

**People's Democratic Republic of Algeria**

**Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research**

**UNIVERSITY OF 8 MAI 1945 / GUELMA**

**جامعة 8 ماي 1945 / قالمة**

**FACULTY OF LETTERS & LANGUAGES**

**كلية الآداب و اللغات**

**DEPARTMENT OF LETTERS AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE**

**قسم الآداب و اللغة الانجليزية**



## **Brexit and the Crisis of European Integration**

**A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Letters and English Language in Partial  
Fulfillment of the Requirements for Master's Degree in Language and Culture**

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**June 2023**

## **Acknowledgment**

First and foremost, we express our gratitude to the Almighty for guiding and empowering us to achieve this feat. We would also like to express our sincere appreciation and indebtedness to our mentor and guide, Dr. DEKHAKHENA Abdelkrim, who served as a beacon of inspiration for this research project and for his unwavering patience, invaluable advice, and undeniable diligence. He had more faith in us than we ever had in ourselves.

We are equally thankful to the esteemed board of examiners, who generously devoted their valuable time to scrutinize and evaluate the final outcome of this study. Our parents, esteemed mentor, and wonderful friends have been an invaluable source of support and encouragement throughout; without them, completing this work would have been a daunting task. We take pride in having something to present.

We extend our special thanks to all the teachers who provided us with support during those times when we felt disheartened.

## **Dedication 1**

First of all, thank God (Alhamdulillah).

Then, I dedicate this work to my beloved family.

To my parents, my father, the person to whom I owe a big debt The one who fought and believed in me, words are not enough to describe. my mom, who has always been there for me. May Allah bless you.

To my brother and my sisters, who have always encouraged me, may Allah bless them, without forgetting their children. May Allah protect them.

To all my friends who have believed in me and in my capacities: Amer, Hako, Khalil, and Seif.

To companions of the path, Kherchiche Oussama and Sahri Bilal, without whom I would not have been able to continue this journey and accomplish this level. Thanks to you, I had the best five years of my life. Thank you for everything you've done for me, and God bless you. You are the best.

To every person who helped me, even with words.

I dedicate this dissertation to you.

**Aissaoui Salah Eddine.**

## **Dedication 2**

To the individuals who raised me and shaped me into the person I am today, and to my parents who stood beside them through the good times and bad, I am grateful for your unwavering support throughout the highs and lows of my life.

I have never doubted my choices, but rather motivated myself to be the best version of myself. The most significant individuals in my life are my parents, Samir DJENDEL and Souad OURALALI, who have always encouraged me to follow my dreams. Without their love and support, I wouldn't be where I am today. They have come a long way.

My siblings, Wassim and Badr Al-Din, have also been my pillars of strength. My grandmother instilled in me a belief in God.

Kherchiche Oussama, my dear friend, has been a great help to us during this challenging time and has not held back in offering assistance. May God protect and bless you, and may you always remain a dear friend to us.

To all my friends, Haitham, Sami, and Hanni, may God bless you with success, Inch'Allah.

**Djendel Ilyes.**

## **Abstract**

Since 2016, Brexit has continued to dominate global politics. The Brexit referendum gave direct electoral voice to the accumulated resentments of populist forces in the United Kingdom against EU rules administered by what its supporters regarded as an elite bureaucracy in Brussels. Their concerns, mainly over budgetary and regulatory issues, overrode the prospect of losing trade benefits from the EU single market. Elsewhere in the European Union populist parties continue to be active, and many of them are Euroskeptic, based largely on immigration and monetary issues. Many right-wing and left-wing populist parties in particular tend to favor protectionism, but will not be in a position to challenge centralized EU trade policy until they gain power in large EU countries. The UK exit from the European Union will weaken a prominent pro-trade voice in the EU Council of Ministers. Conceptually, this dissertation explores the Brexit dilemma, the formalization of Brexit agreements, and the post-Brexit impact on the economy and society. How did Brexit happen? What are the underlying causes of Brexit? Is Brexit connected to Euroscepticism and populism? By evaluating these contexts, important issues and debates can be reconciled to advance knowledge on Brexit, UK politics, the regional political system, and the rise of populism. This dissertation is currently relevant since it coincides with an obvious upsurge in interest in the post-Brexit Global Britain. This dissertation discusses the role Europe's long history of conflict over geography, and national identity.

## الملخص

منذ عام 2016 ، استمر خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي في الهيمنة على السياسة العالمية. من الناحية المفاهيمية. أعطى استفتاء خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي صوتاً انتخابياً مباشراً للاستياء المتراكم للقوى الشعبوية في المملكة المتحدة ضد قواعد الاتحاد الأوروبي التي يديرها ما اعتبره أنصاره بيروقراطية النخبة في بروكسل. لقد طغت مخاوفهم ، وخاصة بشأن المسائل التنظيمية والمتعلقة بالميزانية ، على احتمالية فقدان الفوائد التجارية من السوق الموحدة للاتحاد الأوروبي. في أماكن أخرى من الاتحاد الأوروبي ، لا تزال الأحزاب الشعبوية نشطة ، والعديد منها من المشككين في أوروبا ، ويعتمدون إلى حد كبير على قضايا الهجرة والنقد. تميل العديد من الأحزاب الشعبوية اليمينية واليسارية على وجه الخصوص إلى الحمائية ، لكنها لن تكون في وضع يمكنها من تحدي السياسة التجارية المركزية للاتحاد الأوروبي حتى تكتسب القوة في دول الاتحاد الأوروبي الكبيرة. سيؤدي خروج المملكة المتحدة من الاتحاد الأوروبي إلى إضعاف الصوت البارز المؤيد للتجارة في مجلس وزراء الاتحاد الأوروبي. تستكشف هذه المقالة معضلة خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي ، وإضفاء الطابع الرسمي على اتفاقيات خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي ، وتأثير ما بعد خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي على الاقتصاد والمجتمع. كيف حدث خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي؟ ما هي الأسباب الكامنة وراء خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي؟ هل خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي مرتبط بالشكوكية الأوروبية والشعبوية؟ من خلال تقييم هذه السياقات ، يمكن التوفيق بين القضايا والمناقشات المهمة لتعزيز المعرفة حول خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي ، وسياسة المملكة المتحدة ، والنظام السياسي الإقليمي ، وصعود الشعبوية. هذه المقالة ذات صلة حالياً لأنها تتزامن مع تصاعد واضح في الاهتمام ببريطانيا العالمية بعد خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي. يناقش هذا البحث دور تاريخ أوروبا الطويل في الصراع على الجغرافيا والهوية الوطنية.

### List of Abbreviations

AFD	Alternative Für Deutschland
ANO	Action of Dissatisfied Citizens
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CBI	Confederation of British Industry
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DHLE	Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
ECA	European Communities Act
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
EUWB	European Union Withdrawal Bill
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	Free-Trade Agreement
FTSE	Financial Times Stock Exchange
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JCB	Joseph Cyril Bamford
KT	Krung Thai
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NHS	National Health Service
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PM	Prime Minister
PVV	Party for Freedom

TEF	Teaching Excellence Framework
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UK	United Kingdom
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
USA	United States of America
WTO	World Trade Organization



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## Introduction

The globe has been troubled by the Covid-19 outbreak, but not long ago, another subject dominated headlines across Europe: Brexit. The dust appears to have cleared following the conclusion of trade discussions between the United Kingdom and the European Union at the end of last year, but have the UK-EU relationship truly reached the end? Despite being characterized as primarily a domestic issue in the United Kingdom, the vote by the British people to leave the European Union (EU) has presented the EU with a unique challenge. This has happened at a time when European integration has been beset by crises in the Eurozone and Schengen Area, strained relations with Russia and the United States (USA), and a tide of illiberalism in European states and around the world.

Before the United Kingdom's (UK) referendum, views were expressed that a vote for Leave could bring about significant changes to European integration. On the one hand stood the prospect of the EU unraveling, with the UK's vote triggering similar referendums elsewhere in the EU, perhaps even provoking the Union's disintegration. On the other hand, was the possibility that the UK's withdrawal could lead to the strengthening of the Union by facilitating further integration. The UK has long been described as "an awkward partner" because it has often blocked integration and demanded special treatment or opt-outs. Its exit could remove this road block and provide a much needed boost to those seeking to push European integration forward.

The European Union is a European political and economic bloc that began its path in 1951 and has since expanded to include 28 European countries. The United Kingdom joined the EU in 1973 after France abandoned its rejection of the idea of Britain joining, which remained in force until Charles de Gaulle left the presidency. Since Britain formally joined the Union, its goal has been one of helping to develop the EU economy, but the relationship between the two parties has been volatile. This has resulted in several fears among the British,

such as the burden of migrants and refugees, the fear of terrorism, and the desire to establish their own free trade. The United Kingdom decided, through the EU exit referendum of 23 June 2016, to become its first country to do so, raising major questions and controversy in the world about Britain's future destiny.

Certainly, the issue of Brexit was one of the most prominent events that sparked wide controversy in Europe in general and the United Kingdom in particular. Events between EU member states and the UK led to a referendum on 23 June 2016 to ratify Britain's final withdrawal from the EU, which prompted us to do this academic research. It is important to put what researchers, politicians, journalists and political analysts have said about Brexit and the crisis left by this decision and its effects on both Europe and the United Kingdom, in addition to the political and economic dimensions that will give a general perspective on this topic. This literature review will serve as a cornerstone in order to strengthen our research.

## **2.1 Literature Review**

This work will focus on the state of the process of Brexit, which will include the works of other academics and their understanding of the situation. After that, we will start by defining Euroskepticism, including Soft and Hard Euroskepticism, and analyzing Brexit, also including Soft and Hard Brexit. This analysis will take place with several definitions of authors and a reflection on the definitions.

Starting with state of the dissertation, previous authors already thought that the divorce between EU and UK had to bring nefarious results. According to Nauro F. Campos in his work, *The Economics of Brexit* (2019), estimates that Brexit in the long term is very detrimental for the United Kingdom, but in the short term, they might have uncertainties. In my work, I beg to differ on the uncertainty in the short term, but mainly because you can already analyse the short term status of the UK. It is true that in 2019 the pandemic was not

known, but thanks to Covid-19, UK's economy has plummeted, especially in 2020 (Campos, 2019).

According to John Van Reenen, in his work *Brexit's Long-Run Effects on the U.K. Economy* (2017): "The bottom line is straightforward: Under all plausible scenarios, Brexit will make Britain poorer compared with remaining in the European Union. This is because the United Kingdom will have higher trade costs with its closest neighbours in Europe (which account for about half of all U.K. trade), and this will reduce its trade and, therefore, welfare. The magnitude of these losses will outweigh the modest benefits of lower net fiscal transfers to the EU budget" (p.368). As this statement implies, the divorce will be again catastrophic for the UK due to the loss of potential trade for the Islands.

Continuing for the consequences for the EU, Neill Nugent (2018), in his work, *Brexit and Beyond*, states: "Brexit is clearly a major crisis for the EU. It is so not only because it is the first time a Member State has sought to withdraw from the Union, but also because the state concerned is a large and powerful Member State whose withdrawal will have damaging political and economic implications for the EU's standing and influence" (p. 54).

This means that for the author, Brexit will have negative political and economic consequences for the Union, as one of the most powerful countries of the EU has left. 10 Economically speaking, that might be true, but only because the EU loses its superpower status as it has lost one of the countries that allowed the EU to be considered a superpower. After the state has been commented on, the analysis of the words Euroskepticism and Brexit will take place. (Campos, 2019; Nugent, 2018; Van Reenen, 2020)

### **Purpose of the Study**

The United Kingdom and the European Union have a very complex relationship over the course of their entire history. From geographic, historical or political differences, the United Kingdom has always felt different from its neighbors. However, given the current state



of affairs, the differences that have always characterized the UK within the EU might become the future challenges for European integrity. The UK has finally exited the European Union, which leaves not only an open wound for the EU's cohesion but also indicates the possibility for other countries to take the example of the United Kingdom (De Vries, 2018). In this dissertation, we will analyse the impact Brexit has left on the European Union regarding its unity and integrity, focusing on Euroskepticism and populism.

### **Hypothesis**

Going back to the research question, "What are the consequences of Brexit for both the European Union and the United Kingdom evaluated through the prism of Euroskepticism?" My research tries to prove that the United Kingdom has stagnated economically, but the European Union will suffer a rise in Euroskepticism. Continuing with the objectives of the thesis, this thesis has the main aim of finding out whether or not Brexit has been detrimental to the European Union and its Integrity.

Other objectives include the analysis of the Covid-19 hiatus, as the quarantine separated all the countries at once, and one could argue that this quarantine may have got an effect that may be the complete opposite as Brexit. On the other hand, thanks to the quarantine, the European integrity and Brexit may have also given a positive aspect on being European, as the EU has helped the countries in the EU that needed it the most. This would traduce in an objective of finding out the impact of Brexit pre and post quarantine, as it can be an indicator of a possible change on the topic.

### **Research Questions:**

Brexit can be catalogued as one of the biggest obstacles, if not the biggest, that the EU has ever handled regarding EU's unity. At the moment of the writing, there is still considerable uncertainty on the events, as the independence of the United Kingdom did not impact how it should have been due to Covid-19. Right now, there is a big question whether

or not the European Union will suffer future schisms in the integrity of its member states or if Brexit could help achieve better integration with the remaining European States (De Vries, 2018).

This opens up the question: What are the consequences of Brexit for both the European Union and the United Kingdom evaluated through the prism of Euroskepticism and populism? The implications for European integration and EU policies are far from clear and require further investigation. This paper aims to answer: what does Brexit imply for European integration? What messages were sent to the EU from the UK referendum? Did EU leaders interpret these messages and implications correctly and did they respond with the right policy? This work aims to delve into Brexit and analyse the effects of Brexit and the risks and gains resulting from Brexit, and try to understand the motives that led to the occurrence of Brexit, as this research will reveal issues related to Brexit, political and economic consequences, and to the popular referendum on this decision.

Concerning this global event and its major development in Europe in general and in the European Union in particular, implications, challenges and bets of the exit, raised several questions that we try through this research to answer and the most prominent of these questions as follows: How did the Brexit affect the EU and Britain? What is the main purpose of Brexit? Is Brexit hurting the UK economy? Who will Brexit affect the most? What rights will be lost after Brexit? Is UK doing well after Brexit? Has Brexit caused inflation in the UK? Is Britain still under EU law? What is the future of European integration and Brexit is Brexit only Brexit? After Brexit who wins the break-up? What is the new relationship between the UK and the EU? How Brexit will affect the European integration?

