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U.S.-NATO Relations: Equal Membership or Leadership?

The Case of Libya.

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Dedication

It is with deep gratitude and sincere words that I dedicate this modest dissertation work to my loving parents who sacrificed their lives for our success. To my mother who lighted my way with her precious advice and prayers. To my father, my first role model and my first competitor for the sense of responsibility, courage and duty. I hope that one day I can give them back some of what they have done for me, may

God grant them happiness and long life.

I also dedicate this work to the soul of my grandfather Mehdi, may Allah grant him Firdaous paradise. To my grandmother who has always supported me in life.

To my sister for her aid and support, I wish her good luck.

To my teachers, friends and all those who are dear to me.

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Dedication

In the name of Allah, most gracious and most merciful

I dedicate this humble work:

To my parents, family members, partner, teachers, friends and classmates.

To everyone who stood by my side, and supported me throughout my education
career.

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Abstract

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization resiliency in the post-Cold War era has been demonstrated by a long series of interventions implemented to address the unconventional security challenges in the twenty-first century. Since the United States was a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance and possessed powerful diplomatic and military capabilities, its leadership of NATO was unquestioned during the Cold War. Over the last three decades, the U.S. has arguably been the ostensible leader of NATO through its sustained commitments to the Alliance's out of area and post-9/11 operations. These have contributed to NATO's survival and preservation the Euro-Atlantic security, as well as the Alliance's transformation into security organization in light of the new security contexts. The main concern of this dissertation is to examine NATO's most recent intervention in Libya to understand the nature of U.S.-NATO relationship, whether it is equal membership or leadership. Indeed, the findings of the study on the 2011 Operation Unified Protector in Libya confirmed that the U.S.-NATO relation is leadership, with the U.S. direct leadership evolving to a "leading from behind" strategy. The transatlantic success in Libya therefore would serve as a model for NATO future interventions in other conflict zones.

ملخص

تجلت مرونة الناتو في حقبة ما بعد الحرب الباردة من خلال سلسلة طويلة من التدخلات التي تم تنفيذها لمواجهة التحديات الأمنية غير التقليدية في القرن 21. باعتبار الولايات المتحدة كانت عضوًا مؤسسًا في حلف الأطلسي وامتلاكها قدرات دبلوماسية وعسكرية قوية، فإن دورها القيادي لحلف الناتو خلال الحرب الباردة لا شك فيه. على مدى العقود الثلاثة الماضية، يمكن القول أن الولايات المتحدة هي القائد الظاهري لحلف الناتو من خلال التزاماتها المستمرة بعمليات الحلف خارج المنطقة وبعد هجمات 11 سبتمبر، والتي ساهمت في بقاء الناتو والحفاظ على أمن منطقة اليورو-الأطلسي، وكذلك تحول الحلف إلى منظمة أمنية في ضوء السياقات الأمنية الجديدة. يتمثل الهدف الرئيسي لهذه المذكرة في فحص التدخل الأخير لحلف الناتو في ليبيا لفهم طبيعة العلاقة بين الولايات المتحدة والناتو، سواء كانت عضوية أو قيادية. في الواقع، أكدت نتائج الدراسة الخاصة بعملية الحامي الموحد لعام 2011 في ليبيا أن العلاقة بين الولايات المتحدة والناتو هي علاقة قيادة، مع تطور القيادة المباشرة للولايات المتحدة إلى إستراتيجية "القيادة من الخلف". وبالتالي، فإن نجاح الحلف الأطلسي في ليبيا سيكون بمثابة نموذج لتدخلات الناتو المستقبلية في مناطق الصراع الأخرى.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACLANT	Allied Command Atlantic (NATO)
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BP	Dayton Peace Accord
DPA	Dayton Peace Accord
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EU	European Union
FAR	The Armed Forces of Rwanda
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IFOR	Implementation Force
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Force
ISR	Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOC	National Oil Corporation of Libya
NRF	NATO Response Force
NTC	National Transitional Council
NTM-I	NATO Training mission in Iraq
OAE	Operation Active Endeavour

OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OUP	Operation Unified Protector
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RSM	Resolute Support Mission
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SOHR	Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
U.S.	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWII	World War Two

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Introduction

Founded in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has now existed for over seventy two years. Its creation was the most important event in American history since the Treaty of Paris which established American independence. The Atlantic Alliance began as a response to a European perception that the world destroyed by the ravages of World War II could not be rebuilt without United States involvement. Despite this assertion, some scholars have shown that the United States was just a member of NATO. The position of U.S. within NATO is not clear enough and it must be redefined.

Therefore, this dissertation sheds light on the reasons which led the United States to engage in order that NATO retains its power. In addition, it highlights the United States' effectiveness as a NATO member and its sustained commitment to NATO missions in the post-Cold War era. The objective of the work is to discover through a historical perspective the relationship between the U.S. and NATO within the context of the Alliance's military intervention in Libya.

This research aims at exploring the U.S.-NATO relations within the context of 2011 military intervention in Libya, is it equal membership or leadership? Furthermore, it aims at exploring the United States' role and contributions to NATO missions following the end of the Cold War.

The U.S. postwar grand strategy of containment was based on the belief that NATO would protect American interests by acting as a bulwark against the Soviet Union's expansion into Western Europe. After the Soviet threat subsided in the 1990s, the U.S. leadership of NATO remained consistent. The Alliance's role in ending the conflicts in the Balkans was largely due to the U.S. decision to take matters into its own hand, which forced NATO to choose between following its "leader" or staying

behind. Thus, the question in the postwar period was whether the U.S. would play a leading role to lead the organization or not?

After the dissolution of the Soviet threat in 1990s, NATO had undergone many changes and broadened its missions of collective defense to address the new security challenges. The main hypothesis of this research is that, the U.S. as the global super power economically and militarily, would play leading role in the alliance, and it would provide the lion's share of military expenditure to the operations of NATO. Also, and since NATO's military interventions and non- interventions are always linked to the United Nations approval, U.S. global leadership and its hegemonic position of the Atlantic Alliance will prove that the relationship of U.S.-NATO is leadership.

Confirming this hypothesis requires answering the following questions:

- Why did NATO last even after the end of the Cold War?
- What is the role and what are the contributions of the U.S. to NATO's operations?
- What justifies NATO's military Interventions and Non-Interventions?
- Can NATO fulfill successful missions without the help of the U.S?
- What is the nature of U.S.-NATO relationship: is it equal membership or leadership?

To answer the aforementioned questions, a combination of the historical method and the analytical method are used to produce a qualitative research. A comparative approach is also required to reach the wanted results. The use of this methodology involves data collection through reading books, articles, websites articles, governmental documents, newspapers and other relevant materials.

Many Researches have been done at the NATO's Post- Cold war transformation, the U.S. contribution to NATO's operation and the Obama's

leadership style. However, it was rare for studies to shed light on the US-NATO relationship, whether it is equal membership or leadership.

Yannan Song in his book *The U.S. Commitment to NATO in The Post- Cold War Period*, demonstrates that the U.S. has been committed to NATO since the end of the Cold War. Although both internal and external debates and even criticism about U.S. commitment to the Alliance has never stopped, it does not really alter U.S. attitude towards NATO. Song also points out that the U.S. recognizes the unique value of NATO, which provides the U.S. with legitimacy, capability, and credibility to deal with crises around the world, enabling the U.S. to exercise global leadership in every instance. Additionally, because NATO has also effectively transformed and successfully participated in “out-of-area” operations, the U.S. felt happy and confident to utilize this experienced organization when needed.

Militarily, Andrew M. Dorman shows in his book *NATO’s 2012 Chicago Summit: A Chance to Ignore the Issues Once Again* that NATO is becoming solely dependent on the U.S. nuclear guarantee, and that U.S. has provided the major share of the nuclear capability in the post-Cold War period.

Indeed, Mark Webber et al. argues in their book *Repairing NATO’s Motors* that the U.S. as a global power relied on a worldwide network of alliance arrangements and NATO was thus one of the many moving parts of U.S. global strategy. They also assert that the enlargement, the campaign in Afghanistan and the policy of partnership also owe much to an agenda set in Washington.

This work is divided into three chapters. The first and the second chapters are theoretical while the third chapter is devoted for a case study.

Chapter one entitled Historical Background of NATO tackles the historical background of NATO, through which we can understand the development of the

alliance from its establishment to the post-Cold War period, it explores the origins of NATO, its most important events and its evolution during and after the Cold War.

