civilians (Judyt 02). The involvement of individuals with ties to the Libyan government in orchestrating such attacks has reinforced the view of Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism in the eyes of the West.

It can be said that the American administration vividly wanted to deal as soon as possible with the so-called international terrorism, in the manner of a doctor treating only the symptoms of a disease and not the roots leading to it (Boyle 45). This resulted in describing Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism, perceived by the West as a major threat to international peace and security.

Through its support for terrorist groups, the Libyan state has undermined efforts to foster stability and has perpetuated violence on a global scale, even though the media had an extreme influence on public opinion. As Western nations grappled with the challenges posed by state-sponsored terrorism, work on understanding the intentions and mechanisms behind Libya's actions that have been incomprehensive in shaping effective responses to this enduring threat

was necessary in addition to analyzing the horrific events Libya was accused of being responsible for.

2.1 La Bella Disco Attack (1986)

On April 5, 1986, in West Berlin, Germany, a famous discotheque well approached by American servicemen was attacked leaving three deaths (two American servicemen) and 200 injuries confirmed by BBC news. The attack monitored by the Libyan agents aimed to bomb the crowded discotheque with 450 people in it so they sift American servicemen and to create chaos in the western world. "U.S. President Ronald Reagan quickly accused Libya of the bombing of La Bella discotheque" as reported by Erica Pearson in New York Daily News. After the U.S officials claimed intercepting a direct contact between the Libyan embassy and Tripoli.

The Sidra incident was a naval confrontation where Libya and the United States were involved. This was a central spark that would finally culminate in the bombing of the La Belle disco. This coup increased the estrangement between the two countries to a point that finally led the United States to carry out an attack, the Operation El Dorado Canyon, as a US reprisal of attacks that were made on Libyan military bases. The strike which hit Muammar Qaddafi's residence 10 days after the Sidra incident comprised 40 Libyan casualties among them Qaddafi's adopted daughter Hanna ("Dealing with a rogue state").

The hawkish military tactic of the U. S aggravated Libya's animosity towards the Western powers, especially the United States that made it feel like to get revenge. Such a situation of the escalating hostilities set the stage for the attack on the La Belle disco, and the bombing was believed to be masterminded by Libya as a revenge. In the attack which was perpetrated at the La Belle disco, the Sidra Incident can be considered as a catalyst to Libya's hostilities with the West, more so to the bombing occurrences on the Western's targets, such as the disco ("Dealing with a rogue state").The foiled terrorist plot was documented in images,

assisting both Western Berlin police and English security agencies in solving a riddle that had persisted for years since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Years of inquiry paid off when East German authorities discovered pieces of information on the attempt in former East Berlin. This resulted in the arrest of five major suspects, including Ali Chanaa, his wife, and her sister. Yasser Chraidi, a Palestinian worker at the Libyan embassy, had assigned Ali, a German man of Lebanese heritage, the responsibility of planting and detonating a bomb in the disco (Sharpe 166).

The German government conducted a meticulous investigation and analysis of the details, leading to the comprehensive scrutiny of the bombing incident. As a result, Channa and three accomplices were convicted of murder in a German court and sentenced to imprisonment ranging from 12 to 14 years. Interestingly, the court did not present direct evidence linking Libya to the bombing. Instead, it relied on intercepted radio communications between Tripoli and the Libyan embassy in East Berlin (Perles 3-4). One intercepted message on the night of the attack instructed a missionary to 'Expect the result tomorrow morning. It is God's will' (Pearson). Additionally, hours after the bombing, another cable reported that 'at 1:30 A.M., one of the acts was carried out with success, without leaving a trace' (Pearson). This incident occurred shortly after the sinking of two Libyan ships in the Gulf of Sidra in 1986, about a month before the bombing. Investigations concluded that Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi was responsible for the attack. In 2003, the U.S. government resolution mandated Libya to compensate around 230 million to the victims' families. The interpretation of the Gulf of Sidra Incident varies; tensions escalated when American forces sank Libyan ships in waters guarded by U.S. military, prompting condemnation from Tripoli. The U.S. response was seen as drastic, especially given the Cold War context and its commitment to safeguarding national security, being also a model of Soviet ideological leader (Stanik). American, German and English

intelligence could collect concrete evidence a call between Tripoli and the Libyan embassy in Germany an order to proceed with the Disco attack.

2.2 Pan Am Flight 103

On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 was supposed to be a simple flight from London to New York carrying 259 individuals between staff and passengers, with just moments from its takeoff in the sky of Scotland everything went wrong, a disaster struck with the intensity of a hurricane. It was ripped apart by a bomb explosion above Lockerbie, Scotland. Passengers were forced into a nightmare scenario when a timer-activated explosive, perfectly hidden within a tape player snuggled in a suitcase, detonated mid-flight (Emerson 22). The explosive device, made from the quiet menace of Semtex, smashed the plane into innumerable shards, unleashing damage over an area of nearly 850 square miles (“ The FBI Report 1993”) .

In an instant, the serene Scottish countryside became a scene of devastation. The once majestic aircraft, now reduced to a debris field, bore witness to the harrowing loss of 259 souls, passengers and crew whose lives were extinguished in a flash of terror. The deadly cascade of wreckage claimed an additional 11 victims on the ground, as 21 houses were destroyed by the falling remnants of the plain (Swire 68).

Amidst the wreckage and chaos, in the same breath a reality emerged, terrorism had once again showed its ugly face, striking fear into the hearts of nations (Cowan 41). Americans formed the majority of victims, amplifying the shockwaves of terror that emerged across the United States. Speculation swirled like a tempest in the aftermath, with investigators pointing accusatory fingers towards Libyan intelligence agents as the architects of this heinous act (Rachid 13).The tragedy of Pan Am Flight 103 was a reminder of the devastating effects of terrorism. From a routine flight to catastrophic death, the hidden bomb within the common object turned the tranquil Scottish countryside into a site of unthinkable destruction. The incident led to the loss of 259 lives, with additional casualties on the ground.

