

People's Democratic Republic of Algeria
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research

University 8 May 1945 – Guelma

جامعة 8 ماي 1945 -قائمة

Faculty of letters and Languages

كلية الآداب واللغات

Department of Letters and English Language

قسم الآداب واللغة الإنجليزية



OPTION: CIVILISATION

**Interest Groups and Political Lobbying: Shaping Domestic
Policy During Obama's Presidency
(2009-2016)**

**A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Letters and English Language in Partial
Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master in Language and Culture**

Board of Examiners

Chairwoman : Dr. ZEMITI Asma

University of 8 Mai 1945-Guelma

Supervisor : Dr. BLANCHET Chahira

University of 8 Mai 1945-Guelma

Examiner : Dr. SADAOUI Lamia

University of 8 Mai 1945-Guelma

Submitted by :

Supervised by :

MAASSEM Mohamed Yacine

Dr. BLANCHET Chahira

2024-2025

Acknowledgments

First, Alhamdulillahirabbil'alamin, The Merciful and All powerful for without His help and blessings, achieving this research would be an impossible feat.

I would like to thank my supervisor **Dr. BLANCHET Chahira** for her valuable guidance and support throughout the journey of conducting this research. As well as my training teacher, **Mrs. BADIS Manel Meryem**, for her precious pieces of advice and the efforts she spent guiding and preparing me for my future career.

Profound thanks to all the teachers who positively influenced us throughout our academic career in the University of Guelma.

I would also like to thank my family and friends, whose prayers and support provided constant encouragement. My gratitude extends to all colleagues and participants who contributed to this study.

Finally, I am honoured to extend my gratitude to the jury members, who dedicated their valuable time to assess and evaluate this thesis and provide their valuable insights and feedback.

Dedication

Alhamdulillah Rabbil 'Alamiin (All praises are to Allah, the Lord of the worlds), who has granted me the health and perseverance to accomplish this dissertation.

May Allah's peace and blessings be upon His final prophet, Muhammad (peace be upon him), his family, and companions.

This work is dedicated with the deepest appreciation to my parents, *Mr. Maassem Lakhder and Mrs. Cherirou Dalila*, for their unwavering support and prayers throughout my educational career. Their belief in me has been the driving force behind this achievement. To my siblings for being a constant source of motivation and companionship.

Finally, I dedicate this work to all my teachers and mentors who have guided me throughout my academic journey.

Abstract

This study investigates the role of interest groups and political lobbying in shaping U.S. domestic policy during Barack Obama's presidency (2009–2016). Despite Obama's campaign rhetoric against lobbyists and his administration's efforts to curb their influence through executive orders and regulatory reforms, lobbying persisted as a powerful force in American politics. Using a qualitative case study approach, this research examines lobbying strategies and campaign finance patterns across key policy areas, including healthcare, financial regulation, climate change, education, and immigration. Special attention is given to the transformative impact of judicial decisions such as *Citizens United v. FEC* (2010), which redefined the legal framework of political spending. The study demonstrates how interest groups adapted to new regulatory landscapes, employing both direct and indirect strategies to maintain influence over legislation and policymaking. Findings reveal enduring tensions between public policy objectives and private interests, underscoring the structural limits of executive action in restraining entrenched lobbying practices. Ultimately, the current work argues that lobbying remains a constitutionally protected but deeply contested feature of American democracy. Effective regulation, therefore, requires continuous institutional reform to balance democratic accountability with the competing pressures of organized interests.

Keywords : Interest Groups – Political Lobbying – Domestic Policy – Obama's Presidency – U.S. Politics

Résumé

Cette recherche examine le rôle des groupes d'intérêt et du lobbying politique dans la formation des politiques intérieures aux États-Unis sous la présidence de Barack Obama (2009–2016). Malgré la rhétorique de campagne d'Obama contre les lobbyistes et les efforts de son administration pour limiter leur influence à travers des décrets exécutifs et des réformes réglementaires, le lobbying a continué à s'imposer comme une force puissante dans la vie politique américaine. En adoptant une approche qualitative fondée sur des études de cas, cette recherche analyse les stratégies de lobbying et les dynamiques de financement électoral dans plusieurs domaines clés : la santé, la régulation financière, le changement climatique, l'éducation et l'immigration. Une attention particulière est portée à l'impact transformateur de décisions judiciaires telles que *Citizens United v. FEC* (2010), qui a redéfini le cadre juridique du financement politique. L'étude démontre comment les groupes d'intérêt se sont adaptés au nouveau paysage réglementaire en mobilisant des stratégies directes et indirectes pour maintenir leur influence sur la législation et l'élaboration des politiques. Les résultats révèlent les tensions persistantes entre objectifs d'intérêt public et pressions privées, mettant en lumière les limites structurelles de l'action exécutive face à des pratiques de lobbying profondément enracinées. Cette recherche soutient que, bien que le lobbying demeure une caractéristique constitutionnellement protégée mais fortement contestée de la démocratie américaine, sa régulation efficace exige des réformes institutionnelles continues afin de concilier responsabilité démocratique et pressions concurrentes des intérêts organisés.

Mots-clés : Groupes d'intérêt – Lobbying politique – Politique intérieure – Présidence Obama – Politique américaine

ملخص

تبحث هذه الدراسة في دور جماعات المصالح والضغط السياسي في تشكيل السياسات الداخلية في الولايات المتحدة خلال فترة رئاسة باراك أوباما (2009–2016). فعلى الرغم من الخطاب الانتخابي لأوباما المناهض لجماعات الضغط، وجهود إدارته للحد من نفوذها عبر الأوامر التنفيذية والإصلاحات التنظيمية، ظلّ نشاط الضغط السياسي قوة مؤثرة على السياسة الأمريكية. وباعتماد منهجية نوعية قائمة على دراسة حالة، تقوم هذه الدراسة بتحليل استراتيجيات الضغط السياسي وديناميات تمويل الحملات الانتخابية في عدة مجالات رئيسية: الصحة، التنظيم المالي، التغير المناخي، التعليم، والهجرة. وتولي الدراسة اهتماماً خاصاً بالتأثير الحاسم لقرارات قضائية مثل *Citizens United v. FEC* (2010)، التي أعادت رسم الإطار القانوني للتمويل السياسي. وتُظهر النتائج كيف تكيفت جماعات المصالح مع المشهد التنظيمي الجديد عبر استراتيجيات مباشرة وغير مباشرة للحفاظ على نفوذها في التشريع وصنع السياسات. كما تكشف الدراسة عن التوترات المستمرة بين الأهداف العامة للسياسة وضغوط المصالح الخاصة، مبرزةً الحدود البنوية لسلطة الجهاز التنفيذي أمام ممارسات ضغط متجذرة في النظام. وتخلص الأطروحة إلى أن الضغط السياسي، رغم كونه سمة محمية دستورياً لكنه موضع جدل كبير في الديمقراطية الأمريكية، فإن تنظيمه بفعالية يتطلب إصلاحات مؤسساتية متواصلة من أجل تحقيق التوازن بين المسؤولية الديمقراطية وضغوط المصالح المنظمة.

الكلمات المفتاحية

جماعات المصالح – الضغط السياسي – السياسات الداخلية – رئاسة أوباما – السياسة الأمريكية

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABA	American Bankers Association
ACA	Affordable Care Act (Obamacare)
ACE	Affordable Clean Energy
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
AGP	Asset Guarantee Program
AIPAC	American Israel Public Affairs Committee
AMA	American Medical Association
AYP	Adequate Yearly Progress
CPP	Capital Purchase Program
CCSSO	Council of Chief State School Officers
CPP	Clean Power Plan
DACA	Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
EESA	Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FEC	Federal Election Commission
FIRE	Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
FRLA	Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act
HIAA	Health Insurance Association of America
HLOGA	Honest Leadership and Open Government Act
IRCA	Immigration Reform and Control Act
LDA	Lobbying Disclosure Act

MMA	Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
NBER	National Bureau of Economic Research
NCLB	No Child Left Behind
NEA	National Education Association
NGA	National Governors Association
NRA	National Rifle Association
NRA-ILA	National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration / Act
PAC	Political Action Committee
PEN	Public Education Network
PhRMA	Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
RFS	Renewable Fuel Standard
RTTT	Race to the Top
Super PAC	Super Political Action Committee
TARP	Troubled Asset Relief Program
TIP	Targeted Investment Program
US	United States
USA	United States of America

List of Figures

Figure 1: Annual Lobbying Totals of the AIPAC: 1998 – 2024	18
Figure 2: Health care Annual lobbying totals, 1998-2024.....	51
Figure 3: Health care Party Split of Recipients, by Election Cycle, 1990-2024 (OpenSecrets)	52
Figure 4: Annual Lobbying by JPMorgan Chase & Co (OpenSecrets)	54

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter One: Background on Interest Groups and Lobbying in US Politics	5
1.1. Lobbying	6
1.2. Public Policy	6
1.3. Interest Groups	7
1.4. Types of Interest Groups	7
1.4.1. Business	7
1.4.2. Labor Unions	8
1.4.3. Intergovernmental Groups	8
1.5. The Lobbying Process	11
1.5.1. Direct Lobbying	11
1.5.2. Indirect Lobbying	11
1.5.3. Revolving Door Lobbying	11
1.6.1. Domestic Influence	12
1.6.1.1. Fossil fuel Industry	12
1.6.1.2. Teacher Unions and State Education	13
1.6.1.3. Gun Lobbies Influence	15
1.6.2. Influence on Foreign Policy	16
1.7. Legal and Regulatory Frameworks Lobbying	19

1.7.1. Theories..... 19

1.7.1.1. The Pluralist Theory 19

1.7.1.2. Hyper-pluralist Theory..... 20

1.7.1.3. Elitism Theory 21

1.7.2. Bills and Acts 22

1.7.2.1. The First Amendment..... 22

1.7.2.2. The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act “FRLA” (1946) 23

1.7.2.3. Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995)..... 24

1.7.2.4. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 24

Chapter Two: Interest Groups’ Impact on Key Domestic Policies and Challenges of Political Lobbying 27

2.1. Influence of Interest Groups on Health Care 28

2.1.1. Medicaid and Medicare..... 28

2.2. Influence of Interest Groups on Economics..... 30

2.2.1. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (2008)..... 31

2.2.2. The Influence of Interest Groups on the TARP (The Troubled Asset Relief Program) 32

2.3. Influence of Interest Groups on Employment Policies 33

2.4. Influence of Interest Groups on Education 34

2.5. Influence of Interest Groups on Immigration 36

2.6. Influence of Interest Groups on Climate Change 37

2.7. Challenges Facing Interest Groups	39
2.7.1. Access to Policy Makers	39
2.7.2. Resources Limitation	40
2.7.3. Legitimacy and Perception	40
2.7.4. Internal Fragmentation.....	41
2.7.5. Regulatory and Legal Constraints.....	42
2.7.6. Opposition from Counter Groups	43
Chapter Three: Implications of Interest Groups on Domestic Policy during Obama’s Administration (2009-2016)	45
3.1. Lobbying Strategies during Obama’s Presidency	46
3.1.1. Campaign Contributions	46
3.1.2. Reforms: Money in Elections	47
3.1.2.1. Obama’s 2008 Revolutionary Campaign.....	47
3.1.2.2. Obama’s 2012 Campaign and the Emergence of Super PACs.....	48
3.2. Influence of Interest Groups on Key Domestic Policies during Obama’s Presidency	50
3.2.1. Health Care	50
3.2.1.1. The Influence of Interest Groups on Health Care.....	50
3.2.1.2. The Influence of Interest Groups on the ACA	51
3.3.2. Interest Groups Influence on Finance.....	53
3.2.2.1. Dodd-Frank Act 2010	53

3.2.3. Interest Group Influence on Climate Change	55
3.2.3.1. Interest Group Influence on Climate Change Policies during Obama’s Presidency	55
3.2.3.2. Interest Group Influence on The Clean Power Plan	55
3.2.4. Interest Group Influence on Education	56
3.2.4.1. Obama and Education	57
3.2.4.2 Interest Groups Influence on Race to the Top.....	57
3.2.4.3. The Strategies Implied by Interest Groups to Influence “Race to The Top”	58
3.2.4.3.1. Strategies Employed by Supporting Groups.....	58
3.2.4.3.1. Strategies Employed by Opposing Groups	59
3.2.5. Interest group Influence on Immigration	59
3.2.5.1 Obama and Immigration	59
3.2.5.2. What is Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).....	60
3.2.5.3. Interest Group Influence on DACA.....	60
3.3. Obama Efforts to Regulate Lobbying	61
3.4. Lessons Learned from Obama’s Administration for Future Administrations	62
3.4.1. Reforms cannot Annihilate Lobbying.....	63
3.4.2. Political Influence is Caused by Relationships not by Occupation	63
3.4.3. Money is Speech.....	63
Conclusion	66
Bibliography	Error! Bookmark not defined.

Introduction

The American democratic principles of representation and citizen participation under a pluralist form of political system, has brought a conflict with the influence of special interest on public policy decision making. Advocacy groups and political lobbying are among the most controversial aspects of the American democratic system, this dissertation delves into the impact of these groups and political lobbying phenomenon on key domestic policies during the 44th president of the United States Barack Obama administration in between 2009 and 2016, a period that witnessed a direct clash between the White House and Lobbyists.

Interest groups have been pivotal players on the political landscape of the United States throughout the nation's whole history, under the First Amendment of the constitution that guarantees the "right to petition the government for a redress of grievances." These groups ranging from business groups, labour unions, professional associations, intergovernmental organizations, or non-economic and civil rights groups function as a channel of communication between the government and the citizens, addressing interests and preferred policy adjustments to legislators. The evolution of lobbying from a suspicious activity at the early of the 20th century without enough legal basis other than the first amendment interpretations to a regulated business within a professionalized industry reflects the growing intricacy of the decision-making procedure the United States faced.

The Obama presidency represent an interesting case for examining the influence of interest groups, despite the campaigning rhetorical the president had made against Lobbying and their extensive influence in Washington and passing "anti-lobbying reforms", yet that period witnessed an intensive lobbying activities influencing major domestic policy areas from healthcare, finance, climate change, education and immigration policies.

While scholarship exists and studies special interest in politics and lobbying in the U.S.A like the “Power elite” Charles Wright Mills who was an American sociologist, there is a lack in knowledge for how interest groups shaped domestic policies specifically during Obama’s period in the white house. Previous studies either examined individual areas of influence of these groups or specific interest groups strategies like Jacquelyn E. Hannan integrated science thesis “The Effectiveness of the Strategies Interest Groups Use to Influence Health Care Reform in The United States: A Case Study Analysis of President Clinton, Bush, and Obama 's Health Care Reforms” with major focus on the Healthcare sector throughout different presidential periods, but almost none have provided a comprehensive study for the interplay between the Obama hostile reform agenda against lobbying and the actual influence interest groups had over a variety of domestic policy domains. The current work covers this gap by providing a holistic screening of interest groups and lobbying activities’ impact during this contradictory period in the United States politics.

Considering the complexity of this issue, this research aims to treat the issue of whether interest groups was able to influence domestic policies during Obama presidency and how, despite the efforts of the administration to reduce and limit the excessive lobbying influence. The study discusses the contradiction between President Obama explicit hostile stance and regulatory agenda against advocacy groups and their continuous influence over key domestic policies during his era.

This dissertation contributes to our understanding of modern U.S politics in a variety of ways. First, it provides factual proof of the flexibility and adaptability of interest groups in the face of regulatory efforts of Obama’s government. Second it illustrates the practical limits of the executive branch in facing special interests. Third, it simplifies the complex dynamics the

pluralist democratic system of the U.S conveys in face of the reality of resources led policy. This analysis provides and crucial insights into the contemporary complex decision-making process of the U.S.

This work also aims to examine the various strategies employed by interest groups to convey their influence, analyse the influence of these groups on key domestic policy areas including healthcare, finance, climate change, education and immigration, evaluate the extent the regulatory changes Obama's government made on the effectiveness of interest groups attempts, and extracting lessons from the valuable experience of Obama in the white house for future administrations seeking to better organize the relationship between public and private interests.

This research sheds light on domestic policy areas during Barack Obama presidency (2009-2016). With major focus on domestic policy lobbying due to the measurability and the transparency this field and where interest groups thrive in success in comparison with foreign policy lobbying. This study includes both successful and failed lobbying attempts examining distinct types of interest groups: business, professional associations, intergovernmental non-economic advocacy groups and labour unions efforts to influence legislation to their Favor.

This paper attempts to answer fundamental questions related to this topic: What strategies are employed by interest groups to influence legislation? How do these groups adapt their strategies accordingly with the legislative landscape of Obama's anti-lobbying reforms era? What were the efforts Obama doing to limit the excessive lobbying influence? What lessons can be drawn from Obama administration's experience for future governments to efficiently regulate lobbying?

This research is conducted through utilizing qualitative approach, case study methodology and utilizing comparative and document analysis. With employing a mix of primary sources

including Congressional records and government documents, secondary sources include academic literature, policy analysis by experts and journalistic accounts. The research examines various specific cases across different domestic policy areas to identify the influence of interest groups.

This research is made into three chapters followed by a final comprehensive conclusion. First chapter entitled “Background on Interest Groups and Lobbying in US Politics” provides foundational background on interest groups and lobbying in U.S politics examining the types of these groups, their strategies, legal frameworks, and the developed theoretical frameworks explaining their functionality and basis. The second chapter “Interest Groups’ Impact on Key Domestic Policies and Challenges of Political Lobbying” provides an examination of the concrete impact of interest groups on key domestic areas and exploring the challenges facing political lobbying. The third chapter “Implications of interest groups on Domestic policy during Obama’s administration (2009-2016)” focuses on the lobbying strategies employed during Obama’s administration by special interest and the regulatory efforts of his government to meet his rhetoric promises of his campaign and the lessons learned for the future administrations. The conclusion provides a summary of this study’s findings and discusses the implications and offers recommendations for future research.