The second chapter entitled NATO's Military Interventions and Non-interventions in Conflicts sheds light on the operations of NATO in the post-Cold War era. It also explores NATO's military intervention and non-intervention in conflicts, and it discusses the possible criteria for justifying NATO's military actions and inactions in conflicts.

The third chapter entitled U.S.-NATO Relations: Equal Membership or Leadership is devoted to discuss the central hypothesis of our study on which the whole research is organized. It highlights the historical context of NATO response to the Libyan crisis. Then, it focuses on the U.S. hesitation to intervene at the very beginning, and its late engagement which came after enforcing UN resolution. An analysis of Obama's administration foreign policy is provided as well as the U.S. contributions to the Libyan campaign. Finally, the study concludes with an analysis and discussion of the findings, which reveal the U.S.-NATO relations within the context of 2011 military intervention in Libya.

Chapter One

Historical Background of NATO

The World's history hasn't known such a powerful and large-scale alliance as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But its history has been turbulent and stormy throughout its existence. Crises, pressures, critics and major divisions have been endured in this alliance. In times of all these troubles, the alliance and its partners have been subjected to enormous strain and had to undergo many changes and face many challenges. But the Alliance has demonstrated through time that it was strong enough to resolve the security matters it has encountered throughout its existence.

NATO is one of the outcomes of the battle between the United States and the former Soviet Union within the context of the bipolar system. The system arose shortly after World War II, when the victorious alliance was swiftly shattered, and two military and ideological blocs developed around the United States and the Soviet Union. International relation had to be envisaged in a bipolar logic with other countries being forced to choose one side or the other.

The development of the alliance can be fully understood only after analysis of its history. This is why this chapter is devoted to NATO's historical background, more specifically, it elaborates the founding history of the alliance, its origins, its most important articles and its evolution during and after the Cold War.

1. Definition of NATO and the Circumstances of its Foundation

1.1 Definition

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a western political and military alliance, founded on April 4, 1949, in the aftermath of the World War II, upon the signature of 12 forming nations of the Washington Treaty: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United

Kingdom and United States (Haglund). NATO alliance was established as an organization of collective defense against the rising power of the Soviet Union to protect democratic nations against the spread of communism in Europe. In addition to its external mission of deterrence and defense against the Soviet Union, the alliance was also intended to build peace and security among its members as democratic countries (Wallander). Its fundamental purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. Originally composed of 12 members, NATO had expanded to 30 North American and European countries today.




Figure 1. NATO members and dates of accession.

Source: Belkin, Paul. *Assessing NATO's Value*. Congressional Research Service, 28

Mar. 2019.

1.2 Foundation

Following WWII, a new superpower emerged, one that would construct and protect a new political and economic international order for the West. The United States was the most powerful country on the planet, with only the Soviet Union standing in its way. The U.S. used its power to build an international order of alliances and multilateral institutions. It also contributed to establish a permanent separation between the East dominated by the Soviet Union and the West.

Western Europe's destruction prompted the United States, as the war's major victor, to shed its traditional isolation from European political and military concerns. Europeans feared that their economies could not be rebuilt without massive American support, and their defense capabilities could not cope with the aggressive Soviet Union without an American commitment to counterbalance the Communist adversary (Kaplan). Europeans knew exactly what they wanted from the U.S.: to join a new western alliance that would discourage the Soviets from increasing their military pressure.

The United States did not establish this system out of fear or insecurity, but rather out of strength and belief in the future of all nations. At the same time, it was undeniably beneficial to American interests. It created a prosperous and safe pro-American world in which the American economy and influence could flourish (Daum). NATO was founded in this new world order to safeguard the safety of the West.

2. Origins of NATO

Before the trans-Atlantic Alliance was founded, several political decisions were made and diplomatic actions were taken. The Atlantic Concept denotes a desire for a particular type of relationship between countries on both sides of the Atlantic. It differs from the concept of a close and integrated Atlantic community in that it is

based on a strong cooperation between the United States and western European countries (Jordan and Bloome 7).

After World War II, Western Europe was economically exhausted and militarily weak, by contrast, newly powerful communist parties had arisen. The Soviet Union had emerged from the war with its armies dominating all the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Europe was left with a power vacuum. The German army was annihilated, the British army was depleted, the French divisions relied on American personnel, and the American Army melted quickly after May 1945, eager to return home (Dumani 28). Devastation therefore was everywhere, from Norway's North Cape to Italy.

After years of German occupation, governments in exile returned to their old capitals: Paris, Brussels, Oslo, The Hague, Copenhagen, and Athens, all attempting to demonstrate that they could govern once more. In Germany, there was no government. While the country debated what to do with the monarchy, the Allies propped up a feeble administration in Rome (Treverton et al. 198). This was the straightforward situation.

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, unlike President Woodrow Wilson, had a different perspective on the United States' role in international affairs. Under the aegis of the United Nations, Roosevelt intended to establish a new world structure. He intended to restore the fragile peace between the Great Powers that had existed during the war, from one conference to the next, all the way to Potsdam. The events that followed the Potsdam Conference would split the world into two adversarial camps representing opposing philosophies and political systems (Agger). This split would shape the world's destiny for the next half-century.

Henry Kissinger, former National Security Advisor to President Nixon and Secretary of State in the Ford administration (1969-1977), has argued that “ The practical result of Potsdam was the beginning of a process that divided Europe into two spheres of influence, the very scenario America's wartime leaders had been most determined to avoid” (“Reflections on Containment”).

Winston Churchill, the then-Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, who, unlike Roosevelt, was never sanguine about cooperation with the Soviet Union, emphasized his concern about Moscow's expansionist strategy in Europe. Churchill was attempting to enlighten the American public about the situation, warning them to be aware of and accept the challenge of history that was pressing down on the nation. Churchill urged the Americans to return to protect Western Europe from the mounting external and internal perils of Soviet-led communism, and conjured up the concept of an Anglo-American partnership to lead the free world in his address (Wallace and Phillips).

The intensification of Soviet threats to the West had already hastened the United States' path toward military involvement in Europe. The U.S. was willing to acknowledge that the survival of Western democracies endangered by Communist external attack or internal subversion was critical to the country's own security (Mastny). In March 1947, in response to growing knowledge of a Soviet threat, U.S. President Harry Truman issued the “Truman Doctrine”, a new policy that became known as the “Truman Doctrine”. He urged the U.S. to support free people who are opposing attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by external pressure, promising economic and military aid to the besieged countries of Greece and Turkey (Sloan). Aid was devoted to these two countries because both were fighting Soviet pressures on their borders at the time

The Truman Doctrine put an end to the United States' previous isolationist stance and declared that America would stand for democratic nations under attack. Economic, military, and political support would be provided, putting an end to the typical attitude of withdrawing from situations in which America is not directly involved (Dumani 31). More generally, the Truman Doctrine implied American support for other nations thought to be threatened by Soviet communism

As a result of the “Truman Doctrine”, the United States became economically linked to European countries through the Marshall Plan. The plan, according to George Marshall, then-US Secretary of State, was a long-standing concept in which America would inject money to foster economic stability in Europe and help it recover from the war. The belief that economic success would immediately transfer into political stability was central to the European Recovery Program (Smith).

For the Americans, political stability in Europe was a show of integration and unity, and the Marshall Plan played a key role in cementing the U.S. commitment to Europe. Starting with the Marshall Plan after WWII, the United States has worked tirelessly to restore Europe, and it has continued to support and encourage Europe's integration efforts. It has been the widely held American view that a united Europe, even though potentially an economic rival, would have a major contribution to make to world more peaceful (Brzezinski).

In 1947, the United States and Europe were not ready for an alliance, but the transatlantic relationship was deepened and encouraged in light of developments on the ground in Europe. In March 1947, the United Kingdom and France signed the Dunkirk Treaty (Egan and Guimarães). This treaty allows for a joint defense agreement between the two countries. It was a “Treaty of Alliance and Mutual

Assistance” between the two countries, with the goal of defending them from any resurgence of German aggression.

The leaders of the United Kingdom and France were looking for fresh way to deal with the Soviet threat because they couldn't agree on Germany's destiny. A stronger, more powerful political union was required. Britain and France were no longer hesitant to sign multilateral agreements. The political climate was ideal for signing the Brussels Treaty which united the Benelux countries and established the framework for postwar Western European cooperation (Lundestad).

On March 1948, Britain together with Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, signed in Brussels a Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense (Heathcoat-Amony). The ratification of the Brussels Treaty, which founded the Western Union, gave Britain a lot of power, but the real concern was how to get the Americans more involved in Europe (Lundestad).

