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## **The US-China Rivalry in Africa: The Uncontested Consequences on the Continent**

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With every word I write, I try to make you proud through expressing honor of your  
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## **Abstract**

Emerging powers are playing a bigger role in Africa, and in the years to come, it's expected that their impact on the continent's political, economic, and security dynamics will increase. Nearly every day, the significance and complexity of these new actors' implications for Africa increase. Additionally, the United States and China are engaged in a fierce competition for dominance over Africa's natural resources, markets, and political influence. To protect and promote their interests, they have adopted a number of strategies and instruments. Despite a long history of collaboration between the US and its Western allies and Africa on a range of aid and development initiatives, traditional donors were not pleased with China's recent arrival into the Dark Continent. China's worldwide influence has been growing quickly as a result of its growing economic and military power. Based on this context, the present dissertation explores the nature of the rivalry between the two global giants and its potential consequences for Africa. It provides a brief history of the US-China rivalry in Africa. It also explores the motivations, strategies, and implications of both countries' presence in Africa, with a focus on their economic, political, and diplomatic connections.

## الملخص

تلعب القوى الناشئة دورا متصاعدا في أفريقيا، و في السنوات القادمة، من المتوقع أن يزداد تأثيرها على الديناميكيات السياسية والاقتصادية و الأمنية للقارة. في كل يوم تقريبا تزداد أهمية و تعقيد الآثار المترتبة على هذه الجهات الفاعلة الجديدة بالنسبة لأفريقيا. بالإضافة الى ذلك، تنخرط الولايات المتحدة و الصين في منافسة شرسة للمهمنة على الموارد الطبيعية و الأسواق والنفوذ السياسي في أفريقيا. و لحماية مصالحها و تعزيزها اعتمدتا عددا من الاستراتيجيات و الأدوات و على الرغم من التاريخ الطويل من التعاون بين الولايات المتحدة و حلفائها مع افريقيا بشأن مجموعة من مبادرات المساعدات و التنمية، فان المانحين التقليديين لن يكونوا راضين عن و صول الصين مؤخرا إلى القارة المظلمة. كان نفوذ الصين في جميع أنحاء العالم ينمو بسرعة نتيجة لقوتها الاقتصادية و العسكرية المتنامية. بناء على هذا السياق، تستكشف هذه الاطروحة طبيعة التنافس بين العملاقين العالميين وعواقبه المحتملة على افريقيا. تقدم تاريخا موجزا للتنافس بين الولايات المتحدة و الصين في افريقيا. تستكشف كذلك دوافع و استراتيجيات و آثار وجود كلا البلدين في أفريقيا، مع التركيز على روابطها الاقتصادية و السياسية و الدبلوماسية.

### List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

US	The United States
UK	The United Kingdom
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, China (Emerging economies)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
PRC	People's Republic of China
BC	Before Christ
WWII	World War Two
UN	United Nations
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ACS	African Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
WTO	World Trade Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
B3W	Build Back Better World
G7	Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States)
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
YALI	Young African Leaders Initiative
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
USD	United States Dollar
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ZTE	Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation
VOA	Voice of America
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
PGII	Public Goods and Interconnection Interoperability
AU	African Union
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RMB	Renminbi (Chinese currency)
CCTV	China Central Television
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
12 FC-1	The Chengdu JF-17 Thunder
OBOR	One Belt, One Road
COVID 19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CPC	Chinese Communist Party
PEPFAR	The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
AMCEN	The African Ministerial Conference on the Environment
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
AAI	The African-American Institute
USAID	United States Agency for International Development



MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
G-8	Group of Eight (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States)
DFC	The Development Finance Corporation
COVAX	COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access
OAU	The Organisation of African Unity
ICRC	The International Committee of Red Cross
FAO	The Food and Agriculture Organization
EU	European Union

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## **Introduction**

One of the most significant external partners in Africa's peace, security and development is the United States, followed by China. Moreover, indications are showing that the African continent is likely to constitute a major area of conflict especially between Washington and Beijing. Reports predict that, in a simulation of the events of the second half of the 20th century in Europe, the two sides' furious conflict for influence will cause the continent to become polarized and eventually divided into an Eastern camp focuses on China and a Western camp focuses on the United States, which can lead many to wonder about how long the African continent will remain the subject of the international competition.

Despite Washington's lack of political and military influence in the region compared to France and the European Union countries as well its military inferiority in comparison to China, Washington is still interested in improving this situation. Additionally, governments that are unable to ensure security and stability must instead make essential services and infrastructure improvements. Moreover, what increases the importance of the continent at this stage is the urgent need for China to diversify sources of energy imports, which in 2016 occupy the top of the list of global oil importers for the first time in its history after the United States abandoned that position. In addition to Beijing's need for new markets for its products. In other words, it contributes to the diversification of its trading partners.

Due to the continent's strategic location and importance, the fact that it contains considerable straits along major International shipping routes, along with the fact that it is the second largest continent and has significance wealth. Africa has become the focus of the global competition especially the US and China which are considered as the biggest rivals for the control of Africa. The current research aims first to shed light on the basis of the US-China rivalry in Africa and the major areas of collision between the two great powers, by categorizing the US and China's competing interests, it also aims at exploring what the United States and China each separately hope and strive to accomplish in the continent through using their own different strategies and methods. This dissertation examines many aspects of competition, such as trade and investment, infrastructure development, and security cooperation. The study also looks into how African countries deal with the US-China competition, as well as the implications for their sovereignty, economic development, and regional stability.

This master dissertation that is entitled: "The US-China Rivalry in the Africa: The Uncontested Consequences on the Continent," will be based on discussing the extent of each country's ability to compete whether the United States (US) on one hand and Peoples Republic of China (PRC) on the other hand. It will also cover what are the mechanisms, methods, strategies and policies used by each country to achieve their goals in the African continent. The research also will identify the motivating factors for the international competitiveness in particular parts of the African continent. It will also offer a number of insights that help in evaluating the rivalry between the US and China as they compete to gain influence and achieve goals that will benefit them by identifying the

factors and the causes behind their desire in particular geographic regions in Africa. It will also reveal how well the attributes of the American Chinese rivalry known in Africa.

This research aims at answering the following questions: How long will the African continent remain the subject of international competition? Has the US-China's role in Africa being positive for the African continent? What are the major interests of both superpowers in the continent? Why the US and China are investing in the African continent? Has Africa gotten the best out of its relationship with the two superpowers? What is the nature of the American Chinese competition in Africa? What are the foundations and motivations behind this competition in Africa? What are the means, mechanisms and methods used to achieve the greatest amount of benefit and to exploit the resource of the continent?

To answer the mentioned questions, a combination of historical and analytical approaches are selected. The historical approach is adopted to report and explore different facts and reasons behind the Sino-American interests in Africa, it is used also to trace the events that raised the competition between the two superpowers in the continent, and also to explore the history of the US-China African relations. The analytical approach, however, is adopted in order to analyze different points of view related to the research topic, and to analyze and examine the events and provide a deep comprehension as well as a meaningful clarification of the important details, points of view, facts and to answer the research questions.

The current dissertation includes four chapters; The first chapter is entitled: "Great Powers presence in Africa": China and the United States. It provides a historical and general background through which we can understand the US-China relations with

the African continent, and how Africa becomes a conflict arena and a home for the world's fastest and growing economies, it aims at covering the reasons that led both great powers to be interested in the African continent. The second chapter is entitled: "The US Interests in Africa," sheds light on discovering the essence of the US presence in Africa. It explores the US-African foreign policy interests, along with the US-China areas of cooperation. It particularly, examines the goals of the US engagement in the African continent. The third chapter is entitled: "China's Growing Presence in Africa." It goes deeply to understand the important roles played by China in the continent. It covers what China strive to accomplish in order to achieve its developmental goals. At the same time, it aims at exploring China's interests and goals of its engagement in the African continent. Chapter Four is entitled: "The US-China Competition in Africa", goes further and discuss the many sources of potential competition and conflict between the US and china in Africa. It also explores how each power is increasingly concerned about the other power's growing influence on the continent.

In order to highlight the significance of this research. It is important to refer to some of the major scholarly works that have already dealt with and have talked about this topic. In his article "China and the United States in Africa: Competition or Cooperation," Wang Lei , through explaining his three way complexity: complimentary, competition and cooperation, demonstrates that, the exchange between China and the United States in Africa are a mirror of how their two-sided relations are changing globally. He believes that, the United States and China's way of interaction is also influenced by how Beijing and Washington view Africa's strategic importance and the shared problems that the two superpowers are facing on the continent. He finds also that, the strategic rivalry between

Beijing and Washington is increasing leading China to threaten the American dominance not only regionally but also worldwide.

*China's New Role in Africa and the South: Search for a New Perspective*, edited by Dorothy-Grace Guerrero and Firoze Manji, is another valuable source that discusses a lot regarding China's globalization but typically from the perspective of the West, which also presents diverse perspectives on the difficulties experienced by Africa as a result of China's growth as a big global economic force. Guerrero and Firoze Manji claim that, China's participation in Africa mostly take three dimensions; commerce, aid, and foreign direct investment. They believe that, in each of these categories, China's involvement surpasses that of the United States. They also believe that, Although China has received harsh criticism for supporting oppressive governments, its engagement has always been motivated by the country's desire for crucial natural resources and particularly oil and perhaps this is the cause for the worries about China's involvement in Africa that have been voice in the West.

Olayiwola Abegunrin and Charity Manyeruke's book *China's Power in Africa: A New Global Order*, presents an extensive examination of China's growing influence and strength in Africa. The authors offer insights into many different aspects of China's interaction with African countries. The book examines the historical, political, economic, and social dimensions of China's participation in Africa, as well as the motivations for China's presence on the continent and its consequences for African development. Abegunrin and Manyeruke assess China's economic investments, infrastructure projects, and resource extraction activities in Africa. Furthermore, the book looks into China's diplomatic strategy, soft power measures, and engagement with regional organizations.

Sammy Mwangi Waweru explores the relationship between China and the United States in Africa in his paper “China and the United States in Africa: A Case of Exaggerated Rivalry.” According to him, the conflict between these two global powers in Africa is frequently exaggerated. While both China and the United States have strategic interests in Africa, Waweru contends that their involvement in the continent are diverse and go beyond a basic fight for influence. Furthermore, the article investigates the effects of China-US competitiveness on African nations. Waweru argues that the exaggerated competition narrative could overpower African governments’ autonomy and sovereignty, reducing them to minor players in a global power struggle.

The book of *China’s Diplomacy and Economic Activities in Africa: Relations on the Move* by Anja Lahtinen, is another valuable book that examines how the relationship between China and African nations has changed through time. In order to shed light on the reasons behind China’s expanding presence on the continent, Lahtinen examines China’s diplomatic strategies and economic activities there. The book also investigates the effects of Chinese investments, trade agreements, and infrastructure projects in Africa as well as their implications for regional economies and local communities.

## **Chapter One**

### **Great Powers Presence in Africa**

Due to its wealth of resources, geopolitical importance, and potential for economic growth, Africa has been coveted by great powers. Foreign countries initially began to exploit the continent during the colonial era, when European nations gained control of the majority of the continent. Many African countries wanted to gain their independence and set their own paths for political and economic growth throughout the post-colonial era. Furthermore, China and the United States have recently emerged as key participants in the international struggle for influence in Africa. This Chapter offers a brief overview of the main international rivalries that have existed throughout the African continent over history, with a special focus on providing the historical context of the US-China past interactions with Africa. It sheds light on how each power has established its presence in the continent throughout history.

#### **1 Africa: Historical Background**

Numerous discoveries in and around the Great Rift Valley region have proven that Africa is where humanity originated. Traditions from its early periods are still followed today. African cultures have a diverse range of beliefs that are influenced by Arab-Islamic and European Christian traditions. The history of Africa, which was marked by the slave trade and colonial control, has been connected to the continent's weak internal cohesion and underdevelopment. Europeans and Arabs began enslaving people in West, Central, and Southeast Africa in the late fifteenth century (Lahtinen 12).

Furthermore, the first significant rise in foreign interest in Africa, known as the "scramble," was sparked when European conquerors divided the continent and took

Africans' land in the 19th century. Although the race for Africa has always been a continuous phenomenon, the current race has multiplied in intensity. The nations competing for Africa's resources are not just European or American countries; they also include growing economies like China, India, South Korea, Brazil, and Malaysia (Ewalefoh). However, China and the United States are the main focus of this chapter.

### **1.1 Pre-Colonial Africa**

By the 15th century, hundreds of cultures inhabited the entire large continent of Africa. For instance, several tribes within the areas we now refer to as West or Central Africa distinguished themselves from one another through a complex range and mix of languages, religions, arts, technology and developing worldviews. The continent was crossed by ancient trade routes, many of which were used to transport slaves people and local and international trade. African traders connected the remote communities of the Nile and Red Sea with routes from the west coast. The Sahara was connected to the savanna to the south as well as to the continent's wooded sections by trade routes that traveled both north and south ("Pre-Colonial Africa").

### **1.2 Colonialism and the Scramble for Africa**

In the seventeenth century Dutch exploration and colonization of the continent began. The largest slave-trading nation in the globe was Britain, which was the ocean's master. Between 1492 to 1885, Europe's continental hegemony was unquestioned. Millions of Africans were transported over the Atlantic to the Americas and the Caribbean (Lahtinen 12). During the 1860s, there was a race for Africa that finally resulted in the colonization of the continent ("Why Africa is Important").



It is believed that the Scramble for Africa took place from around 1870 and the start of World War I in 1914. The Scramble for Africa was a series of significant events that led to the colonization and division of Africa by the Portugal, and Spain during this time period. European involvement in the Suez Canal, the Berlin Conference, the First and Second Moroccan Crises, European colonization of South Africa, and Leopold II 's cruel control of the Congo are a few of these events (Beck).

The invasion of African territory by foreign countries was linked to a number of factors, some of which almost resulted in clashes between these powers before the Berlin Conference of 1844, which identified the rules for establishing colonies in Africa. Creating root on the continent for many years, colonization continued there until the end of World War I, when a few African nationalist organizations pushed for membership in the colonial authority (Bichamikrah1).