### **Division of Work**

In order to answer these questions, the first part of the thesis will analyze the causes of the event in a legal, economic, and socio-political scope, accompanied by its historical

background. After an analysis of the causes has been made, the analysis of the impact will be done. The primary analysis will focus on the impact of Brexit in both the United Kingdom and the European Union. It will be divided into three main parts: the direct impact from the trade deal, which aims to analyze effects that the TCA created; An economic analysis, in which I will evaluate the economic performance of the United Kingdom to show the impact from the TCA, concluding with a socio-political analysis, where the results of the last European Parliament elections will be analyzed, with a brief analysis of the Eurobarometer on specific topics. After the principal analysis has been made, the conclusions will take place. After the conclusion, a brief prospect on the future will take place.

The present work comprises a general introduction, three well-balanced chapters, and a general conclusion. The first chapter of the thesis focuses on the Origins of European populism, Brexit, and the demand for Referendum. It aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of these phenomena by offering a detailed background information on the subject matter. Moreover, it seeks to formulate a general idea that will serve as a foundation for the following chapters. On the other hand, the second chapter deals with the Political process of Brexit and the Brexit Dilemma. It also analyzes the changes in Brexit policies, such as the ideological shift in Defence and Foreign Affairs, by conducting a discourse analysis of the Prime Minister's and other presidents' speeches, rhetoric, tweets, and the like. Additionally, it includes analysts' judgments who are experts in the same field of research. Meanwhile, the third chapter examines Brexit as a European phenomenon and illustrates the observations through case studies of Brexit and its Implications for European Integration, post-Brexit challenges, and the UK's issue.

## Chapter one

### Brexit and the Roots of European Populism

Populism became a relevant political force in Europe in the late 1990s, and the fall of the Soviet Union led to a rise in populism across Central and Eastern Europe. The collapse of Marxism-Leninism also contributed to the growth of left-wing populism across Europe. The United Kingdom's vote to leave the EU demonstrates that rising populism in Europe and the United States are both driven by voters who feel alienated from the benefits of globalization, says CFR's Edward Alden. On June 23, the British people defied expectations by voting to leave the European Union. The hotly contested referendum was marked by the rise of a populism based on the desire to regain control of immigration and reclaim national sovereignty from international institutions. The UK's Euroscepticism also parallels the anti-immigration and anti-trade sentiment surging the United States, both of which are driven by "individuals who feel like they have been on the losing end of globalization,"

The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) had been characterised as a right-wing populist party (McDonnell 2015; Bossetta 2017). with it achieving increased success leading up to the Brexit referendum due to this adoption of populism under the direction of Nigel Farage from 2006 with the party highly capitalising on the increasing immigration concerns in the UK following the EU enlargement of 2004 (Fetzer 2017). After the 2016 UK referendum on membership of the European Union, in which British citizens voted to leave, some have claimed the "Brexit" as a victory for populism, encouraging a flurry of calls for referendums among other EU countries by populist political parties (Foster et al. 2016).

#### 1.1. Definition of the European Populism

Scholars define populism in a variety of ways, including as a body of beliefs, a narrow-minded populist philosophy, a category of political tactics, a discourse, or a mode

of conduct (Gidron, Bonikowski, 1). The idea that society is ultimately divided into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and that politics should be an expression of the “*volonté générale*” (general will) of the people, is described as populism in the definition that is most frequently used (Mudde 543).

However, Mudde contends that because populism lacks the sophistication of other ideologies like socialism or liberalism, it is a thin-centred ideology that could be mixed with other political beliefs and ideas (Mudde 7). The division of society into “us” and “them” is the core characteristic of populism, and this definition is adequate insofar as it recognizes that populism must always be combined with a “thick” ideology in order to give it substance. In addition to this vertical dimension, populism may also have a second horizontal cultural dimension where “the pure people” (those who are morally upright) are differentiated from “others” (those who are morally “bad” and dangerous) who are said to be endangering “the people” and their way of life (Mudde 7). Or as Sengul writes, the radical right's populism is distinguished by the presence of the “Other,” which depends on specific historical traditions in specific national, regional, and local contexts. However, both left and right populisms are characterized by the antagonistic pitting of “the people” vs. “the elite”.

Thus, populism is a “thin” ideology that pits a moral and homogeneous populace against a group of powerful elites and perilous “others” who are all represented as robbing the sovereign populace of their rights, values, wealth, identity, and voice. Populist leaders present themselves as protectors of their sovereignty, saviours of “the people,” and defenders of the “good” and “common” people against their “corrupt” and “other” foes. Thus, efforts are made to transform politics into a Manichean and existential conflict between the forces of good and evil, represented by “the people” on the one hand and “elites” and “others” on the other (Mudde 7). Insofar as it elevates the “will of the people” and puts it above all other factors,

such as minority rights and, occasionally, the rule of law, populism is a form of democratic politics. Given this, populism frequently appears during perceived crises, when the government or ruling class is perceived to be failing to satisfy the needs of the majority, or when populists are successful in creating a crisis (Gidron, Bonikowski, 18).

### **1.1.1. The History of European Populism**

Populism emerged in Europe during the interwar years, with far-right parties and groups opposing elite class privileges and positions. This narrative technique emerged in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. After World War II, populist political parties established their own factions, severing ties with extreme right-wing parties. Populist parties emerged in the late 1980s and increased their power over the ensuing 30 years, significantly impacting campaigns and public policy. Populist positions and ideas have evolved over the past three decades, reflecting changes in political trends and societal balance. Populists' positions and ideas have evolved alongside changes in political trends and societal balance. For example, the National Front in France, the Swiss People's Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, and the Austrian Freedom Party all adhered to the fundamental rationale of exclusivity, which is a reaction against the flood of immigrants altering the nation-state's social structure and creating conflicts of economic rights and interests. This exclusivity later expanded into more general contexts, such as mistrust of interregional collaboration, such as the European Union and European integration (Zhao 228).

### **1.1.2. The Rise of Populism in Europe**

Since the 1990s, populism has become more prevalent in Europe. The roots date back to the early 1970s, though. Mudde claims that it has become such a “regular feature of politics in western democracies” that he was able to identify a “populist.” Comparatively speaking, Europe is one of the continents where populism is most pervasive today. The emergence and

electoral success of right-wing populist parties, with the French Front National, established in 1972, serving as one of the earliest examples, are closely related to the rise of populism in Europe.

Neoliberal populist parties like Forza Italia and those from the left, primarily in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis, are two examples of populist parties that have emerged from the mainstream. Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain are two other examples. The birthplace of the philosophically more moderate “centrist populism” is Central and Eastern Europe. Overall, Europe's populism is distinguished by its variety. Over one-third of European populist parties were included in a national administration in 2019; in the interim, they have spread to the centres of political power. However, even in places where they weren't, the mainstream parties' policies are likely to have been influenced by their election success. Populism has grown at the European level in addition to the national level, posing a threat to the EU's democratic system and decision-making in the European Parliament, the European Council, and the Commission (Pintsch et al. 408, 409).

### **1.1.3. Populism in European Union**

Western Europe recognized that false mechanisms were not an assumed option after the Second World War, leading to the rise of populism. This led to the rise of populism in the West, which has gained ground despite not being explicitly labeled as such. The fear of capture is an old one, and the state is concerned that interest groups will be successful in capturing a particular area of public affairs. The established political parties, who see themselves as the guardians of democracy, practice blind inbreeding and fail to recognize that populism is more than just a passing fad. Populism has grown significantly since the most recent elections in Germany and the Czech Republic. Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a new right-populist party established in 2013, received 12,9% of the vote and was admitted to the Bundestag, where it currently holds 94 seats. An extreme right group gained seats in the

German parliament for the first time since 1945. Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO), a more recent right populist group in the Czech Republic, defeated the country's traditional parties. There was a decline in populism in eight nations, but only in two of those instances was the decline noticeable: from 40,2% to 17,2% in Slovakia and from 32,1% to 21,7% in France (Pinto 58).

The only other instances of decline were minor ones in Luxemburg, Austria, Romania, Belgium, Slovenia, and Cyprus. The Index of Authoritarian Populism reveals left and right populism in twenty-seven nations in the European Union, excluding Malta. Belgium is one of them and shows a split between right and left Populism. In the remaining 26 nations, right populism predominates in 15 of them, including Hungary, Poland, Denmark, Austria, France, Finland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovenia; the left populism takes hold in 11 of them, including Italy, Cyprus, Greece, Spain, and the Czech Republic. The parliamentary elections in October 2017 were won by the right-populist Akce nespokojených občanů (ANO) party, established by billionaire Oligarch Andrej Babis.

The extreme right-wing Freedom and Direct Democracy party has more than quadrupled its representation in Portugal, Romania, Germany, Croatia, the Republic of Ireland, and Luxemburg since the previous election in 2013. In contrast to what is happening in Latin America, right-wing Populism predominates in the European Union, assuming that the predominance of one side of the spectrum does not invalidate the existence of populism with an opposing ideological drive. However, the dominance of right-wing populism does not preclude the presence of populist parties in the European Union that are comparable to those in Latin America (Pinto 59).

## **1.2. Brexit and Demand for Referendum**



Brexit, a portmanteau of the words “British” and “exit”, was created to describe the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union on June 23, 2016 EU. Brexit happened at eleven o’clock. 31 January 2020, Greenwich Mean Time. A preliminary free-trade agreement was reached between the UK and the EU on December 24, 2020, guaranteeing the free exchange of goods without tariffs or quotas. Yet, important aspects of the future relationship, such as trade in services, which account for 80% of the British economy, are still undetermined. This avoided a no-deal Brexit, which would have severely harmed the British economy.

Brexit is the abbreviation for Britain leaving the European Union. Brexit occurred on January 31, 2020, as a result of the nation’s referendum in June 2016. 51.9% of voters’ voted to leave the EU, while 48.1% chose to stay. The terms of a divorce agreement were discussed in negotiations between the U.K. and the EU between 2017 and 2019. After Brexit, there was a transition period that ended on December 31, 2020. Brexit and its repercussions continue to dominate international and domestic policy in the UK and the EU on both a political and economic front. On June 23, 2016, a public referendum in which 72.2% of eligible voters participated saw the United Kingdom decide to leave the European Union (EU). Should the UK leave the European Union or remain a member? was the question posed to UK citizens. Whereas in the UK, 48.1% of voters chose to stay in the EU, compared to 51.9% who chose to leave (Alex Hunt, Brian Wheeler 4).

### **1.2.1 What Is Brexit and Why Did it Happen?**

The phrase "Brexit" is widely used in the UK and globally, with the term "Brexit" being derived from the Greek exit from the euro. The relationship between the UK and the EU has been tumultuous, with London avoiding Brussels by securing exemptions from EU core principles. However, a resurgence of Euroscepticism has been stoked by the EU's erratic

response to recent crises. Brexit supporters claimed that the UK would be better able to control immigration, be free from onerous laws, and spur more dynamic growth if it reclaimed its national sovereignty. The Brexit campaign won the June 2016 referendum, leading to turmoil in financial markets and the resignation of Prime Minister Theresa May. The UK's decision to leave the EU was influenced by rhetoric around immigration and British economic independence, which were the main justifications put forth by the Brexit campaign to engender fear and skepticism among voters (Day 32).

### **1.2.1.1. Immigration**

The Leave campaign aimed to incite panic and xenophobia in Britain about the increasing number of EU citizens and refugees. The narrative was designed to incite anxiety among British nationals, as high levels of immigration would result in fewer jobs, lower salaries, and insufficient public services. The EU reported that 2.1 million EU citizens were employed in the UK, but the Leave campaign distorted this data and claimed that immigrants were stealing jobs and driving down wages. This demonstrates that jobs are not a zero-sum game, and the British welfare system may be exploited by EU immigrants. The campaign portrayed non-EU immigrants as a danger to personal and national security, instilling mistrust and dread. The number of refugees trying to enter the country has increased, and UK Independence Party member Nigel Farage produced a dramatic anti-immigrant poster a month before the referendum (Day 33).

### **1.2.1.2. Economic Independence**

The Brexit Leave campaign won the UK's economy despite EU membership's economic advantages, claiming it imposed too many rules and charged billions of pounds annually for little return. The campaign aimed to reclaim control over its trade agreements and restructure its economic system, but its figures were incorrect. The Leave campaign argued that reclaiming control over trade agreements would lead to increased economic stability and


corporate development, leading to the Brexit vote being referred to as a "protest vote," with economic independence being the most persuasive case. In 2016, a referendum was held to determine whether the UK should leave or remain a member of the European Union.

The majority of the population voted for Leave, with 71.8% of the vote taking part. Factors influencing the vote included trade, immigration, trade integration, and the exposure of structural funds to the EU's local public service delivery and financial consolidation. Immigrants from the EU subsidized public spending and contributed to lowering the fiscal deficit, but the Leave campaign often referenced the demand for public services. The outcome is uncertain, but it suggests that older voters are more likely to vote for Brexit. Additionally, those with less education may struggle with globalization and its negative effects. Wages, economic structure, and unemployment also play a role in voter preferences, with regions experiencing economic deterioration responding favorably to the Brexit campaign (Days 34, 35).

Brexit was the abbreviation for the "British exit" from the European Union, an economic and political bloc to which the United Kingdom had belonged since 1973. When the U.K. decided to exit the EU on June 23, 2016, that situation changed. The locals came to the conclusion that the advantages of free commerce did not outweigh the disadvantages of immigration freedom. 17.4 million people voted to leave, compared to 16.1 million who wanted to stay in the country (Kimberly Amadeo).

The Conservative Party requested the referendum in 2015. The majority of Brexit supporters were older, working-class citizens who lived in rural areas of England. They claimed that people from poorer nations were stealing employment and benefits, which is why they were terrified of immigrants and refugees moving freely. EU fees also irritated small firms. Some believed that leaving the EU would lead to job growth. According to many, the UK contributed more to the EU than it took out. London, Scotland, and Northern Ireland were

the main voting regions for those who wanted to stay in the EU. The majority of EU immigrants, they argued, were young and eager to work, and they supported free trade with the EU. Most people believed that the UK's standing abroad would suffer if it left the EU (Kimberly Amadeo).




Source: (Becker,

et al.)

**Figure 1. Map of the Leave Share (In %) Cross Local Authority Areas in the 2016 EU Referendum**

### 1.2.2. Brexit Referendum Results

There were 48.1% votes to stay in the EU and 51.9% votes to leave it in the referendum on the UK's membership in the EU, which was conducted on June 23, 2016, with a turnout of 72.2%. even though it wasn't formally a referendum The government's decision to leave the



**Figure 2. Map of turnout (in %) across local authority areas in the 2016 EU referendum**

EU is legally binding. The choice was supported by a parliamentary act of authorization. The parliaments of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland were not consulted on the issue. The referendum's results were not distributed equally among the UK. While voters in Scotland and Northern Ireland preferred to remain members of the EU, Wales and England chose to leave.