The Treaty specified the core European obligations of the future trans-Atlantic deal. Following the signing of the Brussels Treaty, U.S. Senator Arthur Vandenberg was tasked with drafting a resolution outlining the U.S. Congress' support for the administration's efforts to link the U.S. to the European self-help project (Sloan). Vandenberg concurred with the State Department that the United States had a crucial stake in Europe's defense and that a military response to aggression is not out of the question (Kaplan).

Following the Vandenberg Resolution, the Truman administration took significant steps toward establishing joint defense accords with Western European nations. The United States, 10 European states (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, France, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and the United

Kingdom) and Canada signed the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, prompted by the Berlin blockade (Haglund).

On July 21, 1949, the Senate approved the North Atlantic Treaty by a vote of 82 to 13, a margin large enough to signal that the U.S. had abandoned its isolationist history (Egan and Guimarães). Since the late 18th century, this contract has formed the sole peacetime alliance between the United States and any European country.

NATO was established with a primary objective in mind: to address the trans-Atlantic security challenges. The Atlantic Alliance was founded primarily to instill confidence in Western Europe, which was lacking in countries that were recovering from WWII and doomed to live in the shadow of Soviet military might. Nonetheless, the Alliance was intended to be more than merely a military alliance from the beginning (Thies). The parties have agreed to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, safeguard their people's freedom, common heritage, civilization, and promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area, according to the North Atlantic Treaty Preamble (NATO Treaty).

Parties also pledged to contribute to the continuing development of peaceful and cordial international relations by strengthening their free institutions. They will work to resolve inconsistencies in their international economic policies and stimulate economic cooperation among any or all of them. The United States underlined its desire to expand the Marshall Plan's multilateral collaboration into the security arena by signing the North Atlantic Treaty. In this compact, the United States teamed up with Western Europe to combine American substance with European desire (Kolodziej).

3. NATO's Important Articles

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization includes several articles, the most important of which are:

3.1 Article 2

In the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO promises to increase its own cooperation in a wide variety of areas, as follows:

“The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being”. The Article also insists on members to “... seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them” (“The North Atlantic Treaty”).

3.2 Article 4

Under the authority of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO calls for consultation over military matters when the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened. It states: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened” (“The North Atlantic Treaty”).

3.3 Article 5

NATO success was founded on the importance of the Washington Treaty's Article 5, it is the core of the alliance and is of primary importance for NATO's existence.

Article 5 commits each member state to consider an armed attack against one member

state in Europe or North America, to be an armed attack against them all. Article 5 states that:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. (“The North Atlantic Treaty”)

Article 5 therefore, indicates that there was a great sense of unity among NATO allies since they will react to defend or retaliate whenever any member is attacked.

3.4 Article 6

Article 6 defined the area in which an attack would demand a unified response, as follows: “For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer (“The North Atlantic Treaty”).

4. The Harmel Report

4.1 Brief History

The Harmel report, one of NATO's most important documents, was realized in December 1967 in response to a number of reasons that had pushed the organization to the brink of a crisis (Kupiecki 1). The NATO crisis and its subsequent transformation were crucial in the 1960s, a period marked by: France's withdrawal from NATO's military structure and refusal to participate in the integrated Alliance air defense. Divergences among Alliance members, Moscow's advantage in conventional weapons and rapidly growing nuclear potential, and a persistent dispute over a new Allied strategy to escape from the massive retaliation trap and stalemate military escalation. It was also a decade marked by debates over nuclear policy and differences of opinion among members on how to improve strained relations with the communist bloc (Kupiecki 1).

From the west's view, the emergence of polycentrism in Eastern Europe posed a challenge to NATO's unity. It was feared that the Soviet Union would ease tensions selectively in order to isolate Germany and reduce U.S. influence in Europe. The problem with bridge-building was that Soviet leaders viewed it as a European means of sowing schisms inside the Warsaw Pact, a worry borne out by events in Czechoslovakia, in Moscow's opinion (Mastny). The member states'

ability to balance these new opportunities with well-known hazards was the key to NATO's development.

The withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated military structure has raised widespread doubts about NATO's relevance. The alliance needed to broaden its political responsibilities and play a bigger role in improving East-West relations. In 1966, Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel approached Washington with the idea of a major study on the future of the alliance in light of international developments to underscore the continued relevance of NATO (Locher and Nuenlist).

At the December 1966 ministerial meeting, Harmel proposed to his colleagues that the NATO Council analyzes the political events which have occurred since the Treaty was signed. The Council also studies the future tasks which face the alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them, in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable peace (Locher and Nuenlist). Harmel's proposal was well received by the Foreign Affairs Ministers, who gave NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio and the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) a broad mandate to design processes for the research and establish its scope (Mastny).

The NAC resolved in February 1967 to form an open-ended special committee of representatives named by states, which would be chaired by the Secretary General. The NAC tasked the Special Group on the Alliance's Future Tasks with researching: the development of political events as it affects the purposes of the Alliance; and the consequent future tasks of the Alliance. The Special Group was to create as many special procedures, sub-groups, and rapporteurs as it felt

necessary, as well as to seek staff work from the NATO International Staff (Locher and Nuenlist 19).

The Special Group met in secret session during the month of March 1967 to stimulate wide-ranging talks. During these discussions, they established the foundation for the study's execution. The Special Group established four sub-groups, each focusing on a broad topic of importance to the Alliance and led by a reputable rapporteur ("Discussions with Permanent Representatives").

During a final meeting in October at Ditchley Park (UK), the reports were examined and their findings compared after going through numerous phases. The Special Group conducted a two-day high-level meeting the next month, during which the substance of the Report was addressed. On November 22, 1967, the Special Group considered and updated a draft Report circulated by the Secretary General. The NATO Ministerial Session presented the Report on the Alliance's Future Tasks, which was accepted by Foreign Affairs Ministers ("07 - Future Tasks of the Alliance").

On 14 December 1967, the NATO Council approved the Harmel Report, formally titled "The Future Tasks of the Alliance". This public statement enabled the alliance to strike a new balance between its military and political functions. NATO's future security policy was to rest on two pillars: military security and a policy of détente (Locher and Neunlist).

4.2 Scope and Content

The Harmel report opens with a definition of NATO, which is defined as a group of people who share common beliefs and interests. The study made an important point, implying that the West's position toward Moscow could not be a source of Alliance divisions indefinitely. It also called for further cooperation between the two

political and military blocs, particularly on issues where bilateral connections could aid future strategic solutions. It was also urged that the USSR not view communist regimes as a single, fully controlled bloc, allowing for a wider range of connections with Eastern European countries. It was also agreed that the Alliance's future functions will be determined by four concurrent processes that characterized the world context at the time:

- 1) Halting spread of communism in Europe and undermining the unity of the Eastern bloc.
- 2) Deepening integration of Western European states and lack of balance of power between them and the United States.
- 3) Decolonization and changing relations of European states with the rest of the world.
- 4) Increasing problems in relations between developed and developing states (Kupiecki 4).

NATO's two most essential roles were presented against this backdrop. The first was related to the necessity to retain military force and political solidarity as the principal base for effective deterrence, discouraging aggression via collective defense if aggression were to be met. The second of NATO's duties, as outlined in the Harmel Report, was to deal with the insecurity of East-West ties (Kupiecki 4).

5. NATO and the Cold War

The diplomatic and security policies of Euro-Atlantic countries, as well as international organizations as NATO, were heavily influenced by the Cold War. The end of the Cold War and the transformation of NATO were brought about by profound changes in Europe in the late 1980s. Slow and meticulous consensus building since the end of the Cold War has resulted in the reinvention of a treaty-

based collective defense Alliance created in 1949 into an institution projecting influence and stability far beyond its own region. Rather than disbanding, NATO grew and evolved. Members of the Alliance continued to value the institution that had given protection for decades (Antis). Emerging threats, meanwhile, reawakened the Alliance's collective defense nature.

5.1 NATO During the Cold War

During the Cold War, NATO has kept its focus on collective defense. Issues related to Eastern-West security, European security and Member States' defense were all deemed relevant by the alliance. It also evolved from a political pledge to a sophisticated political and military structure; it established general assets for political dialogue, decision-making, military preparation, coordination, and implementation. The Alliance also established defense, financial, and production committees within its first year, in addition to a civilian staff and a secretary-general position to oversee the coalition's political operations (Kay).