### **1.2.1 The Main Factors Leading to “The Scramble for Africa”**

There were several factors that led to the Scramble for Africa. First, the vast interior between Egypt and Southern Africa, which is rich in gold and diamonds, had important strategic value in ensuring the flow of international trade. Second, the idea of racial superiority that Europeans had during the 19th century contributed to the Scramble for Africa. Third, the new inventions and technologies that enabled the European countries to subjugate the various African communities (Beck).

Beside a significant portion of the colonization is attributed to the rivalry between the UK, France, Germany, and other European countries. The European nations were looking for new territories to conquer in order to expand their access to resources that might be used to create products (Joplin).

### **1.2.2 European Settlers in Africa until the 1880s**

By the 1880s, Europeans controlled just a small section of Africa which was mainly limited to the coast and a short distance inside along key rivers like the Niger and the Congo. In addition to having a sizable number of colonies in Southern Africa, Britain also possessed Freetown in Sierra Leone, forts along the Gambia's coast, a presence in Lagos, the Gold Coast protectorate, and forts along the coast of The Gambia. France had incursions into the Assinie and Grand Bassam districts of Cote d'Ivoire, a protectorate over the Dahomey coastal region (now Benin), and had started colonizing Algeria as early as 1830. Portugal maintained long-standing bases in Mozambique and Angola (Boddy-Evans).

### **1.2.3 Early 1880s Mad Rush into Africa**

African land claims by European countries increased dramatically towards the beginning of the 1880s. Britain invaded Egypt in 1882, and Italy started colonizing Eritrea. British and French Somaliland were established in 1884. German South West Africa, Cameroon, German East Africa, and Togo were established in 1884, and Spain annexed the Ro de Oro (Boddy-Evans). Furthermore, the continent was used for exploitation and domination in the name of trade, Christianity, civilization and conquest (Lahtinen 13).

### **1.2.4 The End of Colonialism**

According to Anja Lahtinen, from 1807, when Britain prohibited the slave trade, until 1957 and when Ghana obtained independence from the Gold Coast, there was a brutal continental war between Africa and Europe. When it was finished, Africa had

earned official independence from colonizing nations, but it was still under the psychological and physical influence of its previous colonial rulers (qtd. in Asante 13).

In fact, some African governments started gaining their independence as of the late 1950s (Bichamikrah 1). Nevertheless, after the continent gained freedom and experienced numerous wars over the course of the next fifty years, decolonization took place. With the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia, which were never colonized, all the nations that were formerly ruled by Germany, England, Italy, and France gained freedom from those empires (Lahtinen 13).

### **1.3 The New Scramble for Africa**

“New forces in town,” which refers to emerged powers as: China, India and Brazil and are not former colonial powers in Africa, confronted the complete freedom that African nations had experienced immediately after gaining their independence. The goal of these emerging forces is to create a “borderless” world where intercultural exchanges are open to all and new technologies are rapidly moving across international borders (Bichamikrah 1).

Essentially starting after the majority of the countries on the continent had attained their primary political independence, the new scramble for Africa’s resources began. China, South Korea, India, and Malaysia are recent additions from the East (Charles 4-5). Charles Alfred mentions that, Africa has been conquered by the BRIC nations of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (without using force), which instead have moved into Africa with resources such as cash, products, ideas, and mining and drilling machinery (4-5).

Africa's three-decade struggle to overcome war, poverty, and political unrest will assist to make this new competition for the continent's wealth significantly different from Europe's 19th-century attempt to take the benefits of colonialism (DeMarco). In many ways, this is an illustration of broader global trends that are characterized by a shift of power and income away from the US and Europe and toward the fast expanding economies (Arkhangelskaya 4).

Although Africa was for a long time perceived as only a source of armed conflicts, disasters, and famines, its natural resources had attracted the big powers since colonial period. During the Cold War, the continent became a theater of proxy warfare due to ideological conflict between major countries as well as geostrategic and geopolitical circumstances. For China, however, Africa has long been a top priority for strategic, economic, political, and ideological reasons (Sujana 1).

The United States was the only global superpower left in competition after the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) fell in 1991. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has tried to acquire this role as a developing competing superpower since the conclusion of the Cold War era, which has heightened tensions in US-China ties (Watts 1).

### **1.3.1 China in Africa: A Historical Perspective**

Historical records of China and Africa reach back fourteen centuries to the early Tang dynasty, when traders from both countries exchanged goods such porcelain, silk fabric, ivory, gold, silver, and wildlife. For political, security, and economic reasons, China has long attempted to form partnerships with African nations. Chinese diplomacy has greatly benefited from African assistance (Carter III et al. 107).

### **1.3.1.1 China's Rise and Growing Significance in the Global System**

China has consistently ranked among the world's most economical and technological developed countries for the majority of human history. When visiting West Africa in 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao declared that, "China's development will not pose a threat to anyone, but will instead only create more opportunities and space for development throughout the world." Moreover, China is already having a significant impact on geopolitical ties, international economic frameworks, and development diplomacy discussions and practices (Dent 4-5).

### **1.3.1.2 China and Africa: Historical Ties**

A long history has existed between China and Africa. Records of bilateral trade go back to the ninth century BC, when the Egyptian city of Alexandria began trading with the country of China (Dent 5). Archaeological sites in Zanzibar, along the Swahili coast of eastern Africa, as far south and as inland as Great Zimbabwe, and other locations have produced Chinese coins and porcelain fragments belonging to the Sung Dynasty (960-1279). These findings show that there has been direct or indirect communication between China and Africa for a very long time (Taylor 16).

However, it was during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) that the famous expeditions of Chinese Muslim admiral Zheng Ho, were first noted as establishing Sino-African links. Zheng Ho carried goods with him so that he could trade with the locals. Since then, traces of these have been discovered in Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Moreover, Zheng Ho's initiatives have been referred to as the "climax of China's efforts to develop relations with Africa" in the period before the Chinese Revolution (Taylor 16).

### 1.3.1.3 Contemporary Sino-Africa Relations

The contacts between China and Africa can be divided into three historical eras with different patterns and priorities. China gradually established bilateral ties with a number of African states between 1949 and 1979, beginning with Egypt in 1956. The 1950s, China's interaction with Africa in modern times has been marked by the former's backing for liberation movements. When China began its "Opening up and Reform Policy," a comprehensive plan that gave rise to the modern China, in the 1980s, the dynamics of the interactions between China and Africa experienced a significant change (Ye 25).

The motivation behind China's current engagement with Africa is not the aim to export a certain political philosophy, but rather economic and geostrategic goals (Berhe 1). Sino-African relations shifted toward a more economic focus between 1979 and 2000 as a result of shifting international relations and China's domestic reform and opening strategy, however the political links also grew stronger as a result of the frequent high-level visits (Ye 25).

The Sino-African relationship has gone through three stages of development. The first phase lasted from the early 1950s to the late 1970s, when the Open up and Reform policy was adopted. Due to their recent independence, China and Africa both concentrated on political growth at this time. China went to the industrialized, developed west for its plenty of funding and development experience after adopting the Open Up and Reform program at the end of the 1970s (Arkhangelskaya 11).

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Africa and China have increased their interactions, creating an explosion of viewpoints on the implications of the relations for

Africa, China, and the rest of the globe. Over this brief time, viewers have examined a number of contradictions that support the relationships. Despite the advantages for Africa, trade and economic imbalances are primarily in China's favor (Wekesa 11).

### **1.3.2 The US-Africa Historic Relationship**

Although the Cold War era represents the United States' most major involvement with Africa, connections between the two continents existed prior to that time. The time around the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade saw the most significant early encounter. Later, the American Colonization Society's foundation of Liberia would reestablish a connection between the United States and Africa. Between 1822 and 1900, according to the US-Liberia emigration program from the Americas, "about 16,000 Blacks and 400 Afro-West Indians settled in Liberia" (Magu 55).

Moreover, the US has been a colonial power in other places, but never in Africa. That played a big role in the development of friendly US-African relations after World War II. Between 1800 and 1885, in the nineteenth century, the Western European nations made a significant push into Africa ("Scramble for Africa").

The United States possessed a blue water navy in the early 19<sup>th</sup> Century. Barbary Wars against North African pirates located in Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya were fought and won by the United States under Thomas Jefferson's presidency. So why did the US choose not to establish colonies in Africa? The Louisiana Purchase, holds the key to the solution. The United States started to search for land and opportunity and any intention to colonize Africa has vanished. Additionally, the early 19<sup>th</sup> c saw a great deal of disease among American Christian missionaries who traveled to West Africa (Cohen 1-2).

Furthermore, the United States became the world's most powerful country at the end of World War II (WWII). Since the end of World War II, it has fought for democratic principles, a free market economy, modernization, and legal frameworks that have taken the form of organizations like the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations (Divon and Derman 1).

Since the end of World War II, the US has switched between engaging with and withdrawing from Africa. While US priorities in Africa have historically been primarily driven by national security concerns, such as limiting the influence of different actors and ensuring access to natural resources and key locations, the US also has a history of advancing democracy, development, peace, and security (Bonnier and Hedenskog 12).

#### **1.3.2.1 Africa and the US: A disordered Legacy of the Cold War**

Although the United States and Africa's connections did not begin during the Cold War, this time period represents the most significant involvement. Many newly-emerging African republics saw the United States after World War II as an "anti-colonial." Furthermore, in their quest for freedom and self-governance, these nations wanted independence from colonial powers and considered the United States as a potential partner. The idea of being anti-colonial allowed the US to advance its positions and begin forging new allegiances with African nations (Bonnier and Hedenskog 12).

It is therefore evident that, the US interests in Africa took on a number of unique paths from the beginning: First and foremost, the containment of Soviet influence and the prevention of its spread everywhere, especially in the new African nations; second, the maintenance of Africa as a source of raw materials, particularly minerals, for her strategic industries, particularly uranium deposits and third, having military strategic bases in



Africa, especially those close to the Middle East region are used to achieve strategic advantage and collaboration (Magu 59).

Robert. J Griffiths' description of Africa as a "foreign policy backwater" helps put one view of Africa into context; in the early post-World War II era, the United States saw Africa in this manner. The former colonial powers continued to have a significant influence in these recently independent nations, and the Soviet Union and its strategic interests in Europe, the Far East, and the Korean Peninsula were the US's main worries (Magu 60).

Despite being fast to support Europe's response to the invasions brought on by World War II, the United States was also pro-colonial. According to Magu Stephen. M, the country's position on colonialism was a little difficult to understand, he notes that, "starting with Franklin Roosevelt and the Atlantic Charter, the United States was on record demanding self-government or independence for the majority of colonies. Even though they weren't enthusiastic about independent African republics, successive U.S. administrations maintained an anti-colonial position" (qtd. in Hubbard 60).

Africans' appreciation of the US was also frequently documented, probably in the context of the colonial rule's alternative. Magu also mentions that, even during the period of decolonization, "the United States' image as democratic and non-colonial garnered it considerable respect in the eyes of Africans [...] The Nigerian nationalist leader Nnamdi Azikiwe, praised the US as an example for political and religious freedom in his writings" (qtd. in Gershoni 62).

### **1.3.2.2 US Hegemony and Africa's Position in the Post-Cold War Era**

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the US tried to go after “strategies of positive, constructive engagement.” More focus began to be placed on advancing democracy, ethical leadership, and human rights. Resources that had previously been allocated to Cold War allies (such as Zaire, Liberia, and Sudan) have now been diverted to nations that are actively working toward democratization (such as South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique). In the field of conflict resolution, the idea spread that, under some conditions, US traditions and principles required engagement in humanitarian initiatives, even when there were no immediate strategic or financial rewards (Bonnier and Hedenskog 12).

However, the new method of interaction was not long-lasting. When 18 US Soldiers were killed in a mission in Somalia during the Black Hawk Down event in October 1993, both policymakers and the general public in the US became hesitant of sending military forces overseas. The United States then engaged in a phase of disengagement and withdrawal during which it reduced its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations and cut back on its support for democratization and aid to Africa in general (Bonnier and Hedenskog 12).

The post-Cold War era provided the United States with an opportunity to change its foreign policy and strategic interactions, especially with areas that had only up until then functioned as barriers against Soviet communist expansion: It presented the opportunity for fruitful interaction and strong alliances. For instance, Vines and Cargill argue that “under the George W. Bush administration, American awareness of the strategic importance of Africa had taken place” (Magu 76).

### **1.3.2.3 The Arc of Instability: “The New World Order” and 9/11 Events**

Some argue that, Africa has never been more important to the United States than as a “problem” to be solved, an underdeveloped collection of ethnically split nations, to which to occasionally donate money and keep under control in order to prevent the spread of disease, famine, and bloodshed over the oceans. Therefore, Africa is poorly suited to integrate into the future, as of yet undefined “world order” that the US imagines (Magu 73).

After the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed in 1998, questions were raised regarding Africa’s possible role as an asylum for terrorists. After the attacks on September 2001, the US placed a high priority on counter terrorism and reducing its reliance on oil from the Middle East. As a result, there was a resurgence of interest in Africa, and US involvement rose once more. President George W. Bush’s commitment to battling global health problems like HIV/AIDS and malaria, which greatly expanded US foreign aid to the region, served as an additional motivator for the engagement (Bonnier and Hedenskog 12-13).

Under President Barack Obama, the goal of combating terrorism remained a top priority, but with a focus on soft power’ and diplomacy and a desire to minimize the military presence on the ground. Additionally, there was a stronger emphasis on boosting US investments, notably in the fields of energy, health, and food security (Bonnier and Hedenskog 12-13).

The first two American presidents of the twenty-first century focused heavily on Africa due to both geopolitical considerations and expectations, especially since to President Obama’s ethnicity and African aspirations that he would have a more pro-

African agenda. as well as the continent's ongoing strategic significance in the US's worldwide fight against terror in regions like the Maghreb, Mali and North Africa's Mediterranean coast, which includes Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, as well as the unrest-ridden Horn of Africa (Magu 77).

#### **1.3.2.4 Why Africa Matters to the Unites States?**

Today, new players have started interacting with Africa significantly. These new actors have developed a greater interest in Africa as a result of realizing how much the continent has to offer. In many ways, the US has been hesitant to take advantage of the customers presented by the new Africa. While it is true that American engagement benefits Africa, it is also true that American engagement benefits Africa (Banks et al. 1).

