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**Assessing US Intervention in Somalia: The Case of G. H Bush
and Clinton Administrations (1992-1994)**

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Dedication

This dissertation owes its existence to a number of individuals; First and above all this work is in honour of the memory of my grandfather Taher Mallem raḥimahu llāh. A special feeling of gratitude goes to the two candles that enlighten my life; my beloved parents Bouraghda Laid and Naima Mallem who continually have shown their moral, spiritual and emotional support and who always have been my source of motivation, strength and inspiration.

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Dedication

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Abstract

The research examines the approaches and policies of both the G. H Bush and Bill Clinton administrations towards the mission in Somalia from 1992 to 1994. The purpose is to compare the US interventions in Somalia under the leadership of both administrations. The study also analyses the transition of their responsibilities to determine if both administrations had the same objectives as initially mentioned. According to G. H Bush's administration, the key motive to intervene was to proclaim a humanitarian intervention to help the people of Somalia in their time of crisis and build a peaceful, self-sustaining, and democratic state. However, during Clinton's presidency, the intervention escalated into a large peacekeeping mission and a multi-front armed war with local warlords and factional militias. This dissertation closes with the conclusion that the US intervention in Somalia was hindered by a lack of coherent strategic planning and continuity between the G. H Bush and Bill Clinton administrations. In other words, President G. H Bush's intervention focused on humanitarian aid but lacked long-term strategic planning and clear objectives, while Bill Clinton's administration, lacking a clear foreign policy, faced escalating violence and ultimately withdrew US troops. The failure in Somalia highlights the necessity for clear, achievable objectives, coherent strategic planning, and adaptable strategies in international interventions to avoid mission creep and ensure success.

الملخص

كانت التدخلات الأمريكية في صوماليا (1992-1994) خطوة تحويلية نحو بناء عالم أكثر سلماً. تدرس هذه الأطروحة الأساليب والسياسات التي اتبعتها كل من إدارتي جورج بوش الأب وبييل كلينتون تجاه المهمة في صوماليا. في هذا السياق، تهدف هذه الدراسة الى مقارنة تدخلات الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في صوماليا تحت قيادة كل من جورج بوش الأب وبييل كلينتون. بالإضافة الى تحليل انتقال المسؤوليات بين الإدارتين لتحديد ما إذا كانت الاهداف المعلنة في السابق من قبل الإدارتين متطابقة أم لا.. وفقا لمصادر إدارة بوش الأب، كان الدافع الرئيسي للتدخل هو تدخل إنساني لمساعدة الشعب الصومالي في وقت أزمته، بهدف بناء دولة سليمة مكتفية ذاتيا وديمقراطية. في المقابل، خلال فترة رئاسة كلينتون، تصاعد التدخل ليصبح مهمة كبيرة لحفظ السلام وحرابا متعددة الجبهات مع زعماء الحرب المحليين والمليشيات الفصائلية. تختتم هذه الأطروحة بالاستنتاج التالي؛ تم إعاقة التدخل الأمريكي في الصومال بسبب غياب التخطيط الاستراتيجي المتماسك واستمرارية السياسات بين إدارتي جورج بوش الأب وبييل كلينتون. بمعنى آخر، ركز تدخل جورج بوش الأب على المساعدات الإنسانية لكنه افتقر إلى التخطيط الاستراتيجي طويل الأمد والأهداف الواضحة، في حين واجهت إدارة بيل كلينتون، التي كانت تفتقر إلى سياسة خارجية واضحة، تصاعدا للعنف وانتهى بها الأمر إلى سحب القوات الأمريكية. يبرز الفشل في الصومال أهمية وجود أهداف واضحة وقابلة للتحقيق، وتخطيط استراتيجي متماسك، واستراتيجيات قابلة للتكيف في التدخلات الدولية لتجنب التوسع المفرط وضمان النجاح.

Abstract

La recherche examine les approches et politiques des administrations de George H. Bush et de Bill Clinton vis-à-vis de la mission en Somalie de 1992 à 1994. Le but est de comparer les interventions des États-Unis en Somalie sous la direction des deux administrations. L'étude analyse également la transition de leurs responsabilités pour déterminer si les deux administrations avaient les mêmes objectifs que ceux initialement mentionnés. Selon l'administration de G. H Bush, le principal motif d'intervention était de proclamer une intervention humanitaire pour aider le peuple somalien en période de crise et de construire un État pacifique, autosuffisant et démocratique. Cependant, pendant la présidence de Clinton, l'intervention a évolué vers une importante mission de maintien de la paix et une guerre armée à plusieurs fronts avec les seigneurs de guerre locaux et les milices factionnelles. Cette dissertation se termine par la conclusion suivant; L'intervention américaine en Somalie a été entravée par un manque de planification stratégique cohérente et de continuité entre les administrations de G. H Bush et de Bill Clinton. En d'autres termes, l'intervention de Président G. H Bush était axé sur l'aide humanitaire mais manquait de planification stratégique à long terme et d'objectifs clairs, tandis que l'administration de Bill Clinton, dépourvue de politique étrangère claire, a été confrontée à une escalade de la violence et a finalement retiré les troupes américaines. L'échec en Somalie souligne la nécessité d'avoir des objectifs clairs et réalisables, une planification stratégique cohérente et des stratégies adaptables dans les interventions internationales pour éviter la dérive de mission et assurer le succès.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Acronyms	Identification
BPRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
CBS	Columbia Broadcasting System
CNN	Cable News Network
EC	European Community
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
MHI	Military Humanitarian Intervention
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSC	National Safety Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPC	Operation Provide Comfort
OFDA	Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPR	Operation Provide Relief
QRF	Quick Reaction Force

RRG	Rocket-Ropelled Grenade
SNA	Somali National Army
TF	Task force
TFR	Temporary Flight Restriction
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USOFDA	Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance
USA	United States of America
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USG	United States Government
USC	United Somali Congress
UNOSOM 1	United Nations Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM 2	United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNITAF	Unified Task Force

USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
QRF	Quick Reaction Response Force
USAF	United States Air Force
USG	United States Government
USFP	United States Foreign Policy
WWII	World War II
USCENTCOM	The United States Central Command

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General Introduction

After the end of the Second World War followed by the end of the Cold War, there was a rapid change in the world system. The major change is the United States' position globally. The United States became a great power that imposed itself as a spokes-country into international affairs, especially when a country suffers from humanitarian crises and wars...etc. After what was happening to the countries in Eastern Europe and African countries, the United Nations and the US have conducted humanitarian aid in different parts of these countries to protect human rights and maintain international peace and security. The 1990s became the decade of US international interventions including "humanitarian/military intervention" in Somalia.

Somalia, the African land, lies in the Horn of Africa. A country occupies an important geographical and geopolitical position in Africa. It is located between sub-Saharan Africa and the governments of Arabia and southwestern Asia; the capital, Mogadishu, is located just north of the Equator on the Indian Ocean. Somalia's position is the main reason this country's history is full of events. Somalia's history as a federal republic is so tragic and complex at the same time. This complexity appears in colonization, clan conflict, and civil war history.

Somalia was under the colonization of several countries. In the late 19th century, the Somali peninsula became a theatre of competition between Great Britain, Italy, and France (Lewis). The Italian Empire gained control of parts of the coast and established the colony of Italian Somaliland. This occupation lasted until 1941 when a British military administration replaced it in addition to Italy (1925), Britain (1941s), France (1860s), Egypt (1875s), and Ethiopia also had a role in the colonization of Somalia (Somalia profile- Timeline). An independent and unified Somali country did not exist until 1960.

Somalia's horrible events and the struggles of Somalia did not stop by gaining its independence. It became worse and worse when the clan conflict started which led to the

birth of what was called a civil war. This later was an on-going conflict that grew out of resistance to the military junta which was led by the dictatorship Said Barre during the 1980s. The civil war caused widespread death and destruction in Somalia. Adding to the suffering of the Somali people, this conflict was a turning point in the timeline of Somalia's history and added more suffering to this country. Hence, Somalia in today's terms is defined as a failed state and one the poorest countries on earth.

The US and the UN began to take a path toward international humanitarian efforts to the suffering of the Somali people in January 1991. The US government was involved in Somalia, in the light of both Presidents George H Bush and Bill Clinton (1992-1994). The two US administrations played a significant role in Somalia. However, along with these interventions, the US Foreign Policy has been a subject of both debate and criticism mainly concerning the issue of its direction as well as its efficiency to both help Somalia and to change situations. The African zone, more specifically, the Somali zone was one of the many areas where such questions were raised. The G. H Bush administration and Clinton administration present a record that can help in concluding what many scholars are debating and analyzing.

The United States has been a part of many international interventions throughout history, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, intending to promote democracy and human rights and provide peace for civilians all around the world. In the early 90s, the situation in Somalia worsened due to famine and inter-clan wars, especially after the collapse of the dictatorship of Siad Barre, leaving the country in a spiral of wars and human crises. This necessitated international humanitarian organizations to intervene, including the US by orders from President Bush, within the framework of humanitarian aid to help the people of Somalia under the so-called "Operation Restore Hope (From the 5th of December 1992 to the

31st March 1993)." This mission continued even after President Clinton took office (Oakley and John).

This research is significant as it digs deeper into the course of the US mission in Somalia under both administrations, documenting the transition from a purely humanitarian mission to engagement in military operations in the area. This study offer an in-depth look at the evolving circumstances in Somalia from 1992 to 1994 by putting the cases of both presidents, G.H Bush and Bill Clinton, into comparison.

The aim of this research, mainly, is to offer an alternative reading of contemporary US foreign policy, accompanied by its foreign strategy and tactics towards the Somalia crisis of 1992-1994. Additionally, the study aims to gain an understating to how the US foreign policies get into the application when intervening in Somalia under both the Bush and Clinton administrations. By doing so, this investigation aims to provide an outline of the overall policy of both the G.H Bush and Clinton administrations with an analysis of how each one of the two US' administrations get along with its ideology to intervene in Somalia.

From the Cold War era to the present time, American global engagement played a an important role in maintaining its position as the world's leading superpower. American foreign policy has frequently witnessed interventions abroad, ranging from strategic and political alliances to military involvements under the umbrella of promoting democracy, stability, humanitarian considerations, or protecting national security interests. In this context, the case of Somalia represents a significant chapter in US foreign policy. This dissertation focuses on two key research questions: How did the US intervention in Somalia under President G.H Bush differ from that under President Bill Clinton? Furthermore, this research seeks to investigate: to what extent do President Bush strategies correlate with the Clinton administration's strategies?

Within his book entitled, *Saving Soldiers or Civilians* (2018), Sebastian Kaempf delves into the interaction between Somali warlords and American military forces, and the set of challenges posed by this conflict. He sheds light on the difficulties that the American military has encountered conducting war while prioritizing the maximum caution for less casualties and respecting humanitarian principles. Questioning whether the US military managed to conduct the war in Somalia in a manner that prioritizes minimizing casualties while at the same time ensuring the course of military objectives (108-154).

In the same research, Kaempf extensively examines the decision-making processes within the evolving circumstances in the area, analyzing how strategic interests shaped the American approach in Somalia especially the shift from Bush to Bill administration, and the complexities surrounding the withdrawal decision (108-154). However, While Kaempf touches on the shift from Bush to Clinton's administration and how it affected the execution of military objectives. This research center explicitly on comparative analysis between the two administrations approaches in Somalia, exploring in depth this transition by highlighting its specific impacts on diplomatic, military, and humanitarian dimensions within the region.

Lidwien Kapteijns, an African historian with a long term research focusing on Somalia, in his research under the title "Test-firing the 'new world order' in Somalia: The US/UN military humanitarian intervention of 1992-1995" (2013). Lidwein works on the US/UN Military Humanitarian Intervention (MHI) in Somalia, with a particular emphasis on the consequences of the intervention on Somali citizens both moral and human implications. He places the blame on the US military for its failure to sustain peace and contributing to escalating violence, instead of improving the humanitarian wellbeing of Somalis.

The current research employs a different theoretical framework than the research mentioned in the preceding paragraph. On the other hand, the former was evaluating the overall effects of US intervention in the region during both administrations. In the latter, the

study compares the cases of both Presidents; G. H Bush and Bill Clinton, and it provides a detailed analysis of the changing situation in Somalia between 1992 and 1994.

The first section of Delia C. Welsh's 1995 study, "Role of the US Military in Humanitarian Interventions." examines the US military's involvement in humanitarian interventions over time, with a particular emphasis on Somalia. It raises questions about the soldiers' departure from their traditional roles to provide humanitarian aid and considers the complex circumstances surrounding their mission, as well as how to navigate interactions with local forces in Somalia (457).

The aforementioned research centers on the US military's involvement in humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. However, this study adopts a different tack; expanding on Welsh's initial research. It delves deeper into the tactics used by the various US administrations to shape the subsequent move toward active engagement in yet another war. It also examines the intricate diplomatic and geopolitical elements that shaped US policy decisions.

Walter S. Poole examines the tactics used by American authorities in Somalia in an article titled "The Effort to Save Somalia" (2005). He analyses how the situation in Somalia changed in the early 1990s, forcing the shift from humanitarian aid to a peacekeeping mission. Even though it resulted in a brief period of calm in the area and effective humanitarian efforts, events like the death of Pakistani troops returned the conflict back to its original state (33). But this study goes deeper into how the aftermath of horrific events like the Black Hawk Down and the Baidoa Ambush affected the decision to withdraw.

Pointing to the nature of this research work, this study is conducted through a qualitative method to provide a full understanding to the US foreign policy in Somalia 1992-1994, more specifically, in the light of both the G.H Bush and Clinton administrations. In

addition, the study implements three methods, the historical, the content analysis, and the comparative methods in order to cover the aim properly.

The first method, the historical method, pointed to serve as a historical framework that has to do with the US international interventions, more specifically from the 1992 to the 1994. The goal is to offer essential context for understanding the history of the USFP. The second method, the content analysis method, is to organize and educe the meaning from the data collected in which it attempts to analysis various sources of data, primary sources or secondary sources, Also it is necessary to analyze The USG documents along with a collection of books, articles, journals that are linked with the study above to deeply comprehend and uncover details about the research. The third method is the comparative method, this method used to point both G.H Bush and Clinton administrations as the main case studies by highlighting their similarities and differences in order to help support conducting the research.

The research framework contains five major parts: A general introduction, three main chapters, and a general conclusion.

With the title “The United States and The New World Order”, the first chapter provides a thorough analysis of US foreign policy and the New World Order, covering both its military and humanistic facets in various parts of the globe. This section of the dissertation concentrates on how the United States has intervened internationally in the affairs of other nations and how it has maintained international peace by helping to end internal civil wars in these nations.