These assets were primarily built to counter the danger of a Soviet military onslaught, but also to resolve allied mistrust or disagreements, and to allow the alliance to discuss issues, decide how to solve them, and put decisions into actions after they were made (Sandler and Hartley). These innovations were intended to serve as broad institutional assets that would offer information to Alliance members, allowing them to consult and make informed decisions. The NAC and civilian staff have evolved over many years to meet the demands of Alliance consultation and decision-making (Thompson 5).

The pressures of dealing with recurrent Alliance crises, such as the one over flexible response in the 1960s or the one over West Germany's Ostpolitik and the United States' detente policy in the 1970s, led the members to strengthen Alliance

mechanisms for consultation and consensus decision-making over time (Wallander 713). NATO was an efficient organization during the Cold War, working on its goals; it helped drag the U.S. into European affairs.

In late 1950, the U.S. made its first large commitment of forces to be deployed in Europe, in addition to raising its own force levels, and European countries upped their own defense budget. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was founded in 1951. The United States agreed to retain a large conventional military presence in Europe, as well as an extended nuclear deterrent, as part of the 1951 Paris Agreement opening the way for West Germany's admission as a member (Fukuyama and Kugler).

Within the U.S.-led NATO, the alliance demonstrated its strength in dealing with the German problem; it has succeeded in the reunification of Germany. Due to the possibility of escalation, a flexible reaction involved the deployment of massive numbers of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe linked to U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, in addition to the deployment of allied soldiers in West German (Fukuyama and Kugler).

West Germany became a sovereign state with the right to arm in NATO in 1955, but it agreed not to create a general staff, essentially subordinating its armed forces to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). In this approach, NATO's early institutional assets were designed to make Germany unable to rely on "national" defense policies and military strategies, as well as other NATO members (McInnis and Osgood). West Germany was apparently pro-NATO, because it saw its accession to NATO as an important step in the country's rehabilitation and paved the way for Germany to play a substantial role in the defense of Western Europe during the Cold War (Bose).

On the Economic side, NATO witnessed a remarkable development during Cold War; it established a series of committees and procedures for coordinating budgets, infrastructure spending, procurement and other economic aspects. The civil budget, military budget, standardization committees, as well as subordinate groups for consumer and production logistics, emergency preparation and arms cooperation, are all part of NATO's economic assets (Wallander).

The Cold War period is also marked by the economic isolation of the Western and Eastern bloc. Each bloc aimed to weaken its opponent and support its allies or satellite governments via economic sanctions. The "Molotov Plan," subsequently known as COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Development), was a Soviet alternative to the Marshall Plan. Its goal was to rehabilitate the countries of the Eastern bloc. The true purpose of COMECON, however, was to prevent Soviet satellite governments from seeking assistance or marching towards Western Europe (Diebold et al.).

5.2 NATO After Cold War

NATO began to change to a limited degree in the late 1980s as a result of the easing of the Cold War, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991) when NATO lost its main conventional enemy and strategic opponent. NATO has gone through a significant period of adaptation and change. One of the most important aspects of this transformation has been the creation of a new Eastern agenda. NATO's eastward expansion has been the focal point of this new agenda. Enlargement was not carried out in response to a new military threat, but rather to aid in the export of stability eastward and to prevent the emergence of a security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe (Labatut).

Without the main military and political opponent NATO was able to redefine the notion of security, by shifting its focus from the strictly defined territorial defense to the defense of the security interests of the Alliance (Good). NATO aimed its activities at cooperation with the former Soviet Union satellite states and their integration into the organization as well as into other international organizations, such as the European Union, to widen the zone of security and stability in Europe.

As Gorbachev's Soviet Union reduced its military presence in Europe, arms control negotiations grew in number and scope, and the opposing coalitions began a series of confidence-building measures, the quantity and magnitude of Alliance exercises decreased. The 1987 U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated a class of nuclear weapons that had been fundamental to NATO's strategy for credibly threatening nuclear escalation, also modified NATO's nuclear policy indirectly (Wallander). The U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed in 1991 to phase out ground-based theater nuclear forces, while NATO decreased its deployed theater nuclear forces by 80% (Fleischer).

NATO launched a review of its military strategy in November 1991, resulting in the release of the "new Strategic Concept" at its Rome summit ("Towards the New Strategic Concept"). Several institutional developments followed this shift in thinking. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was formed in 1991 as a political entity that included members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. At its summit in January 1994, NATO established the Partnership for Peace and authorized plans for forming integrated military task forces ("Declaration of the Heads of State and Government").

By 1994, NATO started reshaping its integrated command organization decreasing the major NATO commands. Allied Command Channel was incorporated

into Allied Command Europe (ACE), leaving the latter and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT); and resulting in the shuffling of the subordinate commands. NATO has also begun preparing and training to assist in the security of safe areas as well as UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR). During 1994 and 1995, NATO launched a series of limited air attacks in defense of UN safe areas. These missions ended with the Dayton Agreement of November 1995 (Wallander).

It was necessary to change the military command structure. First, NATO members insisted on a unified command structure in any future operations, and the focus on adapting NATO's command to post-Cold War objectives gave those pushing for change more clout. Second, the changed security environment required a shift in command's capacity and makeup. NATO's 1994 solution was to establish new offices (a planning staff at SHAPE and a Crisis Coordination Center in Brussels) to adapt alliance procedures to the new missions. The process started with the implementation force/ stabilization force (IFOR/ SFOR) in Bosnia (“SFOR Stabilisation Force in Bosnia”), and by 1999, when the Kosovo Crisis erupted, NATO was significantly better prepared to deploy a combined joint task force.

In the same period, the alliance had to contribute to Europe's security without threats. NATO's first attempt to address this issue was to create the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a way of including nonmembers to cope with security relations, advancing defense conversion and reform, and consulting on political- military security matters (Wallander). In this way, the NACC complements the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the European Union, and the Council of Europe in building a Euro-Atlantic community of stable and democratic societies.

The original plan was to focus on limited peacekeeping missions because peacekeeping was an apparent post-Cold War duty. The program was supposed to be called “Partnership for Peacekeeping”, but it was changed to “Partnership for Peace” after 18 soldiers died in a peacekeeping mission in Somalia (Burk 54). Its agreement covers military cooperation, planning, training, exercises, and peacekeeping.

Partner countries requested assistance in arranging the exercises, and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) collaborated with them. Civilian governments yearned for NATO's standards and procedures to influence their military, and militaries yearned for professionalization and connection with NATO military, especially after their experience as Soviet clients. NATO's leadership began sharing its military planning, exercising, and execution procedures with partners, demonstrating its commitment to Partnership for Peace. This was a significant role in influencing NATO member armies' attitudes toward expanding peacekeeping ability (Wallander).

To sum up, and according to the previous trends about the historical background of NATO, it is understood that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established as the most influential organization in the world. It was setup to tackle security challenges in the trans-Atlantic region and instill confidence in Western Europe.

NATO became a relevant military force; it has made great strides towards transforming the alliance into an entity that will have an impact not only on the European continent, but across the globe. NATO has taken on conflicts from peacekeeping, nation building and combating the war on terror. There have been debates among scholars since the end of the Cold War on whether or not NATO would continue as an alliance. Secretary General of the time Manfred Woerner, and

all leaders of NATO member states decided that NATO should be preserved. They believed that the alliance was more than a military organization; it was a “community of values” that rose above any specific threats (Dumani 95).

While NATO's high degree of organizational and institutional development sets it off from other alliances, increasing political and economic integration suggest that future security efforts by states will be more multilateral in nature and show greater institutional development than in the past. To the degree that the security needs of increasingly interdependent states are seen in a broad, multilevel perspective that encompasses political, economic, social, and domestic dimensions, alliances like NATO are likely to endure, especially as publics are increasingly unwilling to support unilateral security measures where the costs cannot be spread. The U.S. was also the strongest supporter of the idea that NATO should be transformed, not diminished.

Chapter Two

NATO's Military Interventions and Non-interventions in Conflicts

Since NATO's establishment, there have been numerous conflicts around the world, particularly in the post-Cold War era, yet the number of the Alliance interventions remains small. Hence, this chapter centers on the factors that determine NATO's interventions and non-interventions in conflicts. The chapter begins by explaining interventions of NATO since the end of the Cold War, which are divided into two categories: out of area interventions and post-9/11 interventions. Also, it provides a brief insight of how the Atlantic Alliance survived during the Cold War, persisted and transformed into the world's largest peacetime military Alliance after the Cold War. Then, the chapter explores the cases of NATO's interventions in Bosnia and Afghanistan, as well as its non-interventions in Rwanda and Syria, while also it sheds light on U.S. role as an active member in NATO and its continued commitments to the Alliance's missions. Finally, the chapter discusses the possible criteria for justifying NATO's military actions and inaction in conflicts.