Banks et al., mention that, Lesley Anne Warner explains the significance of Africa for American national security. According to Warner, the security of African nations is connected to the overall security of the world. Therefore, for the interest of both Africa and the United States, early involvement with Africa in ensuring peace and security is essential. They also state that, Yun Sun discusses China's expanding influence in Africa and the need for the United States to take a more active role in the region in comparison to China (2).

John Banks explains that how crucial Africa's energy requirements are to American foreign policy, he clarifies why it is essential for U.S. national security and economic interests to assist African nations in managing their new oil and natural gas resources and expanding their access to energy. According to Banks et al., Witney Schneidman also talks about how important Africa is for American trade and investment. U.S. development assistance is a significant component of relations with Africa, Steven

Rocker and George Ingram emphasize that the United States' development assistance to Africa advances a number of important humanitarian, national security, and economic objectives (2).

### **1.3.3 China and the United States Competing in Africa**

During the Cold War, the United States and China emerged as rival superpowers seeking global influence. This conflict spread to Africa, where both parties fought for the support of the continent's countries to advance their individual political structures and strategic objectives.

In recent years, the rivalry between the US and China in Africa has intensified as China's engagement with the continent has grown significantly. The United States has been working to maintain its influence in the face of China's expanding power. The rivalry between these two powers encompasses various aspects such as economics and politics, and it often involves suspicions and tensions between them.

Given the historical connections and strategic interests that both countries have in the continent, numerous scholars and viewers expected the US-China rivalry in Africa. David Shinn, a former US ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia and a recognized authority on US-Africa relations, was one important individual who brought attention to this rivalry.

Shinn stated in a 2011 article for the Africa Policy Journal that US policymakers were becoming more concerned about China's expanding influence and its effects on US interests on the continent as a result of China's increased participation in the region. He pointed out that China's emphasis on obtaining natural resources in Africa and its

willingness to cooperate with nations with a history of violating human rights was undermining the US-led strategy for promoting democracy and effective government.

Deborah Brautigam, who has written widely on China's engagement in Africa and its impact on African economies and governance, is one important individual who has been warning about the US-China competition in Africa for some time.

Brautigam in her book, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*, published in 2010, claims that, China's expanding economic involvement in Africa was causing Western nations, particularly the US, to worry about China's expanding influence and its effect on Western interests on the continent. As African nations were caught in the middle of the conflict and had to balance the interests of both major world powers, she also emphasized the possibility that US-China rivalry in Africa may lead to unrest and instability on the continent.

The extent to which China is competing for influence in Africa alongside or even attempting to replace it with that of the United States and other Western nations has been a major topic of public debate. This mostly misses the mark. China and the United States battle in Africa for commercial advantages like trade, contract wins, and occasional investment possibilities (Shinn, "China and The United States", 7).

Even though the US and its Western allies have long-standing relationships with Africa in terms of development and aid, China's recent entry into the Dark Continent has angered the traditional contributors greatly. The Asian giant invested so much money in Africa that it engaged academics to study the trend from a variety of angles, including politics, economics, business, governance, human rights, and security. The action also served as a wake-up call or reawakening for the US and its think tank in that, with the

immensity of rich riches under its soil, Africa is to be redefined in a more appealing form, very unlike the Dark Continent the West had misread it for calculating ulterior interests (Eno 20).

## **Chapter Two**

### **The US Interests in Africa**

Africa is the second largest continent in the world with many valuable resources that peak the interests of the global superpowers. This chapter discusses the interests of the United States of America in Africa seeing how their policies towards the continent changed throughout the last few decades and their place in it now. This chapter will also deal with how the United States policies changed and evolved throughout the time by looking into the policies of many US presidents, and seeing how they affected the continent.

Throughout the history of the United States, many presidents have influenced the country's relations with Africa. Beginning with President Truman's support for African decolonization and followed by President Eisenhower's Cold War containment policies, the United States' interest in Africa continued to grow. President Kennedy supported anti-colonial struggles on the continent, while President Johnson's administration focused on providing economic aid and promoting development. President Nixon's policies towards Africa were characterized by the Cold War politics of containment, while President Carter focused on human rights and promoting democracy. President Reagan's administration continued with the Cold War policies towards Africa, while President Clinton shifted the focus to trade and economic development. Under President Obama, the United States prioritized security cooperation with African countries, while President Trump's policies were characterized by skepticism towards foreign aid and a focus on trade and security. This chapter will examine the policies of these presidents and their impact on US-Africa relations.



## **2.1 American Interests in Africa**

The United States has long held a multifaceted interest in the vast and diverse continent of Africa. From historical ties rooted in the transatlantic slave trade to modern-day partnerships, America's engagement with Africa spans economic, political, security, and humanitarian dimensions. As the world's second-largest continent, Africa is home to a wealth of natural resources, emerging markets, and strategic geopolitical importance. Recognizing these factors, the United States has continually sought to foster cooperation and advance its interests in Africa, aiming to promote stability, economic growth, democracy, and human rights. This introduction explores the various facets of American interests in Africa, shedding light on the motivations, challenges, and opportunities that shape this crucial relationship between the United States and the African continent.

### **2.1.1 Political Interests**

Since 2007, the United States has attempted to use its worldwide fight against terrorism to advance its own narrow interests in Africa and to push for the militarization of the continent via the Africa Command (AFRICOM). Despite Washington's claims that AFRICOM is a force for humanitarianism and development, the organization, based in Germany, has concentrated on combating terrorism and was involved in the "regime change" in Libya in 2011. The United States' interests in Africa frequently conflict with the continent's own security agenda, which prioritizes long-term peace building (De Arimatéia and Stephens).

The United Nations has implemented innovative approaches to maintaining peace and security in Africa, but has not consistently applied them elsewhere. The UN Security Council has sometimes ignored the African Union Peace and Security Council and worked with sub-regional organizations aligned with its powerful members. Unless the

Council is reformed to distribute power more fairly between the North and the “global South,” its ability to respond to conflicts in Africa will remain inadequate, and its legitimacy will be questioned (Sarkin 25).

The US believes that an open and accessible Africa is important for mutual cooperation, trade, investment, and countering negative foreign influence. The US is supporting African governments, civil society, and the public to promote transparency and accountability, combat digital authoritarianism, and promote democratic values. The US is also working with African countries to improve fiscal transparency, expose corruption, and support reforms in accordance with the US Strategy on Countering Corruption (Campbell 349).

The US believes that the commitment and capacity of African nations to renew their democracies and address conflicts is crucial for both Africans and Americans. Poor governance, corruption, human rights violations, and insecurity have been exploited by terrorist groups and foreign actors. The US aims to offer choices to Africans and limit openings for negative actors by addressing these challenges while reaffirming the benefits of democracy. The US will work with allies and partners in the region to respond to democratic backsliding and human rights abuses, and will partner with the African Union to address public dissatisfaction with the performance of some democracies (Obama).

The US supports African democracies by empowering marginalized groups, backing civil society, and defending free and fair elections. Diplomatic efforts, development programs, and defense tools will be used to strengthen partners and respond to drivers of conflict. Counterterrorism resources will prioritize reducing threats to the


US homeland, persons, and diplomatic and military facilities. The US will work primarily with African partners, in coordination with key allies, to achieve shared counterterrorism objectives and promote non-kinetic approaches where possible. Tailored programs will build the capacity of local partners' security, intelligence, and judicial institutions to identify, disrupt, degrade, and share information on terrorists and their support networks ("US Africa Partnership").

### **2.1.2 Economic Interests**

Throughout history, Africa was not a priority in US foreign policy. The military also neglected Africa, and even in diplomatic circles, Africa was seen as a "backwater" and left to African people and their colonial powers to struggle for independence after WWII. The US intervention in Somalia in the 1990s signaled a shift in policy, but the ill-fated military operation and domestic economic concerns ended this involvement. By the turn of the millennium, some US politicians began showing more interest in Africa due to its rich resources, particularly oil. With the increasingly unstable situation in the Middle East, some think tanks and politicians began looking to Africa as a potential alternative energy source (Xu 1125).

The US has a history of neglecting Africa in foreign policy, with some politicians showing more interest in the continent due to its rich resources, particularly oil. While some policymakers have acknowledged Africa's rising strategic importance, with Colin Powell visiting oil-exporting countries and Gabon becoming eligible for assistance under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, President George W. Bush stated during a debate with Vice President Al Gore that the US does not have vital interests in Africa. However, Nigeria's oil remains important to the US, with plans to double oil imports

from the country in the next five years, and Africa is expected to supply up to 25% of US oil imports by the end of the century. The US is also reportedly interested in establishing a naval base in the Gulf of Guinea and on the southern tip of South Africa (Almquist 19).



**Figure 1:** Crude Oil Reserves in Africa in 2021, by Country

**Source:** Kamer, Lars . “Crude Oil Reserves in Africa by Main Countries 2020.” *Statista*,. Accessed 13 June 2023.

Figure 1, provides a visual representation of the crude oil reserves across various African countries. It highlights Africa’s significant oil wealth and the potential for the continent to support international oil needs, including those of countries like the United States and China.

In 2002, a symposium was held to discuss the significance of African oil for US national security and African development. This led to the establishment of several task forces, all concluding that Africa and its oil were too important to ignore, with the Gulf of Guinea being of vital interest to the US. Their recommendation was for the US to

mobilize all its forces, political, diplomatic, military, and economic, to secure control of the region due to rising domestic energy demand and the need for more secure energy supplies. The primary interest in Africa was the geopolitics of oil, driven by new oil discoveries and production in Africa, rising energy demand in the US, and new players entering the continent (Klare and Volman 617).


Africa is rich in natural resources such as fertile land, water, oil, natural gas, minerals, forests, and wildlife. It holds 30% of the world's mineral reserves, 8% of natural gas, and 12% of oil reserves. It also has significant amounts of gold, chromium, platinum, cobalt, diamonds, and uranium. Additionally, Africa has 65% of the world's arable land and 10% of its internal renewable fresh water source (Alao 28).

Natural capital constitutes between 30 percent and 50 percent of total wealth in most African countries. Forests and woodlands provide a livelihood for over 70 percent of people in sub-Saharan Africa, and land is an essential economic and socio-cultural asset. However, many of these resources are used unsustainably or lost through illegal activities, resulting in a reduction in benefits generated from them. Africa loses approximately USD 195 billion annually due to illicit financial flows, illegal mining, illegal logging, illegal trade in wildlife, unregulated fishing, environmental degradation, and loss ("Our Work in Africa").

The African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) recognizes that natural capital is critical to the continent's economy and asserts that utilizing it as a means of generating wealth and investment will contribute to achieving the United Nations 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the AU Agenda 2063 through financial, economic, social, and

environmental interventions. Collectively, Africa has much to gain by harnessing its natural resources to finance its development agenda towards greater prosperity while ensuring that future growth and exploitation of natural resources is results-oriented, climate-resilient, and sustainable (Zedan 27).

Africa is known to have vast reserves of various minerals, including precious metals, base metals, gemstones, and industrial minerals. The continent is rich in mineral resources, and its geological formations have contributed to the creation of valuable deposits over millions of years. Figure 2, which visually represents the abundance and



**Figure 2:** Top Minerals in All African Countries

**Source:** Al Jazeera. "Mapping Africa's Natural Resources." *Www.aljazeera.com*, [www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/mapping-africas-natural-resources](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/mapping-africas-natural-resources).

diversity of mineral resources found in Africa. The presence of these minerals can indeed make the continent an attractive destination for investment. Some of the key minerals

found in Africa include gold, diamonds, copper, cobalt, platinum, manganese, and bauxite, among others.

### **2.1.3 Humanitarian and Security Interests**

The United States works with various government bodies and international organizations, including the United Nations, African Union, and Regional Economic Communities, to contribute to peace operations in Africa. While the U.S. is the largest bilateral donor for peace operations in Africa, it deploys relatively few uniformed personnel as peacekeepers and focuses more on supporting other actors through training, equipment, and other assistance programs. The U.S. has used its political influence to push for institutional peacekeeping reforms at the UN and to authorize the expansion of peace operations in Africa. Additionally, the U.S. has introduced new initiatives to encourage other countries to increase their contributions to UN peacekeeping, such as the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (Williams 12).

The US historically lacked strategic interest in Africa, but the 1998 retaliatory strike against Sudan after terrorist attacks on US embassies marked a turning point. Africa was not included in the US military command structure until 1952 and remained outside any command until 1960. However, the Bush and Obama administrations recognized Africa's strategic importance and shifted focus towards building partnerships and capacity-building on the continent. The US military now engages with Africa through multiple government bodies and international organizations to support peace operations and other initiatives (Ploch 14).

The US military has a significant but often hidden presence in several African countries, and its activities are carried out under the guise of temporary or bilateral

agreements. The creation of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) aimed to coordinate diplomatic and state functions while unifying military commands in Africa. However, some African countries have resisted its establishment, fearing repression of political opponents. Although the US military argues that its activities in Africa are primarily to combat terrorism, its growing military power has displaced and absorbed other US interests in the region (Schewe).

## **2.2 Paths of American-African Relations**

The relationship between the United States and Africa has been a complex and evolving one, shaped by a range of political, economic, and social factors. Over the years, different U.S. presidents have taken varying approaches to engaging with Africa, reflecting changing priorities and shifting geopolitical realities. From the early days of the American republic to the present day, U.S. policy towards Africa has been characterized by a mixture of strategic interests, humanitarian concerns, and ideological influences. In this essay, we will examine the different paths of U.S.-Africa relations that have emerged through various presidential administrations, highlighting key moments and trends in the history of this important relationship.

### **2.2.1 During the Lyndon Johnson Presidency**

During the Lyndon Johnson presidency, the US government's interest in Africa reportedly declined rapidly after a brief period of heightened attention. This was due to the perception that the economic and cultural ties between African nations and Europe were more significant than any relationships with the Soviet Union or China. George Ball, Secretary of State for political affairs during Johnson's administration, even suggested that the US could simplify its problems in Africa by reducing its interest in their



development. By the end of Johnson's presidency, Africa was allegedly "the last issue considered, the first aid budget cut" according to an anonymous official (Clough 8).