This incident was only fuel to the fire and added to the tension within the conflict, sharpening animosities. The results of this tragedy brought out more fully the urgent necessity of diplomatic action to tackle the causes that lay at the bottom of the ill-feeling and therefore bitterness. Moreover, emphasizing the imperative for proactive measures to prevent the recurrence of such catastrophic events. The motives behind the attack presented by Leslei Stahl in her BBC report seemed to have been deeply embedded in a history of international conflict. Among analysts and observers, it was a widely discussed rumor that the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 had been done out of vengeance, as a brutal response to the U.S. bombing campaign on Tripoli, the capital of Libya, in 1986. Termed as Operation El Dorado Canyon, it was the U.S. military's point attack against Libya over their alleged involvement in terrorist activities, such as the bombing of a West Berlin nightclub, which American servicemen favored. Beneath the wreckage and suffering brought about by the Pan Am Flight 103 attack, the search for justice seemed illusory. German investigation analysis about the ongoing events resulted in many speculations equating the bombing to a revenge strike due to the 1986 bombing campaign on Tripoli, commanded by the Libyan leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi, accountability was still farfetched (Stahl).

To make matters worse, Qaddafi boldly refused to surrender the accused perpetrators for trial. This defiance of international demands for justice underscored the problems associated with holding state actors accountable for acts of terror committed on foreign lands (Foot 10). More so, it confirmed the position that reaching for diplomatic relations and the legal system has proven to be complicated procedures in the path toward justice for the victims and their families. The impunity enjoyed by the attackers at the same time was a grim reminder of the obstacles that remain in addressing transnational acts of terrorism and continuing to struggle for accountability in the face of political maneuvering and diplomatic tensions.

2.3 Possession of Mass Destruction

Besides terrorism and supporting it, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction was another issue, which led to deterioration of relations between Libya and the United States. Libya's journey to acquire weapons of mass destruction came as a challenge to the new distribution of powers, as long as Qaddafi's controversial motivation and the origins of his implications which led to an intrusive debate of global security and opposed to the new American approach of disarmament and non-proliferation. This part tends to shed light on the chronological timeline of the Libyan program, motivations and the west's perspective towards it.

2.3.1 The Chronology of Libya's WMD Program

The journey of Libyan pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction and nuclear power began with a clandestine step seeking autonomy and strategic regional dominance. Starting with nuclear expertise in the 1970s and then the Uranium enrichment in the 1980s (Bahgat). These steps blurred Western perception towards Qaddafi's intention of this program, numerous attempts to proceed forward, collapsed in 2003 affected by international sanctions implied by The United States and the UN.

The first step of Libya to acquire nuclear weapons was from China in 1970. Libyan repeated efforts in acquiring chemical technology ended by a rejection, but the Libyan representatives continually, showed their interest to achieve their goal. Despite serious efforts, WMD project seemed to have stagnated at a certain point and did not move forward (Joshua 96). Evaluating the current citation of the state, Libya faced serious obstacles; the consistent expression of interest in nuclear technology highlighted Libya's persistent pursuit of strategic autonomy and regional influence.

2.3.2 International Collaboration and Interception

Libya tried to get over 1200 tons of uranium from French occupied mines in Niger. The transaction supported by top company officials collapsed thanks to the French government

because apparently there was no need for such an amount only to develop nuclear weapons, a clandestine action to an unknown purpose, which Libya did not declare such quantity of Uranium was questionable. Enrichment intelligence was obvious that the use of it was for a Mass Destruction Weapons (Kenneth).

Kenneth R. Timmerman, a former journalist at Newsweek, stated in his report “Libya’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction” that he contacted former French Defense Minister Charles Hernu in 1986 to be updated about Project Hamid, a secret operation involving military equipment shipments to Libya. Hernu exposed the story about intercepting a disguised delivery headed for Libya and mentioned previous contracts for aircraft spares. His response in the phone call interview shed light on the complexity and secrecy of arms deals with Libya at that time, showing the challenges of monitoring and preventing illicit proliferation activities. This state, showed Qaddafi’s insistence to keep his WMD program alive despite previous failures with other states such as Pakistan and India.

Cooperation between Libya and Pakistan began in 1977. Libya provided financial assistance to Pakistan and later delivered uranium yellowcake from Niger in the hope that Pakistan would share the results of its nuclear program with Libya (Cirincione 307). The agreement with Pakistan was in the form of giving financial aid in hope for this last, to develop nuclear intelligence and share it with Libya. However, after serious discussions and procedures from the U.S with Pakistan, Pakistan dropped the program accords leading to the denial of the program by the president Zia Ul Haq. The Pakistani president publicly declared that his country was not helping Libya in its WMD program (“New York Times”). Libya, however, did not stop here but also sought to get access to nuclear energy from India.

Unfortunately for Qaddafi, this attempt also ended with rejection. Although Libyan emissaries traveled to India in an effort to purchase atomic weapons and offered to pay India's entire foreign debt (estimated at \$15 billion) in exchange for a nuclear weapon (John 22-31),

the offer was rejected. The previous timeline, though it did not tackle all attempts, showed how Libya wanted to get nuclear power plant. However, the fact that Libya was perceived as a threat to global security, made the dream of getting nuclear weapons an impossible ambition.