1. Interventions of NATO

Since its inception in 1949, NATO history has been violent. The Alliance has been under pressure during the Cold War due to the divergences and crises its major member countries engaged in, such as; the tension over France withdrawal from NATO, West Germany's Ostpolitik (which was a diplomatic policy aimed at normalizing relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe.), U.S. deployment of missiles in Europe, the Suez Crisis, and U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War... etc (Ludlow). However, NATO sticks to the mission of collective defense as defined by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The transatlantic success therefore was

reflected in the fact that, the periods between 1949 and 1989, NATO forces were not engaged in any military operation at all (“NATO’s Military Missions”).

At the end of the Cold War, the communist threat disappeared and the Soviet Union disintegrated. Many scholars expected that NATO would disappear as well. Neorealist theories for example believed that an Alliance without threat will not last. Scholars like Waltz Kenneth predicted the dissolution of the transatlantic Alliance with the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Hellmann and Wolf 18), yet NATO survived, and expanded its operational role of territorial defense of its members to include engagement in out of area regions via peace and support operations.

The Balkans' 1990s events, particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo, saw the first ever NATO peacekeeping missions, the Alliance interventions were successful in bringing an end to the Bosnian conflict. Similarly, the ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo came to an end a few years later (Schmidt 94). These interventions confirmed that NATO would survive but would perform different kinds of missions.

After a decade without a strategic threat, NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept highlighted non-traditional threats and discussed how to address new security challenges. The Washington Summit in 1999 included the following reference: “Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources...” (“The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”). New global circumstances and challenges will therefore be the incentives for NATO to act.

Subsequently, NATO intervened following the U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan, and in Iraq upon the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) in the United States. After a decade fighting terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of

Mass Destruction (WMD), the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011 has highlighted the unpredictability of threats and the necessity to retain a broad range of military capabilities. The U.S. as the driving force behind NATO's formation and as the Alliance's ostensible leader proved the Atlantic Alliance's relevance in the twenty-first century in maintaining global security in the current threat environment (Roth Jr), it did so by demonstrating its capabilities in a wide spectrum of multilateral interventions with European members of NATO.

The table below (Table 1.) includes major NATO's interventions especially out of area and post 9/11 missions, and provides brief details about missions' code names, where they took place, and when each mission started and ended.

Table 1. NATO's Post-Cold War Missions in Chronological Sequence

NATO Operation	Where	Started	Ended
<i>Anchor Guard</i>	Turkey	Aug 90	Mar 91
<i>Ace Guard</i>	Turkey	Jan 91	Mar 91
<i>Agile Genie</i>	The Mediterranean Sea	May 92	May 92
<i>Maritime Monitor</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Jul 92	Nov 92
<i>Sky Monitor</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Oct 92	Apr 93
<i>Maritime Guard</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Nov 92	Jun 93
<i>Deny Flight</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Apr 93	Dec 95
<i>Sharp Guard</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Jun 93	Oct 96
<i>Deliberate Force</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Aug 95	Sep 95
<i>Joint Endeavour (IFOR)</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Dec 95	Dec 96
<i>Joint Guard (SFOR)</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Dec 96	Jun 98
<i>Joint Forge (SFOR)</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Jun 98	Dec 04
<i>Allied Force</i>	Kosovo	Mar 99	Jun 99
KFOR	Kosovo	Jun 99	on-going
<i>Essential Harvest</i>	Macedonia	Aug 01	Sep 01
<i>Amber Fox</i>	Macedonia	Sep 01	Dec 02
<i>Eagle Assist</i>	The United States	Oct 01	May 02
<i>Active Endeavour</i>	The Mediterranean Sea	Oct 01	on-going
<i>Allied Harmony</i>	Macedonia	Dec 02	Mar 03
<i>Display Deterrence</i>	Turkey	Feb 03	Apr 03
ISAF	Afghanistan	Dec 03	on-going
<i>Distinguished Games</i>	Greece	Jun 04	Sep 04
<i>Allied Provider</i>	The Indian Ocean	Oct 08	Dec 08
<i>Allied Protector</i>	The Indian Ocean	Mar 09	Aug 09
<i>Ocean Shield</i>	The Indian Ocean	Aug 09	on-going
<i>Unified Protector</i>	Libya	Apr 11	on-going

Note: Currently all of NATO's on-going operations, as listed in the table, have been successfully completed.

Source: Edström, Håkan, and Dennis Gyllensporre. *Pursuing Strategy : Nato*

Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi. Edited by Håkan Edström and

Dennis Gyllensporre, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 13.

1.1 NATO's Out of Area Interventions (1989 to 2001)

From 1989 to 2001, NATO shifted its strategy from collective defense to out of area interventions, which are the operations that took the Alliance beyond of its geographical borders, the Alliance also has evolved beyond its defense mission and adapted to the new security challenges, while also has broadened its security agenda. Between 1989 and 2001, NATO adopted two Strategic Concepts, the first in 1991 and the second in 1999, both of which proposed the transformation of the Alliance for future political and military activities, reaffirmed the Alliance's core commitment to collective defense, by developing military capabilities in order to maintain the Euro-Atlantic area's security and stability, as well as addressing the challenges of the twenty-first century (“Strategic Concepts”). In general, these two Strategic Concepts would suggest that NATO is becoming more political and global.

The Strategic Concept of 1991 highlighted the risks to Alliance security, which are unpredictable and can arise in various ways. The concept stated that:

Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe... (“The Alliance's New Strategic Concept”)

Thus, the transatlantic military Alliance has to adapt to new security contexts by taking military actions outside of its borders. In the early 1990s, U.S. politician Senator Richard Lugar remarked that in the post-Cold War period NATO had to go “out of area or out of business” (qtd.in Asmus). Lugar’s words left no room to doubt

NATO's engagement in its new post-Cold War missions, and mainly out of area interventions.

During the Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict in 1995, NATO launched the first out of area military operation, Operation Deliberate Force, which suppressed Bosnian Serb air warfare capabilities, and in 1999, an air campaign called Operation Allied Force (OAF) in Kosovo effectively stopped Milosevic's ethnic cleansing (Hendrickson). Accordingly, these NATO's successful out of area interventions provided peace to the Balkans while also opened up more possibilities for the Alliance's survival and development. They also put an end to the intra-Alliance debate about NATO's post-Cold War role.

2.1.2 NATO's post-9/11 interventions (2001 to the Present)

NATO interventions in the post-9/11 period may alternatively be referred to as "out of Europe interventions" owing to the fact that NATO began acting beyond the European theater after the 9/11 events. In this period, the international security environment has altered dramatically following the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States on September 11, 2001. In response to the terrorist attacks, the next day NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter for the first time in its history (Pruitt), which states that "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all..." ("The North Atlantic Treaty").

With the acceleration of globalization and the rise of new threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, NATO started operating out of European borders. For this reason, the Alliance has carried out operations in the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East, and Africa. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, NATO launched Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) in

the Mediterranean Sea (“Operation Active Endeavour”), in which the Alliance adopted maritime operations to hinder terrorist activity in the Mediterranean.

The International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), on the other hand, was NATO's first deployment outside of Europe and its first counter-insurgency mission when it was launched in 2003. ISAF was deployed in Afghanistan to provide efficient security in the capital Kabul, but its mission was subsequently expanded to include the whole country's stabilization and reconstruction (Morelli and Belkin). In 2004, NATO established Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I), a non-combat mission aimed at assisting and training Iraqi security forces (Sharp and Blanchard), the mission was a part of NATO peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts.

NATO operations continued to be carried out in many parts of the world. In 2011, following Qaddafi's forces attacks on civilians, the Alliance launched Operation Unified Protector (OUP) which backed Libyan rebels in their fight for democracy and the removal of the Qadhafi regime (“NATO and Libya”). The intervention in Libya demonstrated that NATO continues to be a vital source of stability in the face of international crises, and marked the last intervention of the transatlantic Alliance in the post-Cold War world.

After the Libyan crisis, new international crises have emerged. These crises directly affect the security of NATO's European members, represented by the resurgence of the Russian threat demonstrated by Moscow's illegal seizure of Crimea, the war in Eastern Ukraine, and the Syrian war, were all serious international conflicts (Fryc), yet NATO members did not act at all. Nonetheless, the Alliance has implemented security measures to counter the Russian threat as well as other hybrid threats.