Chapter One

Background on Interest Groups and Lobbying in US Politics

Interest groups and lobbying have long played a central role in shaping both domestic and foreign policy in the United States. These groups—ranging from corporate lobbies and labour unions to advocacy and professional associations—seek to influence governmental decisions in ways that reflect the interests and priorities of their members. In a democratic system, lobbying is often seen as a vital mechanism that allows citizens and organizations to participate in the policymaking process and hold elected officials accountable. However, the ethical implications of lobbying, particularly the extent of its influence and the resources involved, remain subjects of ongoing debate.

This chapter provides a foundational overview of interest groups and lobbying within the context of U.S. politics. It introduces key concepts such as public policy, the definition and classification of interest groups, and the strategies they use to influence political decisions. This chapter pays special attention to highlight and distinguish the diverse types of interest groups including business, labour, intergovernmental, professional, and non-economic organizations and how their goals, tactics, and levels of access differ.

The chapter also examines the legal and regulatory frameworks that govern lobbying activities in the United States, including landmark legislation such as the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (1946), the Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995), and the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (2007). Furthermore, it outlines key theoretical perspectives such as pluralism,

elitism, and hyper-pluralism that help explain the distribution of power among competing groups in a democratic society.

By laying this conceptual groundwork, the chapter sets the stage for deeper analysis in subsequent chapters, which will focus on the practical impact of interest groups on specific domestic policy areas and the challenges they face in navigating the U.S. political landscape.

1.1. Lobbying

Lobbying is a major part of contemporary world policymaking, allowing a diversity of interest groups to affect the policymakers to pass laws and policies aligning with their interests. Lobbying is an accepted method of communication between decision makers and the people to be heard in the political arena, referring as well to any attempt of influencing government' decisions by individuals or interest groups. This procedure is implemented in every political system (Salisbury 69).

1.2. Public Policy

There is no single definition for public policy, many scholars defined it differently but they share the same core concepts, Thomas R Dye a political science professor defined it as :
“whatever government does or doesn't whatever the role the government chose to play going from solving internal conflicts to declaration of war on other nation, rewarding citizens either in a materialistic or symbolic way and gaining the resources required to operate and flourish” (1), and Lassance a senior researcher at the Brazilian Institute for Applied Economic Research who argued that a public policy is the result of the dynamic interaction between two key elements a recognized and well disclosed issue and the response of a governmental body who can influence

the policy making procedure, after applying a strategy this body can address the issue in well-structured manner to manifest his view on legislation (9).

1.3. Interest Groups

Interest groups are formal organizations of people who share common interests. These groups work to protect and promote their shared interests by influencing government decisions and public policy. They serve as a practical link between citizens and government, which is why they are sometimes called "linkage institutions." While interest groups can vary significantly in their size, goals, and methods, their main goal stays the same: to influence government action in favour of their causes (de Grazia 114).

1.4. Types of Interest Groups

1.4.1. Business

Business is a major factor in American politics according to many academics. Large corporations enjoy the status of being significant actors in the United States economy. responsible for the country's economic performance, elected officials often worry that anti-business policies will impair it. Business, however, also makes use of direct levers of influence. Large multinational firms use a wealth of resources to further their political aims. In the political process they typically represent the opinions of an entire industry as members of several trade associations. Businesses also back umbrella organizations like the US Army and the National Association of Manufacturers. S. The Chamber of Commerce stands for the entire business community. Finally, certain businesses directly influence lawmakers and give millions of dollars to the politicians they support (Binderkrantz et al. 880).

1.4.2. Labor Unions

In the early 20th century labour unions expanded gradually but in the 1930s they started to play a major role in American politics. The National Labor Relations Act gave collective bargaining protection and accelerated the expansion of unions. In the 1950s and according to the Palmer survey, they accounted for a peak of 35% of the workforce (Callaway and William 8). Nevertheless, union membership started to fall in the 1960s reaching its current level of about 15% of the working population, Unions political influence also decreased in tandem with their economic influence.

The reasons for this decrease in union membership are too complicated to go into here but they include the global economic evolution and the US economic transition from a manufacturing-based to a more of a service-oriented one (Bluestone 50). Although the power of Labor unions declined but their influence on policy making output of different sectors is still present and effective as a strong lobbyist, despite their low lobbying expenditure (Kaplan and Naidu 15).

1.4.3. Intergovernmental Groups

Intergovernmental groups include interest groups that represent state and local government entities and fight for their interests at the federal level. Despite these groups do not have official recognition in the United States. In a federal system that divides authority among the federal state and local governments they function similarly to other interest groups despite being composed of governmental entities and public officials in general (Anderson 126).

To put it another way they use the media to support their viewpoints and communicate with member opinions to the administration and Congress. The National Governors Association

(NGA) and the National Conference of State Legislatures for example represent state officials. Due to state governors direct administrative and political accountability for conducting federally mandated social welfare programs, the NGA had a major influence on members of Congress when it comes to crafting social welfare legislation (National Governors Association 4). Cities general institutional interests are represented by the National League of Cities (Redefining the National League of Cities State Sovereignty Doctrine 1461) whereas counties' general institutional interests are represented by the National Association of Counties who plays a pivotal role in promoting investments and representing the interests of the counties on a federal level (Hokama 45).

1.4.4. Professional Associations

The common interests, values and advocating for favourable policies for their profession are the focus of organizations such as the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association. Professionals are among the most powerful interest groups and the biggest spenders on lobbying (Holman and Lenz 301). And as Hacker adopted the policy focused approach Hacker in analysing business groups activities (Hacker 35) and Anzia confirmed it that interest groups work in an interest focused way, so it is normal that there is a national organization for almost every specialty within state and local government (Anzia 9).

One among the best examples for professional groups is the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, The National Council of State Housing Both represent housing agencies across the USA, state and federal laws prohibit such groups (nonprofit organizations) from engaging in partisan activities under the IRC 501(c) with all its paragraphs (Judith 337). Nonetheless they and other professional groups organize their members to meet with representatives from their own states or districts and testify before Congress on matters of their

programs or influence the media and the public opinion to support and spread their ideas (Jessani et al. 9). These associations of service providers serve as a vital voice for the impoverished in the American political process because low-income recipients of public programs seldom form influential national interest groups.

1.4.5. Non-economic Groups

Non-economic interest groups promote societal ideological or rights-based goals. A significant subset of these are public interest groups which work toward goals that help society such as consumer advocacy, civil rights and environmental protection agency EPA as opposed to focusing on generating financial gains for their members (Susan and Welsh 389).

One of the most distinctive marks in interest group activity would be the coalition between two noneconomic groups West Harlem Environmental Action and the Columbia Centre for Children's Environmental Health. According to a research report done through the collaboration of University of California, Berkeley, School of Public Health and Policy Link organization these groups advocated for health issues caused by emitted diesel from vehicles and used a variety of strategies to advocate for their cause going from direct connection to the policy makers, using media to raise public awareness of the dangers of those gases and demanded the change of public transportation buses to ones powered by a cleaner energy source, and despite the difficulties they faced in meeting and having a hearing with influential public official this campaign succeeded in getting their demands and got 300 buses powered by less harmful fuels as well as establishing a new air monitoring system in Harlem (Minkler et al. 17).

1.5. The Lobbying Process

Lobbying can be defined in various ways but at its core is the constitutional right for any citizen or a group of people (advocacy groups) to solicit or petition against the government to influence the policy-making process manifest the democratic values and it can take several forms: direct, indirect or via the revolving door phenomenon (Berg 564).

1.5.1. Direct Lobbying

Direct lobbying or inside lobbying is any attempt to influence decision making through direct interaction with a legislative body through communication with a government officials who has an influence on the creating and shaping legislation procedure, participating in committee hearings and meetings where the policies are discussed, providing legislators with information and other interest groups to make demands more audible (Nicoll 3).

1.5.2. Indirect Lobbying

Indirect lobbying grass roots lobbying or outside lobbying all these terms refers to procedure consists of multiple strategies used to influence the public opinion with respect to legislation using their support to strengthen the cause and then impacting the decision-making process to rule in the favour of the lobbyist (Jesus 73).

1.5.3. Revolving Door Lobbying

The inevitability of private sector employees changing to public sector or conversely leads to giving authority for these officials to exert legislation in their favour and act like lobbyists for their own projects or and with the capitalistic view of the USA and dependency on economic revenue led to the revolving door lobbying occurrence more significantly (Blanes et al. 3732).

According to Jennifer Nicoll Victor who is an Associate Professor of Political Science, interest groups can use a single tactic or a variety of these strategies to increase their chances of reaching their policy goals depending on their budget, experience, and the nature of their objectives (5).

1.6. The Role of Interest Groups and Lobbying in US Politics

Interest groups and lobbying have a significant influence on US politics. Through a variety of tactics, they have an impact on public policy legislation and the larger political scene in this section there will be examples of the influence of various groups on legislations.

1.6.1. Domestic Influence

Domestic policy is a set of principles and strategies implemented by governments that influence the residents of the country, and it is concerned with vast areas of policy which are thought to be presidential shaped but in fact there are a lot of constraints on how these policies are shaped (Light 111), one of these constraints is the intervention of interest groups.

1.6.1.1. Fossil fuel Industry

Fossil fuel industry lobby is considered among the most powerful lobbies in the United States and spends enormous amounts of money on lobbying for favourable terms and according to OpenSecrets a nonprofit research group tracking money flow in the US politics, the oil and gas industry alone spent over 50 million dollars yearly at least on lobbying activities since the beginning of the 21st century (open secrets), the US policies were heavily criticized due to the immense influence of different interests on shaping them especially in the oil and gas field and energy policies in general (Bipartisan Policy Centre 11).

Fossil industries played immense role in shaping several domestic policies throughout the American history and even when they failed to achieve their wanted goals, they went off the political battle with beneficial results or at least negate bills that would harm their benefits like climate change policies (Føehn et al. 77).

Big oil companies lobbied heavily in each election cycle to weaken regulation especially ones concerned with gas emissions standards. They also imply grassroots lobbying strategies like the “save our beach view campaign” which was funded by oil companies to mislead public opinion to oppose wind farms in Delaware and Maryland which was considered as a threat to these companies’ profits, using a variety of strategies helped in cancelling the program as well as setting an example for this lobby's financial and political influence (Morsberger).

Fossil industries has a major role in academia as well, according to interdisciplinary WIREs Climate Change is an academic article fossil industries spread within the higher education field through board memberships, educational partnerships and research funding, many executives of the industry serve on university boards and inviting universities staff and doctors to meetings organized by them in order to give them “advice” on certain topics influencing the university curricula, big companies grassroots lobby via sponsoring scholarships, conferences and student trips and even naming buildings after fossil fuel firms further more hosting recruitment events and offer training programs (Hiltner et al. 4).

1.6.1.2. Teacher Unions and State Education

Teacher unions are special type of labour unions representing educators across the United States on different levels nationwide, statewide or local ones, which advocates for favourable terms and conditions for teachers, higher salaries, smaller classrooms, shorter work days and

educational years using lobbying and strikes to secure the tutor's rights and better working conditions and it is obvious that the more unionized the state, pedagogues get higher salaries and work under "better conditions" (Cowen and Strunk 3).

Public school teaching was a union free zone until the 1960's where the emergence of new legal framework adopted by most states made public sectors work under the labour laws, this made a quantum leap in the size and activity of teacher unions turning the profession from a union free one to a heavily unionized one by 1978 (Moe 2).

Teacher unions depend on many variables to gather its political power, as any other group seeking to be influential on the political arena and acquire power and teacher unions are no exception, They gather their manpower from their profession affiliates which is considered to over 70% of the total of American teacher (around 3.8 million tutors) in 2015-2016 (U.S. Department of Education) , this big number of affiliates contributes to the financial power of these groups and even aligning themselves with political parties to gain influence and support from them and push for favourable policies considering the pedagogical agenda (Stevenson et al. 7), as well as using variety of lobbying strategies going from grassroots lobbying via strikes , protests and using media support to shape public opinion and pressure legislators (Wachira and Derrick 594).

In 2018, a big success for teacher unions in republican states succeed in performing a big walkouts and teacher strikes with the help of parents and other workers starting from West Virginia followed by Oklahoma and Arizona and spread on a national level later to demand better pay, better working conditions and increased educational funding (Blanc 68). These walkouts succeeded in guaranteeing immediate benefits on different levels across different states and the

state that got the most is West Virginia by guaranteeing pay raises and frozen health care costs and pro charter school laws and Arizona where tax cuts were stopped and pay raises without cuts from social programs (Bennett 95).

This makes it clear that teacher unions grassroots lobbying strategies are influential even in red states and oppose austerity policies even in republican states who oppose this kind of walkouts and strikes.

1.6.1.3. Gun Lobbies Influence

As a non-economic interest groups and on the head of the gun lobby, the National Rifle Association (NRA) stands out as one of most ferocious interest groups, its main aim is to protect the gun rights as it is constitutionally protected in the second amendment of bill of rights (United States Congress 1580). The NRA creation goes back to post civil war era as a civilian's association in 1871 to improve marksmanship of soldiers and National guard, and after the two world wars and the period after the second one which witnessed a blooming in number of the NRA members reaching over 9 million members and divergence of their interest from marksmanship to hunting which made the association reorder its priorities to fit their members interests (Lagayette 54).

The NRA employed various strategies to impose its influence on legislation, it is noted that these groups depend on six main tactics Membership Mobilization targeting new social segments to grow their base and neglect the stereotype of being exclusive to only men and white, Grassroots Mobilization through activating their big base to influence legislators to vote for favourable terms via calls emails and controlling voters to side with pro-gun lawmakers, and innovating political scorecards which ranks politicians according to their stance towards gun

rights , putting pressure on candidates to align with the NRA views to gather voters support and using the 2nd amendment text as a core American value to unify its members and entitle them under a single cause (Sierpien 52)

The NRA exercise pre-emptive lobbying to guarantee pro-gun rights policies and neglect gun control measures (Sierpien 54). The NRA established National Rifle Association Institute for Legal Action “NRA-ILA” which is the lobbying arm for the NRA established in 1975 and played an immense role in shaping a variety of gun related policies and stopping other bills (Musa 2).

An example of the success of organized membership base, clear messaging, and strategic alignment with political trends of the NRA is the 1994 is what is called as “Republican Revolution” of 1994 where the great old party for the first time in 40 years got the majority in both chambers of congress and President Clinton himself stated the NRA as the cause of the democrat’s loss due to their support for the assault weapons ban bill (Kenny 332).

1.6.2. Influence on Foreign Policy

First, one needs to define what foreign policy is, according to Nuechterlein, an American diplomat and an academic who was a professor of international relations that foreign policy is a set of principles and activities a government practices to guide its relationship with other nations which aims at protecting its national interests such as security, economy, ideology, well-being and world order in case of bigger sovereignties (248).

One of the most famous incidents regarding foreign interests and lobbying was the Malaysian case in 2002 where the lobbyist Jack Abramoff lobbied on behalf the Malaysian government to guarantee a meeting between the ex-prime minister at the time Mahathir Mohamad and the US former president George W. Bush with denials of the Minister regarding

the payment sourced from the Malaysian government (U.S. Department of Justice). This incident increased doubts about regulations concerning foreign lobbying policies.

An interest group known for influence on foreign policies in the US, the *American Israel Public Affairs Committee* “AIPAC” a powerful advocacy group within the Israeli lobby which was established between 1949–1954 (Aridan 135), the main aim of protecting and strengthening the relationship between the United States and Israel as well as ensuring unconditional support for the Zionists. AIPAC influences the U.S legislation through political donations, pressure campaigns and lobbying to mandate pro-Israeli policies, military and financial aid to the Zionist entity (America and the ‘Israel Lobby.’ 3651). While AIPAC does not support candidates directly, instead it moves its political action committees and members to fund the pro-Israel lawmakers in their campaigns due to the association’s nature and to avoid regulatory violations (Gultom and Miftah 43).

The AIPAC played a crucial role in shaping key foreign and domestic policies since its first official establishment in 1959 originating from the American Zionist Council “AZC” (Solomon 4). The group was successful in ensuring gargantuan amounts of support in the early 1950s, gathering over 159 million dollars as grants between 1951 and 1953 after heavy lobbying using the argument that allocating support to Arab countries who were receiving aid due to hosting refugees but not to Israel was discriminatory and it was considered as one of the biggest diplomatic achievements for the group and the lobby in its early days (Aridan 132).

More recent and apparent incident that shows the influence of this group is 2017 Embassy Relocation from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem rooting back from 1995 under the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act that required the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the embassy

should be relocated by 1999 “United States Congress 339” and the act was delayed due to presidents signing waivers every six months for security reasons (Watson 843), this act was the aim of the AIPAC since the 1967 and lobbied and pressured several American governments and congress throughout the years to recognize Jerusalem as its capital and move the embassy to Jerusalem (Elgindy 88).

This chart shows the lobbying expenditures of the AIPAC, and it is obvious that it reached its peak before and during the period the act was enacted starting from 2016 till 2018 and shows the interest of the AIPAC in the Council relocation case.




Figure 1: Annual Lobbying Totals of the AIPAC: 1998 – 2024

Source: <https://www.opensecrets.org>

This raise in expenditure can be due the Candidate at the time Donald J. Trump confirming that relocating the council and putting the 1995 law into the presidential agenda, The candidate at the time Donald J. Trump stated in his speech in 2016: “We will move the American embassy to the eternal capital of the Jewish people, Jerusalem” (Begley), The promise was a motive for the

AIPAC. The latter stands as an example of the immense influence of interest groups on foreign policies as one of the most powerful and effective interest groups in the USA (Safty 88).