Under the Nixon and Ford administrations, the US government took a more interventionist approach towards Africa, as they began to consider the possibility that the Soviet Union was not focused on the global expansion of communism. Instead, they tried to negotiate with the Soviet Union to avoid superpower conflict in Africa. As a result, US forces were withdrawn from pro-US client states like Ethiopia. However, this policy changed once Jimmy Carter took office in the late 1970s (Ohaegbulam 24).

### **2.2.2 During the Bill Clinton Presidency**

During his presidency, Clinton prioritized market reform and free trade as a mechanism for development and democratization, with an emphasis on spreading democracy as a key policy tool. While Africa was not initially a top priority, Clinton's appointments of key foreign policy aides soon changed the direction of U.S. policy towards Africa (Smyth 89).

During Clinton's presidency, his Africa policy aides aimed for more multilateralism and less bilateralism in their foreign relations to counter accusations of isolationism while maintaining a critical focus on domestic policy issues. The Clinton administration created the post of Secretary of State for Global Affairs, which highlighted key issues affecting Africa, such as environmental degradation, terrorism, drugs, population policy, international health risks, and migration. Clinton also supported renewed regionalism in Africa, with the State Department embracing Nigeria-led ECOMOG peace operations in Liberia, despite media criticism (Banjo 141).

George E. Moose, who was appointed by Clinton to replace Herman Cohen as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, inherited a full desk of United States' concerns in Africa, including civil war in Angola, humanitarian disaster in Somalia, and concerns about the onward march of Islamic fundamentalism in Africa. After a whirlwind diplomatic shuttle in Africa and Europe, Moose declared that fostering democracy would be the central plank of the administration's policy, followed by conflict resolution and trade and investment. Moose's statement marked a change in the direction of U.S. policy towards Africa, which soon became the essential character of the Clinton years (Rotberg 193).

Clinton's policy towards Africa was also characterized by a focus on development issues, which included direct financial assistance, aid, peacekeeping and building, economic justice and fair trade, human rights and democracy, environmental sustainability, disaster mitigation, and conflict resolution. While Africa's conflicts ranked lower than those in Bosnia or the former Soviet Union in terms of international strategy, Clinton's appointments soon changed the course of U.S. policy thought on Africa (Bouchet 176).

The Clinton administration had a well-planned strategy for engaging with Africa, which led to the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) being signed into law in 2000. The AGOA provides trade benefits for 34 sub-Saharan African countries, including the lifting of textile and apparel quotas, duty-free access for certain apparel, and duty-free access for apparel made with African fabric and yarn. While some believe AGOA is a positive shift towards a more pragmatic US approach to Africa, others argue that it promotes US business interests at the expense of African economic growth and the needs

of Africa's poor. The African-American Institute (AAI) organized a debate on the topic of whether AGOA is good for Africa, which highlighted varying opinions on the opportunities and reservations regarding the Bill (Banjo 144).

### **2.2.3 During the George Walker Bush Presidency**

In 2001, the US increased its investment in African development by 340% through the State Department and USAID, amounting to an additional \$3.8 billion through Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) compacts. Former President George W. Bush's vision focused on country ownership, good governance, accountability for results, and economic growth. The US is on track to achieve its 2005 G-8 commitment to double aid to Africa by 2010. However, a more comprehensive and strategic development approach is necessary to ensure the longevity of these successes and further progress (Hesse 334).

A more comprehensive and strategic approach was deemed necessary for continued success in African development, building on the commitments and innovations of the Bush administration. The focus should be on sustainable growth and development that empowers the continent to take ownership of its future. Strengthening good governance, accountability for results, and promoting economic growth in the region was essential for achieving this goal. The aim was to ensure that African countries can continue to progress and transform their future, ultimately leading to a more prosperous and stable region ("USAID's Approach to HIV").

During the Bush administration, the US focused heavily on Africa and launched various programs to support the U.S. foreign assistance framework's objectives. This included contributing to ending seven conflicts in Africa, training over 40,000

peacekeepers, and creating AFRICOM. However, there was confusion about AFRICOM's purpose. The US also supported participatory politics and human rights across Africa and assisted during the 2007-2008 political crisis in Zimbabwe (Nathan 59).

During recent years, the US has increased its military presence in Africa and established military bases in some African countries. They have also signed bilateral agreements to allow US military planes to land and refuel. Additionally, the US has doubled its foreign aid budget, with a focus on Africa. This has led to the expansion of US oil companies' exploration and production in Africa, and US crude oil imports from Africa have increased significantly. While some experts are skeptical of these efforts due to instability in the region, there has been little opposition even among those uncomfortable with the pursuit of natural resources. US policy is supported by politicians concerned about terrorism and those with ties to oil interests (Mangi 100).

During the Clinton administration, the US emphasized multilateralism and renewed regionalism in Africa. In the Bush administration, the US significantly increased its investment in African development, with a focus on country ownership, good governance, accountability for results, and economic growth. The US also increased military activities in Africa and signed bilateral agreements with some African countries to allow American military airplanes to land and refuel. In order to gain the acceptance of the African people, the US government issued many speeches about the importance of working alongside them for the best interest of both Americans and Africans. One example is former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's speech on the importance of education and the role of the African-American Institute in empowering people through education (Cooke 70).

In another speech at the Organization for African Unity, the Secretary of State of the United States expresses a desire to open a dialogue with the people of Africa, and acknowledges the new spirit of hope and accomplishment brought about by Africa's best new leaders. These leaders share a vision of empowerment for their citizens, nations, and continent, and are challenging the United States and the international community to work with them to transform Africa. The Secretary of State emphasizes the importance of achieving lasting peace in the Great Lakes region, and states that the United States cares about what happens in Africa because of its own important interests, as well as for the sake of Africans (Albright).

#### **2.2.4 During The Barack Obama Presidency**

The election of Barack Obama as the first president of African descent in the United States had a significant impact on US policy towards Africa. Obama's visit to sub-Saharan Africa after his election was greeted with enthusiasm by millions of Africans. In his speech to the Ghanaian Parliament, Obama declared that Africa's future depended on Africans themselves and that the responsibility for the continent's development lay with them. He also highlighted four key areas where the US would offer its support: building democratic governments, supporting development, strengthening public health, and resolving conflicts peacefully (Hesse 336).

Obama explained that the success of US involvement in Africa would be measured by more than just aid; it would also be measured by its contribution to building the capacity for transformational change. He argued that assisting Africa's development was in the United States' interest, even if responsible governance was a condition for aid. Obama's vision influenced the National Security Strategy of the United States, released

in May 2010, which focused on development goals instead of traditional security concerns. The strategy emphasized consultative cooperation encompassing global, regional, and national priorities, including access to open markets, conflict prevention, global peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and the protection of vital carbon sinks (“Barack Obama”).

In June 2012, the Obama Administration released a new U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, articulating how it has worked to translate the critical goals from Obama’s 2009 speech to the Ghanaian Parliament into action. The four main pillars of the new strategy are strengthening democratic institutions, spurring economic growth, trade, and investment, advancing peace and security, and promoting opportunity and development (Van de Walle 56).

The United States’ increased involvement in Africa also led to the establishment of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007. AFRICOM is responsible for all US military operations on the continent, including training, equipping, and advising African partner forces. However, the establishment of AFRICOM has been met with mixed reactions from African countries and scholars. Some have expressed concern about increased US military presence on the continent, while others have welcomed the US’s involvement in addressing security challenges such as terrorism, piracy, and other transnational threats (Pham 23).

### **2.2.5 The U-turn in US-African Relations under the Trump-Administration**

Trump’s approach towards Africa represented a return to the pre-Clinton era of disengagement, which is described as “malign neglect.” His administration’s policies negatively affected Africa, with detrimental effects on US foreign private investment, and

Africa's foreign direct investment from the US. It also mentions that punitive measures were taken against countries that did not comply with the administration's expectations of reciprocal "free" trade, which caused smaller economies to suffer. Additionally, Trump's "Muslim" travel ban, which included some African countries, further reinforced negative images of the continent (Owusu and Carmody).

President Donald Trump has had a different approach towards Africa since the beginning of his presidency. He did not follow the usual decorum of most leaders and took actions that were deemed insulting towards African states. This included implementing travel bans and immigration policies that had a disproportionate impact on African people, especially students. Trump kept Africa at an arm's length and engaged very little with African leaders. His administration launched Prosper Africa and created the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which embodied Trump's view of doing business with individual firms and countries instead of a more multilateral approach. The DFC has invested \$8 billion in 300 projects across Africa and has a credit line of \$60 billion (Kajunju and Keita).

In the final months of Trump's presidency, he introduced rules on student visas that could affect 21 African countries, restricting the time for completing studies to four years. This move undermines the most mutually beneficial aspect of US-Africa relations, which is education. The Africa-America Institute (AAI) has supported 23,000 African professionals through US government funding, who later became presidents, prime ministers, business leaders, and more. Nigerians spend about half a billion dollars a year in the US on education and related services. African professionals who study in the US

are increasingly contributing to both Africa and the US through brain circulation (Greenwood).

During the beginning of his presidency, President Trump did not give clear indications of how he would handle the United States' long-standing partnerships with the 55 member states of the African Union, which have a combined population of over 1.2 billion. However, in regards to mitigating damage to the global environment and helping vulnerable low-income countries adapt to climate change, Trump's policies could have dire consequences for Africa. His 2018 Budget Blueprint proposes significant reductions in foreign assistance to developing countries, many of which are African, and the elimination of programs supporting good governance, human rights, and democracy (Stremlau 5).

### **2.2.6 During the Biden Presidency**

Biden's efforts to promote democracy and the rule of law in West Africa have faced complex challenges due to increasing authoritarianism, with recent protests in Senegal being the latest example. Third-term presidential bids in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire have led to violent demonstrations. Ruling parties have also consolidated power in Burkina Faso and Niger. In addition, violent extremism and environmental instability further complicate the region's political future. Islamist attacks have increased, and millions have already been displaced by environmental degradation in the Sahel, with further destabilization expected in the future (Rattner 7).

The fight against climate change could potentially become a central pillar of Biden's Africa policy, with a focus on reducing fossil fuel dependence in African countries. Helping African countries recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and its



aftermath is also critical, with potential for the US to draw on its experience in fighting the Ebola epidemic and engage bilaterally, support COVAX, and invest more in African public-health systems. Such efforts could greatly increase the region's resilience to pandemics and offer opportunities for collaboration with the EU and Germany (Soest 8).

### **2.3 Areas of the US-Africa Cooperation**

The cooperation between the United States and Africa has a long history, spanning over several decades and encompassing a wide range of areas. From development aid and economic partnerships to security and humanitarian assistance, there are many areas where the US and African nations have worked together towards shared goals. Over the years, this cooperation has evolved and adapted to changing circumstances and priorities, reflecting the complex and dynamic nature of the relationship between the two regions. Despite the challenges and setbacks that have been encountered along the way, the partnership between the US and Africa remains an important and multifaceted aspect of global affairs.

#### **2.3.1 US-Africa Diplomatic Ties**

Diplomatic ties between the United States and African countries have a long history, dating back to the 19th century when the U.S. established consular relations with Ethiopia. Since then, the relationship between the U.S. and Africa has grown, with the U.S. playing a significant role in promoting economic development, security, and democracy on the continent. Today, there are over 50 U.S. embassies and diplomatic missions across Africa, with 3.1 million Africans living in the United States, creating numerous areas for cooperation between the two regions.

### **2.3.1.1 Diplomatic Visits**

Diplomatic visits are a vital part of international relations, providing opportunities for world leaders to engage with their counterparts, build relationships and promote cooperation. The United States has a long history of diplomatic engagement with African countries, dating back to the early days of its independence. In recent years, the US has intensified its diplomatic outreach to the continent, recognizing the strategic importance of Africa in the global arena. This has led to a series of high-level diplomatic visits by US officials to various African countries, aimed at strengthening bilateral ties, promoting trade and investment, and addressing key issues of mutual concern. In this context, the US Diplomatic Visits to Africa program is a significant initiative that highlights the US commitment to deepening its engagement with African nations.

#### **2.3.1.1.1 US Africa Leaders Summit**

In August 2014, the first U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit was held, where leaders from across the African continent met with President Obama for three days to strengthen ties between the United States and Africa. The summit focused on trade and investment in Africa, as well as America's commitment to Africa's security, democratic development, and its people. The summit aimed to foster stronger ties between the United States and Africa, with a theme of "Investing in the Next Generation" to discuss ways of stimulating growth and creating an enabling environment for the next generation ("2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders").

The U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit in 2022 brought together delegations from all 49 invited African countries and the African Union, alongside civil society and private sector members. The three-day summit was focused on strengthening ties between the

United States and Africa, with discussions on trade and investment, health, climate change, peace, security, and governance. The second day was dedicated to increasing two-way trade and investment at the U.S.-Africa Business Forum, while the third day focused on high-level discussions among leaders, including partnering on Agenda 2063 and food security. The summit ended with a discussion on upcoming presidential elections in Africa and a dinner hosted by President Biden for all 50 heads of delegation and their spouses (Urnov 9).

#### **2.3.1.1.2 African Union Summit**

In May 1963, 32 independent African States signed the Charter creating the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The OAU was established to unite Africa and promote understanding and cooperation among African states to achieve freedom, equality, justice, and dignity for African peoples. The OAU was based on the philosophy of Pan-Africanism, which embraced African socialism, communal characteristics, and practices of African communities, and the common heritage of Africa. The OAU aimed to transcend ethnic and national differences to foster brotherhood and solidarity among African nations (Badejo 18).

The OAU aimed to eliminate colonization and apartheid, promote unity and solidarity among African states, coordinate cooperation for development, defend sovereignty and territorial integrity, and promote international cooperation. Through the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, the OAU helped the continent speak and work together as one. In 1999, the Sirte Declaration was issued by the Heads of State and Government of the OAU, calling for the establishment of an African Union

to accelerate the integration of the continent and address various social, economic, and political problems arising from globalization (Olaniyan 79).