3. Libyan Motivations and Westerns Perspectives

The Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi had long-standing illicit intentions for nuclear power for several years. Qaddafi's motives were a mix of revolutionary desires, and political paranoia in which it symbolized prestige and power on the global stage, and initiative to regional political consideration. Domestically, he saw WMD as a tool to bolster his authority, and counter any potential threat to the regime. Internationally, nuclear power expressed Libya's power on the global stage. Moreover, Qaddafi's motivations have been highly influenced by the rivalry of neighboring state in a form of regional arm race, especially the state of Israel (Castli). Nevertheless, all interval obstacles, mismanagement, institutional failure and state turbulence in Libya prevented Qaddafi to proclaim his nuclear intentions. In this case, although Libya was sneaking nuclear assistance from the black market, it did not have the means to maintain an operational program.

Western perspectives on Libya's motivations to possess nuclear power, seen as threat that held multiple significance. Some parties were optimistic in the achievement of disarmament, due to the states' past acts of violence, the infrastructure to build a nuclear weapon, and internal struggles caused by the economic sanction. Other parties appealed to stop the program of WMD, but at the same time intended to maintain some elements of the proposedley lines that included economic incentives to benefit from potential new investors "Libya and the surrounding region" (Takeyh).

From the western vision towards the Libyan case, it is possible to identify several factors that contributed to the total denial and a call for disarmament. As Muammar Qaddafi was tending to acquire WMD, the motives were not for the purpose of his need, mainly while

considering his sponsorship of terrorism. Additionally, internal revisionism of the state was obligatory and Qaddafi needed to reevaluate his ideologies and adapt his policies in the processes of making decisions according to the global norms not in response for external pressure.

3.1 Diplomatic Efforts

Nations often use economic sanctions as a tool to exert pressure on other nations to modify their behavior (Mulder 5). In the Libyan case, the United States implemented economic sanctions. These sanctions intended to economically and diplomatically isolate Libya, and raised concerns since Libyan attempts to acquire WMDs was considered a threat to global security. It is believed that sanctions may succeed in compelling governments to adhere to global standards, by limiting its ability to access the international market (Barnum and Fearey 236). In fact, the economic sanctions imposed on Libya caused the state to be restricted, leading to efforts to normalize relations with the U.S despite past confrontations and conflicts (Nephew 9-12). Libyan foreign policies prioritized normalizing relations with the U.S and mending diplomatic ties, concluding in dismantling WMDs programs.

In 2003, Qaddafi's nuclear adventurism ended as Libya publicly announced the dismantling of its nuclear program. This decision marked a significant shift in the Libyan stance attributed to the mounting pressure from the U.S. The United States through its influence on the UN and the west, effectively isolated Libya, exacerbated its internal situation more and more. Facing sanctions and isolation, Qaddafi found himself with a little choice but to abandon his pursuit of WMDs. The United States succeeded through diplomatic alliance and strategic alliance in convincing Qaddafi to recalibrate his approach, and participate in a diplomatic discourse in order to corporate over confrontations.

Conclusion

During the rule of Libya's controversial mastermind Muammar Qaddafi, the relations with the United States were far from friendly, filled with ideological clashes, geopolitical maneuvering and direct confrontation. Qaddafi's support of terrorism and relentless pursuit of WMD, posed a crucial threat to regional and global security. In response to these threats, the United States began a series of interventions and diplomacy usually targeted at preventing these threats and preserving world peace.

Moreover, Libya's support of terrorism and its covert procurement of WMDs escalated tensions further. Qaddafi's dreams of attaining nuclear, chemical and biological weapons petrol saw the world power's stepping up counter proliferation activities. Trials that were involved in disabling the WMD program in Libya involved use of intelligence operations, diplomacy as well as the use of economic measures which finally compelled Libya to surrender to the required disarmament in 2003.

Libya and the United States' relation during Qaddafi's rule reflected the difficulties that societies of the rest of the world faced in addressing the matters of certain state leaders – so called "Rogue State ". It captured the interplay between peaceful relations and sanction mechanisms, and the use of force when necessary in an endeavor to remove threats to world peace. It is of importance to note that the two parts were able to mend their relations and Libya was able to withdraw from WMD programs as a diplomatic measure, which showed that even after years of animosity and enmity, negotiating a peaceful settlement is possible.

Chapter Three

U.S Reaction to Qaddafi's Support of Terrorism and WMD Pursuit

Introduction

The US relationship with Muammar Qaddafi's Libya was turbulent, resembling a rollercoaster with highs and lows that influenced the region's political environment. The United States' response to Muammar Qaddafi's actions during his rule in Libya was a complicated story that played out over many years since 1986 to 2011.

Tension, conflict, and diplomatic isolation defined the relationship between the United States and Muammar el-Qaddafi's Libya during the 1980s and 1990s. Allegations of terrorism supported by Qaddafi's government led to economic sanctions and military actions by the United States.

The actions of Colonel Qaddafi and behavior especially the support of terrorism, and maintaining strong connections with different organizations and groups, supporting them financially, providing them training and sanctuary, made the relations between Libya and the U.S worse. The United States, from its part, did not remain silent and took necessary measures that were exaggerated in most times.

American reaction led Libya to change its behavior especially after the isolation caused the economic sanctions. Qaddafi's regime initiated diplomatic gestures and real compromises in order to shift its foreign policy stance. This change opened the door for potential enhancements in relations with the United States, offering the possibility of a thaw in the frosty diplomatic standoff.

The third chapter discusses the reaction of the U.S to Qaddafi's actions. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part talks about the economic sanctions and diplomatic measures taken against Libya. The second part delves into the military attack in response to Qaddafi behaviors while the last part explores the response of Muammar El Qaddafi to the U.S,

and what did he do to make America get Libya out of the isolation it imposed on his country and how he successfully improved the relations with his previous enemies.