1.7. Legal and Regulatory Frameworks Lobbying

Lobbying is a protected right for US citizens constitutional under the first amendment which guaranteed the right of speech and the lobbying disclosure act in 1995 which codified that even further with a framework of how lobbying should be practiced and many scholars came up with more theories to further understand the mechanisms of interest groups.

1.7.1. Theories

To understand the role of interest groups and their frameworks, it is important to understand the developed theories that explain their functionality and basis.

1.7.1.1. The Pluralist Theory

Pluralist theory supports that democratic political power is distributed across numerous competing interest groups which represent a wide range of social segments. From this perspective multiple interest groups share power across policy domains through uneven distribution which leads to policymaking through negotiation and compromise among these groups. In democratic systems executives and party leaders function as mediators who balance competing interests instead of enforcing unilateral decisions (Garceau 105). This political vision values diversity within institutions and responsiveness to various constituencies, while maintaining institutional balance. The real-world application of pluralism reveals its failure to meet its theoretical expectations (Milojevich 3).

Different interest groups encounter unequal opportunities to access resources and participate in policymaking channels. The financial resources and strategic organization of business groups and professional associations surpass those of associations representing marginalized or economically disadvantaged communities. The governmental stance towards various industries and sectors is not impartial since they depend on sectors like defence, healthcare, or finance which consequently increases these groups' influence in policy debates (Gilens and Martin 794).

The dynamics of policy processes show that pluralism exaggerates policy openness and fairness while failing to acknowledge the institutional benefits enjoyed by better-funded groups. Despite its limitations the theory provides important perspectives on group competition's influence on policy results when examined with its critiques and amendments (Dahl 199).

1.7.1.2. Hyper-pluralist Theory

Opposing to pluralism where interest groups different goals play a positive role in shaping policies which serve the needs of citizens, hyper pluralism theory suggests that the presence of many groups that aims at achieving different and contradicting goals may lead to paralyzing the policymaking procedure due the high number of policy influencers and powerful advocates (Ferrara 100), which can to a policy gridlock and Government inefficiency due to the conflicting demands of powerful interest groups which makes it hard for the government to come up with efficient solutions that are satisfying for these interest groups as well as to fragmented authority due to the over representation and strong authority interest group have under this theory (Cameron et al 35) .

A classic example of hyper pluralism is an act that was amended several times since it was passed first in 1954, the Public Law 480 one of US food aid policies which was immensely shaped by the conflicting interests of several groups, according to Polly Diven, this act was the result of strong advocates trying to guarantee their shares which resulted in ineffective law in many ways which made the bill loses its original aim: using the surplus of agricultural products to support humanitarian efforts, to a pressure card (381).

1.7.1.3. Elitism Theory

Interest groups are the channel for the citizens to push for policies that interests and benefits them and at the same time block policies that are more favourable to the ‘higher class minority, but with the evolution of these groups and the appearance major groups that dominates their fields as well as their extensive interventions it makes them serve the opposite goal they were found for at the first place (Andreas and De Bièvre 8).

Another theory that explains the interest groups activities is elitism, one of the major literatures studying this theory is the professor of sociology C. Wright Mills work “The power elite.” According to Mills Interest groups elites are not neutral and have good influences on domestic policies, but rather instruments of elite influence, always reinforcing existing power structures and holding the power to shape policies on a national importance on various sensitive (Mills 275).

Another interesting testing of American Politics confirms that this kind of theory can be the most relative one when trying to study interest groups, studies shows that elitism perspective dominates the policy making procedure, where the opinion of the elites of economy and business groups drive the policy output more than the majority of citizens and neglects the American

democratic values suggesting that the USA system is more of Economic-Elite driven more than democratic majoritarian one (Gilens and Benjamin 576).

dominant interest groups can play a pivotal role in shaping bills that are opposing to the public interest like 2010 Dodd frank policy, Energy Policy Act of 2005, and other bills to give favourable policies to big corporations like bankers and fossil fuels companies (Johnson 18).

1.7.2. Bills and Acts

Until the mid of the 20th century lobbying was seen as illegal and unethical and courts dealt with it as a wrongdoing (Teachout 12). Later the legislative body made laws allowing lobbying which was a taboo and a non-negotiable civil offense instead of banishing it (Briffault 4).

1.7.2.1. The First Amendment

The first amendment's content "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances" (United States Constitution. Amend 1). put forward the legal foundation for the interest groups activities as they are a 'pipeline' for citizens to opine.

With the development of the lobbying profession and the controversies around the ethicality and legality of the action. The first amendment which encourages the citizens to participate in the decision-making process and the self-governance that the whole American democracy is maintained by (Browne 729). Interest groups are an extension for both the pluralist theory and the republican ideal which affirms that interest groups are entitled to their lobbying efforts as they believe it is constitutional right (Magarian 57).

In the 1953 case *United States v. Rumely* (345 U.S. 41), Rumely was accused of violating lobbying disclosure laws because he refused to disclose the names of individuals who made bulk purchases of his politically oriented books, which were viewed as a form of indirect lobbying. The Supreme Court held that the House committee had exceeded its authority by seeking this information, and in doing so, reinforced First Amendment protections for publishers, writers, and readers. The ruling implicitly protected the right to indirect lobbying through publishing, emphasizing the constitutional importance of free speech and press in political discourse. (*United States v. Rumely* 345 U.S. 41)

1.7.2.2. The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act “FRLA” (1946)

The FRLA was the first law in the United States history to regulate the “Lobbying” activities, it was passed after the war as fears of different interest groups dominating the legislative body and to guarantee transparency over these practices (The Federal Lobbying Act of 1946 103). The Act required lobbyists to register with the federal government and disclose the name and address of any donor contributing \$500 or more. These disclosures had to be filed quarterly with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate (Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 49). This was the first act that explicitly setting the legal basis for lobbying other than the interpretations of the first amendment. Although the act was received as full of loopholes and lacking in many ways and many revisions were requested by President Harry Truman due to its poor drafting and not enough regulation for what is important to disclose in those reports especially that the bill focused only on direct lobbying (Holman 6). but it sets a precedent for other better and effective bills like the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act “LDA”.

1.7.2.3. Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995)

The loopholes, short-comings and the vagueness of the federal regulation of lobbying act of 1946 led to a commotion that needed remedying, leading to a new more expansive and detailed bill further regulating the lobbying procedure which is the lobbying disclosure act as the congress' compiled and updated version of the federal statute states ("United States Congress" 14) which defined 'lobbyist' as a person who spends at the least fifth of his time or more doing lobbying for six months for a 'client' which is defined as a person or an organization whose employees lobby on his behalf for financial or other kind of payment and a report every six months. A semi-annual report disclosing lobbying activities and spendings exceeding 20000 dollars rounded to the closest 500 shall be provided to the clerk of the house of representatives and the secretary of the senate. ("United States House Committee on the Judiciary" 18) which ended up monitoring most of the lobbying activities except for the grassroots lobbying due to the republican opposition at the time but the act had bipartisan acceptance due to the need of a law to behave the lobbying phenomenon (Torre 20).

1.7.2.4. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007

This act was passed as a response for the exponential increase in corruption cases especially those relating to lobbying, most notably the *Jack Abramoff case*, who was one of the biggest republican lobbyists at that time caught in a scandal involving Indian casinos where he would do lobbying for and against his 'Clients' at the same time to maximize his personal profits as well as tax evasion, conspiring to bribe public officials and fraud (Vandenbergh 1135). This case was a major event which exposed the Illegal nature of interactions that go on between legislators and

lobbyists which resulted in a new law to regulate these activities to achieve maximum transparency.

The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) of 2007 executed basic changes to codify and further reinforce the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 by closing loopholes, and going from semi-annual to quarterly reporting which was one of the most eminent changes introduced by this bill, as well as the expansion of the "covered officials" definition by HLOGA to also include senior White House staff and top congressional assistants, eliminating previous loophole that allowed behind-the-scenes influence to stay unreported ("Honest Leadership and Open Government Act" 13).

The act barred lobbyists from giving officials gifts, dinners, and private jet trips which dissolved potential channels for dishonourable impact (Torre 25). Revolving imposed stricter "revolving door" policies which forced previous house representative and senate members and other higher ups in the government to go through a grace period to avoid the revolving doors phenomenon and make it harder for previous officials to utilize their knowledge and connections directly after their termination (Drutman and Bruce 5). The act also required officials to disclose earmarks which limited their capacity to distribute government resources secretly towards their own projects (Congressional Institute 3).

The HLOGA introduced harsher financial penalties on violators in comparison to the LDA going from 50,000 dollars under the previous bill to over 200,000 dollars under the new regulations with the possibility of facing criminal charges and being confined to prison for a period reaching 5 years ("United States Congress 121 STAT". 749).

To round up, this chapter establishes the foundation for understanding the complex mechanisms through which lobbying and interest groups shape the U.S. political landscape. By introducing key concepts such as public policy, lobbying, and the nature of interest groups, and by categorizing them into business, labour unions, intergovernmental, professional, and non-economic groups, the chapter demonstrates their significant role in influencing policy outcomes. Through both domestic and foreign policy examples, it becomes evident that interest groups and lobbying are central to the formulation and development of legislation across a wide range of issues.

This chapter also explores the strategies employed by interest groups to influence the policy-making process, including direct (inside) lobbying, indirect (grassroots) lobbying, and revolving door practices. Through concrete examples—such as the lobbying efforts of the fossil fuel industry, teacher unions, and gun advocacy groups—it becomes evident that these actors possess significant power in shaping legislation that aligns with their specific agendas. While such influence may enhance democratic participation by representing diverse societal interests, it also raises critical concerns regarding equity, transparency, and the ethical boundaries of political engagement. These issues highlight the need for robust regulatory frameworks to ensure that lobbying activities remain accountable, fair, and consistent with democratic principles.

This foundational understanding of lobbying and interest groups provides a basis for further investigation in the next chapters, where the focus will shift to evaluating their effectiveness, the implications for the political system, and the challenges these groups face, further recognizing the multiple roles and strategies they employ to influence key domestic policies.

Chapter Two

Interest Groups' Impact on Key Domestic Policies and Challenges of Political Lobbying

Interest groups have accumulated enduring influence over legislation throughout the history of the United States, evolving into powerful actors within the political system. Their role has been increasingly formalized and legitimized through various legislative frameworks that recognize advocacy as a legal and essential part of democratic participation. These groups—ranging from professional associations and labour unions to business coalitions and civil society organizations—serve as intermediaries between the public and policymakers, seeking to shape public policy in ways that reflect the interests of their constituents.

This chapter explores the concrete impact of interest groups on key domestic policy areas, including healthcare, economic and employment policies, education, immigration, and climate change. By examining specific legislative cases and historical milestones, the chapter demonstrates how different groups have used various lobbying strategies—such as direct lobbying, grassroots mobilization, media campaigns, and electoral contributions—to influence the policymaking process in their favour.

In addition to their successes, this chapter also highlights the challenges and limitations that interest groups encounter in their pursuit of policy influence. These challenges include restricted access to decision-makers, financial constraints, internal divisions, questions of legitimacy, regulatory burdens, and opposition from rival interest groups. Such obstacles often shape the degree to which interest groups can achieve their goals or maintain public trust.

Ultimately, this chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of both the capacities and constraints of interest groups in American domestic politics, offering insights into how these

actors operate within a competitive and pluralistic system. By focusing on their role in major policy areas and the difficulties they face, it becomes possible to understand the complex dynamics of political lobbying and its evolving place in the American democratic process.

2.1. Influence of Interest Groups on Health Care

The U.S. healthcare system underwent many hurdles throughout its history due to the absence of universal healthcare, and the dystopian view of interest groups towards healthcare and treating it as a profit-oriented capitalist venture (Hoffman 72).

2.1.1. Medicaid and Medicare

After decades of intense debate and vigorous advocacy for a federally supported healthcare system, two landmark programs—Medicaid, which provides health coverage for low-income individuals, and Medicare, which serves elderly Americans—were introduced as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1965 under President Lyndon B. Johnson. These programs marked a significant milestone in U.S. social policy and were signed into law after sustained pressure from interest groups, public health advocates, and social reformers (Berkowitz 11).

Marmor, a Professor Emeritus of Public Policy and Management & Professor Emeritus of Political Science in Yale university, highlighted the immense dissent and opposition of American Medical establishment to universal healthcare coverage, which reached its peak in the post WWII period, and the demand for such coverage were not unique to just the USA as other ‘industrial’ countries were pressured to provide universal healthcare coverage but the case of the states was different due to the structure of the US apparatus which helped in extending the influence of interest groups on legislation (873).

One of the most famous and successful achievements of interest groups as it relates to universal healthcare coverage was slapping down the Clinton health care program or the Clinton plan, where interest groups followed various strategies, in a case study by the college of Wooster affirming that pressure groups used grassroots lobbying via the HIAA's "Harry and Louise" propaganda ads which aimed to manipulate the public opinion of the bill by portraying it as a government overreach that limits their choices and violates their right when it comes to healthcare programs they can register in (Hannan 69). As well as other strategies as dominating the public insurance towards privatization of the health insurance programs becoming the administrators of such programs due to the misjudgement of the power interest groups have and the support they are receiving from Republican Party and shifting towards bipartisan support after the success of failing Clinton's care program (Kelly 25).

Another example would be that of president George W. Bush in 2003 where he pushed for legislation addressing some key aspects of the Medicare program commonly known as Medicare part D or Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act "MMA", which introduced prescription drug benefits from Medicare approved private insurers, a long-sought goal ever since the inception of the program in 1965. The George W. Bush administration achieved this after extended discussions with congressional committees and various interest groups (Santangelo 32). The bill that was passed in 2003 and put in effect from starting 2006 provided prescription drug benefits administered through Medicare-approved private insurance companies that offered beneficiaries a multitude of plans to pick from. This bill helped cover millions of low income and elderly Americans and lowered their drug prices significantly (O'Sullivan 1).

Drug manufactures played an immense role in shaping crucial provisions of the bill; a remarkable example is that of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) which was among the leading “Big Pharma” interest groups that lobbied aggressively and successfully against allowing the federal government to negotiate drug prices (a measure that would be *partly* rolled back 19 years later) utilizing different strategies including “Revolving Door” (Evers-Hillstrom), direct lobbying and litigation (White et al. 957)."

Health insurance companies and drug manufacturers considered this to be a victory, as their lobbying efforts were not in vain. The bill was in line with their interests, especially the act's dependency on private plans to provide drug coverage (Gencarelli 1). Hacker Jacob a professor of political science at Yale University revealed the immense role of the private insurers, pharmaceutical companies, medical device makers and manufacturers and the revolving door lobbyists at shaping the Medicare reform with support from republican legislators who held authoritative positions in different branches of the government at the early 2000's (130).

In sum, healthcare in the United States is influenced by interest groups' intervention and advocating for their interests as well as shaping the policies in their favour using different strategies and Medicare was one case among many cases where they were able to show their influence.

2.2. Influence of Interest Groups on Economics

Interest groups are a representation of shared interests of several groups or individuals, as Olson stated-- this allows them to gain power over legislation to rule in their favour especially in a competitive and capitalistic system like the USA (Dür and De Biever 1). While this environment maybe very fertile for these groups to influence key provisions of economy related

bills, these lobbies efforts can come at odds with the interests and well being of the average American citizens and of United States' economy more broadly while ignoring these possible ramifications so long as it helps their agenda (Murtala 79).

2.2.1. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (2008)

The 2008 economic crisis famous for global monetary crisis made it crucial to make a bill that would stabilize the American economy which was in catastrophic state due to the fall of major economic institutions and the immense need to bailout them (Fein 3). The EESA was a counter measure to this recess that the United States was suffering from (Lopez 4).

Interest groups were heavily involved in lobbying activities according to the NBER **“National Bureau of Economic Research”** working paper that the benefits of involved interest groups went accordingly with how much they lobbied, leading to receiving favourable treatment especially the FIRE **“Finance, Insurance, Real Estate”** industry which stands for the institutions that with different economic aspects of the USA going from Finance, Insurance, Real estate (Igan et al. 16). which have lobbied extremely in order to shape the reform that would help in the bail out of such institutions that were the verge of collapsing leading to the creation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program **“TARP”**. A program that was supervised by the office of financial stability, an office that that was established by the EESA act, the program allowed the treasury department to buy troubled assets enabling the stabilization of the USA stagnant economy and provide liquidity to this sector and helping in reestablishment of confidence in the financial system and encouragement of economic growth via protection of home values and ownership, college funds, retirement accounts (U.S. Department of the Treasury 4).

2.2.2. The Influence of Interest Groups on the TARP (The Troubled Asset Relief Program)

The reaction of different interest groups varied from supporting the program to the opposition due to the different interests and opinions these groups have and had an extremely negative public opinion especially due to the unfair distribution of provision and the misuse of taxpayers' money (Hoffman 8).

Major supporters of the program were the biggest beneficiaries of the program especially banks with and investment firms who lobbied aggressively for it and had political connections and influence (Ran and Dennis 30) , and the congressional research service report on the program demonstrated the focus of the TARP on the bank support programs like the Capital Purchase Program “CPP”, Targeted Investment Program “TIP” and Asset Guarantee Program “AGP”; these were exclusive for only Citigroup and Bank of America , and several other programs that provides immense support for the financial institutions (Webel 20). This shows that the political influence and relations in addition to lobbying can provide exclusive benefits for such groups and institutions and in the EESA, case were banks and business coalitions.

On the other hand, the TARP program was passed in hurry just before a presidential election and under overwhelming economic recession with conflicting goals as stabilizing the crisis as well as guaranteeing social justice, all of this led to hasty decision and shortcomings (Calomires 72). TARP “Bail out program.” for “Big Banks” lobby who had major electoral contributions and spendings on lobbying (Connor 5), but the ABA “American Bankers Association” and small businesses were on the opposition side of the TARP due to it immense focus on supporting big banks and wall street according to Senator Mary Landrieu in a congressional record (Congressional Record S6186).