### **2.3.2 The US Governance and Democracy Promotion in Africa**

The United States has a long history of promoting democracy and good governance in Africa. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has been actively engaged in supporting democratic institutions, promoting human rights, and fostering economic development on the African continent. The US has supported democratic transitions, worked to strengthen civil society, and provided assistance to electoral processes in various African countries. Additionally, the US has been a strong advocate for the rule of law and anti-corruption efforts in Africa. In this context, the US has developed a range of programs and initiatives aimed at promoting good governance and democratic values in Africa.

#### **2.3.2.1 US Democracy and Governance Programs**

In 1991, the US Agency for International Development began to expand its democracy and governance programs, focusing on the establishment and strengthening of democratic institutions. They initiated multi year programs in a small number of African countries, providing assistance in several related areas of activity. The examples given were a three-year \$5 million program in Ethiopia and a five-year up to \$15 million project in Zambia. The programs included support for electoral commissions, constitutional commissions, media institutes, and public opinion studies. However, the success of these programs was mixed due to uncertainties about the commitment of the transitional governments to establishing democratic systems (McMahon 21).

The United States Agency for International Development program in South Africa, which preceded current democracy and governance programs in Africa, was initiated in response to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1985. The program aimed to assist the majority population and to rush the end of apartheid without providing funds to any entity of the South African government or public institutions. The program supported civil society, mostly local non-governmental organizations, with aid. The US also provided funding for the transitional elections, including grants for campaign consultants to any party that rejected violence and a delegation of international observers. Ultimately, the US spent \$35 million on the election (Barkan 11).

### **2.3.3 The American African Military Cooperation**

The United States and various African nations have had a long-standing history of military cooperation, with various forms of support and assistance provided to African countries over the years. This cooperation has included training, equipment, and joint military exercises, among other forms of support. The primary objective of this collaboration has been to improve security and stability on the African continent, while also addressing various security threats such as terrorism, piracy, and transnational crime. This partnership has evolved over time, and today, the American African military cooperation remains an essential aspect of the US foreign policy towards Africa.

#### **2.3.3.1 Joint Military Exercises**

The American African Joint Military Exercises are a series of training exercises conducted by the United States military in collaboration with several African countries. These exercises are designed to improve the military capabilities and interoperability of both American and African armed forces, and to strengthen bilateral relationships

between the participating countries. The exercises typically involve a combination of classroom instruction and practical field training, covering a range of military skills such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and disaster response. The American African Joint Military Exercises have been taking place for several decades and have grown in scope and participation over the years, reflecting the deepening security ties between the United States and Africa.

#### **2.3.3.1.1 African Lion**

African Lion is an annual multinational exercise that takes place in Morocco, with additional related activities occurring in Tunisia, Senegal, and Italy. The combined joint task force headquarters of the exercise is established by the U.S. Army's Southern European Task Force, Africa, which brings together components of U.S. Africa Command and international partners to solve a complicated, cross-regional crisis ("African Lion").

AFRICOM and Morocco sponsor training exercises that involve military personnel from both Europe and Africa. These exercises include various combat tactics, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance operations, and command-and-control techniques. One such exercise is African Lion, which aims to improve the quality of operations conducted by the North African and U.S. military ("African Lion").

African Lion 22, which occurred between June 6 and 30, 2022, was the largest annual military exercise of the U.S. Africa Command. The exercise involved more than 7,500 service members from various components, including the Reserves and National Guard, and took place in four countries: Morocco, Ghana, Senegal, and Tunisia. Notably, militaries from Brazil, Chad, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom also

participated alongside the U.S. and host nation troops. African Lion 22 aimed to enhance shared defense capabilities and counter transnational threats, including violent extremist organizations. The exercise involved various events such as a joint task force command post exercise, a combined arms live fire exercise, a maritime exercise, and a humanitarian civic assistance program event, among others (Bradley).

### **2.3.3.2 Training and Counter-Terrorism Initiatives**

The United States has been actively involved in supporting training and counter-terrorism initiatives in Africa for many years. These efforts are aimed at building the capacity of African security forces to counter the threat of terrorism and violent extremism, while also promoting regional stability and security. Through partnerships with African governments and international organizations, the U.S. has sponsored a range of training exercises, including Flintlock and African Lion, and provided technical assistance and equipment to bolster the counter-terrorism efforts of African security forces. These initiatives reflect a shared commitment to promoting peace and security in Africa and beyond.

#### **2.3.3.2.1 AFRICOM**

In 2007, President Bush announced the creation of a new military command for Africa, called AFRICOM. Prior to this, U.S. military activities in Africa were managed by three separate commands responsible for different regions of the world. Africa was not seen as a major concern for the United States, but this changed when the Bush administration declared access to Africa's oil supplies as a "strategic national interest" and proclaimed a global war on terrorism. AFRICOM's creation reflected this increased attention to Africa in U.S. national security policy and military affairs (Nathan 69).

AFRICOM was replacing three separate commands that oversaw US military activities on the continent. Its unique structure allows it to oversee both traditional military activities and programs funded through the State Department budget, with a commander who has both a military and civilian deputy. The new command is composed of both military and civilian personnel, and there are no plans to assign it control over large military units, as the US plans to reduce its overseas military presence.

AFRICOM's establishment was driven by Africa's rising importance in US national security policy, particularly in relation to oil and the Global War on Terrorism (Mills and Jeffrey 42).

#### **2.3.4 US Military Assistance to Africa**

The presence of Western military forces in the Sahel region has been steadily increasing in recent years. In 2013, President Barack Obama deployed 100 US troops to Niger, and this has grown to 800 troops as of September 2022. The US also has troops in Cameroon, Chad, Mali, and Nigeria to assist in the fight against terrorism. In November 2018, the Pentagon announced plans to reduce the number of US troops conducting counterterrorism operations in Africa, but there is no evidence that this strategy has been implemented (Idahosa 81).





**Figure 3:** US Military Bases in Africa

**Source:** Busch, Gary K. “The Logistics of the War in the Sahel.” *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, vol. 2, no. 2, 12 June 2013, p. 22, <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.bh>.

Figure 3 showcases that, The United States has established a big number of military bases and installations in various African countries. These bases can serve multiple purposes, including supporting counterterrorism efforts, promoting regional security cooperation, conducting joint training exercises, and facilitating humanitarian and disaster relief operations. This shows the big dominance the U.S has over the continent in terms of military presence.

### **2.3.5 African Humanitarian Cooperation**

African Humanitarian Cooperation is a term used to describe the collective efforts made by African countries and international organizations to address the humanitarian needs of African communities affected by conflict, natural disasters, and other crises.


Africa is a continent that has been plagued by numerous humanitarian crises, ranging from armed conflicts to natural disasters. In response to these challenges, African countries have increasingly cooperated with one another and with international organizations to mitigate the impact of crises and provide humanitarian aid to those in need. This cooperation has taken various forms, including the establishment of regional organizations and partnerships, the sharing of resources and expertise, and the development of joint strategies to address humanitarian challenges (“Africa Humanitarian Action”).

### **2.3.5.1 Health Initiatives**

PEPFAR, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, represents the largest-ever commitment made by any country to tackle a single disease. Since its launch in 2003, PEPFAR has been supported by the compassion and generosity of the American people, and has continued to allocate over \$900 million annually towards strengthening health systems capacity and supporting more than 3,000 labs, including 28 national reference labs, across Africa. As part of its \$85 billion programs around the world, PEPFAR has devoted \$75 billion for Africa, and its efforts have helped save over 18 million lives. Additionally, PEPFAR has prevented the transmission of HIV from mothers living with the virus to over 2.6 million babies worldwide (“U.S. Global Public Health”).

On December 15th, 2022 President Joe Biden has made an announcement that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) will allocate \$2 billion to provide vital assistance to crisis-affected individuals in Africa, subject to funding availability. Across the continent, humanitarian crises such as catastrophic droughts and torrential floods continue to have a devastating impact on countries. Furthermore, the compounding

effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, Putin’s war against Ukraine, and climate change have led countries already in crisis towards catastrophic food security outcomes. The Horn of Africa, for instance, is currently facing the world’s most severe food security crisis, with almost 21 million people urgently requiring food assistance due to the worst drought in over 70 years. In West Africa, over 32 million people are in urgent need of food assistance, with estimates suggesting that this figure could rise to 45 million during 2023 lean season, marking the region’s most severe food crisis in decades (United States Agency for International Development).



**Figure 4:** Direct U.S. Global Health Assistance in Africa

**Source:** “U.S. Global Public Health Assistance to Africa.”

Figure 4 illustrates a comprehensive Map of the Labs That Are Supported by PEPFAR, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, along with their respective budgets. This map highlights the extensive network of laboratories established and sustained by PEPFAR to enhance healthcare services. Remarkably, the allocated budget for these labs surpasses a staggering 7 billion US dollars. This substantial financial commitment signifies PEPFAR's unwavering dedication to providing high-quality healthcare, particularly in the fight against HIV/AIDS. The generous funding empowers these labs to carry out vital diagnostic tests, research initiatives, and treatment interventions, contributing significantly to global efforts to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

#### **2.3.5.2 Food Security**

Africa experienced a severe food shortage in 2022, affecting over 20 million people, including at least 10 million children, as a result of crop failure and four consecutive dry seasons. In East Africa, recurrent drought and low response capacity caused the loss of almost 2 million livestock in a year. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa projects a significant increase in Africa's annual food imports, with the current \$43 billion likely to triple to \$110 billion by 2025, and a seven-fold increase from \$15 billion in 2018 ("Strengthening Africa's Food").

The food crisis in Africa has been worsened by several factors including climate change, conflict, and inefficient farming methods, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has called for immediate and long-term interventions to address the issue. Recent reports by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the African Union (AU) indicate that the food crisis has affected an estimated 346 million people in

Africa. According to Deeko Adan Warsame, the chair of the women's council of Guriel in northern Somalia, the situation is dire as there is a scarcity of food and water, and it is impossible to escape the drought even if one runs away from the fighting. As a result, almost \$1 billion of emergency food security aid has been given to African countries by the U.S government, to combat severe hunger and malnutrition. This aid is a part of the total \$2.76 billion funding that President Biden declared in June 2022 to address food insecurity globally. The remaining amount is anticipated to be allocated to countries across the world by the end of the year (International Committee of the Red Cross).

## **Chapter Three**

### **China's Growing Presence in Africa**

In recent years, China's influence in Africa has grown significantly. China has made a significant impact on the African continent through major infrastructure expenses. China has established solid political and commercial connections with several African nations. This expanding presence has resulted both appreciation and criticism since it has the potential to contribute to economic growth and development while also raising challenges like neocolonialism. Overall, China's influence in Africa has changed the dynamics of the continent and will likely continue to do so. This chapter aims to shed light on China's interests in Africa and the steps Beijing has taken to protect its interests on the continent. It demonstrates the growing role of China in Sectors as; trade, Investment and infrastructure and the strategies used by China towards Africa that make it the most significant partner to Africa.

#### **3.1 Chinese Interests in Africa**

According to Anton Mariana, a number of strategic interests were the driving force behind China's renewed interest in Africa. First, China must ensure that its citizens have access to the energy, mineral, and agricultural products that are vital to the country's economic development (15). Second, China wants to strengthen its economic ties with Africa through trade, investment, and aid Assistance, which takes the form of grants, loans and debt relief. Third, in contrast to the American "bipolar system," China aspires to become a significant global player that supports a multipolar world. Finally, China is attempting to replace Taiwan's worldwide recognition with Beijing's (Anton 15- 16).

### **3.1.1 Political Interests**

China looks for diplomatic and political support wherever it can find it in Africa, and the outcome has been surprisingly successful over time. Although the objectives seem to have many different components, the most important thing is to create as much diplomatic support as possible for China. This has given Beijing a solid foundation of support throughout the international community and among international organizations and institutions like the United Nations (Pannell 707).

China has relied on the U.N. backing of African nations for its political ambitions. When 26 African countries voted for the People's Republic of China to reclaim its seat at the United Nations in 1972, China learned of Africa's real political importance and value. Furthermore, Ending Taiwan's diplomatic representation in Africa is also one of China's main political motives in its interactions with that region. In addition, China needs political backing from as many of Africa's 54 nations as possible (Sun 4-5).

### **3.1.2 Economic Interests**

With trade and investment, China has gained access to Africa's natural resources like oil, steel, minerals, and food. Africa has been essential in helping China meet its increasing agricultural needs. Moreover, China wants to benefit from Africa's rapidly expanding population, an increasing population means more consumer demand. In hopes of exporting more of its goods, including technology, energy, the development of smart cities, medicines, and financial tools, China will continue to maintain solid ties with African markets (Ezran).

China's government and business players have three main economic interests in Africa: a source for importing natural resources, a developing and mostly undiscovered

market for exports and investment, and a chance for Chinese businesses to expand employment and gain international experience. China's investment in Africa takes place within the bigger context of Beijing's commercial "Go Global" plan, which aims to enhance Chinese outbound investment and commercial presence (Thrall 12).

### **3.1.3 Security Interests**

China's security interests in Africa are mostly defensive and focused on protecting its inhabitants and current economic interests. Due to its expanding influence and interests there, China is participating in UN peacekeeping missions in Mali and South Sudan, also its deployment of military vessels in the Gulf of Aden as part of operations against piracy authorized by the UN (Gil 9).

Security threats against Chinese nationals come in many different forms. They comprise attacks by criminals like robberies and kidnappings as in southern Nigeria in January 2007, nine Chinese laborers were abducted. In Addition, politically motivated crimes on Chinese people in response to China's support of regional authorities or exploitation of local resources such as, Sino Hydro's construction site was attacked in January 2012 by the opposing Sudan People's Liberal Movement, and 29 workers were seized (Sun 9-10).

## **3.2 The Status of Africa in China's Foreign Policy**

Zhou Enlai, China's first premier and foreign minister, has established the basis for China's policy toward developing nations in general and Africa in particular during the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 (Zhang and Wei 26).



Sino-African ties improved in 2000, especially with the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Partnership (FOCAC), which is based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Lahtinen 19-20).