The impact of President G.H Bush on US foreign policy toward Somalia is the subject of the second chapter, entitled “The G.H Bush Administration's Somalia Strategy (1990–1992).” This chapter investigates and analyses the causes of the Bush administration's intervention in Somalia. It focuses on President G. H Bush's endeavor to "Restore Hope" in

Somalia. Also, it looks at how the Bush administration started this international intervention effort in response to the humanitarian problems in Somalia. It also examines all of the acts and policies that he has put into place while holding office.

The US foreign intervention in Somalia during the Clinton administration is examined and discussed in the third chapter intitled “Clinton’s Administration Strategy in Somalia 1993-1994.” In order to determine whether the Clinton administration's ideology changed as a result of administrative changes or remained the same as that of the Bush administration, it is crucial to highlight all the events and circumstances that shaped the direction of this administration in this chapter. Additionally, it looks at every act and policy that US President Bill Clinton (1993–1994) adopted during his administration.

Chapter One

The United States and the New World Order

Introduction

This chapter offers a succinct summary of US foreign policy interventions around the globe in the 1990s, with particular attention to the following areas: The US' series of interventions in the 1990s, including the Gulf War (1991), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995), Somalia (1992–1994), Haiti (1994), and Kosovo (1999), which marked the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the New World Order.

World peace has been a major concern and ubiquitous in international politics, particularly in the United States politics since the 1990s. In particular, the end of the Cold War led to the rise of conflicts in several parts of the world. The 1990s witnessed a significant shift in the approach to humanitarian interventions, marked by a growing emphasis on the use of military force for humanitarian purposes. This shift was influenced by the emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention, which gained attraction in American public opinion and decision-making circles (Western 324-345).

The United States' has adopted the concept of the states' responsibility to protect civilians and innocent people from humanitarian crises and to promote a political resolution and diplomatic solutions to the crises and the problems that many governments face, such as Somalia (1992), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995), Rwanda (1994), and many others... The interventions in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor were landmark cases of international intervention during this period (Seybolt 46).

Additionally, many governments have been unable to solve their problems. The United States believed that those conditions needed international actors to take action. The US is one of the actors that intervene in these governments' internal issues. According to the

United States' beliefs -promoting the use of foreign humanitarian aid and military aid, as a foreign policy tool, is to further democratic and humanitarian outcomes for the benefit of all people. As a result, President G. H Bush and others saw the American military could be “a force of good in the world”. In simple words, after the Cold War, the United States adopted many strategies and plans for the explicit purpose of protecting, defending, and supporting activities such as peace talks.

With the end of the Cold War, many believed that it was time for the international community to turn its attention and resources towards building “a New World Order” in which crises like the one developing in Somalia, and Bosnia... etc. could be confronted and widespread human suffering greatly curtailed.

1.1.The End of the Cold War and the New World Order

1.1.1 The End of the Cold War

After World War II, there were major changes in the world policy. In this sense, beginning with the decline of the great powers, Britain and France, to the new wave called the Cold War. After the War, the world power was left in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States. The US and the USSR gradually built up their own, dividing the world into two opposing blocs.

The Cold War was a major traumatic experience to the world, the emergence on the world stage of two ideologically opposed blocs, the liberal west and the communist bloc, right after the WWII. According to Khanna, the war was used for an acute tension that developed between the United States of America and the Soviet Union and that it started right after the end of WWII in August, 1945 (264-265). Both of which had developed strategies to achieve world dominance. These two emerging powers, the US and Russia, showed a strong animosity to each other ideologically.

The conflict was a product of the growth of Soviet power. In other words, the expansion of the Soviet Union in the world caused concerns in the United States, and this later began working on how to limit the spread of communism in the world through willing to engage internationally and to act to make the world safe for capitalism. In the diplomatic war, America kept on propagating that USSR was an expansionist State, an imperialist power which had not only installed Communist regimes by force in the East European countries but even crushed Hungarian and Czechoslovak communist leaders who desire to act independently of Soviet control and free from Russian domination. On the other hand, Soviet leadership described the Americans as colonialists, imperialists and capitalist exploiters (Khanna 264 – 265; Kegley and Blanto 100).

By the time it becomes a real phenomenon that affected the peace of the world. According to Theodoros, the Cold War became geopolitical, ideological, and economic struggle between two world superpowers, the USA and the USSR, which started in 1947 at the end of the Second World War and lasted until the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991.

The end of the Cold War was a development which took a number of years; the process of ending it was gradual. The end of the conflict followed the fall of the Soviet Union and the destruction of the Berlin wall, in which there was a huge peaceful negotiation that took place through the world. However, with the increased peace in international relations the world saw an enormous increase in civil conflicts in Africa and the Balkans (Phipps 4).

1.1.2 The New World Order

The phrase New World Order has been widely used on the political scene since the end of the Cold War. The term has a relation with the aspects of the Cold War scenario. On September 11, 1990, President George Bush stated that: “Out of these troubled times,

our...objective—a new world order—can emerge... Today, that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we have known” (Kevin 11). The end of the Cold War marked a significant shift in global geopolitics, leading to the emergence of what may termed the ‘New World Order’. The phrase became popular because of President G. H Bush in the early 1990s. The term was characterized by stability, peace, and international interventions... to achieve balance in the world and to ensure and preserve peace of the humankind. President G. H Bush suggests that a "New World Order" has emerged. Principles of democracy, shared responsibility and mutual cooperation are the hallmarks of that new order (Bush 17).

On 11 September 1990, President G. H Bush outlined to Congress a vision for the future, calling it the New World Order. He described it as an era "freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world ... can prosper and live in harmony" (Bush 18). He went on saying that this is "a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak" (Miller). Clearly, the President sought the establishment of a stable democratic world,

According to the United States, the nations of the world cannot allow a catastrophe human crisis, and wars to happen. Also, the US obliged the entire international community to accept a shared responsibility for worldwide peace and stability. This led to the foundation of many international organizations that they have the intentions and power to help fragile countries. As the preeminent global power, the United States sought to promote its vision of the New World Order, advocating for principles such as free trade, democratic governance, and the rule of law. American leadership was evident in initiatives like the expansion of

NATO, support for international organizations such as the United Nations, International interventions, and the promotion of market-oriented economic policies worldwide.

The world has changed since the 1990s, and with the change has come new challenges and new policies. The New World Order's policy worked on one of the main principles, which is maintaining security and restoring hope, since wars motivated by ethnic groups are more common and more vicious than they used to be. These wars challenged the moral and ethical principles of world security and human principles, In particular the UN and peacekeepers' principles (Kevin 8). The efforts of the new policy were made to reform such situations.

However, the concept of the New World Order was not without controversy. Critics argued that it represented a form of American hegemony, where US interests and values were imposed on other nations. Moreover, challenges such as ethnic conflicts, terrorism, and economic disparities persisted, highlighting the limitations of the New World Order's ability to address all global issues effectively.

1.2 The United States' Series of Interventions in the 1990s

There has been a heightened interest worldwide in the law of armed conflict, also known as international humanitarian law from the United States side. In 1990, the United States became one of the world's leading providers of international humanitarian assistance. The US foreign policy about "protecting human rights", "creating a secure environment" and "the humanitarian obligation of a superpower" focused on producing measurable results and on-going opportunities such as saving lives from the human crises that many states faced. American policy in any international affairs hinged upon the concept of a low-risk operation. In other words, America emerged as a world power that believed in working on bringing peace and installing justice without violating human rights or controlling the population.

1.2.1 The United States Military Intervention in Iraq -1990s

Figure 01: A Map Represents the Location of Iraq



Source: Khadduri, Majid , Chambehrs, Richard L. etal . "Iraq." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 24 May. 2024.

Iraq is among the largest countries in the Middle East; it is located in Western Asia and surrounded by Turkey Iran and the Gulf countries. It is a country that was involved in three wars between 1980 and 2003: the Iraq-Iran war in 1980- 1988, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990-1991, and finally the American occupation of 2003 (Iraq profile- timeline). All of these wars have different characteristics, reasons, and results that affect the country's government position.

This section discusses the US intervention in Iraq in 1991by giving an overview of the this event, with shedding light on the history of the Gulf War as a significant event from the beginning of Saddam's rule to the long period leading up to when the Gulf War took place, as well as the various conditions and circumstances that shaped this conflict. The Gulf War was

the first major; military initiative of the United States in the post-Cold War world (Garofano and Ronald 3-5).

1.2.1.1 The Gulf War: A Brief Overview (1990-1991)

The 1990s was a tumultuous year for Iraq; it experienced significant upheaval and transformation primarily due to the subsequent events. It was a pivotal period in Iraq's history highlighted by the Gulf War. The Gulf crisis was viewed as the first true challenge to the American New World Order; it was a turning point in US history. The Gulf War, also known as Operation Desert Storm, was a military conflict that took place in 1990-1991 between Iraq and a coalition force led primarily by the United States (Persian Gulf War).


The US found itself in an unexpected military confrontation that would require it to employ and use its forces. The roots of the war back to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. For Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait presented the country with one of its biggest political challenges since the establishment of the kingdom. A day after the invasion, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution, condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and demanding its immediate withdrawal (Persian Gulf War).

1.2.1.2 The US Response to the Invasion of Kuwait

The Gulf War consisted of two phases led by the United States and its allies against Iraq. The first was named Operation Desert Shield, launched to the building of troops and defense of Saudi Arabia. The second Operation Desert Storm was the combat phase, in which the application of the military intervention using military powers and weapons happened.

1.2.1.2.1 Operation Desert Shield

Figure 02: Map of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm Area of Operations.



Source: Jeffrey J. Clarke. "War in the Persian Gulf: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm August 1990 – March 1991." Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2010.

This invasion challenged the US to assert its world leadership by condemning the invasion. These actions alarmed Arab powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt called on the United States and other western nations to intervene. The USG has justified its decade-long intervention in Iraq as a "war on terror". President Bush made it clear that the US would be aggressive and serious in opposing the Iraq's invasion. He responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and stated "this will not stand this aggression against Kuwait" (George H Bush).

The United States, along with other countries, began building a coalition to respond to Iraq's invasion. On 7 August, the president backed up his words with a military response named Operation Desert Shield, and organized a coalition of 35 nations to defend Saudi Arabia and ultimately liberate Kuwait (Operation Desert Shield).

The United States responded by taking action with the primary goal of forcing Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait. President Bush went on to identify the objectives that the US would pursue:

- Withdraw and remove all Iraqi forces from Kuwait immediately;
- Restore Kuwait's stability;
- Maintain and ensure security and stability in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf;
- Protect American citizens abroad.

In response to the Iraq's aggression, August 1990- January 1991, the United States and its allies sent soldiers and troops to the Gulf region, particularly Saudi Arabia, to prepare for the military action against Iraq. It aimed at prevent further Iraqi invasion while also defending Saudi Arabia.

The United States led efforts to organize an international coalition, which working through the United Nations Security Council, passed Resolution 660 demanding Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal, Resolution 661 imposing economic sanctions, and Resolution 663 declaring the annexation of Kuwait null and void (The Gulf War 1991).

1.2.1.2.2 Operation Desert Storm

On January 1991 the United Nations set deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, it passed a series of demanding an immediate withdrawal. However, the diplomatic efforts failed and Saddam Hussein refused to take back his paths form Kuwait. The Operation Desert Shield transitioned to Operation Desert Storm on 17 January 1991 with the start of the air war (Operation Desert Shield).

The United States and its coalition partners launched Operation Desert Storm, a massive bombing against Iraqi targets in Kuwait and Iraq. The turning point came with the initiation of that operation, and the coalition forces fought to liberate Kuwait. A few days after starting the ground offensive by the US forces, Iraq accepted the terms of the ceasefire


proposed by the coalition, resulting in the end of the Gulf War effectively in February 1991. In all, an estimated the coalition forces lost 392 dead, including 47 British soldiers. Iraqi battle deaths were estimated at between 20,000 and 35,000, while over 3,000 civilians were killed in coalition air strikes (What was the Gulf War?).

1.2.2 The United States' Humanitarian/ Military Intervention in Bosnia (1992-1995)

The world witnessed horrifying acts of violence that intentionally aimed to destroy a specific group of victims. The Bosnian case is the most recognized case of genocide that took place after World War Two. Bosnia is located in south-eastern Europe, on the Balkan Peninsula. This country was among many countries that faced the darkest chapters in their history characterized by brutal conflicts. The conflict in Bosnia known as the Bosnian War, in which it traced back to the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The 1992-1995, where the Bosnian war took place, stands as a tragic reminder of the human cost of ethnic conflicts in Bosnia (John).

1.2.2.1 The Bosnian Conflict (1992-1995)

Figure 03: Map representing Ethnic Structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, According to The Population Census of 1991.



Source: “Bosnia and herzegovina--ethnic population by opština, 1991 census.”
Loc.gov, Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency,1997.

In 1992 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence from the former state of Yugoslavia. The conflict began because of this movement. There was a sense of domination between the ethnic groups in Bosnia, each ethnicity wanted to dominate and expand by using forces.

The events started in February 1992, when the Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats were in favour of independence, while the Bosnian Serbs were against the vote. Since this country had many ethnicities under its rule, these ethnicities used their armed forces against each other rising what is known as a Civil War. These ethnic groups were killed, rapped, and destroyed in Bosnia. The estimated death toll was horrible compared to the population. Innocent lives from these three ethnic groups perished and killed in a tragic way. The population was composed of about 40 % of Muslims, 33% Serbs and 12 % Croats. These three ethnic groups used their armed forces against each other and killed, raped and destroyed the villages and cities. Alongside them, there were some armed forces from Croatia and Serbia, UN troops, and NATO soldiers. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the end result of such conflict was the death of 200000 people among whom 12000 were children (qtd. in “Statement by H. E. Dr. Haris...”).

However, the Serbian was the only ethnic group that offered resistance to the independence of Bosnia. Soon after the independence, the national policy in Bosnia change, and the rise of the massacre against the Bosnian Muslims and Croats kept increasing. The Serb forces systematically and specifically raped women to humiliate and destroy the non-Serb societies. Many women testified that they were raped in front of their male family members to increase humiliation (Crider 21). Rapes were one of the Serb’s mechanisms to carry out their plan. Serbians had no clue about human rights or respecting other boundaries, all they wanted the expansion and domination. They unified with other Serbians in the

country to double their number. By doing so, they become the largest population in the Bosnian' cities.

In July 1995 the UN safe area, Srebrenica, became the most recognizable atrocity in Europe since the 1940s. At that time, the Serb forces attacked as the defence forces of the city were removed. They separated women and children from men and in a period of a few days, the Serb forces killed around 8000 people. The massacre of Srebrenica was carried out under the authority of the two Bosnian Serb Generals, Radislav Krstic, and Ratko Mladic, and the Serb political leader Radovan Karadzic (Gibbs 2).