2.3. Influence of Interest Groups on Employment Policies

One of the most known acts within the United States employment policies was the Occupational Safety and Health Act “OSHA”, an act that aimed to ensure workers safety and a healthy workspace and guaranteeing their rights and providing them with the ability to fight for them and file complaints against the employers who violates their rights, an act that was sought for a long part of the American history (Semitaro 642).

OSH Act was passed in 1970 by the president Richard Nixon and enacted by the congress creating the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor unions being the major supporters and enforcers of such the passage that would resolve the problems that were existing in the system since President Abraham Lincoln days (Rosner and Gerald 626). The labour unions had a passive stance when speaking of safety and healthiness of workplace and had major focus on wages, but the employees and rank-and-file who were the founding activists for the act protests which was not just against the employers but against heads of labour unions like the American federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO) enforced them to be making the heads of the unions change their stance and lobby for the passing of the OSHA (Donnelly 66).

On the other hand, employers were very opposed to the act under the pretention of the losses they had due to the costs of deference to the act’s regulation regarding the workplace conditions but quickly adapted to the regulations, especially because of the growing financial returns they received from the increasing productivity (Fairfax 644).

In general, this was one among many cases where interest groups played a significant role in shaping employment policies as well as reshaping them as the OSHA act itself received multiple regulatory updates to strengthen its efficiency and widen its employee protection coverage.

2.4. Influence of Interest Groups on Education

Interest groups played immense role in shaping education policies and regulations, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001 is one of the most fitting examples for the current study. the act that advocated for accountability and equity between different students of different races and closing educational achievements gaps via the strict academic standards federal government provided with key provision regarding standardized testing via yearly assessments for student in between third and eighth grade in mathematics and language arts and once in between tenth and twelfth grade to ensure continuous monitoring on the educational system as well as protecting children rights in proper education and encouraging them to stay in schools (U.S. Department of Education 3).

The NCLB act established AYP “Adequate Yearly Progress” a system that allowed the USA department of education to measure how academic institutions were performing according to the tests previously mentioned, the AYP applied to all sub groups of students, the standards of AYP simply consisted of “uniform-bar” that stands for a minimum score decided by each state and should progressively improve over time and out of each racial group of students at least 95 percent of them should be tested, the program gave a chance for schools that didn’t achieve that “uniform-bar” to meet the AYP standards if the school showed at least 10 percent of improvement on students levels (Riddle et al. 5).

The act was heavily criticized by teachers, as Mathis, a Senior Policy Advisor to the centre of education demonstrated the impossibility of this act's ability to achieve its goals due to the different starting point each student starts from and aiming to achieve the same high standards that the AYP proposes which puts schools with higher percentage of learners with difficulties and lower proficiency in danger of not complying to the AYP, as well as losing the support of even interest groups with future visions such as the national business roundtable who lobbied against the list of schools that were listed as AYP failure and lost their privileges due to the lack of credibility as well as the acts ridiculousity as well as criticizing the ones behind the standards, for not being engaged within the educational field in a way that makes their judgments realistic and possible to attain (Mathis 145).

This act found itself in opposition to groups from both sides of the political spectrum due to its support to government's provisions which contradicts with conservative business republicans principles and beliefs based on raw capitalism and the religious conservatives which believe in the freedom of parents to raise their offsprings without the mediation of the government in the process, and lost the support of the democrats due to the ignorance and the isolation they received while starting to push the act into action and due to the lack of support to the educational system receiving as well for the pressure it puts them under (Bankole and Rob 8). Later these groups regained their influence on the NCLB due to the lack of president George W. Bush support from both sides of political spectrum support due to his negligence of them while passing the law in 2001 (Bush 10) and used the PEN "Public Education Network" hearing between 2004 and 2007 as a justification to be able to intervene in the policy making of NCLB. This makes it clear that NCLB is the result of negotiation among different political parties and

advocacy groups which highlights the immense role of interest groups in shaping domestic policies.

2.5. Influence of Interest Groups on Immigration

The United States, known as a nation of immigrants, has the highest number of immigrants globally, largely because its economic system promotes the inclusion of diverse ethnic groups to sustain its capitalist model (Robinson and Xuan 3). Interest groups played a significant role in shaping U.S. immigration policy, just as they have in other areas of domestic policy. The Immigration Reform and Control Act “IRCA” of 1986 serves as a clear example of legislation influenced by these groups (Facchini et al. 5).

The Immigration Reform and Control Act, signed into law by President Ronald Reagan in 1986, aimed to control illegal immigration by legalizing certain undocumented immigrants already living and working in the U.S. and to discourage future illegal immigration. It required employers to verify the legal status of workers before hiring and applying penalties against the violators, making it more difficult for undocumented immigrants to find employment (Immigration Reform and Control Act 274).

Interest groups had an immense role in shaping the IRCA due to its impact on their interest depending on the nature of the group itself, for Immigrant advocacy groups the allowance of legalizing millions of undocumented immigrants is their biggest win and plays a role in strengthening their profile (Fuchs 115), as well as for business groups and especially ones advocating for labour-intensive fields like agriculture sees immigrants as an access to low price working hands leading to extensive lobbying for the act (Elberg 205), and labour unions like the AFL-CIO which aimed at protecting workers’ wages and the work conditions these organizations

aim to protect which the undocumented immigrants would be a threat, these groups lobbied for the passing of the law to protect their existence and further make it harder for employers to hire undocumented workers and further control the immigration (Schey and Carlos 179).

Restrictionist groups supported the function as well and lobbied heavily for it as it serves their purpose which is restricting legal and illegal immigration via the penalties and enforcements this act proposes to be applied upon the employers who hire undocumented immigrants (Perrotti 751).

The IRCA is a landmark in the U.S. history of immigration policies, showing that the act was not passed into law only government priorities but shaped via the competing interests of several interest groups with different beliefs going from pro-immigration groups to restrictionist groups as well as labour and economic groups with each of these groups lobbying for the act to align with their interests.

2.6. Influence of Interest Groups on Climate Change

Climate change and environmental issues can be considered as one of the most controversial and challenging areas of policy making in the United States due to the extreme debates between environmental groups promoting pro-environment policies and different industries' advocacy groups hindering them aiming for their gains (Basseches 6).

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 signed by the president George W. Bush can be an example for how these groups can influence the creation of laws, the act came as a counter-measure for the growing energy need and increasing prices of oil prices in the united states and breaking the cuffs of dependency on foreign oil and to develop the energy production infrastructure,

authorizing huge exemptions for energy producers to cover the increasing needs for energy in the united states (stolte 127).

The energy industry lobbies supported and lobbied for favourable terms heavily: A huge amount of subsidies, deregulations and tax reductions as well as giving these industries access to more federal land for exploitation via multiple strategies going from direct lobbying like in Chenny the vice president of the United States during George W. Bush meetings with the heads of oil industries according to many reports which helped in shaping the bill as well as applying indirect lobbying strategies in form of campaign contributions which was embodied in Tom DeLay a former leader of the united states house of representatives successful attempt at inserting around half a billion dollars in subsidies for fracking research purposes, and he was listed as one of the beneficiaries of energy lobbies contributions (Barikor 51).

Environmental interest groups did not have that strong influence due to the leaning legislative system towards the influential fossil industries, yet they were able to push for some important pro-environment policies : establishing and funding new programs focusing on efficiency of energy consumption 'Energy star' which aims at installing energy efficient products on federal agencies and setting new standards for energy infrastructure for building (Holt and Grover CRS 6) as well as including RFS "Renewable Fuel Standards" aiming at increasing the implementation of bio friendly fuels and granting incentives for renewable energies (Bracmort 2).

This act serves as a vivid example of how interest groups play a pivotal role in shaping climate and energy policies, the conflict of gargantuan energy advocacy groups lobbying for

favourable terms and the green groups delaying fossil industries plans and pushing for pro-environmental policies.

2.7. Challenges Facing Interest Groups

Advocacy groups, driven by their specific interests and often competing agendas, encountered numerous obstacles in their efforts to lobby for their desired outcomes. The following section outlines the primary challenges these groups confront.

2.7.1. Access to Policy Makers

The access interest groups have to policymakers is often seen as a mutually beneficial exchange. Public officials, who may lack detailed information, time, or specialized expertise in certain areas, rely on interest groups to serve as advisors. In return, these groups gain the opportunity to influence policy decisions in ways that align with their interests (Beyers and Caelesta 95).

Within the American legislative system, it is often difficult for interest groups to gain access to policymakers, whose attention tends to favour those who contribute significantly to their campaigns. With many competing groups vying for recognition, smaller interest groups—particularly those lacking strong financial backing—struggle to compete with larger, economically powerful organizations (Hanegraaff et al. 52). As previously noted in the case of the Energy Policy Act, powerful fossil fuel advocacy groups overshadowed the influence of environmental organizations.

2.7.2. Resources Limitation

In the highly capitalist system of the United States, where the notion that "money is speech" was affirmed in the Supreme Court case *Buckley v. Valeo*, it becomes evident that interest groups with greater financial resources wield significantly more influence in the political arena. Disadvantaged groups face substantial challenges in engaging in direct lobbying, particularly through campaign contributions, due to intense competition from wealthier, more established organizations. As Cortner notes, the judiciary often represents the only viable avenue for smaller groups to make their voices heard. However, even in litigation, courts tend to favour well-funded interest groups, although they still provide a platform for less resourceful organizations to gain some level of recognition (de Figueiredo and de Figueiredo Jr. 165).

2.7.3. Legitimacy and Perception

Interest groups function as representatives for individuals or communities with shared interests. For these groups to successfully influence change and for that change to be accepted by the public, they must earn the trust of their "clients" and be perceived as legitimate. Policies tend to gain greater public acceptance when relevant interest groups engage in the decision-making process, as this ensures both representation and legitimacy (Rasmussen and Reher 47).

However, lesser-known interest groups or those viewed negatively by the public face challenges in shaping policy, as their perceived credibility can influence how policymakers respond to them (Eichenberg et al. 573).

Transparency is a crucial factor for advocacy groups seeking to gain legitimacy and earn the trust of both policymakers and the communities they represent. Interest groups that disclose their sources of funding and lobbying activities are generally perceived as more trustworthy. This

openness enhances their credibility and increases their chances of influencing policy, as it demonstrates accountability and responsiveness—key qualities that help prevent corruption and misrepresentation (Crepaz and Arikan 897). People’s acceptance is crucial for authorities to gain their authority as it is for interest groups to gain the approval of both people and legislators to be able to function (O'Brien et al. 822).

The strategies adopted by interest groups significantly affect how they are perceived and the challenges they face. Wealthier groups with greater access to resources often operate with a degree of secrecy, which can lead to problems of legitimacy and negative perceptions among both legislators and the public. In contrast, groups that employ grassroots lobbying strategies—focusing on mobilizing broad public support—tend to enjoy higher levels of legitimacy, even if they lack substantial financial resources. Their transparency and public engagement often earn them greater trust and influence despite limited means (Walker 7).

2.7.4. Internal Fragmentation

Interest groups derive their power from internal cohesion and the alignment of shared interests and views among their members. This unity enables them to coordinate efforts and effectively mobilize resources to pursue their agendas (Fenoaltea et al. 2). However, internal fragmentation can arise when divergent or specialized interests emerge within the group, leading to a disconnect between the group’s official agenda and the priorities of its members (Krutz and Waskiewicz 354). When such interests are underrepresented, fragmentation may weaken the group’s influence on legislation, diminish its legitimacy, and hinder its ability to mobilize resources (Røed 5). Moreover, this fragmentation poses a threat to the very existence of the

group, as the strength of interest groups is closely tied to their internal density and unity (Hansen 937).

Cohesion is essential for interest groups dynamics, as the more active and cohesive the interest group, the more active the members of the group and the more shared interests in common between the members, it is more likely they are going to contribute more to the group's case, leading to the group's effectiveness and possibility to achieve their sought goal (Holyoke 4).

2.7.5. Regulatory and Legal Constraints

One of the challenges that face interest groups is legal constraints which is vital to the interest functionality as well as to their existence, where it is necessary for the rules and regulations concerned with lobbying activities to clear and statutory and easy to execute in way that does not eliminate less financial advantaged groups from the policy-making procedure and to guarantee equity, legitimacy and transparency to the process (Resimić 3).

The U.S. legislation enforces disclosure on sensitive lobbying activities information which puts more pressure on interest groups through different acts: Lobbying Disclosure Act and the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act which guarantees more integrity and transparency to these groups' activity (La Torre 52).

Interest groups influence can be limited in the United States due to the regulations that limits their contributions in political campaigns and it influences the integrity of elections and violates the first amendment, but on the other hand this can immensely limit the ability of such groups to embody the opinions and interests of its members, which pushes the groups to follow a different approach to reach their desired goals (Whitaker 12).

2.7.6. Opposition from Counter Groups

Interest groups often face intense competition from other groups operating within the same policy domain but advocating for different ideologies or policy goals. This rivalry presents a significant obstacle, as opposing interests can dilute or even nullify a group's efforts to influence the policymaking process. In response, interest groups may be compelled to lobby not only supportive legislators but also neutral or even opposing lawmakers to broaden their influence and improve their chances of success (Austen and Wright 28). However, this comprehensive lobbying approach imposes a substantial financial burden. As a result, competition among interest groups can drive them toward forming coalitions—not as a strategic luxury, but as a necessary step to pool resources and amplify influence. Such coalitions are particularly effective when they include influential actors in the policy area, making the benefits of unification outweigh the potential costs (Hojnacki 62).

This kind of inter-groups between interest groups reflects the pluralist theory that writes down that outcome of policy making is a result of the competition dynamics among distinct groups with different financial and bureaucratic access to policy makers (Wollebæk and Raknes 7).

To conclude, Interest groups and lobbying is not a new phenomenon but quite the opposite, they were long entrenched within the U.S system playing central role in shaping major domestic policies as in healthcare, economics, education, immigration, and climate change areas. Interest groups have the ability orchestrate campaign, mobilize voters, provide expertise within their specialized fields, and influence influential legislative bodies. Employing variety of lobbying strategies, Advocacy groups are one of the pillars of the American system.

Despite the strength of these groups, they face notable obstacles including limited access to policy makers, resource constraints, questions about their legitimacy and transparency, internal fragmentation, regulatory and legal constraints and fierce competition from opposition groups with different views on the same issues which can cancel one another's influence, these aspects interplay to both empower and strengthen and weaken the influence of interest groups within the complex political landscape of the United States. Understanding these factors can shed the light on the impact of interest groups and the mechanisms they employ to convey their influence as well as the obstacles they face.

Chapter Three

Implications of Interest Groups on Domestic Policy during Obama's Administration (2009-2016)

Interest groups are pivotal actors in the political arena, as discussed in earlier chapters, and the President Obama administration was no exception to the activity of these groups. Yet the 44th president of the United States is considered a landmark in the history of the country, not only due to the big reforms that were passed, but also due to the controversial role interest groups played during this period, and the strategies implied by advocacy groups despite the repeated attempts the president done to guarantee transparency and reform in the political process this groups still managed to advocate for their causes and push their agendas in the political process.

This chapter examines the lobbying strategies employed by interest groups during President Obama's two terms in the White House. It starts with an analysis of the financing tactics employed and the increasing influence of Public Action Committees (PACs), alongside the connotations of the Supreme Court's Citizens United ruling, which reshaped the lobbying concepts in the United States. Furthermore, it analyses the influence of advocacy groups in shaping key domestic policies, such as health care (Affordable Care Act "ACA" commonly known as Obamacare), finance (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act), climate change (Clean Power Plan), Education (Race to the Top) as case, and immigration (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals" DACA"), as case studies to further understand the role of different types of interest groups on policymaking procedure with the efforts of Obama's administration on managing this procedure.

Finally, this chapter analyses the complex interplay happening between private and public interests, providing insights on the limitations Obama's presidency faced and lessons learned from these experiences for next presidential generations on how to manage this phenomenon.

3.1. Lobbying Strategies during Obama's Presidency

Obama was known for his anti-lobbyist political trend, and this was clarified through his participation in creating and pushing for the HLOGA Act during his senator days (Thurber 5), and in his speech in des Moines, Iowa where took a strong offensive stance against lobbyists and clarified his previous attempts at restricting their activities and how he rejected their influence stating that they didn't support his campaign and they won't get a place in the white house and promised that he would redirect tax breaks from big corporations to support American workers instead (American Rhetoric 10 November 2007).

Obama anti-lobbying trend did not stop at his senator days only, but continued into his presidency as well, this can be seen through his executive order 13490 of 2009 where he banned lobbyists from participating in advisory boards and his staff from receiving gifts from registered lobbyists as well as two-year ban on "revolving door lobbying" matters (Straus 8).

3.1.1. Campaign Contributions

Obama's 2008 campaign was successful at attaining huge amounts of support from small Individual donations, which according to the Presidential Pre-Nomination Campaign Receipts he was able to gather over 657 million dollars from individuals alone which was the highest among both Democrats and Republicans and did not accept federal funds (Federal Election Commission). But that does not mean that he did not receive money from registered and unregistered

lobbyists or employees under them, which law firms are considered as the biggest indirect donors to his campaign alongside other industries like education and healthcare as well, who are classified among the top five spenders on his campaign (OpenSecrets).

The 2010 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission allowed the emergence of Super PACs due to the allowance of unlimited expenditure on indirect campaign contributions like through advertising for favourable candidates influencing the public opinion (Briffault 1666). The Supreme Court 2010 ruling was heavily criticized by Obama in his speech saying that it will open the gates for special interest to further influence American campaigns (Haynes).