Except for London and Gibraltar, every local authority area in Scotland voted to “Remain,” whereas every local authority area in England chose to “Leave” (Backer et al, 611).

**Table 1. Proportion of the votes on referendum of UK’s membership in EU**

**Source: (Uberoi, Elise)**

	<b>Leave</b>	<b>Remain</b>
<b>England</b>	53.4%	46.6%
<b>Wales</b>	52.5%	47.5%
<b>Scotland</b>	38%	62%
<b>Northern Ireland</b>	44.2%	55.8%
<b>National result</b>	51.9%	48.1%

The authors claim that changes in perception of European integration it causes as a result of the national referendum outcomes and regional disparities regarding them. The implementation of British citizens’ June 2015 vote will have extensive and challenging consequences to forecast outcomes across several domains. We concentrate on shifts in the belief that European integration is an irreversible path. We examine the legal system of Brexit and its potential impact on the breakup of the UK. We can evaluate the justification for Brexit and the future structure of EU-UK ties through economic and legal analysis (Kuźnar, Menkes 320).

### **1.2.3. What Effect Does Brexit Have on the Economy?**

Brexit has significantly impacted the UK economy, affecting employment, trade, investments, exports, imports, and overall economic performance. Businesses worry about

losing access to the EU single market, which leads to decreased employment opportunities. Cross-border trade becomes more expensive and time-consuming due to customs checks and regulatory differences. The financial services sector experiences shift in investment and job relocations, while exports and imports face increased paperwork and compliance requirements. The UK's long-term effects depend on its ability to negotiate new trade agreements, establish its global position, and adapt to the changes brought about by Brexit.

### **1.2.3.1 Positive Effect**

When the UK leaves the EU, the danger that the Euro will raise the cost of production and negatively impact the British economy will be reduced because the UK does not use the currency. Instead of being bound by the convoluted rules and regulations of the EU, Britain will have more freedom to negotiate free trade deals with nations outside of the union. According to *The Economist*, the UK's GDP could rise by 1.6% if it could successfully negotiate a free trade deal with Europe. Britain will be able to choose its borders, TCs, and immigration policy after it leaves the EU. You won't have to wait for the 27 additional partner states to approve your solution to their issues.

The UK is no longer subject to the occasionally strict EU regulations and will not be affected by the unrest or scandals that have happened in other member states. Additionally, if the UK decides to leave the EU, it will no longer be required to pay £ 8.5 billion into the EU's shared budget; instead, the British want to use this money to improve the country's healthcare or education systems. The British national identity was maintained despite the less intense competition between the native population and immigrants for employment, housing, and social benefits. According to those who support leaving the EU, the danger from terrorism will diminish if they are no longer a member of the EU. He will also be seen as a secure

haven from European financial risks, luring investors and driving up the value of the pound (Hoang Tien et al, 16).

### **1.2.3.2. Negative Effects and Risks on British Economy**

The exchange rate between the pound and the US dollar fell to its lowest level since May 9, 1985, immediately after the vote results were announced, down 12% from before June 23, 2016. Not only the pound but also the euro fell in value, while bullion, the US dollar, and particularly the Japanese yen all rose. EU and UK economic development both slowed. The OECD estimates that by 2018, the UK economy had shrunk by almost 1.5%; Brexit will also lower the KT “Krung Thai Asset Management European Equity Fund” (KT-EURO) of the Euro Zone area by 1%, the BRICS group by 0.6%, Japan by 0.5%, and the US by 0.2%. Even worse is the IMF's prediction for England (Hoang Tien et al, 16).

According to the organization, the UK's economy will expand by 5.6% less in 2019. Economic activity is significantly reduced, and investment is negatively impacted by the poor pound of sterling. The UK's GDP is now 2% smaller than it was previously. GDP shrank by 800 million pounds (\$1 billion) per week, or \$4.7 million (\$6 million) per hour. In the context of weak growth and more challenging export circumstances, which could negatively affect a number of sectors, including TC, exports, retail, and real estate, stock markets also run the risk of falling.

Bond buyers around the world, primarily in Asia, Europe, and the US, started to become concerned about the effects of Brexit on UK companies and banks in particular, as well as the European banking system in general, at a time when public opinion in the UK was still split over whether or not Britain should leave the EU. The UK will experience a sharp rise in import taxes, challenging trade talks, and decreased commerce with other nations. 48% of UK exports to EU nations and 47% of UK purchases from EU nations were reported to UK



Trade as of April 2016. Due to the UK's weaker position at the negotiating table in terms of economy and technology, tariff preferences may be suspended after it leaves the EU, making future TM negotiations challenging (Hoang Tien et al, 16).

Additionally, since the current global trade tendency is more about negotiations between blocs than between countries, the process of negotiating trade with the rest of the world will take a long time. According to the British Reserve, Brexit will cause Britain's GDP to fall by 6% by 2030. Approximately 1.2 million Britons and 3 million Europeans, respectively, presently reside in other EU nations. They are able to travel with papers as simply as possible because of the union's rules. The majority, however, will lose their employment and be forced to leave the UK if the current British immigration law is applied to EU citizens after Brexit. On the other hand, some British emigrants risk losing their ability to remain in the EU and may even face deportation. The likelihood that the top talent in Europe will relocate to the UK to work will be hampered by Brexit. More than 10,000 banking-related jobs will be lost in the UK.

The conflicts that arise during the Brexit event between the UK and EU will have a negative impact on a number of other industries, including mechanics, building, healthcare, and services. About 950,000 positions were lost as a result of the labour market's instability, raising the unemployment rate to 3%. Additionally, one of London's greatest concerns following Brexit will be the loss of passport rights. The UK will lose thousands of jobs and billions of pounds in profits if the passport rights are removed, making it less of a financial hub for Europe (Hoang Tien et al, 16).

According to EU passport rights for financial services, approximately 5,500 businesses are authorized to operate in the UK and generate a profit of £9 billion. Free commerce between European nations will be restricted and risky if the EU is left behind. The export of British

products is more difficult and expensive than that of other European nations due to trade barriers. According to experts, the UK may lose its credit rating, KT will decline over the next five years, it will experience losses of up to £ 100 billion, or 5% of GDP, GDP will decline by 4-10%, and the value of the pound will decline by 20%. When leaving a powerful EU trade union, Great Britain will run the serious danger of losing its influence on the world stage.

In the past, the UK profited from the EU because it was seen as a reputable financial hub, bringing money to the fields of tourism, education, training, and, most significantly, the real estate market. This promotes FDI inflows, GDP development, and high-quality employment in the UK. When a country leaves the EU, this benefit is lost and suffers from a decline in FDI, which lowers total investment and slows GDP development. There was a tremble on the UK stock exchange as well. Since the referendum, the FTSE 250 index, the stock index of businesses that primarily generate profits in the UK, has decreased by 10%. The groups that seem to be suffering the most are, in particular, the banks. Bank shares, including those of Lloyds, Barclays, and Royal Bank of Scotland, fell by 21%, 20%, and 18%, respectively. Since the referendum, the debt in England has grown to £ 935 billion, according to experts. This could limit the ability of businesses to raise wages and hire more workers, as well as place pressure on the dividend value they give their shareholders (Hoang Tien et al., 17).

Consumer and investor confidence are badly impacted by uncertainty, which lowers aggregate demand and hurts the UK economy. Uncertainty about new trade restrictions may discourage foreign direct investment, which would decrease openness and innovation. Markets in third-country countries, financial sector laws, and service transactions could all be impacted. Loss of preferential access to markets in foreign countries following Brexit may result in new obstacles in trade negotiations. With immigration accounting for half of the

UK's GDP growth since 2005, cutting back on net transfers to the EU would only result in modest savings (W. Chang 14).

To conclude, Brexit actually occurred, and at 11 p.m. on January 31, 2020, the United Kingdom formally exited the European Union. After reviewing and evaluating a number of reports and assessments, it is evident that a British exit from the EU would result in significant economic and political costs, affect the UK/EU relationship, and have an influence on the UK in a number of ways. The British exit from the European Union will undoubtedly have an impact on immigration as well as the UK economy. Additionally, the UK's sovereignty will change in numerous ways.

## Chapter Two

### Brexit Political Process and Brexit Dilemma

The current chapter attempts to adequately comprehend Brexit's stakes and all of its dimensions while addressing its political and economic ramifications. The primary issue that was methodically addressed in the current chapter was how the Brexit affected the EU, what ultimately resulted in the EU vote in 2016, and the Brexit, as well as whether or not the UK left the EU. The dissertation tries to forecast how the two sides' connections will develop in the future. The current chapter intends to accomplish a number of objectives, including analyzing the Brexit referendum and, in particular, its political and economic repercussions, examining UK policy toward the EU, and identifying commonalities among the major crises.

#### 2.1. Brexit Political Process

The Brexit referendum was an electoral process designed to offer voters the option to choose between the alternatives of "remain" and "leave," both of which were purportedly similar "containers" with different policy contents. The vote would be fair and democratic if these binary ballot options were of equal "magnitude," as determined by the official standards set for referendums. To select two official campaign groups that could be trusted to impartially fill the two "standard-sized" Brexit alternatives, the UK Electoral Commission was called upon. The Electoral Commission authorized these strategies by approving "Britain Stronger In" (also known as "Remain") and "Vote Leave" (also known as "Leave"), which may have persuaded voters that they were both dependable and viable policy options. The Electoral Commission's authorization of Vote Leave as the official departure campaign during the referendum created a "straw covering" that made it difficult for many voters to see through it, preventing them from realizing that the Leave option was a deliberate deception and an empty vessel (Baines et al 744).

Policy deception occurs when voters believe that a nonsensical policy option is valid despite the fact that it is not supported by anything that can be delivered in the ways that were promised. Baines and his companions asserted that Cameron's poor political judgment, which compelled him to organize an EU referendum with a bogus "Leave" option, served as the initial catalyst for the Leave option policy deceit. McConnell believes that political failures occur when unfavorable policy outcomes affect parties' and individuals' ability to gain or retain power. Cameron's personal choice to call for the Brexit vote resulted in his own political failure, necessitating him to step down from his role as prime minister due to three main factors: he chose the referendum policy option despite the existence of other alternatives; he made the politically unnecessary decision to make the referendum result binding for all parties; and he chose not to lead the Remain campaign (747).

According to Kuzemko, Blondeel, et al, the six-year-old political process of Brexit is projected to have a variety of effects on UK policy. This article details the effects of Brexit on the UK's sustainable energy policy and contends that the country must strike a balance between leaving the EU while adhering to certain "red lines" and maintaining as many membership perks as is practical. These assessments show that Brexit is part of a balancing act for the UK: it must leave the EU while adhering to predetermined "red lines" and preserving as many membership perks as feasible. Through the integration of knowledge from de-Europeanization, Brexit policy studies, and the political economy of Brexit literature, this essay proposes a conceptual framework for recognizing policy changes brought about by Brexit. With the help of the framework, we can categorize UK policy before the withdrawal into five interconnected dimensions and pinpoint three overarching political themes.

In the third section, the writers apply the framework to UK sustainable energy policy to determine which elements are most likely to change after the country leaves the EU. The Europeanized viewpoint is then contrasted with a sustainable energy strategy in March 2022,

the time of writing. This approach enables us to understand Brexit as it actually happens while keeping in mind the bigger picture of COVID-19. A new area of policy, sustainable energy policy in the UK, connects traditional energy policy and climate change mitigation policy. It includes an energy strategy that helps the UK achieve its legally obligated decarbonization goals while also helping to achieve energy policy goals of affordability and/or supply security. Given the UK's failure to meet legally binding decarbonization targets, the delicate balancing act between political objectives is of utmost importance, particularly as households grapple with escalating energy prices and energy poverty.

Although energy and climate policy were not key factors in the Brexit decision, the UK and EU have generally shared similar views on climate ambition and energy liberalization. This article examines the impact of Brexit on UK policy, offering a conceptual framework for identifying policy implications by combining macro-scale political economy debates with meso-scale policy insights from energy and climate studies. The article also sheds light on why certain policy areas are more affected by Brexit than others, as well as the significant political effort required to construct and implement Brexit and its implications for UK policy capacity (Kuzemko et al, 548 ,549).

Brummer argues that rigid leaders with poor information collection and processing skills are more likely to result in foreign policy disasters. Despite objections from coalition partners, advisors, and even eurosceptic conservatives, David Cameron decided to proceed with his intentions to organize an EU referendum in order to address “party management issues” without any wiggle room. Instead, Cameron enjoyed a comfortable run of political success thanks to his victories in the 2011 Alternative Vote referendum and the 2014 Scottish referendum, as well as his surprising victory in the 2015 general election. This theory is consistent with the prevalent accusation that Cameron was a risk-taker in politics. He believed that by allowing voters to choose between staying in or leaving, he could allay their concerns

about the Eurosceptics in his party, provide a less extreme political alternative to the UK Independence Party, and put an end to the escalating political unrest. However, by telling Whitehall not to prepare for a vote to leave the EU, Cameron's government engaged in a gross act of negligence and increased uncertainty regarding the effects of Brexit (747.749).

The Treasury report, which was published in April 2016, merely provided an overview of the economic implications of three different models and did not fully assess the viability of the leave option. Oliver Letwin, a former cabinet office minister, told the committee that no orders for Brexit plans were made because it was probable that they would leak and be perceived as an unauthorized intrusion into the referendum campaign. Cameron's refusal to start and finish the processes required to make "Leave" a policy option to be adopted before the 2016 vote constitutes a triple instance of process failure. First off, there was no procedure in place for any member state to leave the EU, making this ballot choice "baseless" in Searle's definition. Second, Cameron personally negotiated with the EU and reached agreements on terms for staying, not leaving. Third, the renegotiated Remain option was more politically feasible than the Leave alternative that was on the ballot paper. Although the metaphorical Leave bottle was empty, Cameron never anticipated it being opened; hence, its empty state was irrelevant (749).

According to Brigid Laffan The EU swiftly adjusted to the shock of Brexit, and it was determined to negotiate an orderly exit while defending its interests and preferences. The Union responded to Brexit by implementing all three governance orders. By laying out the broad parameters for withdrawal, Article 50 provided the meta-governance of Brexit. Institutional structures and procedural frameworks mirrored second-order governance. The union's negotiation strategy was centered on principles, rules, and process. It used its collective power to accomplish its objectives. Before the formal discussions began, the Union

established the procedural framework for the talks and established a Brexit institutional ecosystem that protected the remainder of the EU's economy from Brexit.