1.1 U.S. Economic Sanctions and Diplomatic Measures Taken Against Libya

During the 1970s and 1980s, Muammar Qaddafi's regime provided financial support to a variety of Muslim and anti-imperialist organizations around the world, including Palestinian guerrillas, Philippine Muslim rebels, and the Irish Republican Army. In response, the United States imposed sanctions on Libya, resulting in a continuous slide in bilateral ties (History.com Editors). On January 7, 1986; U.S President Ronald Reagan imposed immediate economic sanctions, following terrorist attacks. Substantial evidence pointed to the Libyan government's support for the terrorist group Abu Nidal, which was responsible for these attacks. Reagan established the sanctions to achieve specific foreign policy goals, such as encouraging Libya to quit supporting and assisting global terrorism (Cooke 197).

With Libya's reliance on American technology and experience in the oil industry, these sanctions were highly damaging. The Regan administration took decisive action against the Qaddafi regime, aiming to impose more severe penalties (Zoubir 33). The sanctions had no direct impact on money flow because Libya could still find other uses for its financial resources. Even when the United States stopped buying oil from Libya, the global oil market meant that others just purchased additional oil from various sources. However, the sanctions had an impact on Libya's oil production because they were unable to obtain the necessary parts and assistance from U.S corporations. The U.S and European governments made deals so other companies would not take over the oil fields that U.S companies left (Nephew 10).

President Reagan utilized a law called IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act) to impose severe economic sanctions on Libya. These penalties included prohibiting Libya's government from utilizing any money or property held in the United States or controlled by Americans, even if it was in another country. They also suspended all business between the United States and Libya, including the exchange of goods and services as well as

travel to and from Libya (Mejia-Prieto 12). Between 1989 and 1993, the U.S increased the punishments through additional legislation.

They made things much more difficult for Libya by imposing additional restrictions on flights and business, as well as freezing more of Libya's assets in the United States. Congress also passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in 1996, which penalized non-US corporations who traded with Libya (Mejia-Prieto 12). The passage of this Act made things worse for Libya and the Libyans who would bear the outcome of such restrictions.

The U.S. government implemented a sanction preventing Americans from engaging in contractual agreements with Libya. This restriction applied to new and current contracts with the Libyan government. Consequently, individuals employed by Libyan oil companies found themselves affected by this policy, as their contractual arrangements were rendered void, leading to job losses (Cook 209). Such laws therefore, were affecting some Americans as well with the government paying no attention to their losses.

The U.S imposed sanctions on Libya with three main goals: to put pressure on the government to change its support for terrorism and radical governance, to penalize it for its disruptive acts, and to signal opposition to the Libyan regime's behavior. Initially, this involved preventing the sale of aircraft that Libya had already purchased. As a result, the United States refused to sell any military equipment that could strengthen Libya's military capabilities. Additional steps included delaying the transfer of a defensive system and refusing maintenance to Libyan air force planes. Finally, the United States discontinued selling spare components required for the operating of Libya's existing aircraft fleet (Mejia-Prieto 10).

The sanctions were most effective when they targeted Libya's economic weaknesses, particularly its reliance on oil. These sanctions harm Libya's capacity to grow and explore new options since they focus on preventing advanced technologies rather than simply restricting oil supplies. They did not take away what Libya already had but made it harder for them to improve

their situation (Barnum and Fearey 240). This means that the United States did not impose economic sanctions against Libya to adjust the behavior of Qaddafi only, but also aimed to harm both its economy and its technological development.

1.2 Military Attack

The economic sanction that the United States of America imposed against Libya did not work as intended, so they decided to use military force instead. President Ronald Reagan launched the operation El Dorado Canyon in 1986, a step that demonstrated a shift from diplomatic measures to warfare.

1.2.1 1986 United States Bombing of Libya (El Dorado Canyon Operation)

Since the 1960s, relations between the United States and Libya have been strained due to allegations of weapons smuggling, espionage, and terrorism. Tensions between the two countries increased in 1985-1986 (Ball). Libya was a major backer of terrorism at that time, and its leader, Colonel Qaddafi, was becoming increasingly violent, particularly towards the United States. Qaddafi formed a tight friendship with the infamous Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal. Notably, Qaddafi publicly praised what he called “brave acts” following explosions carried out by Nidal's group in 1985, which resulted in casualties (Major and Blanchfield 19).

In January 1986, the U.S suspended diplomatic ties with Libya. In March, the United States Navy reacted to Libyan missile strikes on its aircraft. The America government held Libya responsible for a bomb explosion of TWA Flight 840 over Greece, which killed four people. On April 5, terrorists assaulted the La Belle Discotheque in West Berlin, killing two U.S soldiers and injuring more than 200 others (Ball). President Reagan led efforts to inform the Americans about potential military responses to terrorism and its supporters.

He announced that nations supporting terrorism were effectively waging war against the United States, providing the U.S the right to self-defense under international law (Trebon and Gregory 11). In November 1985, Abu Nidal's organization hijacked an Egypt Air flight,

killing 60 people during an Egyptian commando rescue attempt. Then, on December 27, 1985, Abu Nidal's terrorists targeted airports in Rome and Vienna, killing 20 passengers and 4 terrorists. Qaddafi publicly praised the terrorists, describing them as heroes and admiring their acts (J.Boyne). Qaddafi's praise to such attacks was considered a direct and official support to terrorism, which required reaction.

Following strikes in Rome and Vienna, the U.S President Ronald Reagan ordered military leaders to prepare for potential action in Libya. They identified targets and planned attacks, expecting Britain would allow them to utilize its bases. General Rogers assigned Vice Adm. Kelso to lead Operation ELDORADO CANYON. They choose to strike at night to avoid Libya's powerful defenses, and to protect civilians they choose planes that could hit targets precisely (Endicott 148). The U.S launched airstrikes on targets in Libya's capital, Tripoli, and the city of Benghazi. The attacks lasted around 12 minutes and involved more than 60 tons of weapons. They targeted military barracks, bases, a training center, and a military airstrip. Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi's residence was also targeted. The Libyan military was caught off guard, with no effective defenses in place. Air-raid warnings were not sounded, and air-defense systems were turned up only after the bombings (“Libya Bombings of 1986 | United States-Libyan History”). This state meant that the surprise attack would cause heavy losses.