Despite his continuous opposition to lobbying, Obama campaign changed its strategy in 2012 to adapt with the changes 2010 citizens united vs federal election commission supreme court events to enhance his chances to win his second period in the white house (Klumpp 9).

3.1.2. Reforms: Money in Elections

Obama's 2008 and 2012 campaigns adopted different strategies at gathering financial tactics and regulations (Di Pace 49).

3.1.2.1. Obama's 2008 Revolutionary Campaign

Obama first presidential campaign is considered as revolutionary political movement that changed the political landscape via the implication of internet in gathering public attention as well as fundraising instead of just depending on traditional door to door techniques, and It stood as landmark in global politics setting the new paradigm for elections (Costa 40).

As previously mentioned, Obama depended on fundraising his campaign without the assist of lobbyists nor the public fundings, still he managed to gather an historic record in campaign

funds over 744 million dollars total (OpenSecrets). Which was the result of embedding new technology and trying to directly address younger generations that were not interested in politics shifting the focus of his campaign from macro to micro fundraising with major focus on small donations and interacting with the new generation which was explicit via his dependence on social media to engage in a new form of grassroots movement without giving up on traditional means of influencing the public resulting in broad-based individual donor fundraising and anticipation (Aaker and Victoria 17) and despite his repeated denouncement of lobbyists he still used them in his campaign as well (McGrath 7).

3.1.2.2. Obama's 2012 Campaign and the Emergence of Super PACs

After 2010 citizens united vs federal election committee, allowing unlimited donations by corporations and unions as outside funding, after the organization filmed the Hillary: the movie 2008 and released it to the public 30 days before the primary elections (Harvard Law Review 77) which was prohibited according to Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 for corporations and unions to publish any thing exposing their opinion about a candidate for the public in the 60 days preceding the elections (McConnell 419) . The case was later brought into the supreme court which ruled that interest groups can contribute unlimitedly to a campaign expenditure like ads without direct contact with the candidate's campaign fundings (Supreme Court of the United States 40).

The case results lead to the emergence of super PACs which are committees that spend unlimited amounts on advertising for or against a candidate and at the same time cannot contribute directly to the elect's campaign (Briffault 1645).

Despite Obama's critics of lobbying and interest groups and especially the 2010 supreme court rule for citizens united case that special interests can spend tremendous amounts on American elections ads which influence the result of the electoral procedure and strengthening their authority inside the white house (Obama: Statement on Senate Action on Campaign Finance Legislation), in 2012 re-election campaigns he changed his stance towards the super PACs to match the republican financial strength obtained via these committees (Christenson 428).

Obama encouraged supporters to contribute to super PACs as a pragmatic shift in financing strategies to adapt to the 2010 events as Thomas E. Mann, a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at The Brookings Institution which is a think tank based at Washington, stated that it was inevitable to do so indicating the role of money in politics and the thirst of special interests for influence inside the white house (1-2).

The main super PACs backing the president barrack Obama is Priorities USA Action founded by former Obama consultants like Bill Burton and Sean Sweany, and although it was established late in comparison with his GOP advocacy groups rivals ended as the third biggest super PACs in the USA raising over 80 million dollars with other two committees The House Majority PAC and The pro-Democratic Senate Majority PAC collecting 36 millions and 42 millions respectively which were smaller in comparison with the democratic super PACs funds raised, which most of these funds were spent on negative ads against his rival Romney (Beckel 657).

The two campaigns Obama lead shows the eminent and entrenched role of big money in politics especially the 2012 electioneering due to the citizens united vs federal election committee.

3.2. Influence of Interest Groups on Key Domestic Policies during Obama's Presidency

As previously mentioned, lobbying and interest groups are pivotal actors on domestic policies throughout the American history and Obama's periods in the white house was not an exception, despite the complex relationship between the president and lobbyists which can be explained simply through the need for lobbyists inside the white house and their strong impact on legislation that defies with democratic values which Obama tried to control in order to provide a pluralist democracy instead of a system controlled by the elites (Thurber11).

3.2.1. Health Care

In Obama's 2010 speech in Ohio concerned with Health care reform which was one of his elections promises calling for the urgency of reforms and using Natoma Canfield's story, a cancer patient who had to give her insurance plan up due to the increasing prices of premium and later was diagnosed with leukaemia to state the failures of the existing system (Obama).

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 more known as ACA or Obama care is a U.S. health care reform passed in 2010 aims at expanding health insurance coverage among most citizens who are uninsured and specifically citizens with low income and a less than 4 times the federal poverty level, increasing the affordability of premiums (Kominski et al. 2-8).

3.2.1.1. The Influence of Interest Groups on Health Care

According to OpenSecrets annual lobbying expenditure (1998-2024) shown in figure 2, lobbying expenses reached a peak in comparison with previous years during Obama's presidency showing the efforts healthcare advocates spend on shaping reforms concerned with health care

especially in 2009-2010 with over 552 million dollars and 525 million respectively where the law was under process (OpenSecrets).




Figure 2: Health care Annual lobbying totals, 1998-2024.

The ACA was not just influenced by health industry groups but other healthcare related advocates like PhRMA and the pharmaceutical industry, health insurance industry and hospital associations (Conti et al. 446-447).

3.2.1.2. The Influence of Interest Groups on the ACA

Interest groups played a pivotal role in shaping the passage of ACA with views ranging from opposition to conditional support (Soni 15). This section explores different interest groups' stances and final impact on the Obamacare program.

Before 2010, during the “laying grounds phase” for the ACA and before the act was even presented in front of congress, different interest groups started lobbying to shape it in a way that goes accordingly with their interests especially the healthcare sector as the financial lobbying targets changed in 2008 from republicans to democrats as shown in figure (3), this show that the

Health sector lobbyists started lobbying for favourable terms considering their sector even before the act was passed.




Figure 3: *Health care Party Split of Recipients, by Election Cycle, 1990-2024*

(OpenSecrets)

Opposing interest groups of the affordable care act consisted of business groups such as insurers and employer organizations as well as other professional groups like physicians' association to guarantee their interests (Callaghan and Jacobs 309). On the other hand, the supporting advocacy groups of the act even if their support was conditional is stronger and bigger than the ones opposing it to protect their interests that align with the law especially healthcare organizations (Hoornebeek et al. 3).

Interest groups played a pivotal role in shaping several provisions under the ACA law, especially the public option which was originally planned within the affordable care act, but influential interest groups, especially insurers and service providers opposed it and stopped it under the argument that it implies socialism, (Hoffman 8) and more importantly for them it may

intervene with their benefits (Burns). At the end, the ACA program ended up depending on private sector providers instead of creating a new “public option” as initially was planned (Rosenbaum 133). This shows that interest groups played a pivotal role in shaping the ACA to go accordingly with their interests.

3.3.2. Interest Groups Influence on Finance

As previously discussed, interest groups especially “economic groups” have an enormous influence on the finance and economy policies and laws due to their huge financial capacities and among these policies that were shaped by the intervention and advocacy of these groups is the Dodd Frank act (Bath et al. 20-21).

3.2.2.1. Dodd-Frank Act 2010

Dodd-Frank act came as a countermeasure and a response for the 2008 global recession and to prevent financial crisis similar to that or the great recession of 1930’s from occurring again (Omarova 86), the act focused on “improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end “too big to fail”, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.” (United States, Congress 1).

Interest groups, especially ones from the financial sector such as banks, wall street firms and trade associations lobbied heavily to shape the act in a manner that would not influence their operations or limit their benefits (Council on Foreign Relations).

Bankers played a pivotal role in eradicating several policies under the act, JPMorgan, one of biggest financial institutions in the us lobbied aggressively to target key provisions of the act,

especially the Volker rule which restricts proprietary trading and derivative regulations using direct contacts to federal regulators and previous ones to influence the legislation (Smallberg).

In addition to campaign contributions as the open secrets graph below show that JPMorgan alone spent over 15 million dollars between 2010 and 2011 and increasing their number of lobbyists to 71 lobbyists which is over more than half the number they hired in the previous year 46, showing their increasing interest in shaping the act which was under the passage procedure in 2010 and enforcement in 2011.



Figure 4: Annual Lobbying by JPMorgan Chase & Co (OpenSecrets)

The JPMorgan Chase case can be considered as a paradigm for how bankers and economic groups acted towards the 2010 act showing how corporates can use a variety of lobbying strategies to erode major reform efforts, and how well funded groups can shape or reshape laws to guarantee their interests (Plepi 73).

3.2.3. Interest Group Influence on Climate Change

Interest groups play a major role in shaping climate related policies in the U.S. throughout the history of the country; these groups stances can be divided into two initially: pro-climate change reform groups advocating for stricter regulations and anti-climate change policies groups which is mainly composed of fossil fuels industry advocators which if stricter policies were to be enacted it can deteriorate their incomes and restrict their activities (Livermore and Richard 2-3).

3.2.3.1. Interest Group Influence on Climate Change Policies during Obama's Presidency

The Obama administration addressed the climate change issue and passed several laws regulating the Fossil fuel industry and pushing for cleaner energy production and among the most significant and ambitious policies the White House passed was the Clean Power Plan 2015 (Carbonell 407).

The Clean Power Plan is a landmark policy in energy production in the U.S. that put national standards concerned with carbon emission from power plants aiming at reducing the carbon pollution caused by coal-fired, oil-fired, and natural gas-fired power plants while maintaining energy efficiency and affordability (English 3), with high financial expectations from the project between 79 to 99 billion dollars in Climate, health and net benefits by 2030 and avoiding catastrophic health issues protecting public health (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2-3).

3.2.3.2. Interest Group Influence on The Clean Power Plan

Interest groups played an immense role is controlling the course of the clean power plan, the act was pushed for by environmental groups for a long time to put control over carbon dioxide emissions (Engel 457), while opposing groups mainly consisted of conservative groups who

considered the law to be federal over-reach and fossil fuel industries due to the CPP proposed system that would cause a huge loss of benefits and workers because of the new regulations (Engel 458).

Fossil fuels industry groups and especially ones related to coal opposed the clean power plan since its release and even during drafting pushing for the delay or the full removal of it and employing legal challenges which escalated to the 2016 supreme court stay of the act (National Mining Association and America's Power 1-2) arguing that it would lead to irreparable harm like coal mines closures and firing or retiring employees working in this industry (Schwartz 10). With the continuous pressure from the conservative groups and coal industry advocates, the act was later replaced in 2019 by the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) which had more lenient regulations in comparison which align with industry preferences (Tsang 2).

This stands as an example of how influential interest groups are and their ability to shape the environmental policies and how they decide the destiny of most laws regarding sensitive issues within the industry. The unprecedented stay of the law shows the influence of these groups (Sussman 3).

3.2.4. Interest Group Influence on Education

With thousands of interest groups concerned with education who have influence on public opinion of united states, it is inevitable that they would have an influence on education policies (Adam 165) and as previously discussed in the second chapter and the Obama period was no exception.

3.2.4.1. Obama and Education

President Obama's administration focusing on education with his signature initiative launched in 2009 "Race to the top" which aims at improving outcomes of students throughout K-12 to higher education providing over 4 billion dollars for 19 states covering 45 of all pre high-education students and over 42 percent of low income student throughout the nation aiming at developing the standards and adoption of better data systems providing crucial information about the students progression to parents, teachers and schools and emphasizing on the role of teachers and principals in the education process and programs aiming at improving low performance schools (The White House).

3.2.4.2 Interest Groups Influence on Race to the Top

Non-profit organizations supported the RTTT program and among the biggest groups was Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation or more known as "Gates foundation" and the Walton foundation in promoting the some of the policies of the program and contributed significantly in creating the common core state standards (Rogers 760), as well as Non-governmental associations like the National Governors Association and Council of Chief State School Officers who played a pivotal role in drafting those standards and helped in integrating them into the states and encouraged in adopting the program by the states (Phelps 4).

On the other hand, the RTTT faced a huge opposition from teachers' unions especially National Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation of Teacher (AFT) concerned the program threatens the job security of teachers and their tenure especially in failing schools, and relating their pay to the students' achievements in a meritable manner which is opposed by these unions are resulted in distancing themselves from the Obama's administration

(Ross-Brown 1-3). In addition to think-tanks and some politicians that the Race to the top program is a federal overreaching the state authority especially due to the implementation of Common core standards violates the as Bobby Jindal, the previous governor of Louisiana presented by his attorney stated that RTTT violates three statutes that prohibits the central government from intervening in designing or supervising the curriculum which think-tanks used as an argument too in opposing the program (Evers 5).

3.2.4.3. The Strategies Implied by Interest Groups to Influence “Race to The Top”

Both supporting and opposing interest groups used a variety of strategies to shape the RTTT reform:

3.2.4.3.1. Strategies Employed by Supporting Groups

Supporting groups employed various strategies in their attempts to help enforce the program through financial support like how the Gates foundation funded 15 states with over 250 thousand dollars each to prepare for their application for the program as Sam Dillion quoted of one of the officials of the Gates foundation (Rogers 761) and later on the Gates’ spread their financial support reaching all states meeting the reform’s criteria (McNeil).

The NGA and CCSSO directly influenced the design of the Common core state standards through providing blueprints and model policies and publishing them to different states to imitate leading to smoothing the federal path to achieve its goal (Council of Chief State School Officers and National Governors Association 1).

3.2.4.3.1. Strategies Employed by Opposing Groups

Teacher Unions used their influence on both state and local levels to impede or soften the program's requirements with major focus on the ones related to "teacher evaluation tied to the students' achievements" which resulted in delaying the implementation of the program in several states through negotiation impasse and legal actions (Blume).

As well as using their most influential factors which is their number of members, to start grassroots movements to oppose the reform with their focus on one of the key components of RTTT; The teacher evaluations methods and merit pay (Chicago Teachers Union 4) and encouraged parents to opt out of standardized tests arguing that its harmful to teacher, students and the schools themselves.

Some of the biggest grassroots initiatives was the Umbrella Badass Teachers Association movement which grew rapidly in 2013 on social media like Facebook and Instagram which aimed attacks at RTTT for its promotion of charter schools and the reform's "negative" impacts on public schools and promoting the idea that it opposes democracy (Kramer 3-5).

3.2.5. Interest group Influence on Immigration

Interest groups are pivotal actors when it comes to immigration policies due to their direct impact on their economic, social, and political agendas (Facchini et al. 4-5)

3.2.5.1 Obama and Immigration

During Obama's presidential era , he made notable promises regarding immigration policies in his speech in 2012 remarks about the DACA and his full support for the Dreamers and his long seeking for an act from the congress which will save the younger generation of immigrants

who were raised on the US lands “And I have said time and time and time again to Congress that, send me the DREAM Act, put it on my desk, and I will sign it right away” which the Dream act was faced a congressional gridlock (The White House).

3.2.5.2. What is Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) is an immigration policy that was announced by the president Barrack Obama in 2012 which aims at protecting what’s known as Dreamers (undocumented children immigrants who were brought to the U.S.) which allows them to apply for protections from deportation for 2 years increments which are renewable and work permits to protect the “Dreamers” who were raised in the U.S. and grant productive immigrants who meets the qualifications to work legally.

3.2.5.3. Interest Group Influence on DACA

Medical and Health care organizations played a crucial role pushing for the DACA program and advocated for solutions for the Dreamers since the first days of the passage; Association of American Medical Colleges reported the rapid increase of students of medical school applications reaching 8 folds after the DACA enactment (Gillezeau et al. 2) and other DACA friendly health associations pushed for access to financial aid and loans for medical schools’ students who were unable to get access to federal loans due to their legal status (Gillezeau et al. 5).

The DACA act received a lot of support from a variety of other interest groups especially the ethnic non-profit groups like the Latinos community and the most influential ones are Univision, Telemundo who pushed for the act through raising awareness among the Latino immigrants and

creating a Politicized Immigrant Identity which encouraged political participation among the Latino community by reinforcing a linked-fate sense amongst Latin immigrants (Sergio and Barreto 84).

Amongst the most significant groups is the coalition of “DREAMers, Bad Dreamers,1 undocumented and/or immigrant youth” in addition to other groups who were operated as non-profit-interest group activists pushing for undocumented immigrants’ rights and was extremely active during the 2000s and early 2010s period advocating for favourable policies like the DREAM act which was not passed and the DACA and played an immense role in shaping the 2012 DACA act (Valenzuela 193-194). And according to President Obama the act was the opportunity to satisfy the young immigrants who Longley pushed for the act and their successful attempts at demanding their rights as a part of the American nation citizens (Patler et al. 251).

Ultimately, the DACA passage was a result of long-awaited act as well as persistent advocacy by medical, ethnic and young groups of immigrants seeking their rights to live in the country they were raised and grew in, this established how interest groups of different rationalities can influence the American policymaking and driving social change (Patler 246).

3.3. Obama Efforts to Regulate Lobbying

Obama was one of the most prominent figures of opposing the lobbying phenomenon and considered is on top of his presidential agenda, which appears clearer in his first period and 2008 campaign (DeLacy and Emerson).

On his first day in the white house Jan 21, 2009, he signed the executive order 13490 entitled “Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Personnel”; which exclusively was determined to limit the ‘revolving doors’ and setting a ban on lobbyists inside the White House,

primarily banning appointed officials from receiving gifts from registered lobbyists throughout their service tenure, restricting appointees from advocating for matters related to their previous employers or clients in form of cooling off periods well as setting a prohibition on newly appointed officials who were registered lobbyists previously from influencing policy areas related to their previous lobbying occupations (Obama 4673-4678).