In order to perform its research and get ready for the discussions, it made use of its position as a knowledge institution, including the Commission. In order to get the results, it desired. The union also adopted time limits and an organized approach to the negotiations. The daily administration of the complicated and intensive steering of Brexit over more than three years was reflected in first-order governance. The early framing of this significant political event by the Union, which allowed the EU-27 to unite over a set of fundamental perceptions of what Brexit meant, was crucial to the governance of Brexit. It's important to note that the Union turned an endogenous shock into an exogenous one (Laffan 87).

### **2.1.1. Withdrawal Process**

According to Enes Güzel, President at Circle Foundation UK the details of the UK's withdrawal from the EU are set forth in the withdrawal agreement (Güzel 10). It provides assurance that the withdrawal will occur in a timely way and Legal certainty once the UK is exempt from the provisions of the treaties and EU legislation All aspects of the UK's withdrawal from the EU are covered by the withdrawal agreement, including Protocols, Gibraltar, Cyprus, the financial statement, a transition phase The exit agreement needs to be ratified by both the UK and the EU in order to become effective. The European Council approved both the political declaration outlining the framework for the future partnership and the withdrawal agreement on November 25, 2018. In the UK, the contentious Brexit deal proposed by the government was scheduled for a vote by parliament on December 11. Due to a lack of support, Theresa May did not vote on the Brexit deal until later. The following day, May visited Brussels. That an impasse Brexit is a likely scenario (Güzel 11).



The authors explained the cause of Cameron's political downfall and argue that his poor choices resulted in a widespread deception during the Brexit referendum. McConnell believes that political failures occur when unfavourable policy results affect parties' and individuals' ability to gain or keep power. They argued that Cameron's personal decision to call for the Brexit vote led to his own political failure, which forced him to resign from his position as prime minister. Three main factors contributed to this. Firstly, Cameron can be held responsible for this failure because he chose the referendum policy option himself despite other options being available. Secondly, he made the politically unnecessary decision to make the referendum's outcome binding on all parties. Thirdly, by choosing not to lead the Remain campaign, he could have distanced himself from the referendum's outcome without risking his position as prime minister. As a result of these factors, Cameron's decision to support Brexit has been referred to as a "major misjudgement." (Güzel 11).

The Labour Party's stance on the matter is to force a general election and renegotiate a Brexit deal with Brussels rather than have a second referendum, despite the fact that the public strongly favours it. Despite the fact that many Labour MPs favour calling for a second vote, Corbin's ambivalence can be interpreted as a de facto endorsement of Brexit in general. The most ardent supporter of a second Brexit referendum has been the so-called "People's Vote" movement. The "People's Vote" campaign, which is supported by a large number of MPs, including former Prime Minister Tony Blair, claims that the only way to resolve the impasse is by a second referendum.

The People's Vote movement organized thousands of people to march in London in October to demand a second referendum in order to accomplish their goal. There are certain cabinet members who are receptive to the concept of a second referendum, including Philip Hammond, Amber Rudd, and Greg Clark, despite the fact that Prime Minister May rejects the idea, claiming that "it would do irreparable damage to our democracy and break people's

faith” (Stewart, 2018). These individuals, along with others in the current government, may have a say in whether or not a second referendum is held if May’s Brexit plan is rejected by parliament. It’s also crucial to keep in mind that a second referendum would require a postponement of the March 29<sup>th</sup> withdrawal date, requiring the consent of all 27 EU member states (Güzel 11). The Treaty on European Union’s Article 50 stipulates that “any member state may decide to withdraw from the Union in conformity with its own constitutional requirements,” but in order to do so, member states must go through specific political and legal processes..

According to European Council standards, the EU must negotiate and reach an agreement with any nation that informs the bloc of its decision to leave, including the terms of the exit and the institutional basis for any future relations. The UK government triggered Article 50 in March 2017 in response to the Brexit referendum, with the official withdrawal date set for March 29, 2019. Negotiating an exit agreement within two years after invoking Article 50 was certainly unachievable given the difficulties involved in establishing an exit procedure with 27 other EU partners without a pre-written plan (Baines et al 749).

According to a 2016 House of Lords report, the government’s refusal to outline its exit strategies “created uncertainty and confusion in the aftermath of the referendum” and suggested that, in the future, Parliament may want to make sure that careful thought is given to how any referendum results will be implemented before the vote actually takes place. It may also want to consider whether explicit provisions should be made in the enabling legislation to either automatically implement the results or give the Government instructions to do so. Because the government did not develop workable (EU-approved) preparations for the UK’s withdrawal, the policy process for leaving the EU failed. The Brexit policy disaster was exacerbated by this procedural error. The Brexit option on the ballot was not supported by EU-approved, physically realizable plans, just as monetary denominations printed on paper

notes are not backed by government gold reserves. If voters assumed their votes might be exchanged, upon request, for new institutional arrangements for a UK outside the EU, they were systematically misled by the official ballot (Baines et al 750).

Following protracted negotiations, the EU and the UK came to an agreement on the exit deal. In addition to provisions for citizens' rights and a Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland, it establishes the conditions for the UK's peaceful withdrawal. The United Kingdom (UK) decided to exit the EU on June 23, 2016, following 43 years of membership. The UK officially informed the European Council of its intention to leave the EU on March 29, 2017, and on June 19, 2017, negotiations for the UK's exit from the EU (Brexit) started underway. The details of Brexit were agreed upon by the EU and the UK between 2017 and 2019. This included discussions about a withdrawal agreement, terms for a transitional period that allowed people and businesses to adjust, and a summary of goals for a future partnership between the EU and the UK. When the EU and UK ratified and signed the EU-UK departure agreement, the Brexit negotiations came to a close. The EU and the UK both approved and signed the Brexit deal.

According to Article 50 of the EU Treaty, it establishes the conditions for the UK's orderly withdrawal from the EU. A crucial agreement that regulates the relationship between the EU and the UK is the exit agreement. Common provisions for the understanding of the agreement, citizens' rights in the EU and the UK, and other topics are covered. separate problems A protocol on Gibraltar, to allow collaboration between Spain and the UK, including for implementing citizens' rights within the departure agreement, is needed to facilitate the transition period from 1 February to 31 December 2020, a financial settlement, Ireland, and Cyprus. Measures must be taken by the UK, the EU, and member states to execute the exit agreement (“The EU-UK withdrawal agreement”).

At the European Council, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the EU have come to an agreement about the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU. At the European Council meeting on October 17, 2019, the updated Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration were discussed and approved. Furthermore, The United Kingdom and European Union have reached an agreement at the European Council on the UK's withdrawal from the European Union. The revised Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration were considered and agreed upon at the European Council on October 17, 2019. The declaration by Her Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland relates to the operation of the 'Democratic Consent in Northern Ireland' provision of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. These documents were laid before Parliament on October 19, ahead of the vote in the House of Commons and consideration in the House of Lords. A statement that political agreement has been reached was also laid in Parliament on October 19 ("New Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration").

### **2.1.2. The Political Factor Behind Brexit**

Brexit has so far been shown to be disastrous for UK domestic politics. The British Parliament is currently divided and in a state of anarchy. Both the British population and the political parties in the country are divided, even from within. The leadership has failed to guide the country in a particular direction. A number of political events have been sparked by the Brexit referendum in the UK. The departure of UK Prime Minister David Cameron from his position as leader of the country was the first result of the Brexit referendum. His political career came to an end with the conclusion of the Brexit referendum because Leave won the vote; he held office for six years (Ghulam et al.5)

David Cameron did everything in his power to persuade Britons to vote to stay in the European Union since leaving would be economic suicide, but the referendum's outcomes

shocked Cameron. On July 13, 2016, Theresa May was elected prime minister of the United Kingdom. She succeeded Margaret Thatcher as the second female prime minister in British history. The UK formally invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty on March 29, 2017, beginning a two-year countdown before the country's scheduled departure from the EU on March 29, 2019. Throughout these two years, a number of processes must be completed. The UK must begin negotiations with other EU nations in addition to the talks between the UK and EU authorities. When all sides have agreed to an agreement, it must be approved by the British and EU parliaments (72% of the 27 EU countries, or 65% of the population) (Ghulam et al 5).

## **2.2. Brexit Dilemma**

Future potential commercial ties with the EU have grown thanks to the general election, which saw the Conservatives lose their parliamentary majority. The Brexit conundrum has come into sharp focus with the beginning of official negotiations between the EU and the UK this week. The macroeconomic policy trilemma or the impossible trinity are terms used in economics. It asserts that it is impossible to fulfil all three objectives of capital mobility, fixed exchange rates, and monetary policy autonomy. Of the three, only two are feasible. When capital may flow freely across borders, for instance, a nation must decide between regulating its currency and pursuing autonomous monetary policy. Therefore, more money will enter the economy and devalue the pegged currency if monetary policy increases interest rates. Because the money supply must vary to meet the peg rather than to modify the business cycle, fixing the exchange rate means that monetary policy is focused on the currency. It appears that there is a Brexit conundrum, or perhaps a trilemma, based on recent developments in the Brexit negotiations. Britain will have to decide whether to join the EU Single Market, create a customs union with the EU, or negotiate its own trade arrangements after leaving the EU.

All three scenarios are improbable since 1973, when it entered the European Economic Community; the UK has not established its own trade strategy because it is currently a member of the EU Single Market and Customs Union. So, none of the three objectives are feasible. European leaders like German Finance Minister Wolfgang Scheuble, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Brexit coordinator for the European Parliament Guy Verhofstadt warned that if the UK changes its mind, the door is “open” for London to stay in the EU just before the Article 50 negotiations began. That did not appear politically likely for Britain, where both main parties had chosen Brexit, according to the panel of economists and political experts I led last night at the London Business School. Thus, difficult decisions will need to be made in order to resolve the Brexit conundrum.

If the UK and EU were to establish a customs union deal after Brexit, they would have a single external tariff to pay. It would ensure frictionless goods trade with the EU, preventing the establishment of a “hard border” between Ireland and Northern Ireland. The border problem in Ireland has gained attention as a result of negotiations between the DUP, a party from Northern Ireland, and the minority Tory administration. A customs union, however, would prevent Britain from concluding its own free trade agreements, which has been one of the positives of Brexit that has been repeatedly cited, i.e., concluding trade agreements with the rest of the world for the first time in more than 40 years. Due to the requirement that they share the same outward-facing tariff, Turkey’s customs union agreement with the EU prevents it from negotiating a free trade agreement with the United States.

Therefore, even though Turkey has no say in the on-going TTIP (Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) agreement, the EU has emphasized that Turkey must accept what it negotiates with America. Turkey does, however, also set its own immigration policies and control its own borders. Therefore, the goal of an autonomous trade strategy is not possible in this situation. A customs union would not be possible if the UK chose to instead negotiate to

stay in, or have largely unrestricted access to, the Single Market. Instead, it could do this by negotiating its own free trade deals. In the case of nations outside the EU that have joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Norway does so as a member of the European Economic Area.

Although Norway is bound by what can be sold into the EU, it does its own free trade negotiations. In exchange, Norway contributes to the EU budget, supports free movement of people—which is a problem point for Britain because the Prime Minister has stated that she wants to regulate immigration—and pays no attention to Single Market rules. However, if the UK agrees to free movement of labour, the German foreign minister, Sigmar Gabriel, has suggested that the UK might be able to stay in the Single Market. So only those with jobs are allowed to move freely.

A further British sovereignty worry that he addressed was the possibility of a joint EU-UK court. Any such court would be expected to follow the European Court of Justice in principle, just like the EFTA court that oversees the EFTA countries. Therefore, the UK must determine if it wants to negotiate its own trade agreements, which eliminates the option of staying in the Single Market and leaving Norway. Another option is to work for a thorough free trade agreement with the EU, which must cover services that are not included in a customs union. That would also entail giving trade agreements precedence over a customs union with a frictionless border for the exchange of goods. But it is improbable that it will be able to negotiate free trade agreements with the rest of the world if it needs a customs union, especially for the Irish border. It goes without saying that “politics is the art of the possible.” (“The Brexit dilemma”). However, given the Brexit conundrum or trilemma, tough decisions will probably need to be made among these objectives (“The Brexit dilemma”).

### **2.2.1. IS UK Struggling After Brexit**

This section examines the effects of various Brexit scenarios, such as a “hard” Brexit, a “softer” Brexit, and a “no-trade deal” Brexit. If the UK Parliament approves the EUWB and the UK Government negotiates a future economic and security partnership with the EU, a “hard” controlled Brexit will be the outcome. If the UK Government’s proposed future relationship and trade pact with the EU are softened during UK-EU discussions, it will lead to a “softer” controlled Brexit. ‘No deal’ or unmanaged At the end of January 2020, Brexit is unlikely to happen, but a no-trade agreement If a trade deal between the UK and the EU is not reached by that date and a deal to extend the transition period is not reached by June 2020, Brexit may still take place at the end of December 2020. Transportation issues, rising food and energy costs, a loss of rights, negative effects on social services, and tensions in the community could result from this consequence (“Brexit: social and equality impacts”).


The UK departed the European Union three years ago, leading to a pandemic and an energy crisis. The most recent figures point to an economic knock, with the UK leaving the customs union and single market, putting new regulations, documentation, and inspections on some commodities. Import volumes have returned to pre-pandemic levels, but the cost of food imported from the EU has increased in 2020 and 2021, possibly by as much as 6%. Additionally, the influence of their affiliation with the EU has had a bearing on the level of funds that companies opt to allocate towards production, education, resources, and innovation. Brexit has resulted in 330,000 fewer jobs in the UK, according to a report by the think tanks UK in a Changing Europe and the Center for European Reform (Dharshini).

Economists disagree on how to account for the gap, with some suggesting the Northern Ireland Protocol’s unresolved issue and uncertainty have discouraged spending. Business leaders have said the cost of Brexit red tape would deter them from investing. The UK is the



only wealthy economy that is still smaller and poorer than it was before the outbreak, with Brexit playing a role. The Office for Budget Responsibility predicts that the UK will be 4% worse off than it would have been if we had voted no. There are still issues to be resolved, such as the Northern Ireland Protocol, financial services, fishing, parts for electric vehicles, and scientific collaboration (Dharshini).