In response, The United States and its allies intervened using military force in August 1995. The United States and other NATO nations aided the Muslim-Croat forces by undertaking two weeks of air strikes against the Serbs. After the military intervention, the United States managed to get the three conflicting sides to sign the Dayton Accords of December 1995 which ended the war (Gibbs 7). The support of the US gave the Muslim forces the chance to conquer Serb forces. As a result, the Bosnian conflict came to an end with the help of the USA and other NATO nations. The long conflicts officially ended in 1995 when the United States took the leadership role and got the three leaders to sign the Dayton Accords agreement (Dayton Agreement, 24 November 1995).

The Dayton Peace Accords took 21 days of negotiations at an American Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio, between the three Bosnian leaders to be approved. The agreement was officially signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. It contained a peace agreement and 11 annexes. The most important outcome of this agreement was that the state of Bosnia would exist as a single nation but divided. 51% of the territory went to the Muslim-Croat Federation with Sarajevo under its control, and 49% to the "Bosnian Serb Republic" (Erlanger).

Figure 4: A Map Represents Dayton Agreement, 24 November 1995: Bosnia and Herzegovina.



Source: "Dayton Agreement, 24 November 1995 : Bosnia and Herzegovina." *The Library of Congress*, 1995.

1.2.3 The United States' Humanitarian/ Military Intervention in Somalia (1992-1994)

The early 1990s marked a period of suffering and Wars in the African country Somalia. At that time, Somali land was moved by the scale of the misery and starvation that was escalating daily. It had been torn by years of civil war and humanitarian crises. The horrific circumstances made the international community turn its attention towards creating "a New World Order" policy, in which crises that are donor the first UN-led peacekeeping mission, it was the first humanitarian based intervention that advocated using direct force under the collective security agreement of the United Nations Charter. The goal was to restore peace to Somalia, by conducting a long-term program of delivering humanitarian aid to famine victims, to achieve these missions and goals, the USG built a plan known as Operation Restore Hope under the supervision of US President G. H Bush.

This later went from the willingness to change the situation in Somalia and restore hope in the country to becoming acceptable and pleasant by Somalia and its armed forces. Furthermore, US forces worked alongside humanitarian organizations to deliver food,

medicine, and other essential supplies to Somalia in need, particularly in areas affected by famine and conflict like Mogadishu.

Unlike President G. H Bush's policy, the mission took a turn in October 1993 during President Bill Clinton's presidency. The US policy was shaped by efforts to prevent the humanitarian crises and civil war in Somalia, in particular; Mogadishu city. However, his policy faced violence and political challenges in Somalia. The resistance of Somali civilians and the armed forces caused an increase in violence.

The Clinton's administration gradually shifted towards a strategy of withdrawal from Somalia. The decision was influenced by domestic opposition to the intervention, and the realization that the mission became difficult to achieve. In addition to the domestic criticism of the intervention concerning what happened in Mogadishu during the military intervention.

1.2.4 Humanitarian/ Military Intervention in Haiti (1994)

The Republic country of Haiti occupies the western one-third of the island of Hispaniola. It is located between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean. Haiti's closest neighbours include Jamaica to the west and Cuba to the northwest. Most Haitians are of African Origin. Furthermore, Haiti has a beneficial relationship with the US, since it is among the poorest countries in the World; it relies on foreign aid and humanitarian assistance from the United States of America and other countries like Canada. Throughout the 20th century, the US engaged in various forms of intervention in Haiti (US Relations with Haiti).

For decades, Haiti faced significant challenges, in natural disasters, since much of the country is mountainous, violence political repression, and human rights enveloped in Somalia and many other weak countries could be confronted. It started first with the UNSC and then later inside the White House. Particularly the 1994 period, was a massive era for the country with a repressive regime, prompting international intervention to restore democracy and stability to the country, economic crises, and humanitarian emergencies. "There's a whole sea

of Haitians looking into their [the American soldiers] eyes, just glad that they're here," a source told Time in 1994 (Bunyan). This passage describes the moment that the American Soldiers enter Haiti. As the US troops entered Haiti, Haitians were standing there looking at them with the hope for change from what the country faced in the years before because of the military Junta.

In 1991, there was an overthrow of the President of Haiti Jean-Bertrand. The military junta forcibly removed him from power. As a result of this, there was the suspension of civil liberties and saliency of opposition voices, putting the power in the hands of the military. Adding to this, the military junta cracked down the human rights by imposing massacres and violence against civilians and many other horrible actions against women, children, and people of different ages and generations. The military junta led what US President Bill Clinton called a reign of terror, raping civilians and killing around 5,000 Aristide supporters over the next three years (Bunyan).

The intervention, known as "Operation Uphold Democracy," (September 19th, 1994) was billed as a success by Clinton administration officials and made headlines in 1994. This operation ended the chapter of three years of repression. Clinton in 1994 decided that the time had come. During the President's Radio Address on Sept. 17, 1994, he spoke of America's interest in helping to "restore democratic government in Haiti" (Bunyan).

The operation was a multinational military intervention to restore the president of Haiti, Haiti's first democratically elected president. The operation included a strategy with several key elements, the limited use of force the diplomatic pressure that was made to negotiate with the military junta to step down peacefully, and civil affairs including humanitarian assistance. This later, the United States made huge efforts to provide humanitarian aid and support civil organizations to help rebuild their country. The United

States with the support of other countries succeeded in returning the stability to the country.

According to Bunyan:

[After the intervention], Haiti became a country dependent on international financial organizations for its funding, its budget ... it was and still is at the mercy of what the international community is willing to give.

1.2.5 US Military Intervention in Kosovo 1999

Kosovo provides an interesting case study on the impact of organized crime on a fragile region. In addition to the fact of the intervention of international organizations and the United States and their efforts to address the threat posed by criminal activities. It is a classic example of how unstable political conditions can create a violent environment.

1.2.5.1 Kosovo: A brief Overview

The republic of Kosovo located in the centre of the Balkan Peninsula. It is situated at the crossroads of Europe and the Mediterranean. Particularly, it lies in Southern Serbia. Throughout the history, Kosovo has been through several occupations, wars, and immigrations which all indicated the radical changes that happened to the country. Kosovo is one of the newest countries in Europe, having declared its independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008 (Kosovo guidebook).

According to the history, the demographics of Kosovo have been heavily influenced by migrations, conflicts, and political changes. The country has a population with a mix of ethnic groups, primarily Albanians, Serbs, Bosnians, and others. Furthermore, Kosovo is not only known for being a multi ethnic country but also for its religious tolerance and coexistence (Lida).

The US government estimates the total population at 2.0 million (Guinea-Bissau 2022 International Religious Freedom Report 2). According to the 2011 census (the most recent),

95.6 percent of the population is Muslim, 2.2 percent Roman Catholic, and 1.4 percent Serbian Orthodox, with Protestants, Jews, and persons not answering or responding “other” or “none” together constituting less than 1 percent (Kosovo United Department of States).

However, the evolution of the ethnic balance in Kosovo created an unstable environment (Malcolm). The majority ethnic Albanian population, as well as the Bosniak, Gorani, and Turkish communities, and some of the Roma/Ashkalia/Egyptian communities are adherents of Islam. The ethnic Serb population is largely Serb Orthodox. Approximately 3% of ethnic Albanians are Roman Catholic (Kosovo United Department of States). Regardless of the recent population proportions, Kosovo is a territory to which both Serbs and Albanians have significant and longstanding claims. Between 1918 and 1999 Kosovo remained part of three multinational Yugoslavias, for most of the time as a non-self-governing province subordinate to the Serbian officialdom in Belgrade (Bebler 70-151).

1999 marked a pivotal moment in the history of Kosovo. That year witnessed a confluence of events that left an indelible mark on the region's trajectory and the lives of its people. The need to halt the crimes against humanity, massive explosions, and war crimes, was widely recognized because human rights violations in Kosovo were horrendous; something had to be done. In other words, the human rights abuses Serbs were committing against ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo had to be done.

1.2.5.2 The Battle in Kosovo

The battle of Kosovo in 1999 was a part of the wider Kosovo War. In this conflict, there were several parties involved, the Yugoslav government forces, the Kosovo Liberation Army, and the NATO forces. The parties involved fought using various tactics and strategies reflecting the nature of the conflict, such as guerrilla tactics, and air power...etc. Furthermore, the motivation behind the conflict in Kosovo was complex and rooted in many factors.

The rise of Serbian nationalism under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic in the late 1980s and early 1990s was one of the motivate factors that caused the conflict over Kosovo. Milosevic prompted Serbian sovereignty and control over Kosovo, leading to significant repression and discrimination against the ethnic Albanian population. During 1998, open conflict between Serbian military and police forces and Kosovar Albanian forces resulted in the deaths of over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and forced 400,000 people from their homes (Conflict background). A year after, in 1999, after pro-independence insurgents began killing Serbian police and politicians, he retaliated with ruthless attacks on the province (Slobodan Milošević summary).

In response to growing Serbian domination and repression, Kosovo's Albanian minority demanded more autonomy and independence. The dialogue between most Serbs and Albanians remains difficult, the confrontation between the Albanian leadership in the province and the Serbian regime raised the human crises in the country. The nonviolent struggle led by Ibrahim Rugova in the early 1990s gave way to armed resistance by the Kosovo Liberation Army KLA, which began attacking Serbian authorities in the mid-1990s (Kosovo conflict).

The conflict escalated significantly in the late 1990s, with both sides accused of cruel acts. Serbian forces, under Milosevic, were reported to be involved in ethnic cleansing and mass atrocities against Albanian civilians to suppress the KLA and assert control.

1.2.5.3 The US Role in Kosovo

During the first six months of this civil war in Kosovo in 1998, various organizations such as the NATO, the EC, and the UN as well as European countries on their own were searching for a peaceful diplomatic solution. Additionally, a year after the civil war, the United States played a significant role in the Kosovo War 1999, both diplomatically

and military efforts to resolve the conflict and address its humanitarian consequences. As President Clinton reported in the white house on Jun 10, 1999:

We must be mindful that even though we now have a chance to replace violence with peace, ethnic and religious hatred with a democratic future, a bloody century in Europe with a Europe undivided, democratic and at peace, there is still quite a lot to be done. . . In the past four months we have seen some of the worst in humanity in our lifetime, but we've also seen the bravery of our troops, the resolve of our democracy, the decency of our people and the courage and determination of the people of Kosovo. We now have a moment of hope, thanks to all those qualities. And we have to finish the job and build the peace (Winning the War and the Peace in Kosovo).

The US was actively engaged in diplomatic efforts before resorting to military action. The objectives in Kosovo are to stop killing and achieve peace that prevents further repression and provides democratic self-government for the Kosovo people. The amount of repression in Kosovo was creating a human crisis; many Kosovars have been displaced from their homes and villages. And homes have been looted.

The instability in the country led to the US and the UN intervene, the preference has been to achieve the objectives through peaceful and diplomatically means. As President Clinton reported in the White House office in March 19, 1999:

Ladies and gentlemen, as all of you know, we have been involved in an intensive effort to end the conflict in Kosovo for many weeks now. With our NATO allies and with Russia, we proposed a peace agreement to stop the killing and give the people of Kosovo the self-determination and government they need and to which they are entitled under the constitution of their

government ... We should remember the thousands of people facing cold and hunger in the hills of Kosovo last fall. Firmness ended that as well. We should remember what happened in the village of Rack back in January... innocent men, women and children taken from their homes to a gully, forced to kneel in the dirt, sprayed with gunfire... not because of anything they had done, but because of who they were (The President's News Conference).

The international community, particularly NATO and the United States, become increasingly concerned with the humanitarian crises and the instability in the region, in other words it had tried to contain the conflict in Kosovo. An intervention also requires significant local support. In Kosovo, ethnic Albanians viewed NATO as saviours; NATO intervened explicitly to protect Kosovars from Serbian violence. This created a permissive environment for the Kosovo Force (Mary "Tree Hugging Work" 50).

In this context and backed by a NATO ultimatum, the US and other members of the contact group sought a final diplomatic solution in Rambouillet, France. The Rambouillet Agreement would have allowed Kosovo to govern its internal affairs, while Yugoslavia maintained "competence" over the territorial integrity of Kosovo, monetary policy, defense, foreign policy, customs, federal taxation, and federal elections (Rambouille Agreement).

This Rambouillet proposal stands in a line of attempts by the international community to end conflict in former Yugoslavia through a combination of ceasefire and institutional reform. As a participant during the negotiations points out that "in terms of substance, the Rambouillet settlement represents a further step in the development of innovative mechanisms to address, if not resolve, self-determination conflict." At the same time, he notes that "in terms of process, the Rambouillet conference on Kosovo represented a significant departure in international mediation. The presence of the parties at the talks had been ensured

through the threat of force by NATO” (Marc 71). This later was the last effort before the war which effectively precluded on Kosovo.

After failed diplomatic efforts and the Rambouillet Agreement, which Milosevic refused to sign, NATO launched a bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in March 1999 to force Serbian forces to withdrawal from Kosovo. The first bombs fell on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the night of March 24, 1999. NATO aircraft flew over 10,000 strike sorties and dropped some 23,000 bombs. After 78 days of bombing, NATO and Serbia signed the Military Technical Agreement on June 9. The agreement ordered the cessation of hostilities by Yugoslav and Serb forces, laid out the phased withdrawal of those forces from Kosovo, and established NATO’s peacekeeping force, Kosovo Force (Mary “A Tantalizing Success”).

The bombing campaign lasted until June 1999, leading to withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the establishment of a United Nations administration in the region. Kosovo remained a United Nations governed entity until its declaration of independence in 2008, which has been recognized by many countries.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the United States’ interventions worldwide during the 1990s, focusing on the evolution of foreign policy and the shift towards emphasizing humanitarian and military interventions, following the end of the Cold War and during the emergence of the New World Order policy.

Moreover, this part of the study highlights the contextual framework for international intervention, and underscores the United States’ active role in attempting to promote global stability and addressing humanitarian crises in the post-Cold War era, reflecting a border effort by the international community to build a new world order focused on confronting crises and reducing human suffering. The United States policy saw the American military

force for good in the world, in promoting democratic and humanitarian outcomes through international interventions with the help of international organizations and other peacekeepers.

Understanding the major United States' intervention in the countries discussed above is important for analyzing the New World Order policy that emerged after the Cold War. It provides valuable insights into the complexities and challenges that both parties, the international community and the countries that suffered from the Wars and human crises, face in their efforts to control the harmful situations.