On his second period in the white house, President barrack Obama stance against lobbying started loosening due the criticisms his administration received as being too rigid and excluding needed “qualified experts” viewpoint and advising due to their previous history as lobbyist while offering waivers to some previous lobbyist to join the administration, especially after issuing a waiver and nominating former Raytheon lobbyist William J. Lynn to the No 2 official in the pentagon as the deputy defence secretary (Wheaton), And leaning towards getting the most of the experienced potential advisers even if they were precedent lobbyists and that can be clearly seen after the 2014 (in *Autor v. Pritzker*) U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit which registered lobbyists considered the previous 2009 executive order contradictory to the first amendment purport “right to petition the government” (*Autor v. Pritzker* 12-14), which later led the Obama administration to adopt a case by case review system for lobbyists who are eligible to become committee advisors in 2016 instead of a total ban (McKinley 1187-1188).

3.4. Lessons Learned from Obama’s Administration for Future Administrations

The Obama campaign he led against “Lobbying” and the efforts spent to limit the intervention of external groups individuals on the public policy decision leads us to learn few important points that should be considered by future administrations when trying to oppose this phenomenon in the future.

3.4.1. Reforms cannot Annihilate Lobbying

Obama throughout his political career either as a senator or a president of the United States managed to pass many reforms aimed at restricting lobbying activities; Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 as senator and the executive order 13490 of 2009 on his debut at the white house, shows that lobbying did not disappear but actually adapted to the changes Barack Obama made (Thurber 21).

3.4.2. Political Influence is Caused by Relationships not by Occupation

Rather than depending on titles solely and issuing expertise, access is more about personal relationships between advocates or lobbyists and influential decision makers (Bertrand et al. 14-16). The relationship that can be built by campaign contributions, socializing with influential officials and legislators, and the revolving door lobbyists whether former congressional staff or members becoming lobbyists or vice versa and employing their contacts to lobbying benefits can lead to more access to influence public policy to the benefit of the lobbyists rather than depending on the expertise or the occupational activities as lobbyists themselves (Horton 76-77).

3.4.3. Money is Speech

New campaign financing mechanics urging after (Citizens vs United 2010) supreme court case supported this claim by leading to the explosion of super PACs and interest groups influence on the electoral process and the results of elections via direct financing rather than lobbying and according to (figure 04), starting from 2008 after the enactment of the HLOGA, the number of registered lobbyists witnessed a decrease in subsequent years unlike the amount of money spent on lobbying which faced an increase in comparison with the pre 2008 period.




Figure 4: **Total Spending & Lobbyists** (OpenSecrets)

As a conclusion for this chapter, the political landscape of the United States during Obama tenure in the White House had complex mechanisms of interaction between the president and different interest groups and lobbyists. Despite Obama's hostile stance towards lobbying and interest groups activities which was supported by reforms like the HLOGA and the executive order 13490 in addition to other executive orders throughout his two periods in the White House yet lobbyists adapted to the changes were pivotal actors in shaping key domestic policies as healthcare, finance, climate change, education, and immigration.

Interest groups employed different lobbying strategies to achieve its goals: influencing the legislative outcome to be compatible with their view of that area. The 44th president of the United States administration experience in opposing this phenomenon and trying to reduce its impact on the legislative outcome was face by the adaptation of lobbyists to the changes rather

than vanishing as it was intended which reveals how deep lobbying is embedded within the system.

This experience suggests that next administrations should put the strength and flexibility of lobbyists into accounts in trying to manage the relationship between public interests and interest groups, and while legislative orders can reduce the excesses of these groups it cannot stop it suggesting that continuous changes are necessary to control their impact.

Conclusion

This dissertation examined how interest groups shaped domestic policy during Obama presidency from 2009-2016 under his administration's explicit efforts to eliminate the excessive intervention of special interest in the decision-making procedure, the strategies employed by these groups and their success in influencing key policy initiative and the failure of regulatory at their aim of constraining the lobbying activities due the flexibility and adaptability of interest groups.

The research revealed that despite Barack Obama hostile stance towards lobbying and the implementation of restrictive regulatory reforms, interest groups kept their influence over domestic policy outcomes throughout his presidency demonstrating remarkable flexibility and adaptability towards any changes happening on the political arena and their ability to respond to any threats to their access to the decision making process and influencing its outcome throughout their well-maintained contacts with influential legislators. Confirming how deeply rooted lobbying is within the American system.

The analysis of key domestic policy areas: healthcare, financial regulation, climate change, education, and immigration show that interest groups are pivotal actors in shaping major policies despite the "War" President Obama declared on lobbying in his campaign. The Affordable Care Act abandoning the public option, the debilitation of Dodd-Frank Act regulatory provisions, expansion of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program exemplifies how strong their influence on legislation during Obama's period despite the executive branch proposed challenges. The 2010 Citizens United v. FEC (Federal Election Committee) decision allowed

unlimited independent expenditures which lead to emergence of Super PAC's and new ways for interest groups to impose their influence altering the political landscape.

This research challenged the proposed pluralist theory by demonstrating that interest groups competition does not produce balanced represented policy outcome necessarily. On the exact opposite, the findings of this research: the resource disparity and access to lawmakers allows certain groups to practice a disproportionate influence over legislation. The Obama experience shows the limits of executive orders and procedural reforms in highlighting the representation inequality issue on the political landscape which suggest that deeper changes may be necessary to achieve more equal representation.

This research offers critical insights for policymakers seeking to manage advocacy groups influence. First, reforms focusing solely on "registered lobbyists" are not effective as the Obama period shown a decrease in number of registered lobbyists but not in the lobbying activities suggesting that regulatory approaches with that sole focus will fail. Second, interest groups adaptability requires continuous adjustments and not static frameworks that will become outdated and can even be used for the opposite of their original aims, finally transparency measures will not reduce special interest interventions but may redirect it through different channels. Future administration should put the depths these interests are embedded in the American political system and the impossibility of eradicating lobbying through either executive action or legislative reform alone. Alternatively, the new governments should focus on creating more impartial access to decision makers, strengthening disclosure requirements for all forms of political influence, and creating a flexible political landscape that can allow the emergence of countervailing force to balance the already dominant interest groups.

This work contributes to the political science study of interest groups via employing multi-policy area approach that reveals the patterns of these groups activities across different fields. This comparative analysis of multiple policy areas during a single presidential administration shows how interest groups strategically and activities can change according to the issue, public opinion around that issue, and political context at the time.

In pursuing academic rigor, this research aimed to provide a comprehensive analysis of the subject matter, several limitations that should be acknowledged existed, First the study focused mainly on federal level domestic policy cases excluding important insights lobbying activities on State and local levels would have provided to the study. Second the qualitative methodology and while providing contextual comprehension limited the ability to make precise claims about interest groups influence and strategies. Finally, the limited temporal scope to only one presidential administration prevents historical comparisons that may lead to undermining long term trends and conveying panoramic historical view on interest groups impact, mechanisms, and dynamics. This research while may be extensive yet it serves only as a groundwork for future research who aim at further understanding the promising direction emerging from this study.

First, Comparative analysis of interest groups impact across different presidential administrations would enhance the understanding of how the political landscape and the white house leadership style and political direction affect lobbying effectiveness and the strategies employed by advocacy groups. Second, Examining Lobbying on State and local level variations in lobbying regulations and the impact of interest groups on those calibres would provide natural experiments and valuable information to prepare different regulatory approaches to regulate lobbying. Finally, Investigating the new emerging political mobilization forms that depends on

digital technologies and social media to further understand the extent to which these technologies can function as an influence strategy.

The relationship between interest groups and the U.S system remains one of the challenges that faces the American democracy as this dissertation demonstrated President Obama experience and his explicit hostility towards special interest influence reveals the nature of this challenge. Interest groups are not external powers but more of a pillar of the American political system deeply involved with policy making procedure through formal and informal channels.

The Obama period is a landmark in American political history and act as a sobering reminder that campaign promises related to changing the nature in which the White House interact with lobbying can face a complex institutional realities, yet it show that executive branch can play a crucial role in shaping the terms of debate and can help raising public awareness creating a momentum for reform even when it is obvious that complete transformation is out of reach. As American political landscape keeps evolving, Obama's experience should always be considered as a reference to address the tension between democratic ideals and interest groups influence.

Works Cited

- “America and the ‘Israel Lobby.’” *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 41, no. 34, 2006, pp. 3651–53. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4418609>. Accessed 14 June 2025.
- Aaker, Jennifer, and Victoria Chang. Obama and the Power of Social Media and Technology. Case No. M321, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 27 Aug. 2009, pp. 1–40.
- Andreas Dür, and Dirk De Bièvre. “The Question of Interest Group Influence.” *Journal of Public Policy*, vol. 27, no. 1, 2007, pp. 1–12. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007824>. Accessed 15 June 2025.
- Andreas Dür, and Dirk De Bièvre. “The Question of Interest Group Influence.” *Journal of Public Policy*, vol. 27, no. 1, 2007, pp. 1–12. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007824> . Accessed 21 May 2025.
- Austen-Smith, David, and John R. Wright. “Counteractive Lobbying.” *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 38, no. 1, 1994, pp. 25–44. JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111334> . Accessed 2 June 2025.
- Bankole, Regina, and Rob Williams. "Reauthorization of the No Child Left Behind Act: Political Forces and Perspectives." *Journal of Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives in Education*, vol. 1, no. 1, May 2008, pp. 7–12.
- Barth, James R., Apanard Penny Prabha, and Wenling Lu. "Do Interest Groups Unduly Influence Bank Regulation?" CESifo DICE Report, vol. 11, no. 4, 2013, pp. 19–25. ifo Institute, <https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/dicereport413-forum3.pdf>. Accessed 1 July 2025.

Basseches, Joshua A., et al. "Climate Policy Conflict in the U.S. States: A Critical Review and Way Forward." *Climatic Change*, vol. 170, no. 3–4, 2022, article no. 32.

<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03319-w>.

Beckel, Michael E. "Super PACs and the 2012 Presidential Election." *Willamette Law Review*, vol. 49, no. 4, Summer 2013, pp. 651–688. Willamette University College of Law,

Begley, Sarah. "Read Donald Trump's Speech to AIPAC." *Time*, 22 Mar.

2016, <https://time.com/4267058/donald-trump-aipac-speech-transcript/>. Accessed 14 June 2025.

Bennett, Michael. "Red State Revolt: The Teachers' Strikes and Working-Class Politics." *The Radical Teacher*, no. 116, 2020, pp. 93–96. JSTOR,

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/48694768>. Accessed 12 June 2025.

Berg, Kati Tusinski. "A Description of Lobbying as Advocacy Public Relations." *College of Communication Faculty Research and Publications*, no. 13, 2007, Marquette

University, https://epublications.marquette.edu/comm_fac/13.

Berkowitz, Edward. "Medicare and Medicaid: The Past as Prologue." *Health Care Financing Review*, vol. 27, no. 2, Winter 2005–2006, pp. 11–20. PubMed Central,

<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4194925/>.

Bipartisan Policy Center. *The Executive Branch and National Energy Policy: Time for Renewal*. Strategic Energy Policy Initiative, Nov.

2012, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2019%2F03%2FBPC_Governance_Report_0.pdf.

Blanc, Eric. "The Red for Ed Movement, Two Years In." *New Labor Forum*, vol. 29, no. 3, 2020, pp. 66–73. JSTOR, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27107964>. Accessed 12 June 2025.

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi, et al. "Revolving Door Lobbyists." *The American Economic Review*, vol. 102, no. 7, 2012, pp. 3731–48. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41724652>. Accessed 11 June 2025.

Bluestone, Barry. "Is Deindustrialization a Myth? Capital Mobility versus Absorptive Capacity in the U. S. Economy." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 475, 1984, pp. 39–51. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1043546>. Accessed 9 June 2025.

Blume, Howard. "Teachers Union Challenges L.A. Unified's New Evaluation Process." *Los Angeles Times*, 8 May 2011, <https://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-utla-challenge-20110508-story.html>.

Browne, Steven A. "The Constitutionality of Lobby Reform: Implicating Associational Privacy and the Right to Petition the Government." *William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal*, vol. 4, no. 2, 1995, pp. 717–. William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, <https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol4/iss2/9>. Accessed 15 June 2025.

Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U.S. 1. *Supreme Court of the United States*, 1976. *Library of Congress*, <https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep424/usrep424001/usrep424001.pdf>.

Burns, Joseph. "What if the ACA Included a Public Option Insurance Plan?" Association of Health Care Journalists, 15 May 2025, healthjournalism.org/blog/2025/05/what-if-the-aca-included-a-public-option-insurance-plan/. Accessed 29 June 2025.

"CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC: CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH." Harvard Law Review, vol. 124, no. 1, 2010, pp. 75–82. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20788313>. Accessed 21 June 2025.

Callaghan, Timothy, and Lawrence R Jacobs. "Interest Group Conflict Over Medicaid Expansion: The Surprising Impact of Public Advocates." American journal of public health vol. 106,2 (2016): 308-13. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2015.302943

Callaghan, Timothy, and Lawrence R. Jacobs. "Interest Group Conflict Over Medicaid Expansion: The Surprising Impact of Public Advocates." American Journal of Public Health, vol. 106, no. 2, Feb. 2016, pp. 308–313. PubMed Central, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4985851/>.

Calomiris, Charles W., and Urooj Khan. "An Assessment of TARP Assistance to Financial Institutions." Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 29, no. 2, 2015, pp. 53–80. American Economic Association, <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.29.2.53>.

Cameron, Charles M., et al. "From Textbook Pluralism to Modern Hyper-Pluralism: Interest Groups and Supreme Court Nominations, 1930–2017." 19 Nov. 2018. SSRN, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3087987>. Accessed 14 June 2025.

Carbonell, Tomás. "EPA's Proposed Clean Power Plan: Protecting Climate and Public Health by Reducing Carbon Pollution from the U.S. Power Sector." *Yale Law & Policy Review*, vol. 33, no. 2, 2015, pp. 403–26. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43921163>. Accessed 2 July 2025.

Chicago Teachers Union. *Merit Pay Does Not Work*. October 2011, www.ctulocal1.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Merit_Pay_2011_10_web.pdf.

CHRISTENSON, DINO P., and CORWIN D. SMIDT. "Following the Money: Super PACs and the 2012 Presidential Nomination." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, vol. 44, no. 3, 2014, pp. 410–30. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43285419>. Accessed 22 June 2025.

Congressional Institute. "The Case for Earmarks: Were They Really That Bad?" 15 Sept. 2016, <https://www.congressionalinstitute.org/2016/09/15/the-case-for-earmarks-were-they-really-that-bad/>.

Connor, Kevin. *Bank Takeover: Campaign for America's Future*. Campaign for America's Future, 2008. <https://studylib.net/doc/8681354/bank-takeover---campaign-for-america-s-future>. Accessed 23 May 2025.

Costa, Pere-Oriol. "La utilització d'internet per part de Barack Obama transforma la comunicació política." *Quaderns del CAC*, no. 33, 2009, pp. 35-41. ISSN: 1138-9761. www.cac.cat.

Council on Foreign Relations. "What Is the Dodd-Frank Act?" Council on Foreign Relations, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/background/what-dodd-frank-act>. Accessed 1 July 2025.

Cowen, Joshua, and Katharine O. Strunk. How Do Teachers' Unions Influence Education Policy?

What We Know and What We Need to Learn. Education Policy Center, Michigan State University, April

2014, <https://education.msu.edu/epc/library/documents/wp%2042%20how%20do%20teachers%20unions%20influence%20education%20policy.pdf>.

Crepaz, Markus, and Gizem Arikan. "The Effects of Transparency Regulation on Political Trust and Perceived Corruption: Evidence from a Survey Experiment." *Regulation &*

Governance, vol. 18, 2024, pp. 896–913. <https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12555>.

DeLacy, Christopher, and Andy Emerson. "Obama Administration Backtracks on Key Lobbyist Restrictions." *Holland & Knight*, 13 Aug.

2014, www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2014/08/obama-administration-backtracks-on-key-lobbyist-re. Accessed 15 July 2025.

Di Pace, Pasquale Domingos. Political Campaign Revolutions: Case Study Barack Obama 2008.

LUISS Guido Carli University,

2016. https://tesi.luiss.it/17877/1/073102_DI%20PACE_PASQUALE%20DOMING.pdf.

Diven, Polly. "A Coincidence of Interests: The Hyperpluralism of U.S. Food Aid Policy."

Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 2, no. 4, 2006, pp. 361–84. JSTOR,

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/24907257>. Accessed 14 June 2025.

Donnelly, Patrick G. The Origins of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. *Sociology,*

Anthropology, and Social Work Faculty Publications, no. 37, 1982, University of Dayton.

Duchin, Ran, and Denis Sosyura. TARP Investments: Financials and Politics. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, 27 June 2010.

Dye, Thomas R. *Understanding Public Policy*. 1972. 15th ed., Pearson, 2017.

Eichenberger, Steven, Frédéric Varone, and Luzia Helfer. "Do Interest Groups Bias MPs' Perception of Party Voters' Preferences?" *Party Politics*, vol. 28, no. 3, May 2022, pp. 567–579. DOI:10.1177/1354068821997079.

Elberg, Steven Alan. "Agriculture and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: Reform or Relapse?" *San Joaquin Agricultural Law Review*, vol. 3, 1993, pp. 197–220.

Elgindy, Khaled. "AIPAC 1995: Politics and Priorities." *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1995, pp. 83–89. JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2537760>. Accessed 14 June 2025.

Engel, Kirsten H. "EPA's Clean Power Plan: An Emerging New Cooperative Federalism?" *Publius*, vol. 45, no. 3, 2015, pp. 452–74. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24734687>. Accessed 4 July 2025.

English, Mary R. *The Clean Power Plan: Regulating Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Existing Power Plants*. Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy, University of Tennessee, August 2014. https://baker.utk.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Clean.Power_Plan_Regulating.Carbon.Dioxide.Emissions.Existing.Power_Plant_.pdf.

Evers, Williamson M. *Federal Overreach and Common Core*. White Paper No. 133, Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research, July 2015.

ERIC, <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED565745.pdf>.