According to Kimberly Amadeo Brexit has had a major impact on the UK economy, with the UK's growth declining from 2.4% in 2015 to 1.6% in 2019. The British pound dropped from \$1.48 on referendum day to \$1.36 the next day, making imports more expensive and exporters more profitable. Younger employees are harmed by the exodus of EU-born employees from the UK, and the EU requires the UK to negotiate new trade agreements with nations outside of the EU. Northern Ireland maintains membership in the EU as long as it shares a border with the Republic of Ireland, avoiding a customs border. London has experienced slow growth as a result of Brexit, with company investment falling by 11%. Scotland rejected Brexit, believing the UK and Scotland would benefit most from being in the



EU (Amadeo ).

### **Figure.3. UK economic growth since 2019**

**Source :** (David, Dharshini)

#### **2.2.2. Brexit Dilemma for the UK and the EU**

According to Katherine Hope The UK is facing an in-out referendum on UK membership in the European Union, which is particularly pressing for businesses given that nearly half of UK exports go to the EU. About one-third of the FTSE 100 companies have signed a letter supporting Britain's continued membership, but many others are keeping their silence until board meetings. The CBI reported that three-quarters of its members believed that being a member of the EU had a positive overall impact on their company. Lord Bamford, the head of JCB, believes the UK could exist outside of the EU "peacefully and sensibly." Richard Higginbottom, a partner at domestic fuel retailer Fred Tarry, is worried about the impact of Brexit on the British economy. David Postings, global chief executive of business financier Bibby Financial Services, believes the destabilizing effect of Brexit could have already threatened key business relationships. Elaine Smith, a partner at Morton of Pitmilly, believes the farming industry could be the area where a Brexit will have the most impact due to the lack of unbiased information (Hope).

According to Naib Alakbarov and Utku Utkulu A referendum on the UK's withdrawal from the EU was held on June 23, 2016, and 51.89% of voters supported it. Theresa May, the British prime minister, officially informed the European Council on March 29, 2017, that the UK intended to leave the EU in accordance with Article 50 of the EU Treaty. With this statement of separation, the UK and the other EU-27 states have two years to negotiate a deal on the specifics of withdrawal, as is contractually required by Article 50 of the EU Treaty. However, it was obvious that the negotiation process would be challenging given that it is anticipated that the UK leaving the EU will have detrimental repercussions on both parties.

The extension of the Brexit timetable, which was supposed to take effect on March 29, 2019, shows that both parties wish to prevent an accidental Brexit (Naib and Utku).

Annegret Engel argues that the UK's unique constitutional concepts and the EU's fundamental principles have contributed to the current Brexit conundrum. The UK's devolution, lack of a codified constitution, and multiple interpretations of international law have hindered its exit from the EU. The EU's fundamental principles, such as Article 50 TEU, do not fully address all issues pertaining to a Member State's options during the withdrawal process, such as the possibility of being revoked. The UK's withdrawal process has highlighted issues arising from the creation of Article 50 TEU itself. The UK's decision to leave the EU was criticized for political decisions and the UK government's obligation to abide by their outcome. However, the UK's withdrawal process has highlighted internal issues, as internal issues attract more attention and cause more unrest from inside than external issues. The UK's exit from the single market has negatively impacted its trade, with imports from the EU falling by 25% more than from the rest of the world (Annegret 30).

As per the examination conducted by Anton Spisak and Christos Tsoukalis, the temporary disparity in imports post-EU departure has fluctuated between 14 and 25%, whereas exports have remained more or less at 6%. This indicates that the short-term impact on trade has been greater than anticipated, both before and after the referendum (Spisak and Tsoukalis).. The decision to exit the EU has resulted in heightened uncertainty, causing a setback in corporate investments in the UK economy. The predicted deficit average stands at 19%, which is approximately twice the anticipated average. As per the study by the Center for European Reform, the actual GDP damage to the UK economy is more than double the expected average.

Spisak and Tsoukalis have affirmed that Brexit has led to an increase in trade barriers, consumer costs, and a reduction in the openness of the global economy. It has also exposed and intensified the issues prevalent in the British economy, including inadequate business investments, low productivity, and a loss of global competitiveness. Voters are in favor of a closer economic association with the EU and are cognizant of the repercussions of Brexit. It is imperative for British political leaders to acknowledge the distress caused by Brexit and take measures to improve the country's trade relations with the EU (Spisak and Tsoukalis).

In another article wrote by Jamie Gaskarth and Nicola Langdon, investigates how opinions on Brexit and British foreign policy are expressed. It focuses on two datasets: a 'control sample' of comments since 2016 and the parliamentary discussions on the first EU Withdrawal Bill in December 2018 and January 2019. The study reveals divergent propensities to substantively invoke traditions to understand and support political choices. The expression of abstract ideals is marginalized by parliamentarians using one particular tradition, pragmatism, and the most innovative MPs typically come from minor regional parties or the political margins. The impasse that results is proof of the significance of traditions in understanding and handling the conundrums of societal change (Gaskarth and Langdon).

### **2.3. Brexit and Policy Changes**

Dramatic political events have resulted from the UK's vote to leave the EU. The political repercussions began right away. Cameron resigned soon after the outcome was known, despite a number of Conservative 'Leave' MPs sending him a letter to express their support for him to continue as prime minister. Cameron chose to start a Conservative leadership election because he was reluctant to lead exit discussions. One implication of this is that the new leader might ask for the public's approval, increasing the likelihood of an early

British General Election. Uncertainty surrounds whether the newly elected Prime Minister will use the outcome of the EU referendum as a springboard to start talks with the EU on the UK's exit, and it may depend on whether or not the new leader was a prominent 'Leave' supporter. The absence of a comprehensive Brexit plan is one aspect of the issue. In the days following the outcome of the EU vote, "Leave" campaigners sent conflicting signals over whether the UK would seek a "Norway plus" option, which would grant it access to the single market but impose restrictions on the free movement of labour, or whether some immigration would be tolerated in exchange for use of the single market.

However, depending on the UK's negotiating position or after a deal is done with the European Union; there is still a chance for a second EU vote. As an alternative to a second referendum, such a mandate might be obtained through an early British General Election (Cutts 3). Leaders of the European institutions and member states have expressed openly their wish for Britain to act swiftly to execute Article 50 and begin the process of leaving in response to the UK's leave. Important political personalities have also reaffirmed their opposition to "cherry picking" which countries receive EU benefits without having to pay for them. The EU's increasingly rigid approach of delaying negotiations with Britain until Article 50 is implemented is motivated by the desire to prevent any ripple effects from the UK's leave and the need to strengthen support for the European project.

In the meanwhile, the outcome of the EU referendum might trigger a fresh UK constitutional crisis. First, when the UK, in this case England and Wales, exit the EU, Scotland, Gibraltar, and possibly Northern Ireland are looking for methods to stay. Such a move is unlikely to be successful given the objections from some nations, especially Spain and the potential precedent it creates for Catalonia, but nothing can be ruled out in these turbulent times. Second, with the UK's vote to exit the EU, it is now more likely that Scotland will hold a second referendum on independence. Such a vote is very likely to happen soon if

on-going EU membership cannot be assured. The survival of the UK in its existing form must also be in doubt given that recent polls indicate a sizable lead for Independence. Thirdly, following the Brexit decision, there are increasing requests from the incoming mayor for the city of London to have more autonomy. Once more, this might affect how power is distributed in England (Cutts3.4).

Political realignment in Britain is another potential effect of Britain exiting the EU. Additionally, this can have unintended consequences for the goal of Europe. Voters rejected the Conservative Prime Minister's call to remain in the EU by a margin of 55% to 45% in all Conservative strongholds. Voters in Labour strongholds outside of London rejected the appeals of well-known Labour officials even more convincingly, by a margin of 56% to 44%. In future elections, both parties may have to appeal to empowered voters whose attitudes are very different from those of the politicians who currently represent them (Cutts 4).

For Labour, who are clearly under threat from the populist radical right, the issue is particularly urgent. Recent election results indicate that UKIP (UK Independence party) is gaining popularity, yet it is possible that their success in rallying traditional Labour voters behind the vote “Leave” slogan will further strengthen their position in these regions. Additionally, excluding Nigel Farage and UKIP from any Brexit negotiations could inflame animosity among certain voters, especially if the future Conservative PM (Prime Minister) “waters down” his or her position on free movement of labour. To gain support from individuals who voted in favour of stricter immigration limits, UKIP will be able to capitalize on the narrative of “broken promises” and mistrust of the political system. Additionally, a strong UKIP with parliamentary representation may provide as encouragement and support for other radical right parties that are Eurosceptic and want to hold national referendums on the EU's continued membership. Growing UKIP support could therefore have political repercussions beyond the UK (Cutts 4).

### 2.3.1 Ideological Shift

Theresa May's departure from EU was compelled by the Leave campaign's victory in the referendum, but no precise non-membership arrangement was specified. The two key choices were “hard Brexit,” which would result in a free-trade and sectorial cooperation deal, and “soft Brexit,” which would maintain the UK in the internal market or at the very least in a customs union with the EU. After months of ambiguity ('Brexit Means Brexit'), May finally declared her support for a 'hard Brexit' in her Lancaster House speech in January 2017. She then reiterated this stance in her letter of withdrawal to the EU. May disallowed joining the internal market since doing so would entail recognizing EU law, the Court of Justice's (CJEU) authority, labour mobility, and “vast contributions” to the EU budget.

Additionally, she pledged to leave the customs union, which precludes the UK from signing its own trade agreements. Through a “new, comprehensive, bold and ambitious free-trade arrangement,” the UK would also aim to have “the greatest possible access” to the internal market. May mentioned a “deep and special partnership” in her withdrawal letter dated March 29, 2017, which included “both economic and security cooperation” and a free-trade agreement that would also cover sectors “crucial to our linked economies” like financial services and network industries, i.e. the two industries that would be most negatively impacted by the UK's exit from the internal market (Schimmelfennig 19).

In this original, pre-negotiation attitude, the post functional goal of regaining sovereignty and controlling immigration was clearly given primacy. The phrase “greatest access” was interpreted to mean the most access without jeopardizing formal sovereignty. May described the referendum as “a vote to restore... our national self-determination” (Johnson), in her letter of notification. The 'hard Brexit' option complied with the demands of both the Leave campaign and Tory voters. Despite the fact that the majority of Britons wanted

a solution that would allow the UK to preserve market access to the EU while also regaining control over immigration, Conservative Party supporters valued migration control by a 60:40 percent (20). However, the EU's negotiation stances are motivated by the need to protect the union's integrity and unity, as well as its institutions and supranational laws.

The European Council (2017) stressed the “integrity of the Single Market” in its guidelines. It disallowed a “sector-by-sector approach” and urged level playing fields in terms of government assistance and rivalry. Procedure-wise, the EU opted for a “single package” and a “single channel of communication” over bilateral negotiations with the UK. It was important to note that it demanded a “phased approach to negotiations,” beginning with a deal on the conditions of withdrawal and then going on to talks on the future accord once “sufficient progress has been achieved.” “Transitional arrangements” would be time-limited and subject to EU regulations in order to close the gap in time between the conclusion of the Article 50 negotiation period and the implementation of a new deal with the UK (Schimmelfennig 20).

In the first phase, the Union focused on three main objectives: a “single financial settlement” that would cover the UK's financial obligations to and assets in the EU; the avoidance of a “hard border” in Ireland; and a guarantee of the existing rights of EU citizens in the UK enforced by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). In general, the three priorities were accepted in May's notification letter. However, she suggested doing so before rather than after the parameters of the new relationship was decided. Her government opposed any post-Brexit CJEU jurisdiction (apart from on-going cases) or contributions to the EU budget and also anticipated that a new accord could be reached within the two years of Brexit negotiations. Threats have been traded between the parties in an effort to strengthen their bargaining positions. May said repeatedly that for Britain, “no deal was better than a bad deal.” The EU was additionally threatened by the UK government with reduced security and



intelligence sharing as well as aggressive tax and regulatory competition. The EU, for its part, has repeatedly warned the UK that it will not engage in future partnership talks unless the UK accepts the terms of leaving and has dismissed the possibility of a “no deal” as being unreal (Schimmelfennig 21).

The resignation of Prime Minister David Cameron has raised hopes for a Brexiteer to be elected as his successor. The pro-Brexit side was expected to secure the initiative, but Boris Johnson announced his withdrawal from the leadership race. Andrea Leadsom emerged as the frontrunner for Leave, and Theresa May became the frontrunner for Remain. May accepted the result of the referendum and reassured Brexit supporters, receiving 199 votes (60.5%). She became Britain's second prime minister on July 13, 2016, sacking half of David Cameron's cabinet to overhaul the government. The new top team, with seven Brexit candidates and 20 Remain candidates, was affected by Brexit. The most controversial appointment was that of Boris Johnson, the foreign secretary, who was appointed secretary of the newly created Brexit Department and International Trade Department. May's focus on Brexit led to a snap election in 2017, leading to her parliamentary deadlock and her return to bipartisan politics. The Conservative Party's share of the vote rose to 42.3%, with 73% of UKIP defectors supporting the Conservatives. The election result also bolstered Brexit skepticism, with people hoping for a smooth exit from the EU and trying to block a deal. May's attempt to keep the Conservatives in power has resulted in a nasty compromise and the biggest loss in the House of Commons in history (Hayton 347).

### **2.3.2. Defence and Foreign Affairs**

The EU has shifted its focus to defense to deepen integration among member states. However, this move comes with risks, as progress in achieving an EU defense and security policy has been limited. The UK has rejected modest proposals for Common Security and Defence

Policy (CSDP) development and has hesitantly supported the expansion of the European Defence Agency (EDA). The EU has vetoed the establishment of a permanent military EU operational headquarters, which many EU member states support. The Franco-German proposals offer momentum for the EU's global strategy to enhance defense collaboration among member states. The UK must consider aligning its national foreign, security, and defense policies with those of the EU, as exiting the EU's CFSP would entail significant costs (Whiteman 4,5).

### **2.3.2.1. No Longer at the Table**

The UK is set to withdraw from the single market and customs union due to Prime Minister Theresa May's decision to invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty by March 2017. This will allow the UK to set its own rules and forge new trading agreements for the whole country. The UK will not have a representative at EU meetings and will not continue to play a strong observer role. EU foreign policy is becoming more of a topic for joint action by the commission and council, often brought together with the External Action Service. The UK will still be interested in influencing EU policy on these matters, but the process of returning powers to the UK and its devolved administrations will be the main focus over the next three years (Chalmers 3).

The EU will need to modify its own structures, policies, and finances, requiring difficult negotiations between member states over burden sharing. New interest equilibria may develop over time, both between EU countries and the UK. The UK and EU may become more competitive after the separation process, but their joint position as mature Western democracies ensures their geopolitical objectives remain closely matched. Future collaborative EU/UK initiatives may emerge from the post-Brexit "special partnership," with the UK actively participating in security policy consultations and strengthening quadrilateral

consultation procedures between France, Germany, the UK, and the US. However, shared decision-making will be limited once the UK leaves, and the UK's ability to influence EU member states' overall strategies will be diminished (Chalmers 4).