Chapter Two

The G. H Bush Administration Strategy in Somalia 1992-1993

Introduction

In the middle of deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Somalia, famine and escalating violence, the United States rooted in the principles of democracy, protecting human rights and global engagement faced an urgent call to address the situation in the region seeking an immediate resolution to reduce tensions.

This main objective of this chapter is to assess the G. H Bush administration strategy in Somalia starting from the year of 1992, by giving an in depth-overview of G. H Bush foreign policy towards the situation in Somalia. In addition to offering a detailed examination of the administration's involvement. This chapter also incorporates a critical analysis to measure the extent of President G. H Bush failure to secure a lasting peace solution in the area and to identify any factors and challenges that contributed to the deviation from the initially stated goals and objectives.

Additionally, this chapter aims to explore the multidimensional approach undertaken by the former president encompassing diplomatic engagement, and humanitarian relief efforts, shedding light on the primary intentions behind the mission. It explores whether the intervention was driven by genuine commitment to end the suffering of the Somali people, or if it was influenced by broader US interests. Moreover, this chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the planning, decision making-process, objectives, and outcomes that shaped the G. H Bush administration's involvement in Somalia during this period of crisis.

2.1 Somalia: Contextual Background

2.1.1 The Outbreak of Civil War

In January 1989 President George Hilbert Walker Bush took office as the 41st president of the United States, succeeding former president Ronald Reagan in a critical political period: the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a New World Order where the US arose as a dominant power in the international stage. President Bush brought with him a wealth of experience in foreign affairs, serving previously as the vice president; his early years of office were soon marked by multiple international crises such as the Panama Invasion, The Gulf War, and the case of Somalia (George H. Bush White House Archive).

Figure 05: Map of Somalia



Source: Lewis, Ioan M. and Janzen, Jörg H.A.. " Hisotry of Somalia." Encyclopedia Britannica, 25 May. 2024.

As the map above presented, Somalia is situated in the centre of Africa, it occupies a strategic position along the coastline of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Somalia occupies the tip of the “Horn of Africa”, a region which includes Ethiopia and Djibouti. Africa's easternmost country, it is bordered by Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti to the west. Somali has a land area of 637,540 km²; also it has the longest coastline in Africa of over 3,025km which ranges from the Gulf of Aden in the north to the Indian Ocean in the east and

south. This region has an estimated population of 7.7 million comprising 6 major Somali clans and other groups (Country Environmental Profile for Somalia).

This location gives it proximity to major shipping lines, including those connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean and Suez Canal with the Arabian Sea. This strategically important region, along with the diverse natural resources in deposit minerals such as; uranium, iron ore, gypsum, salt, and bauxite, made Somalia a central focus of US attention. During the Cold War, the United States viewed Somalia as strategically important; not only due to its proximity to oil transit routes but also as a means to counterbalance the USSR's influence in neighbouring Ethiopia. This strategic influence stemmed from geopolitical considerations and the need to maintain influence in the region (Lewis and Janzen).

The United States saw the opportunity to secure a strategic partnership with president of Somalia at the time Mouhammed Siad Barre, as the Soviet turned their back on him showing support to Ethiopia during the Ogaden war. Siad Barre regime was marked by corruption, abuse of human rights and repression. In the early 90s Somalia fall into a spiral of chaos, humanitarian crises and civil war, following the collapse of president Siad Barre dictatorship (Western “ Sources of Humanitarian Intervention” 119).

In January 1991 as a result of a coup d'état against the central authority led by three former military officers, mentioning Mouhamed Farah Aideed, Ali Mahdi Muhammed and General Mohamed Siad Hersi Morgan, whom then became warlords, along with their factions and allies engaged in intense fighting over power to control the capital Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia, leading the country into a devastating civil war that further deteriorated the already dire humanitarian conditions, forcing hundreds of thousands Somalis to flee their homes (Western “ Sources of Humanitarian Intervention” 119).

According to the Department of Public information (1996), 65 per cent of the population, approximately 4.5 million Somalis identified as needing aid, among them 1.5 million in urgent need. In the vacuum left by the overthrow of Siad Barre, Somalia became a “failed state” with an inexistent economy, no statutory law, and factional fighting with heavily armed elements all over the territory (UNOSOM I Somalia).

2.1.2 UN Failed Efforts: UNOSOM I

The United Nations was already engaged in humanitarian activities in the country, although forced to withdraw from Somalia on several occasions, in April 1992 the United Nations launched an urgent peacekeeping and humanitarian mission under the name “United Nations operation in Somalia”. It aimed mainly to contain the humanitarian crisis and achieve a ceasefire between the armed militias. It is announced by UN Security Council via resolution 751, UNOSOM I authorized the deployment of an international peacekeeping force to assist in humanitarian efforts and promote stability in Somalia (UNOSOM I Somalia).

More than 20 countries participated in the mission including: Canada, Australia, Pakistan, Italy and other neighbouring countries. The mission focused on distributing food, medicine, and other essential supplies. The UN operation in Somalia boasted a total of 4912 personnel all ranks, including 200 international civilian staff, 50 military observers, 719 logistic staff as reported by United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I Somalia).

By the end of 1992 the situation in Somalia continued to worsen, truck convoys were blocked by armed hijackers, and the food aid failed to reach the starving Somalis, according to Vanderpool 350,000 Somalis died due to extent starvation, while an additional 80.000 individuals sought refuge in neighbouring countries. None of the leaders of the three key factions succeeded in achieving control. Therefore, Somalia remained in a state of persistent instability, and UNOSOM 1 ultimately failed to achieve its primary objective of restoring peace and stability to Somalia (Alexander 7-9).

UNOSOM I was considered as a failed mission, President G. H Bush held several meetings with key figures of his administration including Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney, Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, and other key figures of his administration, to discuss the situation in Somalia and put in the table all possible options for US involvement. The staff members highlighted the importance of exercising caution in deploying troops in Somalia due to the associated risks and the need to establish a clear strategy for coordination with UN forces (Beech 9).

2.2 G. H Bush Foreign Policy and Strategic Approach to Somalia

2.2.1 The New Interventionist

It was pointed out that the foreign policy of the United States has always involved both military and diplomatic interventions in international affairs, revolving around its fundamental principles: promoting freedom and democracy (Brigid 5-6). President G. H Bush is generally seen as a pragmatic and cautious leader in terms of international interventions, in comparison to his predecessor Reagan Raynold who perused a strategy of confronting perceived threats to the nation's interest; President Reagan particularly wanted to redefine national policy toward the Soviet Union (Canon, et al.).

President Reagan ordered the military intervention in Lebanon, Libya, and Grenada. His approach to global engagement reflects willingness to use military force to achieve strategic objectives. Furthermore, he defended both the US military presence in Lebanon and the invasion of Grenada on the grounds that the Soviet Union had been allegedly involved: "The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though miles apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists" (Aruri 59).

President G. H Bush on the other hand was generally more cautious regarding international interventions and the use of military forces to deal with such crises, not to say

that G. H Bush was against involving the US in international interventions. In fact totally the opposite, Stedman referred to G. H Bush as “The New Interventionist” regarding his foreign policy towards international affairs, prior to Somalia. According to him the new interventionists seek to end civil wars and stop governments from abusing the rights of their peoples (3).

President G. H Bush authorized the intervention in Panama “Operation Just Cause (December 1989–January 1990)” succeeding in removing the dictator Manuel Noriega from power (Operation Just Cause 2024). The successful execution of the operation underscored his commitment to enforcing international law, protecting human rights, and maintaining stability in the Western Hemisphere. However, while he recognized the importance of protecting US interests, G. H Bush tended to prioritize diplomatic efforts and coalition-building over unilateral military action.

From the US trying to assert its dominance during the Cold War to actually finding itself as the world's only superpower with the responsibility to protect and intervene in global affairs, interventionism can be understood as a natural progression from the principles of internationalism. During this transition, President G. H Bush had to adopt a strategy of the US acting as the world police force, bearing the responsibility to preserve international stability and maintain order in a chaotic world (Stedman 4).

2.2.2 US Airlift 1992: Operation Provide Relief

In January 1992 during the UN Security Council, President G.H Bush expressed his intention to strengthen UN peacekeeping capabilities, by enhancing cooperation between the United States and the UN in combating terrorism and addressing internal conflicts in some countries. He underscored the importance of the United States engaging, backing, and aiding in overdue restructuring of the UN system to enhance its effectiveness, as well as actively participating in all aspects of the United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance;

The United States must renew its efforts to renew the recent effectiveness of the United Nations; we now have the opportunity to make the United States a key instrument of collective security. The United States should do its part to strengthen UN conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace-making capabilities. (Huntington 12-13)

The United States has been involved in Somalia since 1991, but there has not been a large-scale coordinated intervention. President G. H Bush ordered an airlift under the name "Operation Provide Relief," which took place from August to December 1992. Ten C-130 military aircraft, 500 troops, and 3500 UN guards were part of the mission, which included delivering aid to lessen reliance on truck convoys that were blocked at Somali ports (Mroczkowski 7).

Operation Provide Relief was supposed to deliver tens of thousands of tons of food; however, most of it was being looted upon landing. The airlift ultimately failed to alleviate the crisis and unintended fuelled clan violence in the targeted areas. In one instance, two militias fought over a town receiving airlifted aid, halting all aid distribution. The pressure on G. H Bush by the media and within his administration itself grew, forcing President Bush to consider taking serious actions in Somalia (Mroczkowski 11).

2.2.3 Pre-Intervention planning

In November 1992 the deputies committee convened and presented in front of President G. H Bush three potential courses of action ranging from limited humanitarian assistance missions to broader peacekeeping operations, each of its own set of risks with no specific recommendation. Beech argued that the first option entailed enhancing support for existing UN efforts with more US airlift, while the second proposal involved establishing a multinational coalition led by the United States, in which the US will provide logistical

support with no direct military actions by the US army, in the third option the US would spearhead a multinational coalition consisted mainly of US ground combat forces (9).

Glanville outlined what would be referred to as the Weinberger-Powell doctrine during George Bush presidency, according to the doctrine, the use of force should be reserved for situations where there is a clear and significant threat to national security or core national interests, another key idea of the doctrine is that overwhelming force should be employed to ensure victory (3-5).

President G. H Bush with representatives from the Department of State, Department of Defence, and Intelligence reviewed all possible options and decided to go for option three: A multinational operation led by the United States in which US forces played a primary role in providing humanitarian aid to the Somalis in need, with the condition that UN forces would replace the US troops as soon as the situation became under control. Recchia outlined three prevailing narratives prior to the US intervention in Somalia.

The first narrative, the mission was perceived as a purely humanitarian mission to help the people of Somalia with no traditional US interests. This claim has been proven wrong. Declassified National Security Council documents proved that the decision to intervene in Somalia was driven by pragmatic concerns instead of humanitarian ones. Senior American generals were worried that if the United Nations mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) failed due to attacks from armed militias, the US might have to send troops to rescue the UN forces and this could leave the US with an open-ended operation in Somalia with no clear exit strategy (Recchia 352-353).

The biggest concern of G. H Bush administration at the time was to fall into another Mission Creep like the scenario of Lebanon during Ronald Reagan presidency, where the mission expanded beyond its original scope with the deployment of more troops leading to the deaths of 241 American soldiers in Beirut Bombing 1983. Therefore, the administration

insisted on an immediate well-staged intervention plan to restore stability, followed by a transition to a strengthened UN mission, this was seen as a preferable alternative (Recchia 352-353).

Second, the decision to intervene was made by G. H Bush, now logically speaking this statement to some point is correct, since G. H Bush is the only one who has the authority to make such a decision. However, many narratives have claimed that the decision to intervene was pushed by Collin Powell rather than being G. H Bush' free will decision. According to Recchia, Powell stated that "prior to losing the elections to Clinton on 08 November 1992, neither President G. H Bush nor the National Security Advisor Scowcroft was interested to intervene in Somalia." The claim that the three potential courses of action were handed to G. H Bush with no recommendation is not correct, Powell drew the pros and cons of each option, indirectly insisting on option three that involves a large scale US intervention in Somalia (Recchia 352-353).

The decision to intervene by President G.H Bush was mainly advised by Secretary of State Collin Powell. Recchia continue to state that Powell said "we have a plan on how to do it, and the plan reflected my own view that if the UN is going to be able to do this, then we first had to send in something big enough to scare the militias. It was for this reason that I recommended to the president that we send in a large US force." This indicates that G. H Bush's decision to intervene was greatly influenced by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (352-353).

Third, the decision to intervene in Somalia was to draw attention away from Bosnia, this argument generally is not valid, since the intervention in Bosnia was perceived as potentially more significant to the US and more complex. President G. H Bush said that "Americans will not stay one day longer then it is necessary", reassuring that the intervention

in Somalia will not last more than a few weeks, such a short period of time will do nothing to distract attention from the case of Bosnia (Recchia 352-353).

According to Vanderpool, the US mission in Somalia was a "mission other than war." The administration's main goal in delivering food, medical supplies, and other necessities to alleviate the suffering of the Somali people was to provide immediate humanitarian assistance. Restoring the nation's security and stability was another important objective. The goal of the G. H Bush administration was to establish a safe atmosphere that would facilitate the efficient functioning of humanitarian organizations.

This included creating safe zones, enforcing ceasefires, and working with armed militias to find a peaceful solution. As G. H Bush noted in a letter to UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, the plan was to remove combat forces as soon as the initial objectives were met (Vanderpool).

Alexander Claim that the majority of the American population supported G. H Bush's decision to deploy US troops in Somalia. A poll conducted by the New York Times – CBS after President G. H Bush troop commitment found that 81% of respondents believed sending troops to ensure food delivery in Somalia was the right decision. Despite this support, there was also apprehension about a prolonged engagement in Somalia. Only 44% of Americans in the poll felt that the US should stay long enough to maintain peace in Somalia (11).

2.3 Operation Restore Hope

2.3.1 Establishment of the Unified Task Force and UN Authorization

The UNITAF was introduced on 3 December 1992, it was authorized by the United Nations Security Council 794 to intervene in Somalia, the UN welcomed the United States and other member nations to provide contribution and military support, chapter VII of the charter, stated "the use of all necessary means to do so" allowing action by air, sea and land. UNITAF predominately comprised troops for the United States approximately 25.000 out of a

total of 37,000, in addition to other 27 countries contributed to UNITAF including Canada, Australia, Egypt, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Morocco, Sweden and Italy (UNSC Res. 794. 4).