After all, the events of 9/11 and the War on Terror altered the global security environment, triggering a substantial reform and transformation process inside NATO that resulted in new political, military structures, and capabilities to meet the security commitments outlined in the Washington Treaty. Stephen Hadley, U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser, stated:

NATO's core mission is the same today as it was at its founding. Collective defence and consultation about threats to peace and security. NATO put this mission into new practice following the 11 September terrorist attacks. No-one would have predicted that NATO's first invocation of Article 5 would have come in response to an attack hatched in Afghanistan... Article 5 of the NATO Treaty became real that day in a new one, and one that should surely give pause to those who question NATO's purposes. NATO's core mission has not changed. What has changed is the source of the threats to our countries. (qtd.in "Challenge and Change for NATO")

2. NATO's Interventionism and Non-interventionism

NATO's main purpose and mission were lost with the end of the Cold War, but the Alliance's scope was expanded in the post-Cold War years, it went on to undertake missions out of the Euro-Atlantic area, including peacekeeping operations in the nineties. Afterwards, conducting counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, as well as countering the proliferation of WMD in the post-9/11 era. Operationally, the types of NATO interventions that have been successfully carried out have almost covered the entire spectrum, mainly in the countries of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, respectively (Ruiz Palmer).

Notwithstanding, it is worth considering why the Atlantic Alliance intervened in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya but not, for example, in Rwanda's

tragedy or in Syria's endless Civil War. So, In order to understand the criteria for NATO's actions and inactions, this section will explore four different crises, two of which the Alliance intervened in and two of which the Alliance did not.

2.1 NATO Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina

With the end of the Cold War, the stability in Eastern Europe has become more volatile. In the early nineties, Bosnia and Herzegovina was embroiled in a three-year conflict that began shortly after the country declared its independence from Yugoslavia in April 1992 (History.com Editors). This independence would create troubles in the near future.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet threat, NATO's missions and responsibilities have evolved. At the 1991 Rome Summit, the Alliance took on the mission of defending Europe from threats both within and outside NATO's boundaries. More significantly, following the Oslo Summit in June 1992, peacekeeping became an official NATO mission (Gates and Terasawa 373). Therefore, with the tragic events of the Bosnian conflict, the Atlantic Alliance was the only military force capable of bringing the conflict to an end.

The crisis in Bosnia was first addressed by European countries under the auspices of the UN. Although, the location of the crisis threatened the security of NATO's European members, the Clinton administration was against U.S. involvement in the Balkans, and left the initiative to its European allies (Cimbala and Forster 123).

On the one hand, NATO became more involved in efforts to end the Bosnian war. Between 1992 and 1995, a variety of actions were undertaken by the Alliance to monitor and to enforce the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina ("NATO Madrid Summit"). In response to the UN request, the Alliance provided close air

support and air strikes in support of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) activities in reply to attacks against the cities specified in the UNSC Resolution 824 (“UNPROFOR”). The shift to air strikes approach therefore would prompt Clinton’s administration to intervene.

On the other hand, the U.S. unwillingness to share the risks involved in Bosnia's peacekeeping efforts was criticized by allied officials, particularly when European nations had placed their ground troops in Bosnia while Washington did not (Gordon). Nonetheless, the Serbian bombing of Sarajevo's marketplace in February 1994 was a watershed moment, in which the U.S. policy towards the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina changed dramatically (Henriksen 122). Further, as a result of the failure of the European efforts, Washington finally decided to intervene (Cimbala and Forster 123).

The U.S. backed both Deny Flight and Deliberate Force campaigns with enormous air assets (Larson 66–68). Operation Deny Flight which was NATO's first major air operation in the Bosnian crisis, was launched in April 1993 and ended in December 1995, with the goal of enforcing the UNSC Resolution 816. The same applies to the next campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, which was launched in response to Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo. It lasted from August 1995 to September 1995, with the goal of pushing Serbian forces to comply with UN resolutions (Larsdotter 60-81)..

Ultimately, these operations helped to bring about the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA), signed in Paris on December 14, 1995, and NATO took a lead role in the Implementation Force (IFOR) between December 1995 and December 1996, and the subsequent Stabilization Force (SFOR) between December 1996 and 2004 (Larsdotter 60-81). As Bosnia and Herzegovina's security situation improved, NATO officially

ended the SFOR mission on December 02, 2004, and replaced by a military force led by the EU called Operation Althea (“Peace Support Operations in Bosnia”).

In brief, NATO's inactivity in the early 1990s resulted in the conflict escalation, thousands of deaths, and regional instability in the Balkans. This inactivity is linked to the Clinton administration's reluctance to intervene, during which NATO looked for the U.S. leadership. Anyhow, the U.S. late intervention helped to end the Bosnian conflict, by leading NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb forces, and brokering the DPA, that officially ended the country's war (Garding).

Equally important, NATO's successful intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the Alliance's first significant peacekeeping mission outside of its member territory, serving as a sort of "blue print" for subsequent missions (Carati 4). It was also a turning point in NATO's history, as the Atlantic Alliance transitioned from a collective defense to a security organization.

2.2 NATO Non-Intervention in Rwanda

2.2.1 Brief history

Rwanda has a history of two divided ethnic groups: Hutus (85% of the population) and Tutsis (14%), and this history served as a prelude to the tragedy that erupted in 1994. The civil unrest between the Tutsis and the Hutus began during Belgium's colonization of Rwanda, when Belgian colonists treated the Hutus as inferior to the Tutsis. Notwithstanding, following the independence of Rwanda, the Hutu seized power, over the years, their attacks against the Tutsis led to the displacement of half of the population, who fled the country as refugees to Uganda. In 1990, A rebel group known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) consisting mostly of Uganda-based Tutsi refugees, invaded Rwanda and the conflict deteriorated in the country until a peace accord was signed in 1993 (“Rwanda Chronology”).

By 1994, tensions between the RPF and the government had reached an all-time high. On April 6, 1994, the plane carrying then-President Juvenal Habyarimana, and his counterpart Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi was shot down as it was flying over Kigali. Hutu extremists blamed the RPF and launched a slaughtering campaign, which lasted from April to July 1994. The ethnic Hutu militias killed the country's Tutsi minority in addition to moderate Hutus who opposed the massacres, which resulted in the murder of at least eight hundred thousand people (“Rwanda Genocide”).

The mass killings in Rwanda were carried out despite the presence of UN troops in the country. The UNSC members did not call the massacre a genocidal act, which would oblige them to intervene and stop the slaughter. However, the situation in Rwanda was rescued temporarily when the UNSC Resolution 929 sanctioned the French-led military operation known as Operation Turquoise, which took place from June 23 to August 21, 1994. Unfortunately, this operation not only protected civilians but it also helped the Rwandan Armed Forces’ (FAR) retreat into Zaire (Binet 8).

On August 21, 1994 Operation Turquoise's mandate ended and the forces were compelled to leave. As a result, the RPF right away regained the control, causing a new flow of refugees (“UNAMIR”). This French-led intervention showed that halting the civil unrest between Rwanda's ethnic groups is impossible, because such action should have occurred before the genocidal campaign.

2.2.2 Absence of Intervention in the Rwandan Crisis

To some extent, the horrific slaughter seemed to have been averted by UN member states in the very beginning of the civil unrest. The mounted death toll after the first day of ethnic cleansing campaign against the Tutsi minority indicated the need for intervention. The UN, on the contrary, unanimously voted the withdrawal

and reducing the peacekeeping force from 2500 to 270 (“100 Days of Slaughter”). Correspondingly, the absence of a UN legal mandate for an intervention supports NATO's non-intervention in Rwanda.

Furthermore, In April 1994, as the Rwandan massacre unfolded, NATO was involved in the urgent situation in Bosnia. In which the U.S. and its allies sent their top diplomats and military leaders to execute the DPA (Harsch and Headley). Conceivably, the Alliance could not possibly have intervened in Bosnia and Rwanda at the same time. So, NATO's involvement in Bosnia at the expense of Rwanda seems to reinforce the argument for the Alliance's inaction in the latter.

In contrast to their actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO countries did not intervene in Rwanda due to the fact that they had no substantial economic interest in the country. Furthermore, in terms of geographical location, Rwanda lies in central Africa, which is far away from the North Atlantic area. Hence, NATO involvement seems unlikely (Valentino 575), as the Rwandan conflict is too far away from posing a security threat to the Alliance's members.