The Boris Johnson government has not discussed a post-Brexit deal with the EU on diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation, preferring bilateral contacts with former EU partners. This decision is not surprising, as the UK is not the only Western democracy frustrated by foreign policy cooperation with the EU. The European Reform Center's policy brief concludes that London and Brussels should reconsider their positions. Theresa May's government was interested in a substantive agreement with the EU on post-Brexit foreign, security, and defense policy cooperation, but Boris Johnson sees little added value in contractual arrangements. The UK should work bilaterally with major EU member states on foreign, security, and defense cooperation, bringing the rest of the member states and EU institutions into line (Bond 1).

The EU's external security cooperation with other third countries shows that having a treaty-based relationship with the EU does not give a country more influence over EU decision-making. The EU should be open to any arrangement that helps the Union pursue its external policy objectives more effectively. The UK should also keep the door open to closer ties in the future, underscoring the value of structured contacts with the EU as a complement to bilateral relations with member states (Bond 2).

#### **2.3.2.2. The UK and European Defence**

The UK, as the most capable and willing European force in NATO, will continue to have a significant influence on the security agenda in Europe. Recent coordinated deployments include Typhoon aircraft to Romania, 150 army personnel to eastern Poland, and an 800-person armored infantry unit to Estonia. Three of the four 'enhanced presence' battalions will

be led by non-EU nations post-Brexit. However, it may be more difficult for the UK to use this significant commitment to influence politics when it leaves the EU. The UK may contribute to non-military aspects of crisis management and stabilization as a significant economy in its own right, but it will have to put in effort to ensure its policy contributions are not treated as a side effect of the outcomes of the US/EU debate (Chalmers 6).

The UK will no longer participate in the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) after it leaves the EU, but it can be requested on an as-needed basis to participate in upcoming operations based on its skills and interests. The UK's role within the NATO command structure might also be impacted by its decision to leave the EU. The UK's role as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (DSACEUR) is crucial for NATO assets for EU operations organized under the "Berlin Plus" agreements, such as in Bosnia. Brexit may impact the UK's influence and NATO role, as Trump's presidency may weaken the strong intelligence and nuclear cooperation between the two nations. However, the UK's role as a diplomatic bridge between the US and Europe may decline (Chalmers 7).

To sum up, it's time to resolve the European dilemma in British politics, David Cameron said in 2013. Liberals and those on the center-left of the political spectrum cautioned that the referendum was more about the future of the Conservative party than the future role of the UK in the EU, despite the plaudits for Cameron's choice from many in his own party and on the right. Nobody truly anticipated the intensity of the subsequent campaign or how deeply divided Britain would be or already was. While some have compared the historical impact of the UK's choice to exit the EU to the fall of the Berlin Wall, political discourse in Britain itself aims to mend the harm caused by the EU referendum campaign and recognize the socio-economic, cultural, and political fault line that runs across the nation. For those who support the European project and the idea of an "ever closer union," the UK's exit poses an

unquestionable challenge. Leaders of the EU are expected to take a firm position with Britain in upcoming negotiations, as they are aware of the need to prevent greater disintegration. A political realignment in UK politics and the dissolution of the UK could also have unexpected consequences.

## CHAPTER THREE

### Brexit and the European Relations

The referendum's campaign and immediate aftermath demonstrate how the concept of “Brexit” can be used to describe a number of potential post-Brexit circumstances. While it is crucial to examine how different political contestations are sparked in the United Kingdom, it is also true that Brexit is produced and imagined from the outside. This chapter explores how Brexit has been interpreted outside of the United Kingdom.

#### 3.1. Brexit as a European Phenomenon

Brexit, the UK's decision to leave the EU, has had a huge political, social, and economic impact on post-World War II Britain. In three areas (identity, geopolitical reality, and the global economy), it stands for the promise of a distinct future and a particular history. It is critical to examine how Brexit will affect national and European identities, geopolitical reality, and the international economic order. (Meyenburg).

##### 3.1.1. Post-Brexit Britain Seen from the Outside

Brexit re-constructs external perceptions of the UK, highlighting tensions between Churchill's vision of the UK as a European nation and British exceptionalism. German media portrays Brexit as a departure from the country's cosmopolitan image, while others see it as a continuation of British exceptionalism. The UK's historical representation and post-Brexit Britain promise to be diverse and complex. The British worldview is based on historical empire and the desire for a global empire. Brexit represents a continuation of the past, with British familiarity with the UK's imperial past and popular culture being greater than German familiarity. This asymmetric relationship between the UK and other EU members and British exceptionalism may have changed foreigners' perceptions of Britishness and Europe (Nissen et al. 576, 577).

### **3.1.2. Britain as the Other: Constructions of Europe and the Nation-State**

Brexit in Germany is intertwined with European integration discourses, highlighting Germany's historical identity and the need for continued sovereignty sharing. It also reinforces opposing notions of European identities, constructing Northern Europe in opposition to the “South” and promoting Britain's role in the liberal economic agenda of the EU. This paradox highlights the significance of the German-British relationship, which has historically driven Europe and is now necessary for a strong German-British axis. EU nations like the Netherlands and the UK are focusing on their close relationship with the UK, with the Netherlands losing a crucial ally in negotiations. Brexit is seen as performative, reproducing British, European, and national identities and drawing attention to differences between cosmopolitan and communitarian identities (Nissen et al. 577,578).

### **3.1.3. Brexit, Diplomacy and Geopolitics**

Brexit has sparked a variety of diverse interpretations worldwide in terms of geopolitical fantasies and notions of what is diplomatically achievable. It's interesting how many of these readings seem to be at odds with one another. Three vivid examples of the diplomatic promise of Brexit will be highlighted in the sections that follow: multilateralism (the liberal world order, security communities), post-imperialism (the Commonwealth, the Anglosphere), and bilateralism (special connections, partnerships, and “gateways”). The examples show that what Brexit means varies depending on who you are and how you view it (Nissen et al. 578).

Brexit has sparked threats and promises regarding multilateralism and the global liberal order, raising questions about the global system and intergovernmental cooperation. Japan, Japan's most ardent supporter, and Obama promise a resilient international order despite Brexit. China's support for the UK's EU position is rooted in a multipolar worldview, while the US's rhetoric is a liberal, primarily US-led world order. The majority of EU

members emphasize the tenacity of European integration, making Brexit a performative speaking act. Donald Trump's election as US president challenged the notion of an ongoing liberal world order, saying that Brexit signaled the start or even the promise of a new international system based on national autonomy and identities (Nissen et al. 579).

This interpretation was supported by Marine Le Pen of the Front National in France, who said that Brexit marked the beginning of the end of the European Union. Geert Wilders (2016), the head of the Freedom Party (PVV), and Frauke Petry, the leader of the AFD (Alternative für Deutschland) in Germany, argued that Brexit was just the start of a “Patriot Spring” in Europe. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders (2016) claimed that Brexit was just the start of a “Patriot Spring” in Europe before suffering a crushing defeat in the March 2017 parliamentary elections. In Germany, Frauke Petry stated that the time is ripe for a new Europe, a Europe of the fatherlands. In India, Indian officials praised Brexit as strengthening UK-India relations, while Iranians criticized the UK's post-imperialism and British imperialism (Nissen et al. 580).

In China, China expressed interest in the UK supporting strong China-EU relations before the referendum, stating that the UK could play a constructive role in deepening ties. African leaders, however, reacted more pragmatically, believing Brexit would have little effect on their bilateral ties (Nissen et al. 581).

Brexit has significantly decreased the UK's trade accessibility, inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), and growth of immigration. Fresh border impediments and increased transportation costs present novel obstacles to trade, and it is improbable that FDI inflows will return to the levels achieved in the 1990s and 2000s. The UK's trade as a proportion of GDP still trails its pre-pandemic level and is over 6% lower than its Q1 2017 level. The consequences of this contraction in trade, FDI, and immigration remain to be observed, but it could inflict long-term harm on the UK economy. Reduced trade accessibility can restrict



competition for domestic businesses, impede innovation, and create a less varied workforce. The UK is now a smaller player in the global economy than it was before Brexit, and it must adapt to evade the worst economic repercussions (Posen).

#### **3.1.4. Brexit Is an Obstacle and a Potential Game-Changer for the EU**

The UK held a referendum on its EU membership in 2016 and declared its decision to leave the EU in March 2017. This leaflet provides background information and abstracts of pertinent research created by the Policy Department A on Economic and Scientific Policy of the European Parliament. The authors of the report claim that Brexit has the potential to reduce trade integration between the EU and the UK, amplified by increased political uncertainty and uncertainty surrounding the result of discussions between the EU and UK regarding the future institutional framework. Longer term, the fact that Brexit took place might be a sign of more serious problems with the EU, particularly with the standing of the euro region.

This essay explores the effects of Brexit on the stability of the euro area. It suggests that evaluating each member state's "core content" could be useful in addressing concerns about the stability of the euro zone. The data suggests that a "hard Brexit" is likely, where trade barriers between the UK and the EU are raised and both the British and European economies suffer. However, the hazards are unequally distributed: The UK economy will suffer more as a result, especially given the probable drop in jobs in the financial industry. Longer term, political issues pose a greater threat to the EU than economic ones do. The Brexit vote demonstrated that fewer people support the EU than most people think. It also demonstrates how powerful populist political tactics can be for anti-EU political groupings in blaming the EU for a variety of economic issues. The political risks to the EU's continued existence seem to be greater than ever (Paternoster, Dessimirova).

According to Paul De Grauwe Since Brexit became a reality, the main topic of discussion in European politics has been how the European Union should respond to it. Due to a lack of democracy in decision-making at the European level, the EU has a bad reputation. The Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, which share the same democratic legitimacy as national governments and parliaments, make the laws in the EU. Institutions at the national and European levels should be reviewed and changed. The European Union's inability to establish a structure that safeguards the victims of globalization is the root of frustration with the EU. As a result, national governments are now less able to serve as protectors, and no action has been taken to establish a similar mechanism at the EU level (Grauwe 1).

Despite the significant role played by European institutions in promoting globalization, national governments still control social policy. The fiscal regulations and structural changes implemented by the European Union have made it difficult to compensate those negatively affected by globalization, leading to economic stagnation and rising unemployment. Many individuals, primarily victims of globalization, have been obligated to comply with these policies enforced by both European institutions and national governments. If the EU continues with these policies, there may be a widespread revolt, potentially resulting in attempts to leave the Union. The victims of globalization need to be protected by the European Union. Rather than imposing structural reforms on member states, European authorities should prioritize increasing public investment. One way to achieve this is by modifying the fiscal agreement requiring structural budget balance in the Eurozone, which has the disadvantage of supporting public investment with current taxes while benefiting only future taxpayers. As a result, public investment in the Eurozone is at a record low (Grauwe 2).

The primary considerations are that permitting the national debt to increase won't burden our offspring with an insurmountable debt load and that the European Union (EU)

should offer the United Kingdom (UK) the choice of either adopting the Norwegian approach or pursuing independent negotiations for fresh trade deals under the World Trade Organization (WTO). If the UK chooses the Norwegian strategy, it will retain unrestricted entry to the EU's single market for British products and services. The heart of the single market is the Norwegian model, which allows for free movement of EU citizens in and out of the UK, but the British administration is unlikely to agree to this. After Brexit is completed, the UK must initiate negotiations for new trade arrangements with the EU and other countries under the auspices of WTO regulations, and the EU must make it clear that a special agreement with the UK is not feasible (Grauwe 3).

The United Kingdom must not agree to being coerced into negotiations with the European Union regarding a selective agreement. If a country's inhabitants oppose joining a group, referendums must be conducted. For those contemplating a departure from the EU, transparency is essential. The UK can achieve this by demanding a distinctive arrangement with the EU that permits it to sustain the benefits of the union without incurring any of the costs. This would result in a weakened European Union (Grauwe 4).

### **3.1.5. New European Perspectives**

According to Diana Petcu. Brexit presents a unique challenge, as the European Union has not encountered a situation where a member state has left since the establishment of the ECSC in 1951. To ensure a smooth transition and provide legal certainty for citizens of both the UK and the EU, a range of separation provisions have been proposed. In the event that only 27 member states remain in the EU, all citizens and member states will continue to uphold the principles of inclusivity, transparency, conduct rules, language policy, equality, non-discrimination, security, environmental impact, and cohesion. Additionally, the fundamental values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and human rights will be upheld, as they have been since the creation of the EU through the

Lisbon Treaty and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 for its efforts to promote peace, equality in prosperity, freedom, democracy, safety, the well-being of citizens, economic consolidation, cultural and linguistic variety, and a euro economic and monetary union.

However, the UK was the first member state to choose to leave the EU due to dissatisfaction with certain policies. The EU's objectives include protecting the environment, promoting social and economic solidarity, ensuring sustainable development with balanced economic growth, granting citizens freedom, providing security without borders, and fostering peace and well-being. The process of des-Europeanization involves restructuring a state, territory, and country as a third state in accordance with negotiations held in Brussels or London and the requirements of each EU member state. This process is complex and lengthy, and the UK was the first former member to leave the EU. Des-institutionalization at the European level, also known as des-Europeanization, provides the opportunity to implement national decisions separately and independently.

Des-Europeanization can refer to the fragmentation of the EU with the aim of reducing its political, economic, and social strength. It can be applied in political, economic, and social contexts and has various definitions. While Europeanization was once thought to be an ongoing process, reality has proven otherwise. The concept of "European construction" has strengthened interdependence between states in terms of trade, commerce, economics, social interactions, and cultural exchanges. This new potential term has a broad definition and various implications, in contrast to the integration and Europeanization processes (Petcu).

### **3.1.6. Brexit: The End of a New Beginning**

As of the end of January 2020, the United Kingdom will no longer be a member of the EU, as promised by UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson. The harshest element of Brexit has not yet been implemented, though. Given that the majority of voters have expressed a wish to

leave the European Union, the Withdrawal Agreement's implementation marks a turning point in the history of EU integration. A strong and complete structure is required to shape the post-marriage of convenience relationship, but this is lacking in London. The Withdrawal Agreement offers a framework for Brexit that governs the details of the divorce and acts as the groundwork for the interim period.