UNITAF laid down the groundwork both politically and militarily, to pave the way for the United Nations to initiate national reconciliation efforts and negotiate a political resolution to the conflicts between opposing factions. However, the Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros-Ghaly expressed doubt over the capacity of the UN to command and control such a large mission. Consequently, he supported the US proposal to lead the Unified Task Force (Brigade 5-6).

2.3.2 Launching of Operation Restore Hope: President Bush's Vision

President G. H. Bush who was hesitant at first had no choice but to intervene, hoping that the strategy formulated by the US could eventually restore order in war-torn Somalia. In the final NSC meeting prior to the announcement of the mission, President G. H. Bush explained his view for the conflict, Eberhart cited, "Bush said there could be 28,000-30,000 troops involved for an unknown period of time, although I expect that within 40 days troops can start coming out" (121).

On 4 December 1992, President G. H. Bush addressed the nation on live T.V announcing that US ground troops would head into Somalia under the banner of UN Security Council resolution 794, officially launching what was termed as "Operation Restore Hope", a US lead large-scale mission in Somalia as a part of UNITAF. During his speech he that was addressed to the Nation on the situation in Somalia, he emphasized the limited scope of the operation:

First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia...

Second, once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our troops... Our mission has a limited objective: To open the supply routes, to get

the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary... Our mission is humanitarian, but we will not tolerate armed gangs ripping off their own people, condemning them to death by starvation... (Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia).

This reveals that G. H Bush saw the mission as very limited in scope, lasting a couple of weeks at most.

2.3.3 Media Influence and Political Pressure: The CNN Effect

President G. H Bush executed his third International operation in his one term presidency. Having recently authorized the invasion to Kuwait and Panama, many criticized him for having no plan to leave Somalia, and putting his already elected successor Bill Clinton in a no-win situation that he is forced to find a solution for. Although President G. H Bush's decision to intervene in Somalia can be seen as morally more justifiable given the humanitarian conditions, and given the fact that Somalia was a former cold war ally, it is still reasonable to say that the intervention was more driven by traditional US interests rather than being driven by purely humanitarian reasons (Livingston 4).

James Woods recalls "it was his decision based in large measure on his growing feelings of concern as the humanitarian disaster continued to unfold relentlessly despite the half measures being undertaken by the international community". However, the timing of President G. H Bush's acknowledgment of Somalia as a "major human tragedy" needs to be analysed. The fact that President G. H Bush made this declaration nearly a year after the outbreak of civil war raises doubts about the extent to which genuine concern for the well-being of Somalis influenced President G. H Bush's decision to intervene in Somalia. The electoral defeat and the transition to a new administration under President Clinton had implications for US foreign policy priorities. Some argue that the Somalia intervention,

initiated during the final months of Bush's presidency, was influenced by broader political considerations (Livingston 6).

The desire to leave a positive legacy by addressing such international crisis before leaving office may have been factors in President G. H Bush's decision to commit US forces to Somalia (Glanville 5). Alternatively, media-driven diplomacy or what later was labelled as “the CNN effect” in the United States especially in the post-cold war era has shown its power to move governments, and it was highly present in the case of Somalia, the extensive emotional coverage of the situation has undoubtedly played a major role in influencing the US decision to launch Operation Restore Hope and moved it up to President G. H Bush’s political agenda (Livingston 15).

2.3.4 Military and Humanitarian Operation: Challenges on the Ground

On December 09, 1300 marines and 200 soldiers landed on Mogadishu by air and sea, additionally, a second deployment comprised of 230 US marines, 450 mountain division soldiers and a few other troops arrived just four days after the initial landing. The peak troop level was reached shortly after with 38.000 soldiers under the supervision of 49 UN representatives (Vanderpool).

Disarmament was left out of the original objectives due to its impossibility, but what was G. H Bush's expectation of the enemy's response to the US troops' deployment? The Bush administration had to weigh the best and worst case scenarios because it is crucial to create a well-organized plan with defined objectives.

President G.H Bush’s administration was not expecting any major resistance, believing that the large number of troops would contain the armed militias, they saw no need for disarmament, and for them it was as little as dealing with small group of outlaws. Collin Powell states “We may have to kill some people, but I do not expect any major resistance.” However, the situation in ground was completely different from expectations, General Hoar,

the Commanding General of the United States central command (USCENTCOM) was responsible for overseeing the operations in the region, including the ground operations, he noted “deploying troops to Somalia was like going to the moon” (Ebrehart 123).

The US faced many challenges especially with maintaining the air-bridge due to the logistical constraints, maintaining an air-bridge requires intricate coordination of flight schedules, cargo loading and unloading, which can be challenging in harsh conditions and high-pressure environments. Other factors posed challenge to the US such as the limited infrastructure, weather conditions, capacity and volume, cost and sustainability, security concerns and the limited harbour in Mogadishu, the low capacity of the port posed logistical difficulties for the deployment of troops and the delivery of humanitarian aid. The port of Mogadishu was the only one at the country with an established port authority and supporting infrastructure, albeit limited compared to ports at Berbera and Bossaso (Ebrehart 123).

In the short run, as far as January 1993 the situation in ground remained calm, and Operation Restore Hope was somehow able to keep everything in control, exhibiting with no significant resistance encountered from local groups. A notable degree of stability was achieved, the United States Navy Seabees supported the effort by establishing and constructing base camps at the humanitarian relief sites, drilling and restoring water wells, fixing schools and orphanages, clearing city streets, fixing bridges, and renovating and expanding the Baidoa airstrip (Somalia Operation Restore Hope 1992-1993).

The enhanced safety conditions allowed the UN all along with other Non-Governmental Organizations to carry the food distribution around Mogadishu and other areas affected by starvation, however, the coalition cautious approach, by refusing to disarm armed militias and avoiding getting involved in Somalis political affairs, ultimately failed in addressing the root causes of the problem. Tensions between the US and the UN surfaced regarding militia disarmament. Secretary Boutros-Ghaly proposed in a Security Council

report that UNITAF should disarm all factions or at least seize heavy arms, he advocated for establishing weapon-free security zones, voluntary surrender of heavy weaponry, and only restoring to forced disarmament if arms posed a direct obstacle to humanitarian efforts (Alexander 11-12).

From an American perspective, the cautious approach to disarmament made sense because it was intended to reduce casualties. But when seen from a wider multilateral perspective, the decision to forgo militia disarmament presented difficulties for UNITAF's attempts to address the more intricate aspects of state-building and national reconciliation (Alexander 11-12).

The failure of G. H Bush to withdraw before he leaved office was another crucial flaw that would later affect the mission's progress. Originally, it was intended that the US military presence would be temporary with a clear exit strategy, and a promise to limit the mission's scope and duration was made to avoid it from becoming another "mission creep." The Pentagon had previously issued a warning that the mission might go beyond initial expectations (Boys "A Lost Opportunity" 9).

Detailed military assessment within the United States Department of Defence had estimated that stabilizing Somalia and achieving the operation's objectives might require a commitment of at least six months, way longer than the few weeks' timeline set by the G. H Bush's administration. The anticipated withdrawal of US troops prior to the presidential transition was viewed as unfeasible; nevertheless, President G. H Bush moved through with troop deployment in spite of opposition from top military advisors, little comfort from Congress, and doubts regarding the mission's timetable. President Bill Clinton was handed a very complicated situation by many in the George H. Bush administration, even as troops were being readied for deployment (Boys "A Lost Opportunity" 9).

Table 1: Somalia key Events Timeline

21 Oct 1969	Bloodless coup by General Mouhamed Siad Barre.
23 Jul 1977	The start of the Ogaden war, US show support to Somalia.
09 Mar 1978	Somalia defeated; oppositions groups began to form against barre.
1984 – 1998	Siad Barre increases violence against oppositional groups.
20 Jan 1990	50,000 civilians killed in the previous 19 months by Barre's regime.
23 Mai 1990	A manifesto signed calling for the formation of a provisional government.
02 Oct 1990	Three opposition groups sign agreement to overthrow government.
4 Dec 1990	Baree abandons constitution and prosecutes arrests.
06 Jan 1990	The American embassy in Mogadishu evacuated by a helicopter.
Jan 1992	ICRC reports hundreds of thousands are dying from starvation.
Mar 1992	Fighting produced 14,000 deaths and 27,000 wounded in 05 months.
24 Apr 1992	UNSCR 751 requests deployment of 50 UN observers.
28 Apr 1992	Siad Barre leaves to Kenya and then to Nigeria.
12 Aug 1992	Deployment of 500 UN soldiers, Aideed allows UN action.
14 Aug 1992	First NSC meeting, Bush orders airlift to support famine relief.
20 Aug 1992	UN warehouse is looted, Mogadishu airport is closed.
28 Aug 1992	UNSC authorizes 13500 troops to protect aid convoys.
21 Nov 1992	CJCS Powell supports intervention and directs plan refinement.
03 Dec 1992	A series of NSC meetings held on Somalia interventions options
09 Dec 1992	Frist US military elements arrive in Mogadishu OPR officially started.

20 Jan 1993	End of G. H Bush presidency
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Source: Clarke, Walter. "Somalia Key Events Timeline." Somalia: Background Information for Operation Restore Hope, 1992.

Conclusion

President G. H Bush decision to intervene in Somalia marked a significant chapter in US foreign policy. Despite the shortcomings, and for all his faults and mistakes, President G. H Bush's intervention in Somalia must still be considered as a limited success. His strategy until 1993 can be attributed to his multifaceted approach by following a judicious balance between military, humanitarian and diplomatic efforts, as well as his collaborative approach with the UN and other NGOs succeeded to some point in achieving the mission's initial objectives.

Through swift action, the G. H Bush's administration was able to provide much-needed humanitarian assistance to the Somali people, saving countless lives and preventing further suffering, and the presence of American forces helped stabilize the security situation in certain regions, allowing the resumption of aid delivery and the restoration of basic services. Additionally, the intervention brought international attention to the cause and mobilized support from the global community. It could be said that President G. H Bush's approach towards the Somalis crisis was pragmatic, focusing on doable objectives rather than sweeping transformation that could further deteriorate the situation.

However, in the long term, the administration limited focus on humanitarian assistance and reluctance to engage in comprehensive disarmament and nation building efforts left unresolved the underlying political and social problems fuelling the conflict in Somalia, coming short to fulfil one of Bush's most crucial promises, that is to leave before his later days in office.

President G. H Bush left office on January 20, 1993, having failed to complete the mission in Somalia. As his presidency came to an end, the crisis in Somalia remained unresolved, leaving his successor, President Bill Clinton, to take up the slack. As the crisis worsened, the election of President Bill Clinton presented more doubts and questions regarding American policy toward Somalia in the future.

Chapter Three

Clinton's Administration Strategy in Somalia 1993-1994

Introduction

Chapter Three of this dissertation demonstrates the complexities of US intervention in Somalia. Through a detailed examination, it became evident that G. H Bush's strategy, characterized by a balance of these dimensions, achieved limited successes in addressing immediate humanitarian crises and restoring some semblance of stability in the region during the first stages of the mission.

As the study transitions from the Bush Administration to the Clinton era, a decisive turning point in US foreign policy towards Somalia comes to light. This chapter builds on the insights from Chapter two and provides a detailed examination of the Clinton administration's strategy in Somalia. Extending beyond mere chronology, the study of the chapter delves deeper into the strategic calculations and unforeseen consequences that shaped and influenced the course events. Additionally, it analyses the transition of power and its impact on foreign policy priorities, intending to uncover the continuities, discontinuities, and adaptations in the US approach to addressing the Somalia crisis.

At the heart of this critical lens lies a fundamental question: what happens when peace enforcement fails? This research confronts the harsh truth that peace enforcement does not always yield the desired outcomes. When these efforts fail, the wounds are profound, with implications extending far beyond the borders of the conflict zone. The analysis in this chapter aims to shed light on the shortcomings and missed opportunities that led to the tragic event in Mogadishu, and the changing dynamics on the ground. Also, it aims to uncover the root causes of these setbacks, ultimately contributing to mission failure.

3.1 Presidential Transition: From G. H Bush to Bill Clinton

On November 3rd 1992, American voters cast their ballots, ultimately delivering a successful victory to Bill Clinton; Clinton secured 43% of the popular vote compared to G. H Bush's 37%, while third-party candidate Ross Perot gathered a significant portion of the vote as well. Importantly, President Clinton's victory in key battleground states, such as California and New York, solidified his Electoral College advantage, leading to a victory in the Electoral College with 370 electoral votes to Bush's 168 (Levy).

President Clinton's victory was a surprise to the American people. The independent candidate Ross Perot complicated the elections, Perot's populist appeal and fiscal responsibility resonated with many voters, drawing support away from President Clinton. While his predecessor, President Bush, also had enjoyed high approval ratings following the successful conclusion of the Gulf war and the beginning of the intervention in Somalia, however, President G. H Bush faced criticism in his handling of Domestic issues, including healthcare reform and the budget deficit (Boys "Clinton's Grand Strategy" 8).

Taking advantage of this, Bill Clinton ran a highly effective campaign that focused on key domestic issues, this vision of change referred to by James and many as "Clinton's grand strategy" resonated with many Americans, particularly those dissatisfied with the status of the country, leading to the unexpected victory in a three-way election. Bush was defeated by Clinton, a self-proclaimed "new democrat" (Boys "Clinton's Grand Strategy" 12).

President Bill Clinton took office on January 20, 1993, the nation transitioned from a twelve years of Republican leadership under Presidents Ronald Reagan and G. H Bush to a Democratic administration. As President Clinton assumed the presidency, he faced high expectations from the American people. His campaign had promised a new direction for the country, with a focus on addressing economic challenges and social issues. The transition of power from President Bush to President Clinton was marked by the traditional rituals of American democracy (Vyse). These later included the concession speech delivered by

President Clinton, and the inauguration ceremony held on 20 January 1993 in which He declared his administration's Willingness to offer help to other nations in need:

Our hopes, our hearts, our hands, are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause.... when our vital interests are challenged, or the will and conscience of the international community is defied, we will act with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary (Bill Clinton Inaugural Address).

3.1.1 Assertive Multilateralism: "Clinton's New Foreign Policy"

President Clinton initially did not prioritize an assertive foreign policy agenda upon assuming the presidency, instead, his focused was on domestic affairs and economic reform. Notably, Magstadt Analysis highlights the Administration's overarching foreign policy objective: to improve the global economy, according to Magstadt a stable global economy meant domestic economic growth for the US, as the largest importer and exporter of goods at that time, the stability and growth of the world economy were deemed essential for American economic well-being. Magstadt goes further to highlight that a foreign policy focused on the Global economy relies heavily on multilateral collaboration, which means the necessity to cooperate with the UN and other international partners to deal with global issues.