The U.S Air Force planes attacked locations such as Tripoli Military Air Field, while Navy planes targeted places such as Benina Military Air Field. Libyan defenses fired back, and later, Libyan forces fired missiles at a U.S Coast Guard base on Lampedusa, although no one was injured. The Pentagon praised the operation, but Libyan officials reported losses, including the death of Qaddafi's stepdaughter and injuries to two sons. One American plane and its crew were lost (Intoccia 179). The bombs in Libya caught the Libyan military off guard. They had not taken enough measures to protect important areas from a potential U.S attack.

There were no warnings when the bombs fell, and Libya's defense systems only activated after the U.S planes had finished attacking. The attacks inflicted significant damage in many locations, however some planes were unable to drop their bombs and others missed their targets, causing damage to buildings and homes in Tripoli. Even the French embassy was destroyed during the bombings (“Libya Bombings of 1986 | United States-Libyan History”).

The US government expressed condolences for the loss of innocent life, but highlighted that much of the damage was caused by unguided Libyan missiles and anti-aircraft shells falling to the ground. Subsequent reconnaissance aircraft revealed widespread damage to all selected targets. Despite failures, the Air Force accomplished success by accurately attacking three previously unseen targets depicted only in pictures, after a six-hour trip and encountering strong enemy opposition (Endicott 155). Overall, the bombings inflicted significant damage on Libyan targets. However, some planes missed their marks, resulting in collateral damage and human losses.

The Reagan administration stated that the bombing of Libya had reduced Libya's ability to sponsor terrorism globally. They warned Libya's leader, Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, that if he continued to use violence against Americans, Libya would face more military action. President Reagan described the airstrikes as part of a larger effort to fight terrorism. He stated that while they did not want to repeat the bombings, it was up to Libya to stop using terrorism for political reasons (Weinraub). When the U.S. bombed Libya, Americans experienced a scrambling thought about this act. While the majority of Americans supported the bombing of Libya, a significant percentage feared it would escalate tensions between nations. According to a New York Times and CBS poll, 77% of Americans supported the airstrikes, and saw it as a symbol of strength from their nation maintaining a strong defensive position in defending itself. The 23% left believed they would increase international tension leading to a potential escalation that may affect the economy and civilian's lifestyle (Intoccia 187).

Country/Region	Dates	% Approve	% Disapprove
Libya	Mar 21, 2011	47	37
Iraq	Mar 20, 2003	76	20
Afghanistan	Oct 7, 2001	90	5
Kosovo/The Balkans	Apr 30-May 2, 1999	51	45
Afghanistan and Sudan	Aug 20, 1998	66	19
Haiti	Sep 23-25, 1994	54	45
Somalia	Jun 18-21, 1993	65	23
Iraq	Jan 13, 1993	83	9
Libya	Apr 17-18, 1986	71	21
Grenada	Oct 26-27, 1983	53	34

Figure 3: Approval of prior of U.S Military actions

The major purpose of the El Dorado Canyon operation was not only tactical, but also psychological and political in nature. It was not just about eliminating a few terrorist targets but it was primarily about delivering a message to their leader, Qaddafi, who was warned that supporting terrorism could result in serious consequences. The United States sought to show him that there were consequences for his actions, in the hopes that it would make him reconsider doing them again. They also sought to make it obvious to other countries, such as the Soviet Union, that they would not stand by if their allies supported terrorism (Trebon and Gregory 22).

Some individuals believed that the U.S wanted to overthrow Qaddafi. Reagan's statement during the attack hinted at this, emphasizing that the U.S was not against the Libyan people, but rather against their leader (Trebon and Gregory 22). Vice President at that time Bush stated that simply attacking will not put an end to terrorism, and that the U.S may have to use force again. In addition, secretary of state George P. Shultz emphasized that the purpose was not to kill or remove Qaddafi from his position. Instead, they planned to target places that assist terrorism, like training camps, as well as the security surrounding Qaddafi, rather than directly targeting him. Bernard Kalb, a State Department representative, clarified further that

the U.S was not attempting to assassinate Qaddafi or replace his administration. Their goal rather was to prevent Qaddafi from supporting and directing international terrorism (Weinraub). American use of force to either overthrow Qaddafi or fight terrorism was a precedent which would for sure divide the international community' opinion.

Many countries, especially Arab states, the Soviet Union, and France, sharply criticized Operation El Dorado Canyon. It was the first time the United States officially utilized military force to combat terrorism and its supporters (“Libya Bombings of 1986 | United States-Libyan History”). However, President Reagan stated that airstrikes against Libya were necessary for the United States' self-defense. He highlighted that self-defense is a duty, not a right, and that the mission was in line with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The air raid was intended to directly target Colonel Qaddafi's ability to support terrorism and offer him reasons to change his behavior (Major and Blanchfield 21). Tensions between the United States and Libya increased in 1996, when American officials hinted at conducting a nuclear assault on a suspected chemical weapons location in Libya's desert (Zoubir 36).

Both the implementation of economic sanctions and the use of force against Libya were not enough for the United States to adjust Qaddafi's behavior or to destruct Libya, since Qaddafi remained in power and terrorist attacks diminished but did not stop. Accordingly, the American government would turn to use another measure to guarantee Libyan isolationism.

1.3 The UN Sanctions

The strategy of U.S seeking United Nation assistance effectively isolated Libya, at least in the short term. Beginning in 1992, a series of Security Council resolutions urged the Libyan government to respond comprehensively and genuinely to the concerns of the U.S. It also demanded that Libya officially denounce terrorism and demonstrate its separation from it. When Libya failed to achieve these objectives, the Security Council imposed even severe sanctions. These included limitations on aircraft and arms transactions, as well as a freeze of

Libyan assets. As world attention shifted to Libya, reports of terrorism decreased significantly (Schwartz 557).