China's foreign policy, which began under Chairman Jiang Zemin (1993–2003), was mostly non-confrontational as the nation had a long period of prosperity and stability thanks to the continuation of its socialist market economy. The PRC's foreign policy marked the beginning of China's emphasis on international developmental projects and raising its position as a global power beside the persuasion through soft power under Hu Jintao's (2003–2013) administration (Watts 5-6).

Watts Darby.G assumes that, China's foreign policy under Chairman Xi Jinping (2013–present) has become increasingly nationalistic, when the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched, China's foreign policy grew significantly and sent a powerful message to publicly expand Chinese strategic capabilities on the continent. Using the BRI to advance PRC goals has been Chairman Xi's main foreign policy objective. These actions demonstrate how frequently the PRC has employed soft power techniques (qtd. in Shinn 6).

### **3.2.1 China's Non-Interference and Multilateralism Policy in Africa**

Multilateralism is the approach that China adopts in foreign policy. Which is why, it seeks to cooperate with multilateral organizations like the United Nations, the African Union (AU), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Furthermore, safeguarding its economic and political interests in Africa is its soft power in military affairs (Lahtinen 25).

China has committed to the non-interference principle by refusing to vote on resolutions that call for sanctions or interventions. China's "no" vote is equivalent to a veto. By not voting or giving an abstention, it has let a number of interventions to continue. China has rejected the UN's request to put pressure on Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwean administration, arguing that it would be ineffective. Then, it carried on doing business with Zimbabwe. African leaders largely supported this action in public, but the West criticized it (Lahtinen 25-26).

### **3.3 Dimensions of Chinese Role in Africa**

China's footprint, in particular has gradually spread across a variety of fields. China is employing its soft power instruments on the platforms of education and media. Aid for humanitarian causes and development is increasingly a crucial tool in this context. Moreover, Beijing is the continent's most significant commercial partner, and is also stepping up its security presence in Africa (Zamir).

#### **3.3.1 China's Diplomacy and Political Influence**

According to Thrall Lloyd, Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 made his first foreign trip, visiting Russia, Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of the Congo. Every year in the 1990s and 2000s, the Chinese foreign minister's first foreign trip was to an African country. Also, there has been a lot of mid-level administration to administration interaction (qtd. in Brown 47).

Leon Vanessa.C assumes that, China actively engages African nations through summits, public diplomacy, and an improved diplomatic corp. According to Ambassador David Shinn, "China brought twice as many cabinet level officials to Africa in 2005 than the United States or France (73).

### **3.3.1.1 High-Profile Meets and Party-to-Party Interactions**

High ranking officials traveling abroad offer insightful perspectives on the goals of foreign policy and how diplomacy is conducted. Ochieng Haggai Kennedy explains that, The Chinese Communist Party (CPC) has established a variety of channels for communication with political parties in African nations. These interactions are meant to strengthen friendships, promote trust, and increase cooperation (66).

Ochieng, Haggai Kennedy mentions that, Xi Jinping made his first trip abroad in 2013 and went to Congo Brazzaville, Tanzania, and South Africa. He traveled to Senegal, Rwanda, South Africa during his first international trip after being elected president for a second term in 2018. Moreover, Chinese senior leaders, including the president, prime minister and foreign ministries, traveled to 43 nations in Africa on 79 occasions between 2007 and 2017 (67).

### **3.3.1.2 China's Africa Diplomacy's Post Millennium Mechanisms**

According to Power et al., there are two main political fundamental components directing China-African relations. Moreover, 'China's African Policy' consists of China's White Paper on Africa in 2006, which serves as a blueprint for future relations and FOCAC, which serves as a vehicle to explore and implement effective methods to achieve the White Paper's goals (64).

#### **3.3.1.2.1 The White Paper**

Hellström Jerker explains that, the white paper on Africa was first released by China in January 2006 (8). The Chinese government published China's African Policy as a white paper, which was a first in China's diplomatic relations with Africa. This statement represents an important step in the development of Sino-African ties and

includes a comprehensive and long-term plan for further cooperation (Anshan). It highlighted the necessity of development cooperation with an attitude of mutual benefit (Chaponnière 59). It also indicates China's desire to play a bigger role in Africa, with influence based on its substantial trade and investment activity and foreign aid given to African nations (Wu).

### **3.3.1.2.2 The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)**

The Forum on China-Africa collaboration (FOCAC) provides China and African nations with a productive forum and global framework for conducting collective talks and engaging in practical collaboration. Six ministerial conferences, which are held every three years since the organization's founding in 2000, have so far been held successfully (Aiping and Zhan 88). FOCAC has created the framework for business and government partnerships between China and Africa. The Forum serves as an intermediary for ministers, diplomats, and businesspeople (De Beule and Bulcke 45-46).

Forty-four African countries has attended the first FOCAC, which took place from October 10 to 12, 2000. A plan for economic and social development cooperation between China and Africa was announced. The second FOCAC conference took place in Addis Abeba on December 15 and 16, 2003. The meeting's focus was on peace and security issues and strengthening collaboration in areas including infrastructure, agriculture, and trade (Power et al. 67).

The third FOCAC summit, which took place in Beijing on November 4-5, 2006. During this conference, commitments to "south south" and "win-win" cooperation were also reinforced. Forty-nine African states has participated in the deliberations of the fourth FOCAC, which took place in Sharm el Sheikh on November. At the 5th FOCAC

Ministerial Conference, China will begin the “Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security,” and train more officials in these sectors (Power et al. 67).

At the Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation and the Sixth Ministerial Conference in South Africa 2015, president Xi Jinping announced a partnership to carry out 10 Major China-Africa Cooperation Plans, which cover areas of industrialization, agricultural modernization, infrastructure, financial services, green development, trade and investment facilitation, and poverty (“The Interpretations of the Johannesburg Summit”). More African leaders of state and government attended the seventh FOCAC, which was held in Beijing in 2018, than the UN general assembly that year (McDonald et al. 114).


### **3.3.2 Media Involvement, Soft Power Operations, and African Perceptions**

Ronning Helge states that, according to a 2013 article by *The Economist*, an increasing proportion of Africans believe that, the Chinese has improved local economies by investing money, transferring skills, and creating jobs (65). Furthermore, previous BBC surveys on people’s perceptions of various nations also has revealed that, Africa generally had favorable views of China. Additionally, an essential component of China’s soft engagement with Africa, is its development assistance to the continent which takes many different forms, including loans and other forms of direct financial support, as well as aid in the areas of health, agriculture, education, training, academic collaboration, infrastructure building, culture and media (65). Madrid-Morales Dani finds that, according to an article published in 2009 by the Hong Kong-based *South China Daily Post*, the Chinese government intended to spend RMB 45 billion “on the global

expansion of its principal media companies,” including Xinhua and China Central Television (CCTV) (79).

### 3.4 The Sino-African Economic Relations

China’s expanding economic presence in Africa is motivated by the idea of “mutual benefits” for both parties. Within a few decades, China has become one of the largest foreign investors on the continent, its largest bilateral trading partner, and its largest bilateral debtor. There are already more than 1,000 of Chinese companies functioning in Africa, where a million individuals are of Chinese heritage. While some of these Chinese businesses operating in Africa are privately held, some are fully or partially state-owned (Stein and Uddhammar).



**Figure 5:** Africa and China’s Trade

**Source:** Ochieng, Haggai Kennedy. “China’s Public Diplomacy towards Africa: Strategies, Economic Linkages and Implications for Korea’s Ambitions in Africa.” *Korea Institute for International Economic Policy*, vol. 26, no. 1, Mar. 2022, <https://dx.doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.EAER.2022.26.1.405>.

As it is shown in figure 5 above, the scale of the bilateral trade, which saw a significant increase in the new century, is impressive proof. China's exports to Africa increased from \$ 5.01 billion (2000) to \$112.72 billion (2019). Similarly, Africa's imports to China have increased from \$4.85 billion (2000) to \$78.68 billion (2019) (Ochieng 72).

### **3.4.1 The Chinese Actors in Africa**

According to Thrall Lloyd, Chinese business participants can be broadly divided into three groups: major state-owned companies (SOEs) pursuing infrastructure and resource projects, large-to-medium private interests seeking a variety of markets; and small, private merchants farming or selling inside African marketplaces (qtd. In Zhimin and Junbo 23).

In the beginning, mostly Chinese state-owned businesses established partnerships with state-owned businesses in Sub-Saharan Africa to ensure the supply of goods from that region. Currently, other significant state-owned corporations also make investments in Africa. Private Chinese enterprises have recently started operating in Africa. Additionally, there are smaller, privately held Chinese businesses operating in this market (Dijk 11).

### **3.4.2 Sino-African Bilateral Trade**

China and 40 nations on the African continent have signed bilateral trade agreements. Moreover, trade between China and Africa was \$10 billion in 2000; by 2014 it had increased to \$220 billion. From around \$110 billion a decade earlier, total trade between Africa and China increased to almost \$170 billion in 2019 (Prinsloo). The General Administration of Customs of China recently released data showing that, in 2021,

trade between China and Africa totaled 254.3 billion dollars, up 35.3% from 2020. From this amount, 105.9 billion dollars' worth of goods were exported from Africa to China, a growth of 43.7% (Xinhua).

#### **3.4.2.1 Chinese Exports to Africa**

In fact, there is a ready market for inexpensive commodities in big quantities in African society. African clients can instantly increase their purchasing power thanks to the half-priced inexpensive China automobiles and clothing. One important market that contributes to the stability of China's economy and society is Africa, where China may sell its own low-quality or overproduced commodities and inventory (Abegunrin and Manyeruke 33).


These are some of the Chinese goods that were imported into African nations in 2014: China was the source of \$411 million worth of fake bears and wigs purchased by Benin, \$438,929 worth of Chinese soy sauce bought by Mauritius, \$9,372,920 worth of Chinese toothbrushes purchased by Nigeria, \$193,818,756 worth of motorbikes bought by Togo, and \$450,012,993.24 worth of Chinese (Abegunrin and Manyeruke 33).

##### **3.4.2.1.1 Trade in Goods and Services**

Trade between China and Africa was limited in the 1990s but significantly increased about 2005 (see Figure 6). Chinese imports from Africa totaled USD 78 billion, while exports to Africa totaled USD 113 billion in 2019. Undoubtedly, the value of African exports to China significantly decreased during the period 2014–2017 despite stable Chinese exports to Africa. Exports from China to North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) totaled USD 27 billion in 2019, accounting for 23.8



percent of all exports to the continent, while imports from the region totaled USD 7 billion (Stein and Uddhammar).



**Figure 6:** Africa and China's Trade in Goods and Services

**Source:** Stein, Peter, et al. "China in Africa: The Role of Trade, Investments, and Loans amidst Shifting Geopolitical Ambitions." *Observer Research Foundation*,. Accessed 27 Mar. 2023.

#### 3.4.2.1.2 Arms Trade

Hellström Jerker states that, between 2004 and 2007, Beijing has shipped about \$800 million worth of weapons to the continent (14). African nations are particularly drawn to Chinese military hardware, primarily small arms and light weaponry. China

sells aircraft to Egypt and Kenya, and Jane's Defence Forecasts says that; Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Kenya, and Morocco could be practical markets for China to export small strike aircraft like the K-8 and the JF-17 multi role combat aircraft. China and Zimbabwe agreed to a deal in late 2004 to provide Zimbabwe 100 military vehicles and 12 FC-1 fighter jets for about \$200 million (Hellström 14-15).

### **3.4.2.2 African Exports to China**

China's expanding appetite for raw materials has driven Chinese State-owned Companies to African nations with plenty of natural assets such minerals, wood, and wood. Oil prices have increased as a result of China's oil imports, helping oil exporting nations like Angola, Gabon, and Nigeria while harming other oil-importing African nations (Abegunrin and Manyeruke 34).

According to Abegunrin and Manyeruke, trade between Africa and China reached \$166 billion in 2011, these includes Chinese exports to Africa totaling \$93 billion, primarily made up of manufactured goods, and Chinese imports from Africa totaling \$93 billion, primarily made up of mineral ores, petroleum, and agricultural items (34-35).

#### **3.4.2.2.1 China's Oil Imports**

China purchased \$275.6 billion worth of oil in 2011. The Middle East (39%) and Africa (18%) contributed the most. China has diversified its import sources during the past ten years, moving away from the Middle East and Southeast Asia and toward Africa. As a result, between 2001 and 2011, China's oil imports from Africa increased by 34%, and in 2007, Africa's portion of China's oil imports rose to 25%. Together, Angola, Sudan, Congo, Libya, Algeria, and Nigeria supplied 90% of China's African oil imports. South Africa and Chad have both seen a significant increase in their oil exports to China

in recent years. Between 2000 and 2010, Chinese SOEs imported more than 90% of the oil from Africa (Gamache et al. 1).

#### **3.4.2.2 Metals and Minerals**

One of the key goods that China imports is iron ore. Chinese imports of iron ore were worth one-third as much as its purchases of oil in 2006. Five percent of China's iron ore imports came from South Africa. Chinese companies have been granted access to the gold mining industry in Eritrea, manganese mining in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Gabon, bauxite mining in Guinea, titanium mining in Kenya, uranium mining in Niger, chromium mining in South Africa through conventional contracts. Also, China now has access to the platinum mines in Zimbabwe (Hellström 14).

#### **3.4.3 Investment; Chinese FDI, Loans, Debts and the Role of Foreign Aid**

Recent Chinese economic activity and investment in Africa are intended to encourage OBOR infrastructure initiatives. Another noticeable change is that natural resources are no longer the primary source of Chinese investment in Africa. According to statistics from 2017, manufacturing (31%), services (25%), trade (22%), and infrastructure (15%) were the four most significant sectors (Carter III et al. 111).

As it is shown in Table 1, which demonstrates that South Africa; China's largest trading partner in Africa, is where Chinese investments are most commonly made, followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, and Zambia. Ethiopia is the only nation in the table that cannot be described as being rich in raw resources, despite having recent advancements in hydro-power and the potential for geothermal energy (Stein and Uddhammar).