When President Bill Clinton succeeded President Bush, he appointed Madeline Albright as the US ambassador in the United Nations. Albright rejected American unilateralism in other cases that were not considered as US self-defence, she introduced an alternative tactic that would be later referred to as "Assertive Multilateralism". Her approach called to limit unilateralism, advocating instead for active engagement with the UN and international partners to address global issues (Boys "Clinton's Grand Strategy" 2).

This foreign policy model was first used by President G. H Bush before credited to Albright, noted by a success in the Gulf War and the first stages of operation restored hope in

Somalia, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was no need for the United States to play the role of the world police force if they did not have the power to do so. It was the right timing for President Clinton to inherit this strategy from his predecessor and entrust the United Nations with the responsibility that is to fulfil its original mandate, the responsibility to protect and intervene in global affairs, by creating an international force meant for international operations when necessary, with the US taking the foreground. Gathering support from both Republican and Democratic Party, this bi-partisan approach represented a seamless continuity across the two administrations (Boys “Clinton’s Grand Strategy” 2-3).

According to J. Boys, Assertive Multilateralism found its initial success in the Gulf War in President G. H Bush’s era. The mission's objectives were sharply outlined, focusing on the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait within clearly defined operational limits, ending up by achieving its goal efficiently, this success served as a model for subsequent operations, including the intervention in Somalia. However the case of Somalia presented a different scenario, despite achieving a very limited success in the early phases of the operation, unlike the Gulf war, the mission in Somalia was characterized by a flawed planning and unrealistic expectations since the beginning. It was notably influenced by what J. Boys referred to as the "CNN effect," where emotional responses to media coverage drove policy decisions rather than strategic reasoning. Unlike the successful assertive multilateralism demonstrated in the Gulf War, the decision to intervene in Somalia lacked a clear rationale beyond emotional impulses (“Clinton’s Grand Strategy” 2-12).

In 1991, the Gulf War intervention was justified by the recognized threat posed by appeasement policies in the Persian Gulf, ensuring the protection of vital oil supplies. However, in the case of Somalia, there was no such clear imperative. Instead, the decision to deploy forces was prompted by emotional reactions to distressing images of suffering

Somalis broadcasted in the media. Without a clear exit strategy in place, the incoming Clinton administration that campaign aimed to focus on national economy was left to deal with a problem they did not create, the problem of 25.0000 US troops placed in a war-torn land (Boys “Clinton’s Grand Strategy” 2-12).

Furthermore, J. Boys expressed that the Clinton administration viewed Assertive Multilateralism as a potential solution to shift the financial and human burdens of interventions away from the United States. By involving a global organization such the UN, an organization that is capable of fulfilling its post-Cold War mandates effectively. However, the success of this approach relied on the assumption that the American public would tolerate casualties in distant regions without direct national interests at stake, and that Congress would continue its historical support for presidential actions in international affairs (“Clinton’s Grand Strategy” 2-12).

3.1.2 Reshaping the Mission: The Shift from UNOSOM I to UNOSOM II

President Bill Clinton inherited a complex situation in Somalia. At that time, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) comprised 37,000 troops, with 24,000 from the US and 13,000 from the contributing nations, stationed in central and southern Somalia, covering almost half of the countries’ territory. Since the mission was inherited and lacked proper planning, as early as January 1993 there were discussions within the Clinton’s administration considering withdrawal from Somalia to shift focus on domestic issues. However, other members of the administration including Albright, the US ambassador in the United Nations, held tight to the continuity of the mission in Somalia, insisting that assertive multilateralism served America’s best advantage (Boys “Clinton’s Grand Strategy” 15).

Harned stated that President Clinton's National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee met on January 25 and indicated that while President Clinton supported most of President Bush's policies, he was hesitant to commit significantly to the United Nations

Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). Specifically, President Clinton was cautious about contributing beyond providing a Quick Reaction Force and a few logistical units unless a formal presidential decision was made (67-68).

The secretary of state emphasized that the success in Somalia would necessitate a prolonged commitment to offering logistical support for UNOSOM II, and recommended that the newly appointed Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, should influence the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to undertake the following actions: advocating for a new Security Council mandate for UNOSOM II under Article VII for peace enforcement, appointing a UNOSOM II commander, enhancing and refining the UN military support staff, and initiating the formation of a Somali police force under the authority of UNITAF and subsequently UNOSOM II (Harned 67-68).

On 27th January, General Powell reviewed a four phase's withdrawal plan from Somalia:

- Phase I involves a reduction of US forces to 15,500 troops ashore and 4,500 afloat.
- In Phase II, the number of US forces decreases to 12,000 troops ashore and 4,000 troops and afloat.
- Phase III, US forces are further reduced to 6,500 troops on land and 4,000 troops at sea. At this stage, only a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and limited logistical support units remain in Somalia.
- Finally, in Phase IV, the number of US forces decreases to 1,400 troops ashore and 4,500 troops afloat. The focus shifts primarily to logistical support units on land, while the Quick Reaction Force is stationed at sea (Harned 67).

President Clinton directed a review of US foreign policy towards Somalia across departments, taking all necessary considerations to prevent the mission in Somalia from returning to point zero. By January 1993, plans for transitioning to UNOSOM II were

considered, a meeting of the NSC Principals Committee took place, and it was proposed that the United States should gather a totalling of 4,000 support troops to UNOSOM II. The final decision on the transition to UNOSOM II was made the day following, on January 29, the secretary of defence announced that the UNITAF mission in Somalia is soon coming to an end due to budgetary reasons. A reprogramming request was submitted to the congress, aiming for a zero-sum approach in which the total benefits or resources remain constant, with any increase for one side resulting in an equal decrease for the other. The Department of Defence estimated that the involvement of 4,000 US support troops in a three-month operation would cost \$560 million (Harned 68).

By late January, the projected timelines for US military planning by the new administration was outlined as follows: UNITAF transfers its duties to UNOSOM II by April 1993, In autumn 1993, The US quick reaction force exits Somalia, replaced by a Marine Amphibious Ready Group, In December 1993 UNOSOM II withdraws after the establishment of a national unity government (Water 33).

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 814 on March 26, 1993. The resolution expressed concern over the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Somalia, particularly in the areas of southern and central Somalia, and pointed on the urgent need for further action to address the issue. It agreed for the establishment of UNOSOM II, a United Nations peacekeeping mission, to succeed the previous UNITAF mission and assist in efforts to restore peace and stability in Somalia. The resolution authorized UNOSOM II to use all necessary means to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel, and facilities. Additionally, it called all parties in Somalia to cooperate fully with UNOSOM II and other humanitarian organizations operating in the country to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need (Resolution 814).

UNOSOM II mission was distinct from the previous UNITAF mission in several crucial ways, Firstly, it became a UN-led operation, removing the authority of any member state as a lead nation, the area of operations expanded to cover the entirety of Somalia, including regions like the secessionist northwest, lastly, insisting on a total disarmament within a strict timeframe of 90 days. Despite President G. H Bush's white house refusing to go for disarmament, it became a key aspect of UNOSOM II mandate, Resolution 814 emphasized on the necessity of disarmament as an essential component of UNOSOM II, the Clinton administration had no other choice but to go for a total disarmament. The resolution emphasized the Secretary-General's persistent commitment to disarming all Somali factions comprehensively and effectively, recognizing that disarmament is an essential step towards rebuilding the country. This shift in approach from the previous administrations indicates a significant discontinuity in the US foreign policy in Somalia (Harned 26).

3.2 From Operation Restore Hope to Force Protection Mission and Saving Failed State

On May 4th 1993, the role of UNITAF in Somalia has officially ended, transitioning responsibility to the UN. Although the US is no longer in control of the mission, the Clinton administration wanted to preserve their Doctrine of assertive multilateralism. President Clinton was still determined to see the UN mission succeed. He opted to retain 1200 US combat troops in Somalia, departing from President Bush's firm stance against prolonged US presence in Somalia post-UNITAF, but still refusing to take responsibility for the UN nation building mission. Gradually the Clinton policy objectives regarding Somalia started shifting towards a nation-building operation, according to Beech, Aspin a Democratic Party politician who served under Bill Clinton: "The US was staying in Somalia to help rebuild the nation and Clinton has given clear direction to stay the course with other nations to help Somalia", Michael continued to add that Clinton stated that: "the US objective in Somalia was to make

sure that the United Nations can fulfil its mission and continue to work with Somalis towards nation-building” (Beech 26).

General Aideed tried to assess the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping forces on several occasions, on May 6, just two days after the UNITAF duties has ended, Aideed lead an attempt to capture Kismayo, further to the clash on kismayo that lasted for two days, again on 5th June, Aideed forces launched a bloody attack on Pakistani troops, 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed in that attack and other 57 were wounded. As a reaction, the UN passed Resolution 837 condemning the attack, and announcing a 25 thousand dollars reward to anyone who would capture Aideed, as well as giving the UN peacekeeping forces the right to use all necessary means to arrest or act against those responsible (Harned 75).

The United States showed support by participating on the attempts to capture Aideed, both US and UN forces swiftly initiated a string of offensives targeting Aideed forces and strongholds, Aideed's militia responded by intensifying their use of violence, launching more frequent counter attacks against both US and UN troops. The United States faced mounting pressure from the United Nations to intervene and deploy additional troops. Despite opposition to get the US troops involved from many senior generals of the American army, yet, resulting of the UN influence the Clinton administration changed its policy again, the mission suddenly transformed into a “manhunt” for Aideed (Beech 31-32).

3.3 The War in Mogadishu -The Blackhawk Helicopters- 1993

Figure 06: The location of Mogadishu



Source: “Mogadishu”. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 5 Jun. 2024,

According to the figure 06, this city took place on the eastern coast of Africa, notably in the south-eastern region of Somalia, as well as the Indian Ocean coastline. The location of Mogadishu allowed it to connect east Africa with Middle East Asia, and Europe. Adam claimed that Mogadishu, the largest city of Somalia, has been the capital city for centuries. It was previously the most beautiful city in all of Somalia, combining Italian and Arab influence. Mogadishu used to be one of the Africa’s most civilized, educated, and culturally diverse cities.

In early post-independence period, the city experienced high levels of urbanization, as did many other post-colonial capitals. To be more precisely, after independence in 1960, the country as a whole experienced rapid urbanisation. As L. Earl argues that Mogadishu grew at approximately 10% per annum in the 1960, also this period also witnessed the growth of informal settlements as well as land banking, land grabbing, speculation and high levels of corruption in public and private land markets.

This city, in turn, has a vast and eventful history, which dates back to ancient times. Mogadishu suffered from many events in its journey before gaining its independence in 1960, Along with the rest of Somalia, it went from colonization to independence and, then to Civil War. Additionally, Somalia's road from colonization to independence and, later, to civil war, is a long one. Somalia was colonized by European powers in the 19th century. Britain and Italy established the colonies of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland in 1884 and 1889, respectively. These two Somali lands eventually united and gained independence on July 1, 1960 (Jalloh).

After Somalia gained independence, the population of Mogadishu witnessed tremendous increase and changes due to various factors. The UN World Urbanization Prospects evaluated Mogadishu’ population and provided their estimates and projections in

their most recent iteration. Their estimates cover the urban agglomeration of Mogadishu. In which it normally includes that. In the year of Somalia's independence in 1960, Mogadishu grew at approximately 10%, the population was estimated to be around 94,000 people (Campbell 147-149). However, as the newly independent nation's capital city, Mogadishu and all Somalia experienced remarkable expansion year after year.

During the 1990's, Mogadishu experienced massive bloodshed, displacement of civilians, and extreme humanitarian suffering. Horrific images of starving children, robbed, kidnapped, raped and slaughtered persons affiliated with competing factions and minority groups, armed militias civil conflict and resulting humanitarian disasters. On particular, the wars developed with the collapse of the Said Barre administration in 1991, resulting in severe battle for power among several factions. Following the collapse, the city stability declined, prompting considerable changes in the central administration. The failure of this government to function resulted in the outbreak of Civil War. Lindley wrote about the life in Mogadishu in her book, about how the Somalis were seeing the life there. she stated, "Somalis emphasised how life went on- as one NGO worker put it: "Life in Mogadishu is time bomb; you are always worrying that sometime or another it will explode..., and everyone just goes about their everyday life.'" (18).

Due to this, Mogadishu gained international attention, the United States and the United Nations and several humanitarian organizations intervened to provide aid and restore stability in Somalia, practically in Mogadishu city. The United States, beginning with the Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton presidency, was eager to lead this drive. Overall, the United States' operation in Somalia, Mogadishu, initially focused on delivering food and supplies to the starving population this was a part of the Operation Restore Hope under President G. H Bush in 1992. Once on board with the humanitarian

mission, the President G. H Bush declared his words about the United States intervention in Somalia, he remarked at West Point, January 5, 1993 that:

Sometimes the decision not to use force, to stay our hand, I can tell you, it's just as difficult as the decision to send our soldiers into battle. The former Yugoslavia, well, it's been such a situation. There are, we all know, important humanitarian and strategic interests at stake there. But up to now it's not been clear that the application of limited amounts of force by the United States and its traditional friends and allies would have had the desired effect, given the nature and complexity of that situation (Remarks by President George Bush).

However, due the situation in Somalia, Mogadishu's city, the mission has become more challenging and difficult over time, attracting more capable armed resistance than originally expected. The resistance came from General Aideed's militia; he was prepared to crush any further opposition. Shortly after control was handed over to UNOSOM II, clan leader General Aideed, bitter about what he perceived to be partisan support for his rival, Ali Mahdi, 'orchestrated' attacks on Pakistani peacekeepers conducting weapons inspections and distributing food in Mogadishu (Luke 3).

24 Pakistanis were killed and a further 57 were wounded. President Clinton shared the UN's resolve to respond to Aideed's attacks declaring that military action was necessary to strengthen the credibility of 'UN peacekeeping in Somalia and around the world (Luke 1-16). The event caused a major changing in Somalia situation. In other words, there was a significant shift in the United States national policy, in response to the anarchy and famine.

President Clinton's decision to shift towards intervention in Somalia during the 1993 built upon the on-going humanitarian crises and instability on the region. As violence continued in Somalia, the US policy that used in the intervention changed to match the changing in the situations. The Somalia effort was begun by President Bush. However,

President Clinton changed the mission from humanitarian relief to nation-building, leading to the conflict with Muhammad Farah Aideed's forces (Clawson).

The strategy permitted targeted military actions against factions that were causing the violence in Somalia, Mogadishu, the new course towards the new strategy challenged the power of the native warlords. The United States' military actions caused radical changes in Somalia's situation especially in the Capital city of Mogadishu. What started out as a humanitarian mission to combat famine grew into a bloody military struggle, with the bodies of dead American soldiers dragged through the streets of the Somalia capital of Mogadishu in October 1993 (Riley).