The United Nations imposed sanctions on Libya because it refused to hand over two persons accused of blowing up a Pan Am airliner in 1988. The United Nations banned flights to Libya and prohibited the supply of weapons, airplanes, and airplane parts to Libya. Libyan Airlines' offices in other countries had to close. The UN also ordered countries to reduce the size of Libyan embassies and limit what Libyan diplomats might accomplish (Lewis).

The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 731, which demanded that Libya cooperate fully with investigations into the Pan Am and UTA bombings. Libya did not comply, so the Security Council passed Resolution 748 in March, which restricted air travel to and from Libya and imposed an arms embargo. Then, in November 1993, Resolution 883 made the sanctions even stricter by freezing some of Libya's assets and banning the export of equipment related to the oil industry to Libya (Barnum and Fearey 236). According to Security Council rules, Libya must do more than simply hand over suspects in order to lift the sanctions. Libya must take decisive action to prove it is against terrorism. However, Libya did not provide Britain or the United States with the two suspects in the Lockerbie airliner attack, which killed 270 people. Libya did not also send the four other persons to France to be questioned regarding a West African jet tragedy that killed 171 people (Lewis).

The UN suspended the sanctions in 1999, and they were totally lifted in 2003 after Libya promised to compensate the victims. Ironically, the U.S maintained its sanctions until 2006, when fears about Weapons of Mass Destruction were addressed. Finally, Libya stopped supporting terrorism and developing Weapons of Mass Destruction in order to lift sanctions and improve its relationship with the United States of America (Mejia-Prieto 25-26).

2. Muammar Qaddafi's Reaction

Improving relations with the U.S was the only solution available to Muammar Qaddafi as reaction to the American response, which include the economic sanctions, and military attack in 1986. To do so, Qaddafi was required to adjust many of his domestic and foreign policies, in a way compatible to Western principles.

2.1 Qaddafi's Adaptation of Domestic Policies

Qaddafi's reaction to the international pressure and sanctions led to a massive change in the government domestic policies. Initially, he sought to strengthen the unity and resilience against what he framed. To acquire this, Qaddafi increased his efforts, emphasizing Libyan sovereignty and portraying the sanction as an unfair attack on the nation. In addition, exerting his power on national media in changing the public opinion; this aimed to cultivate a sense of victimhood and rally public support behind his leadership (Schwartz 560). However, the prolonged international isolation and economic difficulties forced Qaddafi to reconsider his approach. After various attempts to get over the struggles, Libya started signaling a willingness to cooperate and adapt its policies according to international demands.

Accordingly, Qaddafi came up with a hybrid economic system in order to mitigate the impact of the sanctions. This economic adjustment redirected resources toward self-sufficiency initiatives, also an effort to boost agricultural production and handmade production to reduce reliance on imported goods (Schwartz 561). Politically, Qaddafi domestic policies turned his regime into a more repressive one in response to perceived internal and external threats. He intensified surveillance and crackdown on dissent, in order to prevent any upcoming escalations fueled by the economic struggles. This period saw a form of human rights abuse to control the country by the leader (John 98). However, these intensified efforts to get over the sanction always fell short due to Libya's economic infrastructure.

Another shift Qaddafi made was a strategic diplomatic act. He maintained defiance towards the west, at the same time he sought to build an alliance with other countries against

U.S. policies. Fostering close ties with African and Middle Eastern countries, to promote himself as a figure of anti-imperialist movements and policies (Vandewalle 145). The prolonged international isolation and economic difficulties forced Qaddafi to reconsider his approach. After various attempts to get over the struggles, Libya started signaling a willingness to cooperate and adapt its policies according to international demands.

2.2 Handover the Suspects (2000)

In the beginning, Libya expressed astonishment at accusations against its officials related to the Pan Am 103 bombing. They urged the United States to provide evidence and assured the public of their commitment to conducting a thorough investigation (Schwartz 558). When Libya refused to give up the two suspect of the bombing, Britain and the United States persuaded the United Nations to impose sanctions in 1992. These sanctions prohibited countries from supplying arms or flying planes in and out. However, even with these actions, Libya's leader, Colonel Qaddafi, did not change his mind about handing over the suspects (Jehl). But after much discussion and pressure from numerous countries, Libya finally agreed in April 1999 to give up the two suspects to the United Nations.

The suspects were then sent from Libya to the Netherlands, then to the United Kingdom for trial. The trial began on May 3, 2000. The Scottish prosecutors presented evidence on the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. They were primarily concerned with how the two suspects obtained the materials required for the explosives and gained access to the plane's luggage section. The defense attempted to confuse people about what truly happened by discussing alternative probable causes for the accident and challenging the major witnesses. However, neither of the suspects spoke in their own defense, and they failed to explain many of the allegations made by the prosecution (Zoubir 48).

Many of the victims' families watched the trial in person or via special TV channels established up by the U.S and UK governments. On January 30, 2001, the Scottish court issued

its decision. One of the suspects, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, was found guilty of murder, while the other was released and returned to Libya immediately (Schwartz 567). Tripoli eventually claimed responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and paid compensation estimated at 2.7 billion US dollars to the victims' families (Zoubir 48).

After handing the suspects, Libya seemed to have some chances to get out of the catastrophic situation without any compensation. However, the handing of the two suspect broader implications for Libya's international relations. By agreeing to the trial and handing the suspects over, Libya began to prepare for a potential shift in the foreign policies (Vandwalle 150). This move by Qaddafi was an attempt to mitigate the severe impact of international isolation and sanctions, and led Libya to abandon their own economic and geopolitical projects.