2.3 NATO Intervention in Afghanistan

Following the 9/11 events, it became evident that security could no longer be considered solely on regional terms. Since then, NATO has progressively shifted away from the 1990s' mainly Euro-centric focus in favor of a more outward-looking approach, evidenced by the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan (Moore 10).

The NATO mission in Afghanistan has become a hot topic of debate, and seen by many as a test case for the viability of the Alliance, in spite of this, NATO's security paradigm has shifted significantly as a result of the global War on Terror. In the wake of the terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda upon the United States on September 11, 2001, the allies responded quickly and decisively, on September 12, 2001, the NAC

declared the Article 5 mutual defense clause of the Washington Treaty (Hamilton et al. 14–16). The Article was invoked for the first time in the Alliance's 52 years history.

In fact, the war in Afghanistan is led by the U.S. and not by NATO (Hallams et al. 8). The Alliance did not initially join the Afghanistan campaign because the U.S. rejected the assistance provided by its allies, preferring to avoid the complexity of yet another "war by committee". This is largely due to NATO's politics of decision-making which exposed internal divisions during OAF in Kosovo, as Ellen Hallams noted, "NATO's operation in Kosovo left the Americans feeling distinctly weary of conducting 'war by committee'" (Hallams 40), suggesting that the U.S. did not want to go through a consensus decision-making process when it came to carrying out military operation in Afghanistan.

Another reason the Bush administration rejected the assistance provided by its allies was that the increasing capabilities gap and defense spending between the U.S. and its European allies has raised concerns for interoperability (Nevers 43). Thus, the sluggish pace of NATO's consensus-building process and the organization's capabilities imbalance prompted Bush's administration unilateral action in Afghanistan.

Strikes against al Qaeda terrorists training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan began after Bush's address to the public on October 7, 2001. President George W. Bush stated:

Good afternoon. On my orders, the United States military has begun strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack

the military capability of the Taliban regime . (“Presidential Address to the Nation”)

On the same day, the U.S. military troops deployed to Afghanistan with coalition assistance commenced air strikes on al Qaeda and Taliban targets as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) war on global terrorism (Katzman and Thomas). The aim of OEF was to limit the Taliban support from providing al Qaeda with a safe haven, and to prevent it from operating inside Afghanistan (Dale). Nevertheless, in early March 2002, the U.S.-led Operation Anaconda succeeded to destroy Taliban and al Qaeda forces and eliminated the last remaining organized resistance in Shah-i-Kot Valley (Stewart).

Though in reality, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO was far from inactive. During this period, the Alliance provided Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircrafts that were sent to help and protect the U.S. Also, NATO launched OAE which was the only Article 5 mission, in which NATO's Standing Maritime Forces conducted naval patrols in the Mediterranean to detect and deter terrorist activity (“Countering Terrorism”). As a deterrence and surveillance tools, AWACS and OAE provided full control at sea and in the air in support of the U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and the implementation of NATO’s anti-terrorism strategy as well.

The Atlantic Alliance major response to the 9/11 came over a year later, when it took leadership of the ISAF in Afghanistan in August 2003 (Hallams et al. 58). After the U.S.-led operation ousted Taliban regime, The UN sanctioned the ISAF to act as an international peacekeeping force to preserve security in Kabul. When the mandate was expanded in October 2003, ISAF was tasked with providing security and reconstruction assistance throughout Afghanistan (Hallams et al. 127). This suggests

that the ISAF's long-term existence would be required to secure Afghanistan's transformation.

ISAF's main goal, as mandated by the UN, was to assist the Afghan government in providing efficient security across the country and training new Afghan security forces so that Afghanistan would never again become a safe haven for terrorists. Beginning in 2011, security responsibilities were gradually passed to Afghan troops. When the ISAF mission ended in 2014, the Afghan forces acquired full security responsibilities. Instead, On January 1, 2015, a new, smaller non-combat mission code-named Resolute Support Mission (RSM) began to give more training, advising, and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions (“ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan”).

Trump's administration, moreover, proposed a new plan in 2017 that included sustained support for the Afghan government and soldiers as well as the deployment of additional American personnel (Davis and Landler). After all, NATO member nations agreed to begin withdrawing U.S. and RSM forces from Afghanistan by May 1, 2021 (“NATO and Afghanistan”).

In spite of everything, after a two-decade involvement in Afghanistan, NATO’s mission in the country officially ended on August 2021, but in an unpredictable scenario in which the Taliban government took control of the country. Considering this, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg clearly stated, “The United States agreed with the Taliban last year that U.S. troops would withdraw by May. And after many rounds of consultations, all Allies agreed to follow the U.S. decision.” He eventually stressed “NATO remains a strong Alliance, and we have to remember that the reason we went into Afghanistan was to fight international terrorism... we aren't going to stay in Afghanistan forever.” (qtd.in “Press Briefing on

Afghanistan”). Arguably, it seems that Jens Stoltenberg's statements highlighted the U.S. great influence over NATO decision-making, while also demonstrated that NATO actions are not necessarily based on consensus when the decisions are at the U.S. hand.

2.4 NATO Non-Intervention in Syria

2.4.1 Background to the Syrian Civil War

Syria has been struggling with political and economic conditions, similar to the conditions that led to the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, and Syria’s government has been heavily criticized due to its authoritarian regime. In March 2011, fifteen teenage boys were detained and tortured for drawing slogans referring to the revolutions in the Arab world, with one of them being killed. The arrests provoked outrage and protests gradually spread across the country. Bashar al-Assad's government, on the other hand, responded to the protests by killing and arresting hundreds of people over the next few years (Marks).

The peaceful uprising against al-Assad's government escalated into a multi-sided Civil War has been going on for almost a decade, in which more than 380,000 people have died, cities have been destroyed, and the majority of civilians displaced in neighboring countries. According to The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), by the end of 2020, the death toll from Syria’s conflict reached over 387,118, among them 116,911 civilians. It did not include 205,300 people were missing and presumed dead, including 88,000 civilians died due to torture in government-run prisons (“Why Has the Syrian War Lasted 10 Years?”). However, al-Assad’s regime atrocities against civilians and the high number of casualties during Syria’s Civil War did not elicit any external intervention to save the situation.

2.4.2 Absence of Intervention in Syria

The rising death toll from the conflict, Syria's geographic proximity to Turkey, which would challenge the security of one of NATO's members, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are all justifications for NATO to intervene, however the intervention has yet to take place due to other factors. First and foremost because of Russia's position and its involvement in the Syrian Civil War. In which there have been multiple attempts to pass UN sanctions on al-Assad's regime. However, the UNSC resolutions have been vetoed by Russia and China ("Syria War"). Hence, the idea of launching a NATO-led operation in response to the situation in Syria would only increase the tensions between Russia and the West.

Another factor for NATO's non-intervention in Syria is that both the U.S. and NATO have made it clear that the Security Council and regional support are needed to address the Syria crisis. The region is also divided, with some countries like Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia supporting the rebels, and others including Russia and Iran, backing al-Assad's regime. In addition, given the similarities between Libya and Syria as humanitarian cases, many predicted that Syria might be next after the NATO-led militarily intervention in Libya in 2011. Conversely, NATO's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen confirmed that the Alliance will not intervene in Syria (Joyner).

In response to a question about the difference between Syria and Libya, Rasmussen noted that the situation in both countries is different. For instance, in Libya, OUP was carried out under a UN mandate to protect civilians and the region's countries have actively supported NATO. While in Syria these conditions were not fulfilled (Joyner). Therefore, the Atlantic Alliance would not intervene in Syria in the future, according to NATO Secretary General.

3. Discussion

Arguably, the types of conflicts occurred in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Rwanda, and Syria are all included in NATO's agenda. Despite intervening in Bosnia and Afghanistan, the Alliance did not intervene in Rwanda and Syria due to a variety of factors. For instance, NATO's military engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be explained by the proximity of conflict that poses a security threat to NATO's European members, while the involvement in Afghanistan can be explained by the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

Controversially, NATO's non-interventions generated contradictions over the criteria that determine the Alliance's response to crises, i.e. NATO did not act during Rwanda's genocide despite the fact that it represented a humanitarian crisis; the same situation exists in Syria, where the R2P has not been implemented. Also, after the Turkish F-4 jet was shot down by the Syrian army near Syrian border (Mawad and Gladstone), Turkey could apply Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty which states that "the Parties will consult whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened" ("The North Atlantic Treaty"). However, there has been no action taken.