The city witnessed a highly deadly fight that drew global attention, known the Battle of Mogadishu or The black Hawk Down incident in 1993. This section of the chapter documents the underlying structural changes in Mogadishu related to the bloodshed and the violence during the Battle. Furthermore, the focus will be on how Clinton's administration reversed position on these crises, as well as a chronological summary of the crises to highlight major events that influenced the president's decisions and actions over time. It also examines the loss of control in the city and the United States movements.

3.3.1 How the Battle in Mogadishu shaped

The events of the Black Hawk Down incident in Mogadishu were influenced by several factors. They combined to create a volatile and dangerous environment in the City, which ultimately led to the events of the Battle.

3.3.1.1 The Governance without Government

In fact, the absence of a stable central government and the explosion of armed groups led to a situation where Somalia was often known as a failed state (Bin Anwar). As already mentioned in Chapter Two, everything began when Barre was removed. Different parties in Somalia country began to emerge, particularly in conflicts over control of the capital.

Furthermore, this resulted in increased violence, with numerous warlords gaining control of different sections and regions of the country, typically through militias and armed forces. They battled for power, wealth, and territory, resulting to frequent confrontations and the expulping the humanitarian crises.

Since January 1991 Somalia has been without a functional central government, making it the longest-running instance of complete state collapse in postcolonial history (Menkhuas 74-106). In Somaliland the absence of a central government in Mogadishu has led to the creation of decentralised, regional governments supported by traditional leaders and civil society groups that are helping to rebuild their country from the ground up (Somalia: Peace and development).

Without the functioning of the government to provide security, enforce law, and order, and facilitate political stability, Somalia found itself in an environment surrounded by violence and conflicts, specifically in Mogadishu. After the fall of the government in January 1991, factional warfare devastated southern Somalia. An estimated 250,000 Somalis died as a result of famine and warfare, and as many as a million fled to other countries as refugees. In the northwest, a unilateral declaration of secession established the state of Somaliland in May 1991 (Menkhuas 74-106).

The hostile atmosphere made things tough for humanitarian organizations, which saw delivering aid effectively were considered as a challenge to them, and for peacekeeping forces case, which faced the hard mission to maintaining order and to negotiating peace among warring factions. Between 1992 and 1995 there were three different interventions that attempted to help the situation in Somalia (Ahmed and Green 113-127).

Although beginning simply as a humanitarian effort by the international community, intervention culminated in what would become a peace building operation (Kenning 63-70). The author Menkhuas stated in his writing that, in November 1992, the United States

announced it would lead a multinational peace enforcement operation in Somalia aimed at protecting humanitarian aid (74-106).

As a result of the vacuum authority, humanitarian crises erupted, with millions of Somali people facing starvation, displacement, and the lack of access to basic materials. Somalia has become a state of terrorism and criminal activity.

The rule of many Warlords in Somalia, particularly Mohammed Farrah Aidede, created a highly volatile atmosphere, resulting in tension and combat with the United States Forces. US forces attempting to arrest leaders of Aidede's faction in central Mogadishu encountered unexpectedly heavy resistance on October 3 (Daniel). In other words, certain Warlords, notably Aidede, saw the presence of foreign forces as a threat to their control and attempted to resist their operations. Enemy-fired rocket-propelled grenades took down two troop-laden Black Hawk helicopters, isolating US troops behind enemy lines in central Mogadishu (Daniel). This opposition to foreign intervention by the UN and the US resulted to escalation of the conflict in Mogadishu 1993.

3.3.1.2 The Urban Warfare Challenges

The Urban combat in Mogadishu refers to the fighting that occurred in the city's streets and neighbourhoods during the United States military intervention in 1993. It was blown up during an attempt to seize the lieutenants of Aidede's militia, on October 3, 1993; the US forces staged a seventh attempt to capture Aidede and his top lieutenants (Somalia Intervention).

The involvement of US forces in intense urban fighting with the Somali militia's fighters had an unforgettable effect on military strategy and tactics. Jollota, one of the US soldiers, said:

So, when I analysed Mike Durant's site, I believed that those guys had successfully landed their aircraft and gotten out of the aircraft. I believed they

were moving from their crash site ... I spent the rest of the night ... flying over that city, getting rocked by RPGs, looking for those guys only to find out later that the Somalis had found their radios and turned them on to give us false indications. (qtd in. Nick)

American forces had a technological advantage over the SNA. Still, technology alone could not trump a wily and dedicated foe. Helicopters provided speed and surprise at decisive points. The use of technology, especially in the fourth operation, used to protect US bases, keep roads, ports...etc. The President Clinton chose to airlift most of the deploying additional forces to Somalia and he wanted rapid projection. Huge USAF C-5 cargo airplanes transported most of the 1,700 deploying troops and 3,100 tons of cargo. US Army General Thomas Montgomery, who led the US troops in Somalia, requested armoured vehicles and AC-gunships to give his men more security and offensive capability (Daniel).

Urban combat presents considerable obstacles for US military troops. These challenges are due to the fact that Mogadishu city contains some of the world's most difficult terrain on which to fight. As a retired Jeff Struecker, one of the US soldiers, stated in one of his interviews by saying: "We made a mistake on the ground in the Humvee and didn't share the load in land navigation," Struecker said. "I think most guys thought, 'Five major roads, who can't figure out your way around the city with five major roads?' ... When you get in this, it gets real hard real fast" (qtd in. Nick).

Its environment provides particular obstacles for US military forces, as opposed to the militia fighters in Somalia, who were used to being on the ground. Hooten, One of the US soldiers, said: "Once we got on the ground, that real clear overhead view of the city became a maze of shacks and garbage"(qtd. In Nick). In other words, The Somali fighters used urban environment and local knowledge to their advantage.

The black hawk down is the best example of the urban Warfare challenges. At the time, the battle of Mogadishu was the fiercest combat the American military had seen since the Vietnam War. A reporter stated that, by the end of the relentless 15-hour battle, 18 US service members were dead and another wounded (Sainting). The Reporter, Matt Sainting, also relayed what the soldiers said in the war. He quoted their statement by writing, an Army Ranger and platoon leader, named Perino, in the streets of Mogadishu said “As soon as we made that left turn in to a wall of lead”, “Lots of gunfire everywhere, (rocket-propelled grenades) going up and down the street”.

The Somali militia’ fighters benefited from the tactical aspect on the combat. And the American Military’s tension in the situation worked to their advantages. They used what is known as the Guerrilla tactics, or warfare, involved planning ambushes from covert locations and sniper hit-and-run attacks.

3.3.2 Chronological Overview of the Battle in Mogadishu- 1993

A tragic event had a profound impact on Somalia called the Battle of Mogadishu, in Somalia, was fought on October 3 and 4 1993, between US forces, supported by the UNOSOM II and Somali militias affiliated with the SNA. The United States regarded Mogadishu as one of the most dangerous city in the world. It was the longest continuous fire fight between US forces since the end of their operations in Southeast Asia.

3.3.2.1 Operation Gothic Serpent 1993

The UN and the United States main principle contained that it is the US’s responsibility to promote and defend freedom, human rights, and democracy. According to this, The United States involved itself in Somalia’s crises as a peacekeeper to restore order in the nation which had been torn by civil war and brutal warlords.

October 1993, Somalia, specifically Mogadishu, has been labelled on of the bloodiest fire fights for the United States troops. The operation has been remembered as the Operation

Gothic Serpent, the operation code-names, and that is lunched by the United States' forces to capture Mohammed Farrah Aideed, lieutenant. The US initiated the operation as a part of UNISOM II, the US and the UN gave full support to it. It all started when the warlords increased their quest for power.


After Mohammed Farah Aideed became the leader of one of the larger clans in Mogadishu, SNA, large areas faced starvation due the humanitarian crises from the constant battles. Mogadishu's infrastructure was badly damaged or totally destroyed, and the situation in the city was out of control. An auther in an article in Air Power History stated that, "an estimated 300,000 Somalis died from starvation" (Marion). Aideed's militia was capturing food crates that the United Nations had been dropping on the coast and he used starvation to gain power over the populous. The resistance from Aideed's militia marked the transition in the mission of UNOSOM II.

1993, was the year Bill Clinton assumed the presidency. The recently elected President Clinton terminated Restore Hope handing back to the UN leadership of the operation in Somalia. Nonetheless, the US military maintained a large present in the country (Christian 536). Due to the success of the first operation during George H. Bush Presidency, a new plan was implemented. The United States sent Marines who quelled the situation temporarily to control the problem, and then pulled out of Somalia. On December 9, 1992, 1,800 United States Marines arrive in Mogadishu, Somalia, to spearhead a multinational force aimed at restoring order in the conflict-ridden country (US Marines Storm Mogadishu, Somalia).

President Clinton inherited the situation in Somalia, UNOSOM become UNOSOM II. In March 1993 the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his recommendations for an effective transition from UNITAF to a new mission, UNISOM II, which would replace UNOSOM I (Christian 536). In other words, the United Nations Operation Somalia 2 took

over responsibility from UNITAF; the primary aim of UNITAF was to secure the delivery of food throughout the country, as well as to restore law and order, with the final aim to transfer the responsibility later on to UNOSOM (Christian 517-554).

Figure 07: the UNITAF Area of Operations on February 1993



Source: Brown, J.S. *The United States Army in Somalia 1992-1994*. History.army, 1994.

While UNITAF and only been responsible for providing the conditions necessary for the distribution of humanitarian aid, UNOSOM II's goal was to enforce the peace in the country and build a secure environment throughout the country, and its mandate included the ambitious task of nation building. UNOSOM II should continue to complete mainly through disarmament and reconciliation, the tasks begun by UNITAF, whose primary focus was the restoration of peace, stability, as well as law and order (Christian517-547). Despite US and UN efforts to restore Somalia, the clans were suspicious.

Yet, UNOSOM II under Ambassador Jonathan Howe and Lieutenant General Cevic Bir embarked upon a path that would lead them into direct conflict with Aideed; a confrontation that the UNITAF leaders, Ambassador Robert Oakley and Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, had felt wise to avoid, even with their larger force and unified command

(Durch 340). The mission faced numerous challenges, including resistance from local warlords and escalating violence.

To implement resolution 837 (1993), UNOSOM II initiated military action on 12 June 1993, conducting a series of air and ground military actions in south Mogadishu. UNOSOM II removed Radio Mogadishu from the control of USC/SNA ,General Aideed's faction, and disabled or destroyed militia weapons and equipment in a number of storage sites and clandestine military facilities (UNOSOM II). The tension began to increase almost immediately between UNSOM II and Aideed's SNA. Preliminary reports indicated that General Aideed and his supporters had used civilians, including women and children, as human shields for attacks on UNOSOM II (UNOSOM II).

3.3.2.1.1 Between the SNA and the UNOSOM II

The beginning started with the Ambassador Howe and his attempts to thwart the Aideed's regime. The Ambassador Howe, UN Special Representative for UNOSOM II and hand selected by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake for the position, tried to isolate and marginalize Aideed from the start (Durch341).

The Somali lieutenant increasingly felt that Howe and the UN could not be trusted to be fair brokers because of their policy of marginalization of him and unfair implementation of the Addis Ababa II Accords (Oakley and John). He used the radio of Mogadishu to disseminate propaganda against UNOSOM. He clearly declared that he used the Radio of Mogadishu to vent his growing antipathy for the UN. Among other things, he claimed that the UN had become Somalia's new colonists and incited his followers to resist the UN's nation building attempts (Blogger 299).

Concerned with Aideed's vitriol, Lieutenant General Bir directed some of his staff to develop some options as to how to shut down Aideed's radio station. With civilian Somali spies throughout UNOSOMII headquarters, it is likely that Aideed knew the UN was making

plans to harm his organization (Bolger 300). So, when Pakistani forces on short notice arrived on 5 June 1993 to conduct authorized arms inspections at the SNA arms cache collocated at the radio station and other locations, Aideed may have believed that the Pakistanis were there to shut down his radio station, a major source of his power (Durch 342).

The turning points happened when the General Mohammed Aideed get involved in several attacks against the United Nations peacekeeping forces and humanitarian efforts during the Somali Civil War. Aideed's militia attacked a team of Pakistani peacekeepers in Mogadishu on the 5th Jun 1993. As a result of these fears, a desire to confront the UN, or both, Aideed ordered his SNA forces to conduct a series of coordinated attacks against the Pakistanis (Durch 341-342). In these actions, Aideed's forces killed 24 and wounded 57 Pakistani troops and wounded one Italian and three American soldiers (Roger 1998). As a result, the next day the US helicopter attacked three General aideed's arms depots (Chronology of Events: December 1992-June 1994).

On 6 June 1993 the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 837 which basically declared war on Aideed in all but name. The resolution called for the investigation and prosecution of the individuals responsible for the Pakistani ambushes (Bolger 300). Zinni, Anthony (General), Director of UNITAF between November 1992 and May 1993 and Assistant to the Special Envoy, Somalia (Ambassador Oakley) in October 1993 in negotiations with Aideed for a truce and the release of captured TFR pilot Michael Durant. In the meeting, he clarified that the UNOSOM II had thus transitioned from its neutral role in peace enforcement to taking sides and fighting a counter-insurgency campaign (Sangvic).

The National Security Council principals never discussed the policy implications of this resolution for US involvement in Somalia. According to Elizabeth Drew, there was not a

Principals meeting held on Somalia until after the Battle of Mogadishu took place. The resolution would commit US forces to fighting counter-insurgency (Sangvic).

The day of declaring the resolution by the United States, President Clinton's National Security Advisor, for the Delta Force to be sent to capture Aideed. However, on June 12 1993 Howe and Bir attempted to destroy Aideed's capabilities through three days of AC-130H, AH-1 helicopter attacks, and QRF raids on his acknowledged and unacknowledged weapon storage sites, chop shops containing thirty "technical" (Sangvic). ; The term refer to vehicles, usually pickup trucks that have air defence artillery gun or other heavy machine-gun mounted on them. Somali militiamen or bandits operate the vehicles. These attacks, in particular the radio station attack were supported and assisted by the US.

In the same month, Jun 12, Aideed's militia attacked again a compound housing Pakistani troops and UN stuff in Mogadishu. They argued that the attacks were in response to attempts by the UN to destroy the SNA radio station. This phase of military operations against the SNA ended on 17 Jun 1993. The UNOSOM II failed to capture Aideed, The SNA warlord escaped by having his forces conduct a diversionary attack on the perimeter (Sangvic).