2.3 Termination of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs

Qaddafi's foreign efforts to normalize the relations with the U.S resulted in abandoning his WMD program. This decision was imposed by international pressure and rejection by the international community (Bowen 267). This strategic attempt to improve relations with the west aimed mainly to lift sanctions, allowing international inspectors to verify the dismantling of the WMD process (Porter 98). This meant that Colonel Qaddafi began to reconsider his WMD projects. He then started to shifted Libya's focus from the Middle East to Africa because he thought there were more opportunities for leadership there, and WMDs were not as important politically. Qaddafi also intended to enhance Libya's reputation by attempting to resolve difficulties relating to the Lockerbie incident, thus he began reaching out diplomatically (Tucker 364). In 1999, Libyan authorities proposed to the Clinton administration that they would stop chemical weapons programs, if the U.S eased its terrorism sanctions. However, the United States rejected this offer and preferred to continue pressure on Libya to comply with both U.S and UN requests over the Lockerbie aircraft bombing case (Blanchard 25).

Qaddafi's son Seif al Islam and government officials have been secretly communicating with CIA and MI6, the British secret intelligence organization, for months. They were working on an agreement in which Libya would abandon its plans to build nuclear weapons. However, on December 14, 2006 just a few days before the deal was set to be publicly announced in Washington, Saddam Hussein was discovered hiding in a hole. This made Qaddafi nervous. He was concerned that people would believe he only gave up his weapons because of Saddam's detention (MacLeod). Declaring the deal at that crucial timing would be embarrassing for Qaddafi who would be believed to be afraid of meeting the same destiny as Saddam, therefore, he proposed delaying the announcement.

According to Seif al Islam, British Prime Minister Tony Blair pushed Qaddafi to hurry up, claiming it was a huge success for everyone. This intimate conversation worked, and on December 19, they declared that Qaddafi had agreed to surrender his weapons. Ten months later, when Western agents removed all of Libya's weapons and missiles, Blair wrote a friendly letter to Qaddafi, addressing him as "Dear Muammar" and signing with "Best wishes, Yours ever, Tony." (MacLeod). In 2003, the US government officially informed the west that Qaddafi would no longer produce nuclear weapons. After that, until Libya was removed off the list of nations that support terrorism in May 2006, Western politicians began talking differently about Qaddafi. They hoped that people in the West would view him as a friend rather than an opponent (Kushlan 16-17).

Qaddafi's efforts to resolve the difficulties surrounding the Pan Am 103 bombing demonstrated how much he wanted the UN and the US to cancel the economic sanctions against Libya, remove it from the State Department's list of terrorist sponsors, and rebuild the country's general relationship with the U.S. His cooperation with the U.S on terrorism demonstrated that he had two main motives for working together: he did not want the U.S to regard Libya as an

enemy in its war against terrorism, and he wanted assistance against groups such as al-Qa'eda, which threatened his power and his life (Nelson and Crocker 4).

After the Lockerbie case was resolved and Qaddafi admitted that he stopped his secret nuclear and chemical weapons program, Libya became closer with Western countries. Some saw the shift in mindset as a good result of the 2003 Iraq invasion. They believed Qaddafi had seen what happened to Saddam Hussein and recognized he needed to work with the West to prevent a similar destiny. However, it was more likely that Qaddafi agreed to hand over his weapons when he saw the benefits of collaborating with the U.S and European countries (Asser). This dramatic turnaround by Qaddafi on his earlier policies helped Libya re-enter the international community, adding to that it led to the lifting of U.N. sanctions and an important improvement in relations with the western countries (Whytock 153). Qaddafi's decision was interpreted as a pragmatic step to secure the regime's survival and the future view for the Libyan economic prospects.

2.4 Qaddafi Backing the U.S in the War against Terrorism

After the event of the 9/11 attacks on the U.S, Qaddafi saw a chance to prove his intention to back the United States in its war against the terrorists. Qaddafi quickly condemned the 9/11 attack and offered his help to the U.S. (Blanchard 2). This was a strategic shift in Libya's foreign policies, since it changed from being a state sponsor of terrorism to a state backing the United States in its war against terrorism. It is worth noting that though Libya began to change its behavior in 1999, it was less interested in aiding terrorism and more concerned in promoting peace in the Middle East and Africa. However, following the September 11 attacks, Qaddafi was among the first Muslim leaders to speak out against Al-Qaeda bombers (Kushlan 22). Qaddafi's condemnation to the attacks was a clear attempt to be part of the global community.

Libya discovered that by joining the 'war on terror', like Pakistan and Egypt, they got less pressure from the United States to become more democratic (Gosa 30). Remarkably, the Qaddafi administration held the belief that Osama Bin Laden was involved in a murder, and they provided evidence to Interpol (Stone). However, the 9/11 attacks provided the United States with a significant opportunity to pursue countries suspected of aiding terrorist organizations. Initially, only Afghanistan was linked to the assaults, but the U.S considered striking Iraq, Libya, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon as well regardless whether these countries were anti-terrorism or no (Zoubir 49).

3. Libya's Foreign Relations after 2001

Tony Blair paid a visit to Qaddafi in March 2004, marking the first time a British Prime Minister has visited Libya since 1969. This meeting resulted in an agreement: Libya would no longer sponsor terrorism in exchange for British assistance in developing Libya's oil reserves. It officially restored relations between Britain and Libya. Then, in 2006, the United States and Libya exchanged diplomats, renewing formal ties. On May 15, 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that Libya would no longer be classified a state sponsor of terrorism (Gosa 36), a position it had held since 1979.


Libya improved relations with Europe and the United States under Qaddafi's reign in the 2000s. They were viewed as assisting in the battle against terrorism and limiting illegal immigration into Europe. However, when Arab Spring uprisings occurred in North Africa in 2011, the United States shifted its approach. They suddenly described Qaddafi as a "madman" aiming for "genocide" after previously considering him an ally in the fight against terrorism (Orellana).