**Table.1**

The Principal Receivers of Chinese FDI (2019, in USD billion)

Country	Total stock, in USD billion	Percent of Chinese FDI in Africa
South Africa	6.1	13.8 %
DRC	5.5	12.5 %
Angola	2.9	6.5 %
Zambia	2.8	6.5 %
Ethiopia	2.5	5.6 %
Ghana	1.8	4.1 %
<b>Total six countries</b>	<b>21.6</b>	<b>49.1 %</b>

**Source:** Ochieng, Haggai Kennedy. “China’s Public Diplomacy towards Africa: Strategies, Economic Linkages and Implications for Korea’s Ambitions in Africa.” *Korea Institute for International Economic Policy*, vol. 26, no. 1, Mar. 2022, <https://dx.doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.EAER.2022.26.1.405>.


### 3.4.3.1 Foreign Direct Investment FDI

China’s FDI in Africa has a clear connection with commerce and aid for development. As a result, FDI has grown over the past ten years alongside an expansion in Sino-African trade (0.2% in 1991 and 5.9% in 2007). Over the past ten years, China’s FDI in Africa has increased by 46% annually. In 2007 there were \$4.46 billion worth of foreign investments, up from \$56 million in 1996. Chinese FDI into Africa rose by 81% in the first half of 2009 compared to the same time in 2008, totaling more than \$0.5 billion (Renard 18).

Over half of China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa between 2003 and 2010 was focused on the oil industry. The main receivers were Nigeria, Sudan, Angola,

Egypt, Chad, and Niger. Millions of dollars have recently been spent in resource-rich African nations by Chinese businesses, the majority of which are huge SOEs. As an illustration, the mining operation in Zimbabwe received US\$50 million from the Baosteel Group in 2003; in South Africa, US\$768 million was invested by Sinosteel in the years 2008 and 2009; and in Madagascar, US\$242 million was invested by Wuhan Iron & Steel Co. Large state-owned producers of steel, all three companies (Gamache et al. 1-2).

Importantly, only six nations, all of which were rich in mineral resources, received 50% of China's FDI stock in 2014. (South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, Zambia, DRC and Sudan). The highest percentage, at 18%, belonged to South Africa. The top 20 of the 45 recipients of Chinese FDI are distributed considerably more equally now compared to how it has been (Dzekashu and Anyu 25). For the period from 2003 to 2018, figure 7 displays the breakdown of FDI stock by the two subregions of Central and West Africa in comparison to the rest of the continent.



**Figure 7:** China's FDI Stock to Africa (2003-2018)

**Source:** Dzekashu, William G., and ulius N. Anyu. “China“S Belt and Road Initiative: Will It Make or Mar Development in the Central and West Africa Subregions?” *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, vol. 10, no. 04, 2020, <http://jpag.macrothink.org/>.

### **3.4.3.2 Chinese Infrastructure**

Chinese infrastructure promises to Africa in 2018 reached more than \$25.6 billion. Given that the continent continues to have a huge financial deficit for infrastructure (now expected to be \$108 billion yearly). These are crucial aspects of infrastructure ties between Africa and China. On the one hand, China’s initiatives under the belt and road initiatives (BRI) may address this issue because infrastructure is an essential component of economic growth and development. On the other hand, a rising number of people are worried about China’s increasing exposure to debt on the continent of Africa, as well as the continent’s growing debt stock and financial costs (Prinsloo).

#### **3.4.3.2.1 The Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI)**

The BRI was first introduced in 2013 and it is actively supporting infrastructure and trade facilitation initiatives in over 66 nations. As of 2018, nine African nations; Egypt, Djibouti, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mali, Guinea Conakry, and Senegal, are direct recipients, with 20 more under consideration. According to Michael Baltensperger and Uri Dadush of the Breugel Institute, who has recently made this observation, the BRI has become the touchstone of China’s bilateral economic diplomacy and crucial to its foreign policy. It is Xi’s trademark concept and in 2017, the Chinese Communist Party officially adopted the BRI under its party constitution (Ingram 4).

#### **3.4.3.2.1.1 Tazara Railway (Tanzam Railway)**

In their Book; *China's Power in Africa: A New Global Order*, Abegunrin and Manyeruke explain that, the Tazara railway was designed and constructed between 1968 and 1976. In fact, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) has built infrastructure between 1970 and 1975 with the intention of providing distant Zambia with the sea accessibility it needed to stop relying on the ports and rails of the former Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Angola, and South Africa. The railway is 1160 miles long and cost \$570 million, which is more than all other Chinese-sponsored international projects put together before 1975 (qtd. in Donghai 38).

#### **3.4.3.2.1.2 The New Silk Road**


The One Belt One Road initiative was introduced by Xi Jinping in 2013. Through a system of ports, pipelines, and railroads that covers around 60 nations in Asia, Europe, Oceania, and Africa. It is clear that the new trade route is intended to be a destination for China's massive industrial overcapacity, particularly in the production of steel and heavy machinery. The One Belt One Road initiative aims to connect China with the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean Sea, and West Asia. The One Belt One Road initiative aims to connect China with the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf via Central and West Asia (Lahtinen 23).

However, the 21st-century Sea Silk Road, is intended to follow two different routes, one from China's coast via the South China Sea to the South Pacific, and the other from China's coast through the South China Sea to Europe. China will be connected to the rest of Asia, Africa, and Europe through these new routes. Africa will be connected to the New Silk Road (Lahtinen 24).

### 3.4.3.3 Chinese Loans and Debts

The majority of the loans and export credits offered by China's state banks are commercial, and they are both competitively priced and advantageous. From \$550 million in 2000 to \$2.5 billion in 2011, China's publicly announced annual contribution to Africa has increased gradually, accounting for approximately half of China's entire aid budget. Chinese sources typically provide loan conditions and credits, that are commercially attractive to companies, governments, and projects in Africa instead of aid grants (Thrall 39).

China is the source of about 32% of Africa's external public debt. However, the World Bank and private lenders, notably Chinese lenders, get 35% and 22%, respectively, of the total debt owing by Africa. As it is shown in (figure 8), if one examines the debt owed to China as a percentage of GDP, With a GDP of 100%, Djibouti tops the list, followed by the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) (28%), Niger (23%), Zambia (20%), Ethiopia (13%), Zimbabwe (13%), and 12 percent for Angola (Stein and Uddhammar).





**Figure 8:** China's Largest African Debtors (in USD billion, total stock as per 2019)

**Source:** Stein, Peter, and Emil Uddhammar. "China in Africa: The Role of Trade, Investments, and Loans amidst Shifting Geopolitical Ambitions." *Observer Research Foundation*,. Accessed 27 Mar. 2023.

#### **3.4.3.4 Chinese Foreign Aid to Africa**

Aid agreements have defined China's relations with Africa. China has helped Africa with a number of initiatives, the largest of which was the roughly US\$450 million construction of the 1800 km Tanzania–Zambia railway. China has also built roads, wells, and telecommunications infrastructure in Africa. China also assists Africa with medical personnel. Over the years, Chinese doctors have treated about 180 million patients (Uchehara 99-100).

The other aid initiative from China in Africa focuses on human resources. At the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, a deal was signed regarding the expansion of human resources, 6000 persons has trained in 2003 and 1500 students has traveled to China as part of educational exchange programs (Muekalia 5). China's help to Africans, whether it is in the form of infrastructure or building projects, medical care, or the development of human resources. China had formed 480 joint ventures by the late 1990s in 47 African nations (Shelton 111).

### **3.5 Sino-African Security Practices and Military Cooperation**

China was a moderate contributor of military aid and instruction to African freedom and revolutionary movements. However, China has increased the number of military exchange visits. It participates in the international anti-piracy force in the Gulf of Aden (2008) and is taking steps to safeguard its expanding physical presence and

interests in Africa. Furthermore, China will aid African nations' efforts to prevent the illegal trafficking and circulation of small arms and light weapons (Shinn, "China's Growing Security" 125-127).

### **3.5.1 UN Peacemaking Operations in Africa**

Since China first participated in UN peacekeeping operations in 1990, more than 30,000 of its peacekeepers have been sent to Africa to carry out tasks in 17 different peacekeeping mission areas; more than 1,800 of these peacekeepers are currently carrying out missions in these areas: Mali, DRC, South Sudan, and Western Sahara. Additionally, China has made the decision to deliver 300,000 doses of the Covid-19 vaccine to UN forces, with an emphasis on those assigned to missions in Africa ("The State Council Information Office"). China, which has substantial oil interests in South Sudan, sent a 700-person combat infantry brigade to the UN operation there in 2015 (Shinn, "China's Growing Security" 128).

### **3.6 Cooperation and Exchanges in Culture, Education and Training**

Through cultural collaboration and Confucius Institutes, the Chinese government hopes to improve its image in Africa. In 2005, Kenya established the first Confucius Institute in Africa. China now maintains 46 Confucius Institutes around the continent. From Cape Town to Cairo, they operate as a "partnership" associated with local universities and educational institutions (Lahtinen 56-57).

There has been also a focus on higher levels of education, particularly university collaboration, with 20 higher education institutions in China merged with 20 higher education institutions in top ranking institutions located in 17 African nations under the '20+20' Cooperation Plan (Omoruyi et al. 3). China's Education and Training

Cooperation with Sierra Leone began many years ago, and the current efforts are remarkable. China yearly grants approximately 40 and 20 places to students/scholars from bachelor to doctorate level in various disciplines (Kabia 18).

## **Chapter Four**

### **The US-China Competition in Africa**

The struggle between the United States and China for influence in Africa is becoming an increasingly significant issue in international politics. Africa, with its immense resources and expanding economies, has emerged as a significant battlefield in the larger geopolitical conflict between these two superpowers. Both states are competing with one another for influence, resources, and business partnerships; this competition has broad consequences for African countries. Moreover, the main areas of competition between the United States and China in Africa are examined in this chapter, including economic investment, military presence and political influence, and also how this conflict may affect the development of Africa and what the African reaction would be.

#### **4.1 The Essence of the US and China Rivalry in Africa**

As Cold War trends arise again, Africa has emerged as a significant theater for strategic battle between countries with disparate interests. Its population is expanding, and its mineral resources (oil and gas deposits, diamonds, gold, cobalt, platinum, chromium, uranium and coltan), will be in great demand throughout the green energy transition (Pinto). For the first time since confronting the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the People's Republic of China, a near-peer major power, is a potential long-term rival of the United States. China's economy has grown to be the second-largest in the world, and its businesses compete with American ones for resources and customers (Heath 1).

China's involvement in Africa has come under increasing criticism from the United States. Their rivalry has origins in the Cold War (Ferchen 10). President Obama launched the Asian policy as a part of the future American foreign policy between late

2011 and early 2012 in order to make the United States play a leading role in Asia and beyond. This was done in order to control the development of China and to protect American hegemony (Lohalo et al).

The United States has not only opposed China's involvement in Africa, but has also made an effort to put up alternatives. One example is the B3W infrastructure cooperation program, developed by the Biden administration as an alternative for the BRI, whose goal is to limit Chinese influence throughout the world, particularly in Africa (Lohalo et al). Additionally, there is fierce US-China competition in Africa's business sector, particularly in the fields of communications and digital technology (Ferchen 10).

#### **4.1.1 Africa: A Turn in Fortunes**

Africa's fortunes started to improve in the year 2000 following a period of political and social unrest, slow economic progress, and the Decade of Independence in the 1960s. Since then, sub-Saharan Africa's GDP has expanded five times, contributing significantly to Africa's overall GDP growth. The continent of Africa currently has a \$3 trillion GDP and has bright prospects for continuing significant economic expansion. Around 30% of the essential mineral resources that power the modern world are found in Africa, including large quantities of oil and gas. Additionally, 40% of the world's population will reside in Africa by the turn of the century (Ramzy).

#### **4.1.2 US-China Competition: Economics, Politics and Security**

China will continue to play a significant role in Africa for an extended period of time. The most effective strategy for the West to compete is to surpass China in its areas of strength by offering unquestionably superior goods and services, and to let African

governments decide how to handle China's frequently unfair lending practices and its tendency to hire Chinese workers rather than locals for its projects and investments (Ray).

China's GDP will surpass that of the United States within ten years. Moreover, the expansion of China is viewed as an ideological, political, military and financial threat to the United States. The US-China rivalry in Africa responds to the demands set forth by each big power to safeguard its critical interests. In order to compete with China, the United States has launched and implemented important institutions and programs since 2000, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the African command (AFRICOM), the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) and most recently the B3W. Moreover; China and the United States are currently engaged in a vigorous battle for supremacy in the technology industry (Lohalo et al).

#### **4.1.2.1 Politics: Opposing Ideologies**

Beijing and Washington compete for the respect and allegiance of African countries. They make every effort to gain the support of African nations in international opportunities. The United States views democratic institutions as the key for solving the issues facing African nations, in contrast to China's view that the government's primary responsibility in the developing world is to achieve economic and social development and enable its people to share in the benefits of growth. Chinese people are constant supporters of the non-interference principle and equal sovereignty (Lei 13-14).

When it comes to visiting and hosting African leaders, top officials from China (and other nations) has exceed those from the United States. Since President Reagan, only President Trump has not traveled to Africa. While Secretary Blinken, his top

diplomat, has been to Africa three times in the past year, Biden has yet to travel there as president. Personal visits are seen by African leaders as a sign of respect for them and their nations (Sheehy).

#### **4.1.2.2 Economics**

The role of oil in U.S-African relations has been greatly diminished as a result of changes in the oil markets and the U.S. energy infrastructure over the past decade. The technology economy requires rare earth minerals and other metals, such as cobalt. However, China has already made significant inroads into the African mining industry and is unlikely to remain mute as the United States looks to establish new alliances and secure supplies of essential assets (Gavin 16).

Beijing has achieved great success in strengthening its control in the African telecom industry, which depends on Chinese products and services for internet access. Chinese enterprises have an advantage over rivals in the market thanks to the early entry of Chinese corporations Huawei and ZTE into Africa's telecommunications sector. There is also a chance that African nations would embrace new Chinese technical standards, ensuring long-term economic domination for Chinese enterprises at the expense of U.S firms, as Beijing increases its technological and political engagement ("China's Strategic Aims" 178).