After failing to capture Aideed on June 17 1993, However, with the concurrence of Lieutenant General Bir, Force Commander, UNOSOM II, and his deputy and Commander of US Forces Somalia, Major General Thomas Montgomery, posted a twenty-five thousand dollar reward for information leading to the capture of Aideed (Durch 344).The reward reinforced what Aideed told his clan members: the UN was interfering in Somalia's internal struggle. Instead of weakening Aideed, the small reward further unified Somali support for Aideed (Bolger 303).

The elusive warlord, become more aggressive as UNOSOM II, becomes so focused on capturing Aideed. It had become isolated in Southern Mogadishu. By the beginning of

July Aideed had started to increase the number of aggressive actions: ambushes, vehicular mines, helicopter attacks, RPG rounds fired, and mortar rounds fired (Durch 340).

In July 12th, Aideed's militia clashed with the UN forces in Mogadishu, without any prior warning, Cobra helicopters fired 11, two missiles into the building and killed between 20 and 215 according to the International Red Cross. Furthermore, Aideed's clan met in the Abdi Houssein that day. The attack on the Abdi House was a significant turning point for UNOSOM II. It had dragged the UN into Somali's Civil War. By 8 August 1993 it was evident that the SNA were focusing its attacks on Americans; Aideed had successfully used command-detonated mines to kill four Americans (Durch 346).

One of Aideed's defense Minister, named Andi Hussan Awelah, declared in an interview his own statement by saying: "We realized for the first time that they had not come here as a neutral force to rebuild Somalia they were following their own aims and taking sides between the warring factions." his statement made Aideed's concentrated attacks on the Americans are setting the stage for the largest Battle of Mogadishu. In response, the US decided to deploy an elite unit capable of locating and seizing the warlord.

3.3.2.2 The Secret Initiative Negotiation

The Clinton administration, however, at the same time, in the Midst of the Manhunt, Opened a secret initiative to negotiate with Aideed. It was using the former president Jimmy Carter; who had a previous relationship with Aideed, and volunteered to act an intermediary. The UN commander, Thomas Montgomery, in other side declared that: "Nothing had been communicated to the field. I mean we had no idea about that..." (qtd. in Military AV). The UN commander clearly declared that nobody told US commanders in Mogadishu about the negotiation.

3.3.2.3 The Helicopters Attacks

With that came greater risk; As the US and UN alleged, Aideed and his militia became more difficult and dangerous to target. The helicopter attacks in Mogadishu refer to series of incidents involving the use of helicopters in military operations, primarily in Mogadishu, Somalia. It was one of the most notable events took place on October 3-4, 1993, during the battle of Mogadishu, commonly known as the Black Hawk Down incident. It was a part of the bigger operation by US forces that aiming at capturing the Leader of the SNA, Somalia militia faction, Mohammed Farrah Aideed. What started as a special operation mission quickly escalated into a fierce 18-hours urban battle when these helicopters were shot down by Somali troops (Allen).

As many sources stated, on the 3rd of October, TF commander General Garrison received and the task force received information that several of Aideed's senior advisers were meeting at a building near the Olympic Hotel. He immediately approved a snatch-and-grab mission for later that afternoon. A team of Army Special Forces navy seals, Rangers, and Airmen lifted off from Mogadishu's airport. Three minutes later they reached their destination.

The Special Forces teams immediately fast-roped to the ground, at the same time, hit the site and building, and quickly arrested 24 highly-ranking militiamen, including two key Aideed advisors. Somali were fighting back with a vengeance showering the helicopters and the vehicles on the ground with small armoires and RPGs Several TF Ranger troops were wounded in the first minutes of the engagement.

3.3.2.3.1 TF Ranger UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopter Down

'Super 61' or the TF Ranger UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, the first Black Hawk, flew over Mogadishu, On October 3, 1993. According to many sources, the Helicopter took a direct hit from RPG; Somali militiamen shot down the helicopter using a rocket-propelled grenade, both pilots died in the crash and two of the crew chiefs were severely wounded. The

helicopter was struck by RPG 40 mutes after the mission began. This sent the helicopter into a tailspin, and it crashed in a residential area near the target building (Allen).

Later one the call for help was issued and three teams headed towards the side to help the survivors. While looking for the downed Blackhawk, all three teams endured persistent far from Somali militias and suffered several casualties. In other words, As Ranger ground forces moved to the crash site to recover those still there, they came under a barrage of fire from surrounding buildings and stress and took a number of casualties (Brown 2).

3.3.2.3.2 Super64 Crash

Most of the assault team of the US forces went to the first crash site for a rescue operation during the rescue of Super 61, the Ranger and Special Forces operators found themselves under heavy fire. The attack happened only 20 minutes from the first crash; they had to hang out for 20 minutes until help arrived to collect their wounded teammates. The downing of the second helicopter created additional US casualties.

While they waited a third Black Hawk helicopter, calls Super 64 and the pilot, as shot down by RPG at around 4:40 pm. It crashed about a half mile from Super 61 and was quickly surrounded by an angry mob of Somalis (Allen).

3.3.2.3.3 Super 62 attack

The fourth black Hawk, Super 62, was sent to the crash site to rescue the crash survivors of Super 64 and two snipers were inserted to help provide relief. Like Super 68, it was also hit by an RPG and unable to provide support as planned. It barely made it back to base. Within minutes, the two snipers were killed the crash site was overrun, and all the crew members were killed except the pilot, Michael Durant. He was severely beaten and taken prisoner by one of Aideed's commanders (Allen).

3.3.2.4 The US Forces Withdrawal

As a result of the combat operation conducted by Task Force Ranger, 18 US soldiers were killed, and 84 wounded. It is estimated that some 300–500 Somalis were killed and more than 700 wounded during the fighting. In addition, 22 detainees were captured (Brown 2).

Under the pressure of the Battle, President Bill Clinton decided to withdraw US forces troops from Somalia. Before the events of 3 October, there was an indication from the US and UN that support for the UN operations in Somalia. However, Public Opinion in the United States and elsewhere was deeply affected by the events of October and the violence in Somalia during the Operation. It was all captured when the American people woke up one day in early October 1993 to news reports of dozens of American soldiers killed or wounded in fierce fighting in the streets of the capital city, Mogadishu (Bown 2).

The media and the news published many realistic articles and pictures that conveyed the reality of Somalia, especially the conflict that erupted between the US army and Somalia resistance groups. The loss of American soldiers and many more wounded made the Clinton government reassess its military presence in Somalia. Especially the images of the American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by Somali militia fighters, the views intensified calls for a withdrawal from the American public. The process began shortly after the Battle in Mogadishu and was completed by early 1994.

In an interview with Captain Haad, the sector commanders of General Aideed's militia, answered the question about why did people drag the dead bodies of the Americans in the streets then next day of the attacks? By saying:

There were more American bodies that were buried than the single body that was dragged. A person whose father was killed, don't you expect him to drag a dead body? If a person gets very angry he wants to vent his anger, he wants something to have all his anger accrued on. We as militia did our part of the

fighting through the bullets, those people who were dragging the bodies were only small children and women, and that was their way of expressing their anger. Wouldn't you be very sorry about 73 of our elder men, of our religious leaders, of our most prominent people, having their bodies mutilated...we collected parts of their bodies from the building in which they were attacked... if you were a son of one of those people killed on that day, what would be your situation, how would you feel? (Interviews -captain Haad | Ambush in Mogadishu).

He also added that the exact number of militia men, on the side of Somali, who died on the 3rd October is 133,74. In addition, for the civilian casualties, he declared: “that is almost uncountable, because the place where the fire took place is one of the busiest sectors of Mogadishu and people were not even taking cover. Each bullet fired in one direction might have killed four or five or six persons, because the place is very populous” (Interviews - captain Haad | Ambush in Mogadishu).

Consequently, General Montgomery had clear guidance: protect the force, protect the UN, and bring the force out with a minimum of casualties. In a national security policy review session held in the White House on 6 October, the president directed the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David G. Jeremiah, to stop all actions by US forces against Aideed except those required in self-defence. He also reappointed Ambassador Oakley as special envoy to Somalia in an attempt to broker a peace settlement and then announced that all US forces would withdraw from Somalia no later than 31 March 1994 (Brown 2).

Ambassador Oakley arrived in Mogadishu on October 9, determined to obtain the release of US helicopter pilot CW2 Michael Durant, captured at the second crash site by Somali forces loyal to Aideed. After intense negotiations, Aideed agreed to release the

wounded Durant and a previously captured Nigerian soldier on 14 October as a “goodwill gesture.” Despite this gesture and a unilateral cease-fire 13 declared by Aideed, it quickly became apparent that the US role in Somalia was ending and that the UN would receive no substantive cooperation from the warlord and his clan (Brown 2).

Despite the very public announcement of the US intention to withdraw from Somalia, but UN and local political leadership in Mogadishu did not immediately react. In other words, after several months of comparatively limited activity and few further instances of violence, US forces began withdrawing. Most of the American troops were out of Somalia by 25 March 1994, ending Operation Continue Hope, the follow-on mission to Restore Hope. Only a few hundred marines remained offshore to assist with any non-combatant evacuation mission that might occur in the event violence broke out that necessitated the removal of the over 1,000 US civilians and military advisers remaining as part of the US liaison mission. All UN and US personnel were finally withdrawn almost a year later in March 1995 (Brown 2).

3.4 Conclusion

Examining the Clinton administration’s policy in Somalia, it can be argued that its foreign policy towards the changed situation and the anarchy in Somalia contained continuity with the adding of mixed strategies compared to previous administration. On the security front, the military interventions and increased military efforts in the region, particularly in Mogadishu, were pursued with the focus on eliminating security threaten that came from Somalia’s warlords , in addition to protecting the United States troops.

The US intervention between 1993 -1994 faced a numerous challenges that came as a result of a rapidly changing of the US paths in Somalia, and the reshape of its policy in order to keep up with the developing events. Furthermore, this chapter has provided a historical overview of the Battle in Mogadishu, from the factors that shaped the key events of the conflicts to the US withdraw from Mogadishu and Somalia. As a result, the Battle of

Mogadishu led to policy changes within the US government regarding military engagement abroad, particularly in terms of mission objectives troops' deployment, and withdrawal strategies from Somalia.

General Conclusion

Promoting democracy and human rights became a central principle of American global engagement following the end of the Cold War. The United States of America recognized that it could lead to a more stable and cooperative international relations and reduce the likelihood of conflict that threatens US security. This ideology is closely linked to liberal internationalism that focuses on the connection between democracy, stability, and global economic prosperity, that in-itself leads to US economic growth. This concept of a “new world order” shifting from a bipolar to a unipolar system, created a new vision of a post-Cold War world, where collective security and cooperation would take the spot. At base, the United States international intervention in Somalia 1991-1994 was a practical application of these principles.

This dissertation conducted a thorough analysis of US foreign policy tactics in light of the 1991–1994 humanitarian and military intervention in Somalia. In other words, it provides a thorough examination and comparative analysis of the approaches taken to the Somalia crisis by the administrations of George H. Bush and Bill Clinton. Based on the scope of this research, the topic of discussion it addresses, and the outcomes gained, certain conclusions can be drawn about the success or failure of the US intervention in Somalia by critically comparing the actions and outcomes of both administrations.

The study carefully examined every significant phase, from the US airlift to Operation Restore Hope, to the escalating violence that followed the events in Mogadishu, and ultimately resulted in the withdrawal. It explored the similarities, differences, and adjustments made to US foreign policy during the two administrations in response to the changing conditions in the region.

While President Bill Clinton developed a purpose without a process, President George H Bush developed a process without a purpose. These two administrations took different but

equally problematic approaches. As a president, G. H Bush's foreign policy was defined by a practical, realpolitik strategy, which frequently favored unilateral action. However, over time, there was a noticeable change in his political ideology, leaning more towards multilateral and humanitarian actions. As detailed in Chapter Two, despite the initial success in securing the area and providing humanitarian assistance, the G. H Bush administration's strategy in Somalia was fundamentally flawed from the beginning.

President G. H Bush's Operation Restore Hope in Somalia lacked long-term strategic planning, a clear exit strategy, and a goal to address the underlying causes of the crisis. The decision to intervene was greatly influenced by media-driven diplomacy from the beginning of the pre-intervention planning phase and covert political aspects. Important members of the administration, including the secretary of state and secretary of defence, were satisfied with the interventions, and they wanted to leave with a positive image as their president's term was ending. However, the vital pledge to withdraw from Somalia before President George H. Bush's final days in office was not kept, as the intervention was emotionally rather than rigorously rationally planned.

The shift in political leadership direction from a Republican to a Democratic president also caused challenges in terms of the intervention in Somalia. It brought in a new set of priorities and led to a lack of continuity between administrations. While President G. H Bush's strategy was far from ideal, it is reasonable to say that it was acceptable. However, the mission was led dangerously by President Bill Clinton, who lacked experience in foreign policy.

President Bill Clinton's approach to Somalia lacked coherent and well thought strategic planning. He led a campaign focused on domestic issues mainly economic growth and healthcare reform, and found himself unprepared to deal with a situation that he did not create. His strategy in Somalia was generally regarded as a failure, starting with the departure

from his campaign promises to find him snatched in a war against armed militias. He was widely criticized for having neither a “Grand Strategy” nor a foreign policy in the first place. Instead Bill Clinton was handling issues on a case-by-case basis and developing strategies to deal with complex situations as they emerged. The absence of a well-defined foreign policy quickly resulted in an “ad hoc” the escalating of violence in the capital Mogadishu and the Black hawk incident, and eventually led to the withdrawal of US troops from Somalia.

There were several factors that contributed to the United States’ failure in Somalia. Firstly the 1992 elections occurred at a bad time, distracting attention and resources away from the ongoing efforts in Somalia. Secondly, the transition from a Republican to a democratic president disrupted the continuity of the intervention. In addition, the attempts to redefine the mission’s objectives by the Bill Clinton administration weakened its effectiveness. Lastly, President Bill Clinton’s lack of experience led him to adopt a reactive rather than a proactive approach, which increased the tensions in the area.

Even though the US operation in Somalia ultimately failed, it did set new standards for the success of international interventions, and much was learned from its mistakes, including the significance of having a clear and coherent vision. However, the US still fails to recognize the importance of having a well-thought-out objective and plan, as evidenced by the repeated mistakes made in Iraq, where a lack of post-invasion planning led to increased violence, and Libya, where the mission shifted from protecting civilians to changing the government.

Interventions must be grounded in realistic and achievable goals; overly ambitious objectives can lead to mission creep and eventual failure; minimizing casualties must be taken as a priority; and missions should be designed to avoid any loss of life. Interventions must also be adaptable to changes on the ground, in the case of leadership transitions or

special political circumstances. A flexible and adjustable process can make the difference between a successful and a failed intervention.

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