4. The U.S against Qaddafi in the Arab Spring (NATO intervention 2011)

Libya aimed to enhance its security and impact through the establishment of ties with the United States. Nevertheless, this plan had some drawbacks; when the Arab Spring caused

political tensions and the government used violence to maintain power, Libya's allies provided minimal support (Gosa 42). The Arab Spring was a wave or series of rebellions, which took place in the Middle East and North Africa that began in 2010 and 2011. People in these countries demanded more freedom and democracy; they wanted to change their leaders because they had been in power for a long time. It all started with protests in Tunisia and Egypt, which sparked similar uprisings across the region until it reached Libya. In February 2011, Libyans began protesting against Muammar al-Qaddafi's administration. These protests quickly escalated into a serious armed revolt. By March, when it appeared that the rebel groups would lose, NATO and other countries had joined forces to start airstrikes against Qaddafi's army (“Arab Spring | History, Revolution”).

The U.S became involved in the Libyan case under the cover “humanitarian intervention”. They advocated an international intervention through the UN Security Council, with help of allies. Decision was made, approving restricted air spaces and measures to protect Libyan people from assaults and attacks by Qaddafi's army. However, in March 19, 2011 when the bombings began, NATO, led by the U.S and Western allies went further than just safeguarding civilians. Instead of backing the government, they sought to overthrow the regime; the former Secretary-General of the Arab League criticized the decision, stating that it went against the purpose of the UN resolution, which was to protect civilians instead of causing more harm (Selim 264).



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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_military_intervention_in_Libya

Figure 4: Coalition military actions in Libya in 2011

NATO's intervention in Libya showed how Western powers sought to develop influence or find loyal allies in the Middle East. In the case of Libya, they sought admission into oil-rich regions. The discovery of extra oil in Libya was viewed as a benefit for nations concerned about the political upheaval. The U.S decision to intervene in Libya was not based on a single issue. The points were raised for both humanitarian and tactical reasons. Furthermore, the United States has historically concentrated on Libya and approached it differently than other countries (Gosa 59-60).

In the end after Qaddafi's death, NATO made the decision to conclude its operation in Libya approximately 10 days afterwards, they stated that they would keep an eye on the situation and be ready to help if anyone was at risk. Admiral James G. Stavridis, who led

NATO's operation, declared it a success since they achieved their aim without waging a long conflict. The operation led to Qaddafi's downfall and allowed the National Transitional Council (NTC) to take charge without the conflict dragging on for too long (Leblond14).

Conclusion

The evolution of U.S behavior toward Qaddafi since being convicted of terrorism until 2011 showed the complex nature of the relationship between Libya and the United States. By isolating Libya and imposing UN severe sanctions against it, the U.S sought to stop Libya's support of terrorism. The bombing of Tripoli in 1986 (El Dorado Canyon attack), was a sign of America's willingness to use even power against any terrorist threat, alongside UN sanctions to force Libya to align with international norms. Qaddafi's regime over time experienced important changes in policies, including giving up the three suspects, dismantling the WMD program, and helping the U.S. in the war against terrorism. The effectiveness of Libyan diplomatic shifts gradually restored relations and political ties and lifted economic sanctions. However, the Arab Spring events in 2011 shifted the dynamics once more, leading to NATO intervention and the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime. Despite initial successes, the aftermath of the intervention demonstrated the difficulty of attaining stability in the region.

Conclusion

Culminating a nuanced understanding of the prolonged geopolitical conflict between Qaddafi's ideologies and American interests, narratives came to reveal the multilateral nature of the conflict, hedging in a circle of historical, political and ideological dimension. The previous chapters explored these complexities by examining the historical background of Libya and Qaddafi's rise to power, the events that made the United States declare Libya as the primary adversary, and the reactions of both sides.

Muammar Qaddafi's rise to power in 1969 made a radical change in Libya's foreign policies, and impacted the state's relationship with the west and especially the United States. The anti-western and pan Arabism view of Qaddafi as long as supporting revolutionary and terrorist organizations made him get into a marathon of conflicts and constant clash with US interest in which this last caused to announce Libya as a rogue state. Qaddafi's implication in incidents such as bombardment of the Pan Am Flight 103 and La Bella Disco attack, in order to show his defiance to the western hegemony, intensified the relation and led to the American strikes and sanction. The conflict was not merely bilateral but involved global actor who sought to contain Qaddafi and protect the region from any further escalation.

Supporting terrorism was not the only issue faced by Qaddafi, but also his desire to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction. His intentions were to be the strongest state in Africa and to defend himself from the Israeli threats in the Middle East. The sturdiness and adventurism of the Libyan leader and his violent history alarmed the globe and made the national security at risk, this led to the imposition of strict measures to make order.

The reactions from both sides seemed to be a combination of strategic calculation and ideological conviction. America sought to stop Qaddafi from his copy of communism and to

counter the terrorism. In contrast, Qaddafi stuck to his revolutionary view ideologically, and foreign action, thus fueling the conflict with his ignorance. The long run conflict of a revolutionary state going head-to-head with the world's superpowers and the world's order was the characteristics of the conflict.

As discussed in the previous parts, we came to reveal the reason behind the tensions that fueled the conflict. The U.S. maintained the high ground as the leading state through its influence on the UN and its allies to face Qaddafi's ideologies that were a mix of supporting and containing terrorism alongside the WMD program. The efforts tended to defend U.S. interests and most importantly spread peace in the globe.

After addressing the leading question on the theme through examining operations, it is now important to focus on the future approach of the U.S. after cutting Qaddafi out and imposing a new order in the region. This study aimed to establish the groundwork for further scholarly inquiry on the Libya-U.S. conflict.

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