The Clinton Administration introduced the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a comprehensive U.S trade and investment program, in the same year that China launched the FOCAC 2000. Since that time, AGOA has been the primary economic measure to deepen U.S-Africa relations and the only economically viable response to China in Africa. In addition to, Obama has supported AGOA, much like his

predecessors G.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, to show that the U.S commitment extends beyond only foreign aid, military relations, and exclusive bilateral agreements. In addition, Hillary Clinton visited Africa in 2011 and expressed support for American investments in Africa (Anton 18-19).

China is Africa's greatest two-way trading partner, surpassing U.S.-Africa trade by an average of four and reaching \$254 billion in 2021. China is the largest source of foreign direct investment, sustaining hundreds of thousands of employment in Africa. This is nearly twice as much as American foreign direct investment. China continues to be by far the greatest lender to African nations, regardless of a recent decline in funding to those nations (Sheehy).

#### **4.1.2.3 Security**

Through stronger military ties with African governments, China has also increased its involvement in Africa's security system on other levels. In order to coordinate her expanding military presence in the continent, China has joined the United States in creating a military base in Djibouti. whereas the Chinese military base in Djibouti may cause concern among Washington's top military leaders, China's military efforts in Africa may be justified along with increased Chinese investment in the continent (Waweru 173).

US security interests on the continent are challenged by Beijing's growing military presence. China's willingness to supply weapons to nations that are subject to international and US restrictions, such as Sudan and South Sudan, further weakens American attempts to resolve human rights crimes and might further complicate civil wars throughout the continent ("China's Strategic Aims" 179).



On the Atlantic Ocean coast of Africa, notably in Equatorial Guinea, where Chinese corporations have built and upgraded port facilities, there have been rumors that China wants to establish naval bases. Equatorial Guinea owes money to China, which has the Pentagon concerned that Beijing may use its financial power to purchase a port. The Biden administration increased its interaction with Equatorial Guinea as a result of this (Sheehy).

#### **4.1.3 Confrontation of Interests**

Since 2001, security concerns have focused more on the threat posed by terrorist organization. This led to the US's re-engagement with the African continent, which was evident in the establishment of a military command specifically for Africa, the setting up of drone bases (in Djibouti and more recently Niger). However, China has not been actively involved in African peace and security issues up to this point, in contrast to the US. Although China has not been able to completely distance itself from these discussions as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), the nation has largely upheld a policy of nonintervention and respect for state sovereignty (Gil 17-18).

The United States' interest in Africa is corresponding to the interest of a second actor in this region. The growing effectiveness of the People's Republic of China in Africa, as well as the introduction of the "War on Terror" program following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, increased the United States' interest in the continent. With the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC), the Chinese administration has exceeded the United States as Africa's largest commercial partner in 2009 (Aydin 2).

Both states seek political support from African states for their larger public diplomatic goals, benefiting from African votes in organizations like the United Nations

and WTO. The two states want access to Africa's natural resources, including petroleum. Both states would like to export more goods to Africa (Thrall 76-77).

Thrall also mentions that, the area where U.S and Chinese interests diverge most clearly is in how foreign nations should support good governance and universal human rights standards in Africa (80).

#### **4.1.4 US-China's Policy in Africa**

Shinn David views that, While the US advocates for more policy change, China claims that its primary interest in cooperation is with Africa ("China and the United States in Africa"3). China's foreign policy is to gain recognition and demonstrate its influence around the world, especially in Africa, in order to support the Chinese Communist Party at home. In contrast, the United States has not prioritized Africa with the same amount of high-level attention and resources as China currently does. Shinn mentions that, according to Ambassador Tibor Nagy, the top State Department official for Africa in the Trump administration, China is apparently "kicking our tails everywhere" across the continent (Sany and Sheehy).

Instead of providing loans or development aid, the U.S strategy has been characterized by trade and investment. The African Growth and Opportunity Act, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the 2013 Power Africa effort, or the more recent Prosper Africa initiative created by the Trump administration, are examples of specific programs Washington focuses on instead of broad agendas (Pinto).

However; China has an extended strategy for Africa. Communist system of administration has the benefit of allowing for the prediction of its foreign policy up to two decades in advance. Since 1949, the Communist Party leadership in China has

maintained a largely consistent strategy, though there have been significant policy shifts, as was the case after Deng Xiaoping came to power. The focus on the past and China's extensive history serve as a framework for long-term and strategic thinking (Shinn, "China and the United States in Africa" 2).

#### **4.2 African Reactions to the US-China Rivalry**

For reasons related to economy, politics and security, African governments view China as an important partner. As Nana Akufo-Addo, the president of Ghana, mentioned in October, "Our interests lie in dealing with China. It is the world's second-largest economy. Everybody has to deal with China." Other nations have expressed admiration for China's political system and government-owned economy, including Ethiopia and Rwanda. In addition, African leaders are grateful for China's rising contributions to the security of the area (Devermont 5-6).

Africa typically brings up one of two pictures in the minds of most Americans: a primitive place of famine, illness, and civil wars or an ideal motherland. Neither illustration is exactly accurate (Ray). In a phone conversation with VOA, Josh Maiyo, a lecturer at United States International University claims that, "the rest of Africa has essentially been forgotten. From an African perspective, the U.S has done more than anything else to prevent Chinese advancement. With no actual initiatives to offer or coordinated, structural methods, there have only been superficial engagements" (Cheng).

According to Gustavo de Carvalho, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, honesty is essential for the U.S to maintain fruitful relations with African countries. He also views that, "the United States should... equally engage on how its approaches are conducted and perceived by local and national actors." Additionally,

John Calabrese, the director of American University's Middle East-Asia Project states that," although efforts to combat dangers to world health including HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Ebola have been helpful, his concerns about continuity still exist. Additionally, he states that, "U.S-Africa policy may just be a collection of individual initiatives and not a coherent strategy" (Cheng).

African leaders frequently criticize Western governments for failing to fulfill their commitments by making comparisons between China and the United States. For Example, Ismail Guelleh, the president of Djibouti claims that, "only the Chinese offer a long-term partnership in Djibouti." Similarly, at the UN General Assembly in September 2017, nine African leaders declared to President Trump, "We would prefer to do business with the US as well as other western nations, but you are not there...unlike China" (Devermont 6-7).

Similar complexity exists in African perceptions of the strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing. Most African capitals believe that they will gain from this increased rivalry. It presents an opportunity to broaden access to resources, create new sources of leverage, and reduce reliance on certain foreign financiers (Devermont 6-7). The majority of Western perceptions of China are unfavorable, portraying China as bringing neo-colonialism and a new economic system to Africa, which reflects China's exploitative relationship with Africa (Nassangaa and Makarab).

Eno Mohamed mentions that, Faïda Mitifu, the Democratic Republic of the Congo's ambassador to the United States, emphasizes to critics that Africans are not blind people "who can be easily manipulated." The DRC official expresses the nature of

his country's relationship with China by saying, "The good thing about this partnership is that it's give and take" (24).

Therefore, in contrast to the West's unrelenting criticism of China as a greedy exploiter, Eno addresses that, African-born British citizen Osman Abalu, one of those who support China's quick entry into Africa believes that given Africa's negative interactions with the West, "one wouldn't be much surprised by China's warm welcome to the continent" (26).

The United States and South Africa have established a strong educational and interpersonal relationships, the US and SA also have a number of mutual political, economic, and development goals in Africa. In 1799, the United States opened its first consulate in Cape Town and in 1929, it formally established diplomatic ties with South Africa. The United States significantly aided South Africa's 1994 transition to democracy. Barack Obama and George W. Bush both traveled to South Africa when they were presidents.

The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has received more than \$7.25 billion in funding from the American government since 2004. With a total two-way goods trade of \$17.8 billion in 2019, South Africa is the largest U.S. trading partner in Africa. South Africa is home to about 600 American companies, many of which use it as a regional headquarters ("U.S Relations with South Africa").

Ghana and the United States have a strong and enduring friendship. Numerous Ghanaians have received educations in the US. Thousands of gifted Ghanaians have improved their leadership abilities and associated themselves with America thanks to the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) and other exchange programs. With trade

volume reaching \$1.2 billion, one of Ghana's main trading partners is the United States ("US-Ghana Relations").

#### **4.2.1 US Response and Future Trends**

U.S. involvement in Africa must increase in order to compete with Chinese influence there and counter the counterproductive consequences of China's strategy (Sun 6). There are important concerns, however, on which the U.S. might and ought to concentrate. Furthermore, The United States and China should work together more closely to provide technology, support, and assistance in the areas of health care, medical care, and agricultural assistance. In order to lessen the harmful effects of China's commercial strategy, the U.S. must also activate its political, diplomatic, and soft power influences within Africa (Sun 7).

According to Cheng kang-Chun, Blinken claims at a speech in Nigeria that his trip demonstrates that, "the breadth and depth of our connections in Africa, how we're collaborating alongside to find creative responses to new obstacles, and how we're investing in sustainable sources of strength, rather than short-term solutions." Nigeria's foreign minister, Geoffrey Onyeama, expressed his joy at the United States' return to supporting the multilateral system during an interview with Blinken (Cheng).

Pecquet Julian mentions that, President Joe Biden's administration has reacted in recent days by sending out high-ranking officials: Derek Chollet, a State Department counselor, visited Senegal and Mauritania, while Samantha Power, the administrator of the US Agency for International Development, visited East Africa, which is severely affected by a food crisis that has been made worse by the conflict in Ukraine (Pecquet, "Secretary of State Blinken to Unveil New US Strategy").

Through 2027, the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) hopes to raise \$ 600 billion in public and private funding for infrastructure development in developing nations, particularly in Africa. Many of the numerous projects that are currently in the works are in Africa. These consist of: a cooperation between the government of Angola and two US companies, Africa Global Schaffer and Sun Africa, to invest \$2 billion in the construction of new solar facilities in four districts in the country's south; \$14 million in grant funding will be used to build an industrial-scale grow in Senegal to produce vaccines (Pecquet, "G7's \$600bn Infrastructure Plan").

### **4.3 Controversies over China in Africa**

Although China's growing influence in Africa shouldn't necessarily be feared, it should cause the US to reconsider its development policies (Tiboris). Beginning in the early 2000s, China's role increased causing debate concerning geopolitics, because Chinese loans and investments supported dictatorships in Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Angola. When the benefits of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act ended in 2005 after China joined the WTO, the clothing industry in Lesotho collapsed (Uchehara 108-109).

According to Moeletsi Mbeki, the vice chairman of the South African Institute of International Affairs, China is "both a tempting opportunity and a terrifying threat," we sell them raw materials, and they sell us manufactured things." Chinese companies have also been linked to the smuggling of ivory, particularly in Sudan and Zimbabwe. Up to 75% of Sudan's ivory is reportedly purchased by Chinese firms (Uchehara 108-109).

Eno states that, some opponents see China as an attacker (colonizer) seeking out defenseless victim (Africa). Smith, a leaked US diplomatic cable referred to China as a "pernicious economic competitor with no morals." Hillary Clinton has expressed a

similar viewpoint when she warned recipients of Chinese help in China and Africa to “be wary of donors who are more interested in extracting your resources than in building your capacity.” David Smith, accuses China of being greedy and supports his claim by mentioning that, “critics who warn of morally blind resource colonialism” (Eno 23-24).

### **4.3.1 Chinese Debt Trap**

Brahma Chellaney, an Indian pundit, created the phrase “debt-trap diplomacy” in 2017. His justification is as follows: China extends loans that borrowers find difficult to repay in order to deliberately trap developing nations. These loans “are frequently not meant to support the local economy,” and it would be preferable for China if the projects failed. After all, China’s own use increases the more debt smaller nations have to pay. These states are forced to accept terms that make their debt crises “interminable,” leaving them vulnerable to China’s political and economic influence and inferiority (Singh 2).

Moreover; Reasonable concern regarding China’s objectives in Africa has been exacerbated by the lack of transparency in its lending agreements. Chinese contracts include confidentiality agreements that prevent borrowers from revealing the details of a loan or the existence of debt, as Anna Gelpern who is an attorney and lecturer at Georgetown Law claims. However, a lot of Western politicians have used this lack of transparency to spread false information about Chinese lending. Another widespread misconception regarding Chinese lending is that it is taking the place of the West as a lender in Africa (Ezran).

### **4.4 Engagement in competition: Chinese and US pledges to Africa**

According to Ferchen Matt, China’s competitive advantage in Africa is founded on its claims of historical developing-country solidarity with the continent, which have in



turn been supported by a significant rise in trade, investment, and financial ties over the past two decades. For at least ten years, the United States has been struggling back against China's expanding influence in Africa, and under the Trump administration, this fight has increased. While expressing a desire to compete with China in terms of infrastructure, technology, and health care regulation, the Biden administration is turning down the criticism (11).

## **Conclusion**

International politics is heavily influenced by the competition between China and the United States for influence in Africa. Both nations are competing for resources, commercial partnerships and political power in Africa, which has become an entry point in their greater geopolitical rivalry. The US and China's struggle in Africa has an impact on the growth of those nations and how they respond to the conflict. Furthermore, Africa is an essential destination for both superpowers due to its rising economies, huge natural resources, and growing population.

Additionally, Since China is the only country willing and able to compete with the United States increasingly in all spheres; militarily, technologically, diplomatically and of course, economically, Chinese investments is needed in Africa now more than ever.

While China is establishing strong commercial relations and infrastructure projects in Africa, the United States has launched a number of initiatives and programs to compete with China. While China places an emphasis on economic growth and non-interference, the US places an emphasis on democratic institutions and human rights.

Different reactions can be seen throughout Africa regarding the US-China competition. Due to its economic contributions and non-interference attitude, China is regarded as a significant partner by several nations. Others appreciate the US emphasis on governance and human rights but also criticize the US for not keeping its promises and favor China's long-term alliances. Moreover, The US and China compete with one another in Africa in terms of security, politics and economics, with each nation pursuing its own goals and techniques.

The African response to this rivalry is complicated; it includes chances to gain access to resources and leverage, but it also raises worries about exploitation and neo-colonialism. The US and China's competition for control in Africa has broad implications for both the dynamics of global politics and the development of the continent. Furthermore, It's possible to see the US-China rivalry in Africa as a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it offers chances for African nations to seek investment, advance infrastructure development, and expand their cooperation. However, it also raises worries about possible exploitation, neocolonialism and the lack of sovereignty for African countries.

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