The transition is scheduled to end on December 31, 2020, with a possible extension of one or two years. But both sides might run out of time, creating a precarious situation. While the London authorities have begun to act as though the Political Declaration was not worth the paper it was written on, the European Commission has used the Political Declaration as a starting point in its work on the draft negotiation mandate. According to Tony Barber, the EU and its Member States are just now "waking up" to the UK's shift in position. The UK's position contradicts the promises made in the Political Declaration and the Withdrawal Agreement, and the EU is a rule-driven organization (Adam Lazowski 672).

The UK government claims it is unwilling to accept the first two items on the list and rejects any trade friction between the two regions of the UK that are divided by the Irish Sea. The UK's U-turn in the Brexit talks may be interpreted as a message of mistrust from the EU and other nations. This is made worse by the cacophony of various UK officials who have applied the withdrawal agreement's operating principles. This show of force by the prime minister and his entourage could be an attempt to bulldoze the European Union to the ground. It might also be a cover for hard-core Brexiteers who prefer to focus on rhetoric. Although the Brexit talks will be staged, the devil will be in the details.

If the UK chooses a fundamental trade agreement, it will probably be put on the table. Act 2 will be improvised and lack a detailed nally, The UK and EU have reached a trade agreement with one week to spare, but it falls short of what a great trading nation should want. Manufacturers may be exempt from tariffs and quotas, but they still have to deal with

expensive bureaucracy. The first trade agreement created to restrict access is effectively the cost of British sovereignty, but it provides a starting point for further development and marks screenplay (Lazowski 672).

According to Robert Shrimley The UK and EU have come to an agreement on trade, though it falls far short of what a leading global trading nation would hope for. While manufacturers may avoid tariffs and quotas, they will still face expensive additional bureaucracy, and the service sector will have reduced access. Essentially, the cost of British sovereignty is the first trade deal that limits access, but it provides a foundation for progress and marks an end to the divisive rhetoric that has characterized the pro-Brexit camp. The UK has had to fight hard for even the most basic aspects of the EU withdrawal agreement, and the bloc has remained united in its approach. This should serve as a warning to British politicians in the future. While Nigel Farage and Conservative MPs may try to argue for their continued relevance, the Tories knew that some level of compromise was necessary. Prime Minister Johnson has exempted Great Britain from most of the EU's regulations, rules, and jurisdiction, but this will come at a high cost. In the long term, Britain will be weakened, and the Union will be in great danger. The UK's economic prospects have slowed down, and the PM's political strategy is to conceal Brexit-related setbacks within the broader pandemic-related economic downturn.

According to David Green the United Kingdom has now legally departed from the European Union, and the withdrawal agreement's clauses pertaining to citizenship, financial contributions, and technical matters will continue to hold sway after the transition period. A political discourse is crucial to deliberating on the future relationship after the cessation of the transition agreement, and comprehending the politics of Brexit is indispensable to making sense of otherwise incomprehensible actions and attitudes. The objective of the process is to generate a mutually agreed-upon document, and if the involved parties are earnestly

participating, it usually leads to a series of preliminary drafts before the final, mutually agreed-upon text. The European Union's negotiation guidelines and the United Kingdom's command paper serve as the two principal drafts for these negotiations. The European Union has gained experience from negotiations regarding Brexit, association, and free trade agreements, which may give them an advantage. Advocates of the British government may feel inclined to resume their bravado and foolishness, but the command paper is serious and not frivolous. The second season of the Brexit saga can now begin, and all parties are eager to reach an agreement.

### **3.1.7. Possible Impacts of Brexit on EU Development and Humanitarian Policies**

Brexit could have a significant impact on the EU's development and humanitarian policies. The UK may adopt one of three stances, which would have distinct impacts on EU aid. The EU could respond to Brexit by becoming a regional power or taking on a leadership position on a global scale. The impact of Brexit on EU aid can be categorized into financial, political, and operational effects. The political impact of Brexit depends on the influence or reputation of a nation or union, donor rankings, involvement in multilateral organizations, aid-to-economy ratios, and regional presence through ODA (Olivié et al .1,7).

The operational impact of Brexit is the change in organizational and managerial aspects of aid that would arise from the UK's exit from the EU. The EU would need a reallocation strategy to compensate for the absence of non-governmental organizations and international bodies and specific directives on how to collaborate with officials from the UK government and allocate UK funds (Olivié et al.8).

Brexit's precise implications for British participation in European foreign policy and development cooperation are uncertain, but they could have a significant influence. Following the UK general election on June 8, 2017, there is now even more uncertainty about the direction, timetable, and process of the Brexit negotiations as well as the possibility of a

chaotic breakup. This article explores potential Brexit scenarios, their effects on UK and EU cooperation with developing countries, and their implications within a broader framework of EU foreign action using qualitative interpretative analysis and tracking the leave process. The analysis builds on new institutionalism and aids in the creation of tools for researching these phenomena. Strategic foresight would suggest protecting development policy as much as possible from the trade-offs of the bargaining gamble and putting shared objectives and values beyond debate (Thomas Henökl).

### **3.2. Brexit and its Implications for European Integration**

Brexit will lead to increased barriers to trade, capital, and labor mobility, which will affect the UK's economy and the jobs of the remaining 27 EU members. The UK has strong trade connections with the EU and is one of its major trading partners. There are also significant financial ties, with bilateral capital flows accounting for 52% of the EU-27's GDP in 2016. If integration is reversed, the EU's long-term economic output and employment will suffer. Both parties will suffer from the end of a smooth economic partnership resulting from Brexit. If both parties adhere to WTO norms, the decrease in actual output and employment for the EU-27 will be insignificant. A country-specific approach was used to analyze the effects of higher tariffs and non-tariff barriers on direct and indirect trade. Under the FTA scenario, long-term real output for the EU-27 will be 0.2% lower compared to a no-Brexit scenario, with Ireland's income being the highest among the EU-27. If the EU-27 defaults to WTO rules, the overall output loss will be 0.5 percent, with Ireland experiencing a 4 percent output loss. The agreement reached between the UK and the EU27 will determine the final outcome (Chen et al).

The results of the negotiations between a hard and soft Brexit will determine how Brexit will affect future EU integration. A soft Brexit entails the UK maintaining compliance with EU laws and regulations, while a hard Brexit entails the UK continuing to participate in the single



market and pay into the EU coffers. Jean-Claude Juncker has said that Brexit is not expected to cause a disruption in EU integration, but Oliver and Luo (2017) contend that the UK stands to lose more from the EU. A successful deal will eventually impact all aspects of EU integration and may shift the EU's power structure in favor of EU integration. The long-term effects of a hard Brexit could have an impact on EU integration since it might push other EU member states along the same road as the UK (Ababakr et al.19).

Inter-governmentalism is a foundation for understanding Europe's problems, emphasizing internal circumstances, dominant power, societal perceptions, consensus creation, and state-to-state negotiations. The EU, which Britain has supported, will play a significant role in shaping its future. A soft Brexit won't have a significant impact on the EU's future, but a hard Brexit will have more to lose economically than the EU. Populist parties could exploit this situation to start events like Grexit, Dixit, or Yxit (Ababakr et al.,22).

### **3.2.1. Brexit Was a Warning Sign for the Integration Process**

According to Uğur Tekiner The agreement signed in December of last year was thought to have put an end to the Brexit crisis. However, the future of the UK-EU relationship and the impact of Brexit on the EU remain uncertain. Brexit is an unprecedented event in Europe, and both parties must maintain constant communication. There are three reasons why Europe will continue to be a crucial topic in British politics. Firstly, the four nations that make up the UK still have strained relations due to Europe. Secondly, the COVID-19 pandemic has put further strain on the UK's relationship with the EU. Thirdly, the pandemic has also highlighted the persistent Eurosceptic narratives that are likely to continue after Brexit.

Five years after the Brexit referendum, England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland, who chose to remain in the EU, still have not reconciled. The Scottish Parliament election in 2021 demonstrated the ongoing relevance of this division. Social divisions along class, educational, generational, and regional lines persist, and Eurosceptic forces will

continue to blame the EU for the failings of the British political system. COVID-19 vaccine-related issues have already arisen between the UK and the EU, indicating that Eurosceptic narratives will persist.

The UK's departure from the EU has altered the direction of European integration, creating fresh divisions between member states. This could result in new differences between Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries, between member states that contribute to the EU budget and those that receive it, and between member states in the North and South, as well as the East and West. The Brexit vote highlighted the need to address those who have been adversely affected by globalization and European integration. The future of the EU is now uncertain due to mounting challenges, and strong leadership will be necessary to chart a clear path for the integration process. It is unclear whether the UK and EU can establish a relationship based on mutual trust, or if distrust and suspicion will continue to govern their interactions (Tekiner).

### **3.2.2. The Impact of the UK's Withdrawal on EU Integration**

The European Union's future is a hotly debated subject, especially in the wake of the Brexit referendum. Five potential futures for the EU27 by 2025 are presented in a white paper on the future of Europe by the European Commission. But when Jean-Claude Juncker presented his own distinct sixth scenario, emphasizing liberty, equality, and the rule of law, it drew criticism. Since the vote, there has been even more disagreement over this topic. (Moskal).

### **3.2.3. The Future of the European Union After Brexit Referendum Results**

The outcome of the Brexit referendum stunned everyone, but especially the EU. It was difficult to predict the effects of losing one of the most important member states. 70% of respondents in a survey of about 10.5 thousand EU residents taken between 4 April and 12 May 2016 said that the EU will not benefit from the UK's withdrawal (Kirk 2016). Only 51%

of EU nationals in the 10 nations under study (France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) stated that they had a favorable opinion of the EU as a whole, according to Stokes (2016). The global media cover a wide range of reactions to the Brexit vote, from sarcastic good luck messages for the UK and the EU to the warm support of other non-EU nations (Moskal 29).

The EU leaders responded to the news promptly and gave their thoughts on how Brexit would affect the future of the EU. For instance, Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, calmly said, “We respect the result,” while Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, sternly declared that the outcome “would not be the beginning of the end of the EU.” The UK can now make its own decisions with certainty. Now is the time for real, responsible behavior from all of us. (BBC.com). It's also important to note Donald Tusk's logical response, in which the former Polish prime minister stated, “This is not the time for emotional outbursts. We are resolved to maintain our unity as the 27 leaders, I can state today on behalf of the 27 leaders.

EU law will continue to be applicable to and within the UK up until the UK formally quits the EU, and by this I mean both rights and obligations (BBC.com). However, there were other voices from European leaders that were more sympathetic and self-critical. For instance, Jean-Luc Melenchon, a member of the French Left Party in the European Parliament, said, «This is the end of a world that begins with this Brexit. Europe as a whole should learn from this: either we alter it, or we don't. Now is the time to have a backup plan. In a same vein, Paolo Gentiloni, Italy's foreign minister, stated that “the decision of the British voters must be a wake-up call.” Furthermore, Norbert Röttgen, a prominent member of Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Party, criticized Brexit as the “biggest catastrophe in the history of European integration” (Moskal 30).

### **3.2.4. The Debate on the Future of the European Union in 2017: The Idea of 5+1**

#### **Possible Future Development Scenarios**

The UK's departure from the EU sparked debate on the future of the EU. In 2017, the European Commission published the “White Paper on the Future of Europe,” presenting five development possibilities for the EU27 by 2025. The paper emphasized the importance of European integration, identified shortcomings, and reassured the EU's adaptability to unpredictability (Moskal 30). There are six scenarios for the EU's future. The First Scenario maintains the current operating procedure and assumes the 27 remaining members will focus on delivering a positive reform agenda (Moskal 31). The second Scenario involves a gradual shift towards the single market without expanding cooperation in other sectors, focusing on preserving and enhancing the five freedoms without compromising national sovereignty (Moskal 32). The third Scenario suggests that only EU member states interested in strengthening collaboration will enhance cooperation in specific policies, such as taxation, social issues, defense, and internal security.

Diversified integration promotes faster cooperation and presents new opportunities, but it would make distinctions between citizens' rights and widen the gap between advanced and less advanced nations (Moskal 32). The fourth scenario, “doing less more efficiently,” focuses on rapid development in political areas chosen by the 27 remaining member states (Moskal 32). The fifth scenario, “doing much more together,” suggests a federal union, aiming for enhanced cooperation across all Member States, a single market, a stabilized euro, and a single foreign policy strategy (Moskal 33). Jean-Claude Juncker's alternative scenario, “Union of Freedom, Equality, and Democracy,” proposes a united, stronger, and more democratic Europe for 2025, emphasizing the importance of freedom, equality, and the rule of law. Critics argue that Juncker's political postulates focus on maintaining European integrity after Brexit (Moskal 34).

### **3.3. Post Brexit Challenges**

A Trade and Cooperation Agreement was inked by the UK and the EU in 24 December 2020. The UK officially departed the European Union on January 1, 2021. Until December 31, 2020, a transition period had been set up to oversee economic collaboration. The United Kingdom continued to participate in the Customs Union and have access to the EU internal market during this transition period, but in exchange, it was required to continue adhering to the EU acquis and making financial contributions to Brussels. The UK was also required to continue to accept all changes to EU law during this time. The European Court of Justice maintained its authority during this time.

#### **3.3.1. Brexit: Challenges for Universities in Hard Times**

The UK's decision to leave the European Union in a referendum in 2016 has led to a post-Brexit world, with the UK government introducing a bill to exit the EU in March 2017. The UK's immigration program focuses on high-skill migration and equal treatment for all backgrounds, with the government considering a 30% reduction in international students' fees to reduce net migration. The UK's economy is expected to benefit from a decline in international students, but a migration policy prioritizing high skills could encourage graduates to stay by relaxing the rigorous graduate visa policy (Marginson 8).

UK universities may face challenges in participating in major European research projects due to restricted access to knowledge. The UK's foreign-born population makes up over half of PhD students, and the UK universities receive only 0.4% of GDP and 19.7% of research funding from outside sources. Brexit may impact UK cooperation with East Asian and Chinese research systems, but it is unlikely to impact science. The government of England has started implementing a new Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) for higher education, which aims to improve the quality of undergraduate education and raise the profile of teaching. This will enable students to make more informed decisions about their studies and

higher education. The Teacher Education Framework (TEF) will gradually increase tuition rates for institutions with favorable Quality Assurance Agency Institutional Review, based on student perceptions, academic support, dropout rates, employment rates, and DHLE survey data. Implementation will occur in three years, with subject-level TEF expected in fourth (Marginson 8).

### **3.4. Brexit and Long-Term Challenges to the UK Economy**


The departure of the UK from the EU presents a significant change in its economic relationship with the bloc, moving away from close integration and cooperation with neighboring countries. This shift may create an opportunity to directly negotiate trade deals with non-EU nations. When MPs vote on the government's withdrawal agreement later this year (2018) (Tetlow and Stojanovic).