Facchini, Giovanni, Anna Maria Mayda, and Prachi Mishra. *Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy?* IMF Working Paper WP/08/244, International Monetary Fund, Oct. 2008, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08244.pdf>.

Fairfax, Richard E. "The Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Impact on Employers: What Worked and Where to Go From Here." *American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 110, no. 5, May 2020, pp. 644–645. <https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305624>.

Fein, Melanie L. *The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and Related Government Actions in Support of the U.S. Financial System*. 5 Nov. 2008, SSRN, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1662545>. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1662545.

Fenoaltea, Enrico Maria, Fanyuan Meng, Run-Ran Liu, and Matúš Medo. "Phase Transitions in Growing Groups: How Cohesion Can Persist." *Physical Review Research*, vol. 5, no. 1, 19 Jan. 2023, p. 013023, <https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevResearch.5.013023>.

Ferrara, Alessandro. *The democratic horizon: Hyperpluralism and the renewal of political liberalism*. Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Føehn, Taran, et al. "Climate Policies in a Fossil Fuel Producing Country: Demand versus Supply Side Policies." *The Energy Journal*, vol. 38, no. 1, 2017, pp. 77–102. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44132124>. Accessed 12 June 2025.

Forsythe, David P., and Susan Welch. "Joining and Supporting Public Interest Groups: A Note on Some Empirical Findings." *The Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 36, no. 3, 1983, pp. 386–99. JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.2307/448397>. Accessed 10 June 2025.

Fuchs, Lawrence H. "The Corpse That Would Not Die: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986." *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, vol. 6, no. 1, 1990, pp. 111–127. <https://doi.org/10.3406/remi.1990.1230>.

Gillezeau, Christina et al. "Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) medical students - an examination of their journey and experiences as medical students in limbo." *BMC medical education* vol. 21,1 358. 28 Jun. 2021, doi:10.1186/s12909-021-02787-5

Hacker, Jacob S. "Out of Balance: Medicare, Interest Groups, and American Politics." *Generations: Journal of the American Society on Aging*, vol. 39, no. 2, 2015, pp. 126–133. JSTOR, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26556141> . Accessed 19 May 2025.

Hanegraaff, Marcel, Jens van der Ploeg, and Joost Berkhout. "Standing in a Crowded Room: Exploring the Relation between Interest Group System Density and Access to Policymakers." *Political Research Quarterly*, vol. 73, no. 1, 2020, pp. 51–64. *SAGE Journals*, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1065912919865938>.

Hannan, Jacquelyn E. *The Effectiveness of the Strategies Interest Groups Use to Influence Health Care Reform in the United States: A Case Study Analysis of President Clinton, Bush, and Obama's Health Care Reforms*. 2015. The College of Wooster, Senior Independent Study Thesis. openworks.wooster.edu/independentstudy/6765.

- Hansen, Susan B. *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 59, no. 3, 1997, pp. 936–38. *JSTOR*, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2998650>. Accessed 1 June 2025.
- Hess, Frederick M., and Michael J. Petrilli. “The Politics of No Child Left Behind: Will the Coalition Hold?” *The Journal of Education*, vol. 185, no. 3, 2004, pp. 13–25. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42744085>. Accessed 24 May 2025.
- Hiltner, S., et al. “Fossil Fuel Industry Influence in Higher Education: A Review and a Research Agenda.” *WIREs Climate Change*, vol. 15, no. 6, 2024, e904. <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.904>.
- Hoffman, Beatrix. “Health Care Reform and Social Movements in the United States.” *American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 98, no. 9 Suppl, Sept. 2008, pp. S69–S79. PubMed Central, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2518596/>.
- Hoffman, Michael E. S. *The Political Economy of TARP: A Public Opinion Approach*. Jan. 2012. SSRN, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998384>. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1998384.
- Hojnacki, Marie. “Interest Groups’ Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone.” *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 41, no. 1, 1997, pp. 61–87. *JSTOR*, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111709>. Accessed 2 June 2025.
- Hokama, Riki. “Where We Work and Live: America’s Counties and the Importance of Infrastructure.” *The Military Engineer*, vol. 107, no. 695, 2015, pp. 44–47. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26354457>. Accessed 10 June 2025.
- Holman, Craig. *Origins, Evolution and Structure of the Lobbying Disclosure Act*. Public Citizen, 2012, <https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/ldaorigins.pdf>. Accessed 15 June 2025.

Holyoke, Thomas T. “A Dynamic Model of Member Participation in Interest Groups.” *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, vol. 2, no. 3, 2013, pp. 278–301. <https://thomasholyoke.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/a-dynamic-model-of-member-participation-in-interest-groups.pdf>.

Hoornebeck, J., Lanese, B., Albugmi, M., & Filla, J. (2018). Healthcare reform repeal efforts in the United States in 2017: An inquiry into public advocacy efforts by key interest groups. *Politics and Governance*, 6(3), 190–204. <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v6i3.1507>
<https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/viewFile/1507/890>

Horton, David. "Lobbyists, Relationships, and Legislators' Votes." *Xavier Journal of Politics*, vol. 6, no. 1, Fall 2015, pp. 72-83. https://www.xavier.edu/xjop/documents/vol6_2015/XJOPVOLVI2015LobbyistsVotesandRelationships.pdf.

Igan, Deniz, Prachi Mishra, and Thierry Tresselt. A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis. NBER Working Paper No. 17076, National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2011. <https://www.nber.org/papers/w17076>

Johnson, Kyle. Beyond pluralism and elitism: How much influence do special interests have on the content of congressional legislation? (2017). Senior Thesis, Bemidji State University, Department of Political Science. Available at: <https://www.bemidjistate.edu/academics/political-science/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2022/03/kyle-johnson-thesis.pdf>

- Kaplan, Ethan, and Suresh Naidu. "Between Government and Market: The Political Economics of Labor Unions." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, no. 33295, Dec. 2024, www.nber.org/papers/w33295.
- Kenny, Christopher, et al. "The Impact of Political Interests in the 1994 and 1996 Congressional Elections: The Role of the National Rifle Association." *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 34, no. 2, 2004, pp. 331–44. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092366>. Accessed 12 June 2025.
- Klumpp, Tilman, et al. "The Business of American Democracy: Citizens United, Independent Spending, and Elections." *The Journal of Law & Economics*, vol. 59, no. 1, 2016, pp. 1–43. JSTOR, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26456938>. Accessed 21 June 2025.
- Kramer, Brianne. *A Case Study on Leadership Members in a Teacher Activist Group: "The Fight For Public Education is a Fight For Democracy."* 2017. University of Toledo, PhD dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/acprod/odb_etd/ws/send_file/send?accession=toledo1513284001679202&disposition=inline.
- Krutz, Glen, and Sylvie Waskiewicz. *American Government 3e*. OpenStax, 28 July 2021, <https://openstax.org/details/books/american-government-3e>
- La Torre, Silvio. *A Comparative Analysis of Lobbying Regulation in the United States and in the European Union*. 2017-2018. LUISS Guido Carli, Master's thesis, https://tesi.luiss.it/21824/1/630272_LA%20TORRE_SILVIO_A%20comparative%20analysis%20of%20lobbying%20regulation%20FINAL.pdf. Accessed 1 June 2025.

LAGAYETTE, Pierre. "Lethal Lobby: The National Rifle Association." *Revue Française d'études Américaines*, no. 63, 1995, pp. 52–64. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20872490>. Accessed 12 June 2025.

Lassance, Antonio. "What Is a Policy and What Is a Government Program? A Simple Question With No Clear Answer, Until Now." 10 Nov. 2020. SSRN, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3727996>.

Livermore, Michael A., and Richard L. Revesz. "INTEREST GROUPS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: INCONSISTENT POSITIONS AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES." *Environmental Law*, vol. 45, no. 1, 2015, pp. 1–17. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43432862>. Accessed 2 July 2025.

Lopez Pelaez, Kevin. "Policy Evaluation: The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008." Florida Atlantic University, research paper for PUP 4004 Policy Making & Administration, 10 Dec. 2021. ResearchGate, doi:10.13140/RG.2.2.32477.13289.

Mann, Thomas E. "Obama and Super PACs in the 2012 Election." Brookings Institution, 29 July 2016, www.brookings.edu/articles/obama-and-super-pacs-in-the-2012-election/. Accessed 22 June 2025.

Mathis, William J. "NCLB and High-Stakes Accountability: A Cure? Or a Symptom of the Disease?" *Educational Horizons*, vol. 82, no. 2, 2004, pp. 143–52. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42927143>. Accessed 26 May 2025.

MCCONNELL, MICHAEL W. "Reconsidering 'Citizens United' as a Press Clause Case." *The Yale Law Journal*, vol. 123, no. 2, 2013, pp. 412–58. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23744286>. Accessed 21 June 2025.

McNeil, Michele. "UPDATED: Gates Spreading 'Race to the Top' Help to All States." *Education Week*, 25 Sept. 2009, <https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/updated-gates-spreading-race-to-the-top-help-to-all-states/2009/09>.

Minkler, Meredith, et al. Promoting Healthy Public Policy through Community-Based Participatory Research: Ten Case Studies. PolicyLink and University of California, Berkeley, School of Public Health, 2008, www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/CBPR_PromotingHealthyPublicPolicy_final.pdf.

Moe, Terry M. Teachers Unions, Vested Interests, and America's Schools. Hillsdale College, 2013, www.hillsdale.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/FMF-2013-Teachers-Unions.pdf.

Murtala, Wazeer. "A New Review of: Olson's The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities." *Pakistan Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 6, 2023, doi:10.52337/pjia.v6i1.707 .

National Governors Association. A Governor's Guide to NGA. National Governors Association, 2013, [www.nga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/A-Governors-Guide-to-NGA.pdf\[1\]](http://www.nga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/A-Governors-Guide-to-NGA.pdf[1]).

National Mining Association and America's Power. Motion to Stay the Final Rule of the United States Environmental Protection Agency. United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit, 24 May 2024.

americaspower.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/NMA-et-al-v.-EPA-Motion-to-Stay-Only.pdf. PDF file.

Nuechterlein, Donald E. "National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making." *British Journal of International Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3, 1976, pp. 246–66. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096778>. Accessed 12 June 2025.

O’Sullivan, Jennifer. *Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit: A Primer*. Congressional Research Service, 20 Aug. 2008.

“Oil & Gas Lobbying Profile.” OpenSecrets, Center for Responsive Politics, 14 May 2025, www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/industries/summary?cycle=2025&filter=p&id=E01

Obama, Barack. "March 15, 2010: Speech on Health Care Reform." Miller Center, University of Virginia, 15 Mar. 2010, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-15-2010-speech-health-care-reform>. Accessed 23 June 2025.

Obama, Barack. "Speech at the Jefferson-Jackson Dinner." *American Rhetoric*, 10 Nov. 2007, <https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobamajeffersonjacksondinner.htm>.

Obama, Barack. *Executive Order 13490 of January 21, 2009: Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Personnel*. Federal Register, vol. 74, no. 15, 26 Jan. 2009, pp. 4673–4678. U.S. Government Publishing Office, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2009-01-26/pdf/E9-1719.pdf>.

Obama, Barack. Reform for the Future. The White House, 17 Oct. 2016,

obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/education/reform.

O'Brien, Timothy C., Tom R. Tyler, and Tracey L. Meares. "Building Popular Legitimacy with Reconciliatory Gestures and Participation: A Community-Level Model of

Authority." *Regulation & Governance*, vol. 14, 2020, pp. 821–

839. <https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12264>.

Omarova, Saule T. "The Dodd-Frank Act: A New Deal for a New Age?" Cornell Law Faculty

Publications, no. 1023, 2011, <https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1023>. Accessed 1

July 2025.

OpenSecrets. "Health Lobbying." OpenSecrets, Center for Responsive Politics, February 06,

2025, <https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying?cycle=2024&ind=H>. Accessed 23

June 2025.

OpenSecrets. "Health Sector Total." OpenSecrets.org, Center for Responsive Politics,

2008, <https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals?cycle=2008&ind=H>. Accessed 28

June 2025.

Patler, Caitlin, Erin R. Hamilton, and Robin L. Savinar. "The Limits of Gaining Rights while

Remaining Marginalized: The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Program and the Psychological Wellbeing of Latina/o Undocumented Youth." *Social Forces*, vol.

100, no. 1, Sept. 2021, pp. 246–272. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soaa099>.

Perotti, Rosanna. "IRCA's Antidiscrimination Provisions: What Went Wrong?" *The International Migration Review*, vol. 26, no. 3, 1992, pp. 732–53. JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2546963>. Accessed 28 May 2025.

Phelps, Richard P. "The Council of Chief State School Officers and National Governors Association: Whom Do They Serve?" *Nonpartisan Education Review / Articles*, vol. 14, no. 4, 2018, <https://nonpartisaneducation.org/Review/Articles/v14n4.pdf>.

Plepi, Jessica. "Lobbying Laws and Campaign Finance: Shaping the Trajectory of Post-2008 Financial Reforms." CUNY Academic Works, 2025, https://academicworks.cuny.edu/bb_etds/211. Accessed 1 July 2025.

Resimić, Miloš. *Lobbying Regulations and Civil Society Organisations*. Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk, 18 Jan. 2023, https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Lobbying-regulations-and-CSOs_2023_PR.pdf. Accessed 1 June 2025.

Robinson, William I., and Xuan Santos. "Global Capitalism, Immigrant Labor, and the Struggle for Justice." *Class, Race and Corporate Power*, vol. 2, no. 3, 2014, Article 1. Florida International University, <https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/classracecorporatpower/vol2/iss3/1>. DOI: 10.25148/CRCP.2.3.16092122.

Røed, Maiken. *Interest Group Influence on Political Parties in Western Democracies*. PhD dissertation, Lund University, 2021. <https://portal.research.lu.se/files/107721723/Kappe.pdf>.

Rogers, Robin. "Making Public Policy: The New Philanthropists and American Education." *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, vol. 74, no. 4, 2015, pp. 743–74. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43817538>. Accessed 10 July 2025.

Rosenbaum, Sara. "The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: implications for public health policy and practice." *Public health reports* (Washington, D.C. : 1974) vol. 126,1 (2011): 130-5. doi:10.1177/003335491112600118.

Rosner, David, and Gerald Markowitz. "A Short History of Occupational Safety and Health in the United States." *American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 110, no. 5, May 2020, pp. 622–628. <https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305581>.

Ross-Brown, Sam. "Obama and the Teachers Unions." *In These Times*, 20 Aug. 2010, <https://inthesetimes.com/article/obama-and-the-teachers-unions>.

Safty, Adel. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol. 16, no. 2, 1994, pp. 87–91. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41858091>. Accessed 14 June 2025.

Santangelo, Michael. "Historical Perspective on Adding Drugs to Medicare." *Health Care Financing Review*, vol. 27, no. 2, Winter 2005-2006, pp. 25–33. PubMed Central, <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4194919/>.

SCHEY, PETER A., and CARLOS HOLGUIN. "Employer Sanctions Deserve No Amnesty." In *Defense of the Alien*, vol. 12, 1989, pp. 170–79. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23143064>. Accessed 28 May 2025.

Schwartz, Seth. Schwartz Evaluation of the Immediate Impact of the Clean Power Plan Rule on the Coal Industry. National Mining Association, October 2015, www.nma.org/pdf/EVA-Report-Final.pdf.

Seminario, Margaret M. "The Occupational Safety and Health Act at 50—A Labor Perspective." *American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 110, no. 5, May 2020, pp. 642–643. <https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2019.305541>.

Sergio I. Garcia-Rios, and Matt A. Barreto. "Politicized Immigrant Identity, Spanish-Language Media, and Political Mobilization in 2012." *RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences*, vol. 2, no. 3, 2016, pp. 78–96. *JSTOR*, <https://doi.org/10.7758/rsf.2016.2.3.05>. Accessed 14 July 2025.

Smallberg, Michael. "JPMorgan Deploys Former Regulators to Talk to Current Regulators." Project On Government Oversight, 2 Nov. 2023, <https://www.pogo.org/analysis/jpmorgan-deploys-former-regulators-to-talk-to-current-regulators>. Accessed 1 July 2025.

Soni, Aastha. Lobbying Impact: Assessing the Effects of Lobbying on Healthcare Access for Minority Communities. 2024. Bryant University, Honors Thesis, https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=honors_politicslawsociety.

Stolte, Justin. The Energy Policy Act of 2005: The Path to Energy Autonomy. *Journal of Legislation*, vol. 33, no. 1, 2007, pp. 119–133. Notre Dame Law School, <https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol33/iss1/5/>.

Sussman, Bob. "The Supreme Court's Clean Power Plan Missteps." Brookings Institution, 29 July 2016,
www.brookings.edu/articles/the-supreme-courts-clean-power-plan-missteps/.

"Total Spending & Lobbyists" *OpenSecrets*, 2025, www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying.
Accessed 28 July 2025.

Teachout, Zephyr. "The Forgotten Law of Lobbying." *Election Law Journal*, vol. 13, no. 4, 2014.
Fordham University School of Law Scholarship

Top Industries Contributing to Barack Obama, 2008 Cycle." *OpenSecrets*, Center for Responsive
Politics, 31 Dec. 2008, <https://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/industries?id=N00009638>.

U.S. Department of Education. (2005, February). No Child Left Behind: Annual Report to
Congress
2005. <https://www.ed.gov/sites/ed/files/about/reports/annual/nclb/nclbrpt2005.pdf>

U.S. Department of Justice. "Former Lobbyist Jack Abramoff Sentenced to 48 Months in Prison
on Charges Involving Corruption, Fraud, Conspiracy and Tax Evasion." Office of Public
Affairs, 15 Sept. 2008, <https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/September/08-crm-779.html>.

U.S. Department of the Treasury. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act Programs: FY 2013
President's Budget Submission. May 2012. U.S. Department of the Treasury,
<https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/266/12-FY-2013-EESA-CJ.pdf>.

United States Congress. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Public Law 99-603, 99th Congress, Nov. 6, 1986. Congress.gov, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/99th-congress/senate-bill/1200/text>.

United States Congress. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007. 110th Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 2316, placed on Senate calendar 4 June 2007. Congress.gov, <https://www.congress.gov/110/bills/hr2316/BILLS-110hr2316pcs.pdf>.

United States Congress. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007. 110th Congress, 1st Session, S.1, Public Law 110-81, enacted 14 Sept. 2007. Congress.gov, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/senate-bill/1/text1>.

United States Congress. Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995. Public Law 104-45, 104th Congress, 8 Nov. 1995. U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 109, pp. 398–401. Congress.gov, <https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ45/PLAW-104publ45.pdf>.

United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953)

United States, Congress, Congressional Research Service. K-12 Education: Highlights of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-110). 9 Jan. 2007, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20070109_RL31284_f168bcc9082ae4ee7bbd63816d21ccc54309d36c7.pdf. Accessed 24 May 2025. (RIDDLE)

United States, Congress. Second Amendment—Right to Bear Arms. Constitution Annotated, 2022, pp. 1577–1600, U.S. Government Publishing Office, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2022/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2022-16.pdf>. Accessed 12 June 2025.

- Valenzuela, Jéssica I.** “The DREAMers: How the Undocumented Youth Movement Transformed the Immigrant Rights Debate.” *Diálogo*, vol. 18, no. 2, 2015, Article 30, *via.library.depaul.edu/dialogo/vol18/iss2/30*.
- Watson, Geoffrey R. “The Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995.” *Catholic University Law Review*, vol. 45, 1996, pp. 837–850.
- Webel, Baird. Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP): Implementation and Status. Congressional Research Service, 21 Aug. 2014. Congress.gov, <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R41427>
- Wheaton, Sarah. "Obama facing pressure to rip up his lobbyist rules." *Politico*, 12 Aug. 2016, www.politico.com/story/2016/08/obama-lobbying-rules-226958.
- Whitaker, L. Paige. *Campaign Finance Law: An Analysis of Key Issues, Recent Developments, and Constitutional Considerations for Legislation*. Congressional Research Service, 17 May 2023, <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45320>. Accessed 1 June 2025.
- White, Elizabeth N., et al. "Medicare Drug Pricing Negotiations: Assessing Constitutional Structural Limits." *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics*, vol. 51, no. 4, 2023, pp. 956–960. *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics*, doi:10.1017/jme.2024.12. Epub 13 Mar. 2024. PubMed, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10937171/>.
- Wollebæk, Dag, and Ketil Raknes. "Interest Group Access to Decision Makers at a Democracy Festival." *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 12 Dec. 2021, <https://d-nb.info/1255546255/34>. Accessed 4 June 2025.

- “Redefining the National League of Cities State Sovereignty Doctrine.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 129, no. 6, 1981, pp. 1460–84. JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3311964>. Accessed 10 June 2025.
- Anderson, Totton J. “Pressure Groups and Intergovernmental Relations.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 359, 1965, pp. 116–26. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1035114>. Accessed 10 June 2025.
- Anzia, Sarah F. Local Interests: Politics, Policy, and Interest Groups in US City Governments. University of Chicago Press, 2022.
- Aridan, Natan. “Israel Lobby.” Israel Studies, vol. 24, no. 2, 2019, pp. 128–43. JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.2979/israelstudies.24.2.11>. Accessed 14 June 2025.
- Autor v. Pritzker. 740 F.3d 176, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 17 Jan. 2014. <https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/12-5379/12-5379-2014-01-17.pdf>.
- Barikor, Felix F. "Studies of the Influence of the Oil and Gas Industries on the American Energy Policy Act of 2005." *South Asian Research Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, vol. 3, no. 2, 2021, pp. 47–55. SAR Publication, https://sarpublication.com/media/articles/SARJHSS_32_47-55.pdf.
- Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi. "Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process." *National Bureau of Economic Research*, Working Paper no. 16765, Feb. 2011, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16765>.

-BEYERS, JAN, and CAELESTA BRAUN. "Ties That Count: Explaining Interest Group Access to Policymakers." *Journal of Public Policy*, vol. 34, no. 1, 2014, pp. 93–121. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43864455>. Accessed 31 May 2025.

Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær, et al. "A Privileged Position? The Influence of Business Interests in Government Consultations." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART*, vol. 24, no. 4, 2014, pp. 879–96. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24484875>. Accessed 5 June 2025.

Bracmort, Kelsi. *The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS): An Overview*. Congressional Research Service Report R43325, updated January 27, 2022. Congressional Research Service.

Briffault, Richard. "Super PACs." *Minnesota Law Review*, vol. 96, no. 6, 2012, pp. 1644–1692. https://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Briffault_MLR.pdf.

Briffault, Richard. "The Anxiety of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying." Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-367, 2014. Columbia Law Scholarship Repository, https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1841.

Congressional Record – Senate, July 22, 2010." *Congress.gov*, 111th Congress, 2nd session, vol. 156, no. 108, pt. 1, pp. S6148–S6149. U.S. Government Publishing Office, <https://www.congress.gov/111/crec/2010/07/22/CREC-2010-07-22-pt1-PgS6148.pdf>. Accessed 23 May 2025.

Callaway, Brantly, and William J. Collins. "Unions, Workers, and Wages at the Peak of the American Labor Movement." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, no. 23516, June 2017, www.nber.org/papers/w23516.

Carter, Neil, and Conor Little. "Party Competition on Climate Policy: The Roles of Interest Groups, Ideology and Challenger Parties in the UK and Ireland." *International Political Science Review*, vol. 42, no. 1, 2021, pp. 16–32.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120972582>.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. Supreme Court of the United States, No. 08-205, argued 24 Mar. 2009, reargued 9 Sept. 2009, decided 21 Jan. 2010. Federal Election Commission, https://www.fec.gov/resources/legal-resources/litigation/cu_sc08_opinion.pdf. Accessed 21 June 2025.

Conti, Rena, Stacie B. Dusetzina, and Rachel Sachs. "How the ACA Reframed the Prescription Drug Market and Set the Stage for Current Reform Efforts." *Health Affairs*, vol. 39, no. 3, Mar. 2020, pp. 445–452, doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2019.01432. Accessed 23 June 2025.

Council of Chief State School Officers and National Governors Association. *Common Core State Standards for English Language Arts & Literacy in History/Social Studies, Science, and Technical Subjects*. CCSSO, 2010. <https://learning.ccsso.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/ADA-Compliant-ELA-Standards.pdf>.

Dahl, Robert A. "Pluralism Revisited." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 10, no. 2, 1978, pp. 191–203. JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.2307/421645>. Accessed 14 June 2025.

de Figueiredo, John M., and Rui J. P. de Figueiredo Jr. "The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation." *Business and Politics*, vol. 4, no. 2, 2002, pp. 161–181. https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2670

de Grazia, Alfred. "Nature and Prospects of Political Interest Groups." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 319, 1958, pp. 113–22. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1032442>. Accessed 5 June 2025.

Drutman, Lee, and Bruce E. Cain. "Congressional Staff and the Revolving Door: The Impact of Regulatory Change." 20 Aug. 2013. SSRN, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2313304>.

Evers-Hillstrom, Karl. "AARP, Big Pharma Locked in Battle over Drug Pricing Bill." *The Hill*, 5 Aug. 2022, <https://thehill.com/lobbying/3588542-aarp-big-pharma-locked-in-battle-over-drug-pricing-bill/>.

Federal Election Commission. 2008 Presidential Primary Campaign Receipts Through December 31, 2008. U.S. Government, 8 June 2009, www.fec.gov/resources/news_releases/2009/20090608Pres/2_2008PresPrimaryCmpgnRcpts.pdf.

Garceau, Oliver. "Interest Group Theory in Political Research." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 319, 1958, pp. 104–12. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1032441>. Accessed 14 June 2025.

Gencarelli, Dawn M. *The Medicare Prescription Drug Proposals and Health Insurance Risk*. National Health Policy Forum, Issue Brief no. 793, 4 Sept. 2003, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK559779/>

Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin I. Page. "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens." *Perspectives on Politics* 12.3 (2014): 564–581. Web.

Gilens, Martin. "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 69, no. 5, 2005, pp. 778–96. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3521574>. Accessed 14 June 2025.

Gultom, Y. S. M., and H. Z. Miftah. "The Role of the Jewish Lobby Toward US Foreign Policy Making on the 2023 Israel-Palestine War (Case of AIPAC)." *Hasanuddin Journal of Strategic and International Studies (HJSIS)*, vol. 2, no. 2, 2024, pp. 38–49.

Haynes, Bruce. "Obama's Supreme Court Criticism Hardly New." National Constitution Center, 1 Feb. 2010, <https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/obamas-supreme-court-criticism-hardly-new>.

Hoffman, Allison K. "The Irony of Health Care's Public Option." University of Pennsylvania Law School Faculty Scholarship, 2020, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3216&context=faculty_scholarship/. Accessed 29 June 2025.

Holman, Mirya and Timothy O. Lenz. *American Government*, Second Edition. University Press of Florida, 2018. Project MUSE, <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/66967>.

Holt, Mark, and Carol Glover, coordinators. *Energy Policy Act of 2005: Summary and Analysis of Enacted Provisions*. Congressional Research Service, 8 Mar. 2006. CRS Report RL33302. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20060308_RL33302_5deb6e20eda4faa299d9f2b5ca6cdacf9c60c0b5.pdf

Jessani, Nasreen S., et al. "Advocacy, Activism, and Lobbying: How Variations in Interpretation Affect Ability for Academia to Engage with Public Policy." *PLOS Global Public Health*, vol. 2, no. 3, 18 Mar. 2022, e0000034. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pgph.0000034>.

Jesus, Ana Maria de. "Policy-Making Process and Interest Groups: How Do Local Government Associations Influence Policy Outcome in Brazil and the Netherlands?" *Brazilian Political Science Review*, vol. 5, no. Special Edition, 2011, pp. 69–101. SciELO, http://socialsciences.scielo.org/pdf/s_bpsr/v5nse/scs_a03.pdf.

Kelly, Andrew S. "Private Power in Public Programs: Medicare, Medicaid, and the Structural Power of Private Insurance." *Studies in American Political Development*, vol. 37, 2023, pp. 24–40. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X22000207>.

Kindell, Judith E., and John Francis Reilly. "Lobbying Issues." 1997 Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional Education (CPE) Text, Internal Revenue Service, 1997, <https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicp97.pdf>.

Kominski, Gerald F., Nicole J. Nonzee, and Andrea Sorensen. "The Affordable Care Act's Impacts on Access to Insurance and Health Care for Low-Income Populations." *Annual Review of Public Health*, vol. 38, 2017, pp. 489–505. doi:10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031816-044555. Accessed 23 June 2025.

Light, Paul C. "Domestic Policy Making." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 1, 2000, pp. 109–32. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552073>. Accessed 11 June 2025.

- Marmor, Theodore R. "The Politics of Medicare." ResearchGate, January 2001,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/30530048_The_Politics_of_Medicare.
 Accessed 16\05\2025. pp. 872-874.
- McGrath, Conor. "Barack Obama and Lobbyists: An Inconsistent Record?" APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, 2010. SSRN, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1643840>.
- McKinley, Maggie. "Lobbying and the Petition Clause." *Stanford Law Review*, vol. 68, May 2016, pp. 1131-1205. University of Pennsylvania Scholarly Commons, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2893&context=faculty_scholarship.
- Milojevich, Allyn Katherine, "Interest Groups, Political Party Control, Lobbying, and Science Funding: A Population Ecology Approach. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2014.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/3153
- Morsberger, Layne. "The Gaslight Effect: Lobbying in the Fossil Fuel Industry - Earth Day." Earth Day, 30 Oct. 2024, www.earthday.org/the-gaslight-effect-lobbying-in-the-fossil-fuel-industry/. Accessed 15 Apr. 2025.
- Musa, Sam. "The impact of NRA on the American policy." *J Pol Sci Pub Aff* 4.222 (2016): 2332-0761.
- Nicoll Victor, J. (2007). Strategic Lobbying: Demonstrating How Legislative Context Affects Interest Groups' Lobbying Tactics. *American Politics Research*, 35(6), 826-845. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X07300681> (Original work published 2007)

Obama, Barack. Statement on Senate Action on Campaign Finance Legislation. 16 July 2012, www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201200562/pdf/DCPD-201200562.pdf.

Accessed 22 June 2025.

OpenSecrets. "Summary Data for Barack Obama, 2008 Cycle." OpenSecrets, Center for Responsive Politics, www.opensecrets.org/pres08/candidate?id=N00009638. Accessed 21

June 2025.

OpenSecrets. "JPMorgan Chase & Co Lobbying Profile." OpenSecrets, Center for Responsive Politics, 14 May 2025, [www.opensecrets.org/federal-](http://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/summary?id=D000000103)

[lobbying/clients/summary?id=D000000103](http://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/summary?id=D000000103). Accessed 1 July 2025.

Rasmussen, Anne, and Stefanie Reher. "(Inequality in) Interest Group Involvement and the Legitimacy of Policy Making." *British Journal of Political Science* 53.1 (2023): 45–64. Web.

Richard Briffault, *The Anxiety of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying*, Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-367 (2014).

Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1841

Roy. "Interest Groups in American Education." *Comparative Education*, vol. 11, no. 2, 1975, pp. 165–72. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3097944>. Accessed 4 July 2025.

Salisbury, Robert H. "Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions." *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 78, no. 1, 1984, pp. 64–76. JSTOR,

<https://doi.org/10.2307/1961249>. Accessed 5 June 2025.

- Salisbury, Robert H., et al. "Who Works with Whom? Interest Group Alliances and Opposition." *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 81, no. 4, 1987, pp. 1217–34. *JSTOR*, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1962586>. Accessed 2 June 2025.
- Sierpien, Jeffery A. Frontline Strategies of the National Rifle Association. Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006. Defense Technical Information Center, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA445384.pdf>. Accessed 12 June 2025.
- Solomon, Morris S. The Agenda and Political Techniques of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Executive Research Project, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, April 1993. Public Intelligence, <https://info.publicintelligence.net/AIPAC.pdf>.
- Stevenson, Howard, Alison Milner, and Emily Winchip. Education Trade Unions for the Teaching Profession: Strengthening the Capacity of Education Trade Unions to Represent Teachers' Professional Needs in Social Dialogue. European Trade Union Committee for Education, Sept. 2018, www.csee-etuce.org/images/attachments/RP_TeachProfNeeds.pdf.
- Straus, Jacob R. The Role of Lobbyists in Federal Advisory Committees: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 15 Mar. 2018, <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R44974>. Accessed 22 June 2025.
- "The Federal Lobbying Act of 1946." *Columbia Law Review*, vol. 47, no. 1, 1947, pp. 98–109. *JSTOR*, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1118553>. Accessed 15 June 2025.

Tenenbaum, Jonathan. Limitations on Lobbying Activities: The Rules for 501(c)(3) Organizations. Tenenbaum Legal, PLLC, www.tenenbaumlegal.com. Accessed [Day Month Year].

The White House. Race to the Top. The White House, 2016, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/education/k-12/race-to-the-top>. Accessed 4 July 2025.

Thurber, J. A. (2010). Obama and lobbyists: Assessing President Obama's battle with lobbyists (Working Paper). American University, School of Public Affairs. https://www.american.edu/spa/ccps/upload/changing-the-way-washington-works_thurber.pdf

Tsang, Linda. EPA Replaces the Clean Power Plan with the Affordable Clean Energy Rule. Congressional Research Service, 11 July 2019. sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/LSB10325.pdf PDF file.

U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. "Table: Percent of Public School Teachers in a Union or Employees' Association, by Selected School Characteristics: 2015–16." National Teacher and Principal Survey (NTPS), 2015–16, nces.ed.gov/surveys/ntps/tables/Table_TeachersUnion.asp. Accessed 12 June 2025.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2015, August 3). Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan. Retrieved July 2, 2025, from https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan_.html

United States Congress. (2023). Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 [As amended through P.L. 117-286, enacted December 27, 2022] (Compilation No. 902). U.S. Government Publishing Office. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-902/pdf/COMPS-902.pdf>.

United States Constitution. Amend. I. Congress.gov, Library of Congress, <https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-1/>. Accessed 15 June 2025.

United States, Congress. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Public Law 111-203, U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 124, 21 July 2010, pp. 1376–2223, <https://www.congress.gov/111/statute/STATUTE-124/STATUTE-124-Pg1376.pdf>.

United States, The White House. "Remarks by the President on Immigration." *Obama White House Archives*, 15 June 2012, obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration. Accessed 14 July 2025.

United States. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946. Chapter 8A, Title 3, §§ 261–270, 2 Aug. 1946, 60 Stat. 839–842. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946. Library of Congress, <https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/l1/uscode/uscode1946-00100/uscode1946-001002008a/uscode1946-001002008a.pdf>. Accessed 15 June 2025.

Vandenbergh, Michael P., Jonathan M. Gilligan, and Haley Feuerman. "The New Revolving Door." *Case Western Reserve Law Review*, vol. 70, no. 4, 2020, pp.1121-1148. <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4884&context=caselrev>

Wachira, Nicholas, and Derrick Odhiambo. "The Politics of Teacher Unions: Strategies and Effects." *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS)*, vol. 5, no. 1, January 2021, pp. 593-599, www.rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/Digital-Library/volume-5-issue-1/593-599.pdf.

Walker, Edward T. "Putting a Face on the Issue: Corporate Stakeholder Mobilization in Professional Grassroots Lobbying Campaigns." *Business and Society*, vol. 51, no. 4, Dec. 2012, pp. 561–601. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650309350210>.