#### **3.4.1. How Brexit Might Affect the UK Economy**

The UK economy's output depends on demand for goods and services, which depends on foreign customers' willingness to pay. Brexit may impact these aspects, particularly in terms of trade, foreign direct investment, and productivity. Factors affecting the cost of UK goods and services include transportation, tariffs, and non-tariff restrictions. Brexit may affect the UK's appeal to international investors, as it receives the most FDI. The UK's output depends on a better mix of qualified workers, which influences average living standards. Brexit may lead to changes to immigration laws, tightening up for EU citizens, or targeting specific types of immigrants. Regulations affect enterprise efficiency, cross-border trade flows, and competition. Brexit may alter EU-established rules to better meet UK requirements, potentially increasing productivity and resource allocation but may compromise worker and environmental protections (Tetlow and Stojanovic 12,14).

Rapid productivity growth is crucial for economic growth and improving living conditions. Lowering trade barriers may lead to "static gains" from trade, such as specialized

goods and services and returns to scale in manufacturing. Long-term economic production may be more affected by these "dynamic" improvements than static gains. The UK's economic strength and stability are influenced by the pound's value, which has declined since Brexit. This decline affects imports, inflation, and exporters, while also promoting radical domestic policy reform. Policy Exchange suggests revamping skills policy, while Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell suggests radical solutions for future administrations. These policies should be evaluated independently, as they may significantly impact the UK economy's development over the next decades (Tetlow and Stojanovic 16,18).



**Fig.4. Illustration of long-term static loss from Brexit on the level of GDP**

**Source:** (Bisciari, 2019)

### 3.5. Brexit and EU Disintegration

According to Hans Vollaard, for the first time since January 2020, the UK deliberately exited the EU. The relationship between the UK and the EU beyond the transitional phase is the

subject of ongoing negotiations. However, leaving has proven to be more challenging than anticipated due to political unrest and a lack of information about the economic outlook and laws that will be in place once the transitional phase is over. There is no majority for a comprehensive exit from the EU in any other EU member state's government, parliament, or popular opinion. Nowhere in the EU is there a strong conviction that a nation would be better off outside the EU, and no other international organization can offer peace and prosperity of the same caliber as the EU (Vollaard).

Furthermore, a lot of people believe that their nation lacks the ability to handle contemporary political difficulties outside of the EU. Unhappiness can result in partial withdrawals from the EU, such as failing to follow EU regulations or paying less to Brussels. Another possibility is involuntary fragmentation, such as the expulsion of Greece from the eurozone or Schengen region. The EU will have time to address issues like the democratic deficit and lukewarm emotions toward the integration effort thanks to this slow dissolution process. Dissatisfied member states will continue to participate in the EU, even if only sporadically, as long as there is no viable option outside of it (Vollaard).

According to Timothée Houzel, Brexit as the lone and unique instance of European Dissolution. The UK is still the first member state to start the disintegration process after the shock of the 2016 referendum result. Disintegration is the selective lowering of the degree and extent of integration in a state. It may be internal, as in the case of a member state staying in the EU but leaving some policies behind, or external, as in the case of a member state leaving the EU. The possible conflict between functional demands and exclusive identity is emphasized by post functionalism as a theory of European integration. This hypothesis is especially important for comprehending the causes of both the UK's differentiated integration into the EU and the differentiated disintegration symbolized by Brexit. In fact, this theory links differentiated integration and disintegration to a politicized process that takes into



account a number of variables that are relevant to the UK: The first is the degree of European integration in what were formerly fundamental state functions, such as immigration control. According to the theory, the main political parties abandoned their liberal policies as a result of the rise in immigration to the UK, which began in the late 1990s after the creation of the single market and continued in the mid-2000s after the Eastern enlargement. In 2015, 63% of the British public identified immigration as the most important issue (Houzel).

The second aspect is the country's exclusive national identity, which is particularly apparent in the UK when compared to other member states because 60% of people there identify solely as English. The third factor is the rise of anti-EU and anti-immigration parties, such as UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party), which won the most votes and seats in the 2014 European Parliament elections before being followed by the Brexit Party (headed by the same leader, Nigel Farage), in the 2019 European Parliament elections. The fourth is the use of EU-related referendums, which create an institutional platform for calls for dissolution. One such referendum was called by the Hungarian government in 2016 to oppose the EU's migrant relocation plans (Houzel).

If this were to apply to the UK, the June 2016 referendum would be the culmination of a process that had started much earlier, especially when David Cameron announced the referendum in 2013 to fend off his rivals within the Conservative Party and the UKIP electoral threat rather than talking about actual issues in the United Kingdom's European policy. The following could serve as a summary of these post functionalist presumptions: In the end, Brexit might reveal more about the UK than it will about the status of European unity. Finally, compare and contrast the two primary scenarios for a post-Brexit Europe. According to the first, Brexit will actually start a process of European disintegration. The other contends that, just as differentiated integration enabled this in recent decades, the loss of the EU's most Eurosceptic partner may finally pave the way for a more integrated Europe

without the blocking power of this country. This second option may be supported by the 27 Member States' outstanding cooperation on the Brexit issue during the past three years (Houzel).

### **3.6. Post-Brexit Issues: Irish Problems and the Scottish Question**

Northern Ireland must address the UK's withdrawal from the EU and its only land border, which could hinder trade and mobility. This raises doubts about the peace process and the democratic system's ability to uphold stability and foster economic growth. The UK-EU relationship's altered position is causing political tensions within Northern Ireland, with Ulster Unionist Party and Alliance Party supporting the "remain" position and DUP (Democratic Unionist Party) supporting the "leave" position. The loss of the EU's economic benefits, particularly open borders, is likely to have a more severe impact on Northern Ireland than the rest of the UK. Northern Ireland's economic legacy stems from Brexit, with limited private sector and reliance on agriculture (Doyle and Connolly 2,4).

A hard land border is crucial for political stability and economic growth, but it jeopardizes the Good Friday deal and increases political tensions. Unionists oppose a negotiated sea border, and Brexit could exacerbate internal tensions and damage Northern Ireland's power-sharing executive. The EU sought a formal ruling that Northern Ireland would automatically be part of the EU without a treaty agreement or other member votes, drawing on German precedent (Doyle and Connolly 6).

Brexit poses significant challenges for Northern Ireland, with the region's unique position and circumstances, including the absence of a functioning Northern Ireland Executive, making it particularly vulnerable. The Irish government warns of profound implications for the entire island, while the UK government emphasizes political stability and economic prosperity. The border issue is crucial, as the UK government's commitment to

withdraw from the EU's Single Market and Customs Union is a concern. The UK government has called for flexible and imaginative solutions to address the border issue, while the EU has also called for avoiding a hard border while respecting the Union's legal order. The Irish government has rejected any “visible, hard” border on Ireland, but the challenge lies in managing freedom of movement for people and goods (Martill and Staiger 110).

The risk of a hard border remains, with immediate and significant economic consequences. The Irish government seeks EU support to manage and mitigate risks to trade with the UK, its largest bilateral trading partner, as Brexit poses significant challenges to its economy (Martill and Staiger 111).

### **3.6.1. The Scottish Question**

The EU Referendum Act 2015 allowed a referendum on whether the UK should remain a member of the EU. In 2016, 62% of Scottish voters chose to stay in the EU, compared to 51.9% of the UK as a whole. The Scottish government opposed leaving the EU, proposing a unique solution for Scotland, arguing that Scotland could retain its membership in the Single Market. However, the UK government rejected this idea, and in 2017, the Scottish Parliament agreed to hold a new independence vote around the time Britain leaves the EU. The Smith Commission recommended devolution of power, giving Scotland more taxing authority and permanent status (Sionaidh 1,2).

Brexit may reshuffle the devolution agreement, and the turmoil surrounding Brexit could rekindle support for Scottish independence. The UK government's approach to Brexit has not taken into consideration the concerns of devolved nations. Scotland's Place in Europe aims to maintain Scotland's membership in the Single Market, but concerns about the UK's future arise. The Great Repeal Bill, which aims to repeal the European Communities Act of 1972, changes EU law into UK law, and allows secondary legislation to amend or remove former EU legislation, may irritate devolved governments in Scotland. The UK government

views the British Constitution as unitary, with devolved countries having no legal rights (Sionaidh 7).

COVID-19, safety measures, and the lack of approval of the bill in all regional parliaments make it unlikely that the UK will leave the European Union. Scotland rejected the UK's withdrawal bill in 2018, but enforcing the bill, which was rejected by the local parliament, would raise tensions and anger the Scottish public even more than Brexit. The UK has already passed the two-year deadline for Article 50 to allow member states to leave the EU. If the two bodies do not reach an agreement by the end of this period, the member state will leave the EU and lose its relationship with the EU. The European Union has extended the two-year period, but it may extend it if it decides to do so even once. This could prevent economic devastation, allow less-skilled immigrants to enter Scotland, and ease ethnic tensions between Scots and Britons. Britain's political culture is not ideal for change, and given the choice to leave the EU, it might. But the decision to leave was largely based on misleading statistics and xenophobia. Northern Ireland and Scotland agree on Brexit, but the Scottish government refuses to consider the idea (Stakelum 18).

### **3.7. Challenges and Opportunities in the EU-UK Environmental Law and Policy**

#### **Framework**

The UK's 1973 EU membership impacted its domestic environmental policy, as its traditional approach to regulation clashed with EU norms and practices. The UK's transition from a passive recipient of EU policy to a key voice on climate change in the 2000s has been influenced by the EU's Europeanizing approach. The UK's climate change leadership and participation in EU decision-making processes have been diverse, with stability likely in areas with significant infrastructure upgrades and investments. Brexit has raised concerns about the future of UK environmental policy, as domestic legislation incorporates EU directives into UK law. The EU Withdrawal Bill aims to prevent regulatory voids and maintain crucial EU

environmental policy principles, but its divisive nature raises concern about the UK's constitutional arrangements (Burns and Carter 2,5).

The UK's access to knowledge from the European Commission and other organizations is limited post-Brexit, and states may face legal action under EU law if implementation and enforcement failures occur. The UK's devolution agreement, which granted new powers to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in 1998, has highlighted the unequal structure of the UK's devolution agreement. The lack of a shared EU framework and political dispute over minimal criteria have increased the risk of regulatory "race to the bottom" and policy incoherence across the UK. Michel Barnier, EU chief negotiator, has called for an environmental non-regression clause in future trade agreements. The UK government has reassured the EU that it will not engage in a race to the bottom in environmental standards and protections (Burns and Carter 6,7).

Brexit has significantly impacted UK environmental law, with the EU's environmental legislation having a long history dating back to the Industrial Revolution. The UK's environmental legislation has undergone significant changes due to EU membership, resulting in changes in its legal system. Before joining the EU, UK environmental legislation was typically specific about procedural requirements and policy objectives, leaving the discretion of the government to decide on emissions regulations (Macrory 644).

However, the requirement to adopt EU environmental regulation has led to changes in target objectives, specific environmental quality goals, and precise emission requirements. EU-derived rules are now incorporated into national legislation, such as drinking water standards, which have precise requirements reflected in the law as a whole. Despite the long-term changes resulting from Brexit, these traits are deeply ingrained in the body of environmental legislation, making it unlikely that significant reform will occur in the manner used before the EU (Macrory 644).

In conclusion, Brexit affects more than just the United Kingdom. Additionally, it promotes specific perceptions of bilateral and multilateral connections, as well as the global economy, and helps to build other national identities. The language of Brexit is performative on a global scale; it is ingrained in pre-existing discourses about Britain, Europe, the nation-state, and the international system, and it contributes to the construction of specific pasts. However, Brexit also gives rise to other, frequently at odds with one another, performative speech actions that either guarantee the status quo or a brand-new, bright future—not only for the UK but for the rest of the world. For instance, Brexit has prompted pledges to maintain the unity of the EU-27 and international commitments to multilateralism. Others believe that Brexit heralds a fundamental change toward a new world order, a Europe of nation-states, as well as a shift in the balance of power away from the West.

## Conclusion

Among other effects, sovereignty, immigration, the economy, and anti-establishment politics were among the political issues that contributed to Brexit. 51.8% of the votes cast in favor of leaving the EU were the referendum's final outcome. As a result, the world was stunned by the UK referendum's outcome on June 23, 2016. The outcome of Brexit has direct political and economic effects on the UK and the rest of the world. It was seen as “the most significant event in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall” in terms of the continent. The history of European integration had reached “a turning point,” according to German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Brexit has not only increased trade hurdles for UK businesses but also for international corporations that utilize Britain as a European base. Imports and exports are being hampered, investment is being sapped, and labor shortages are being exacerbated. All of this has made Britain's inflation problem worse, harming both the working class and the business sector.

Thus, Brexit actually happened, and the United Kingdom formally left the European Union at 11 p.m. on January 31, 2020. After reading and analyzing a number of reports and analyses, it is clear that leaving the EU would have a negative impact on the UK's economy and politics, as well as the relationship between the UK and the EU. Immigration as well as the UK economy will surely be impacted by the British exit from the European Union. The UK's sovereignty will also shift in a variety of ways.

Moreover, Prime Minister David Cameron said in 2013 that it was time to solve Europe's dilemma in British politics. Liberals and the center-left across politics warned that the referendum was not about Britain's future role, but about the future of the Conservative Party. Many within the party and on the right opposed the EU despite praising Cameron's election. No one really knew how intense the subsequent election campaign would be, or how deeply divided Britain would be, or if it already was. While some have likened the historic

impact of the UK's decision to leave the EU to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the UK political discourse itself seeks to repair the damage done by the EU referendum movement and socioeconomic, cultural and social perceptions. It is intended to Political Aspects Fault lines running through the entire country. For those who support the European project and the idea of a “closer alliance than ever”, Brexit presents an undeniable challenge. EU leaders are expected to take a tough stance against the UK in future negotiations, acknowledging the need to prevent further collapse. The reorientation of British politics and the dismantling of Britain can also have unintended consequences.

In the same way, Brexit will not only affect the UK. In addition, it promotes a concrete awareness of bilateral and multilateral relations and the global economy, contributing to the development of other national identities. Brexit language is global and performative. It is rooted in existing discourses about Britain, Europe, nation-states and the international system, and contributes to the construction of a particular past. But Brexit will also lead to other, often contradictory, performative rhetoric that guarantees either a status quo or a whole new bright future, not just for the UK but for the rest of the world. Brexit, for example, prompted a pledge to maintain the unity of the EU 27 and international commitments to multilateralism. Others believe that Brexit heralds a fundamental shift towards a new world order, a Europe of nation-states and a shift in power from the West.



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