The results in this chapter indicate that NATO's interventions and non-interventions are mostly determined by the UNSC mandates. Simply put, the UNSC has authorized resolutions supporting NATO's actions in Bosnia and Afghanistan, but not in Rwanda and Syria where no legal mandate to intervene exists. Another view is that, while NATO members agreed to intervene militarily in Bosnia, there was no such consensus in Afghanistan, as evidenced by U.S. unilateralism. This would suggest that NATO's military interventions are motivated by U.S. interests. The

United States appears to have had interests in Bosnia and Afghanistan, but none in Rwanda or Syria.

Chapter Three

U.S.-NATO Relations: Equal Membership or Leadership?

The Case of Libya

In response to the emerging security challenges in the post-Cold War era, NATO has been involved in a wide range of operations in and beyond Europe. These included operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. NATO's operation in Libya in 2011 code-named Operation Unified Protector (OUP) will be the case study of this research to understand the U.S.-NATO relationship, whether it is equal Membership or Leadership.

The Libyan case was chosen because it was the latest in a long line of military interventions by the transatlantic Alliance since the end of the Cold War. It is an operation that has generated heated debate among critics about whether NATO's intervention was successful or not.

This study firstly, highlights the historical context of NATO response to the Libyan crisis. Then, it focuses on the U.S. hesitation to intervene at the very beginning, and its late engagement which came after enforcing UN resolution. An analysis to Obama's administration foreign policy is provided as well as the U.S. contributions to the Libyan campaign. Finally, the study concludes with an analysis and discussion of the findings, which reveal the relationship of U.S.-NATO within the context of 2011 military intervention in Libya

1. Historical Context of NATO Response to the Libyan Crisis

The NATO military intervention in Libya was the Alliance's first combat operation against a North Africa Arab country. The first time the U.S. "led from behind" and the first time the idea of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was used to

defend Libya's civilian people against a 'murderous dictatorship'. Early in 2011, Massive anti-government protests erupted across North Africa. Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, who had been in power for 23 years, was forced to depart the country immediately. Egyptian President Muhammed Hosni Mubarak, who had held power for more than 30 years, was forced to resign in just 18 days (Gaub et al.). These remarkable political developments in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt sparked similar demonstrations in Algeria, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya.

Following the political upheavals linked with the "Arab Spring", political protests erupted in several parts of Libya in early 2011, demanding democratic changes and the ouster of Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi. Unlike in other regions, the protests in Libya quickly escalated into an armed conflict, partly due to Gaddafi's decision to suppress the uprising with brutality and partly due to the rapid consolidation of an armed opposition group known as the Interim National Transitional Council (NTC) (Bellamy and Williams 838). Within a few weeks, the protestors launched an armed insurgency, seizing control of a number of towns and cities, and forming the NTC.

Government forces replied quickly, driving the insurgents back and retaking control of numerous previously rebel-controlled areas. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported on ill-treatment, beatings, injuries, rapes, torture, murders, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary arrests of demonstrators. These tortures included attorneys, human rights activists, and journalists (Ulfstein and Christiansen). Libyan security forces responded by opening fire on demonstrators with heavy weaponry. Fighter planes and helicopter gunships assaulted individuals with no way of defending themselves (Gaub et al.).

On March 17, 2011, one month after the beginning of the Libyan revolution and with up to 2000 people killed, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agreed to support a no fly –zone over Libya and approved all necessary measures to protect civilians. While France, the UK, and the U.S. responded immediately with air and missile attacks against Qaddafi troops under the U.S. command, plans to hand over the job to the NATO within days of the operation were considered. NATO agreed to implement the weapons embargo against Libya on March 22, 2012, and two days later announced that it will take over the military aspects of UNCS Resolution 1973 (Gaub et al.).

In phase one of OUP, NATO and its partners launched a series of attacks against different Qaddafi government ground-based devices, systems, and heavy artillery, as well as enforcing the no-fly zone. At the time, the insurgents demonstrated a low degree of military capability. However, air assaults by allies on government forces surrounding Benghazi and other rebel-held cities, as well as large numbers of loyalist soldiers within, bolstered the rebels (Ulfstein and Christiansen).

UNSC Resolution 1973, paragraph 4, allowed UN member states to take all necessary measures to safeguard people and civilian populated areas under threat of assault in The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi (Ulfstein and Christiansen). The Security Council issued a clear warning to Qaddafi by specifically mentioning Benghazi in Resolution 1973. If Qaddafi does not immediately withdraw his forces from the promised major attacks on Benghazi, NATO will launch a military intervention to ensure its safety (McGreal et al.)

The fast advance of Qaddafi troops within striking distance of the rebel-held city of one million people presented an urgent need for protection, and there was no space for ambiguity regarding the legitimacy of safeguarding Benghazi. NATO

conducted an informal conference in Berlin on the 14th and 15th of April 2011 with NATO foreign ministers and non-NATO countries involved in the Libyan crisis to review the alliance's military participation in the country (Moore).

The U.S. and other NATO allies rejected French and British demands to contribute more to the air campaign in order to assist break the military deadlock. On April 14, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and British Prime Minister David Cameron issued a joint statement in numerous publications. The three state leaders vowed that NATO will defend civilians and emphasized that as long as Qaddafi is in power, NATO must sustain its activities in order to protect civilians and put pressure on the government (“Opinion | Libya’s Pathway to Peace”).

The three leaders recognized that their responsibility and mission under UNSC Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians, which they are doing. It is not a forceful removal of Qaddafi. Nonetheless, they maintained that a future for Libya with Qaddafi in charge was difficult to envision, and that a meaningful transition from dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process could only begin when Qaddafi departed (Ulfstein and Christiansen).

NATO was effectively supreme in air and in navy at the time, while the loyalist military and rebels were blocking on the ground. This strategic equation has changed little for more than four months. The performance of the Alliance was scarcely ideal in many crucial ways. While the “defensive” mission to preserve rebels was officially justified, there was unofficial emphasis on regime change. Many NATO countries were reluctant to actively participate, especially the U.S., and the military capacities for more aggressive operations had been restricted. As the operation continued throughout summer and public condemnation escalated, many

NATO member countries began to reduce their military commitments and the Alliance appeared like it was prepared to explore a diplomatic settlement (Michaels).

2. U.S. Contributions to NATO's OUP

2.1 U.S. Reluctance to Intervene in Libya

When the Libyan conflict arose, the U.S. was hesitant to intervene at the early stages, let alone use NATO to carry out the operation immediately. With the lessons of Iraq and a pressed economy at home, President Obama refused to take command of the Libyan mission, instead delegating it to his European and Arab allies. His preference was “leading from behind”, as opposed to the Bush model of leading alone (Ryan). When the situation escalated, France and Britain took the lead in waging war against Gaddafi, even though the U.S. was not involved.

Many arguments attempted to separate what was happening in Libya from U.S. strategic objectives. For starters, public support was extremely low in the backdrop of the financial crisis, and particularly in the context of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ambassador Kathleen Stephens believed that the American people understood that in order to maintain global leadership, the U.S. needed to be fundamentally strong and competitive in economy and infrastructure, and that performing the Libyan mission would not be an acceptable choice among the general public (Song).

Furthermore, both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars had become increasingly unpopular with the majority of Americans. In fact, the memory of prior wars has profoundly affected not just present public sentiment toward war, but also how the administration views additional military participation. Barack Obama campaigned on ending the conflicts in Iraq, reaching out to the Muslim World, and improving ties between the U.S. and the Arab World (Chesterman). Thus initiating another war

against an Arab Muslim country was regarded as very undesirable by the administration.

The U.S.' lack of direct primary interest in Libya was widely accepted, therefore a response to a state that posed no threat to the American people would be unnecessary; nonetheless, Libya crossed the threshold, making it a major strategic priority for the U.S., which was unavoidable. As a result, no assessment of the U.S. interest in Libya was made in the administration's public statements, which would support military intervention. The U.S. does not consider Libya to be attractive in the energy or gas sectors, but European allies have obtained gas and oil from Libya through massive agreements (Purushothaman).

As a result of Qaddafi's intention for ending Libya's National Oil Corporation's (NOC) contracts with Western oil groupings like the oil giant BP, the Libyan conflict has been shown to have harmed European nations' economic interests. In addition, European security was more directly threatened, given that Europe was physically closer to Libya, with perhaps migrants flowing across the Mediterranean destabilizing the governments and economies of Europe (Lutterbeck).

2.2 The U.S. Engagement in the Libyan Operation

According to President Obama, the primary reason for employing armed troops in Libya was to prevent a humanitarian calamity and to fulfill the “Responsibility to Protect” (Song). This clear justification for U.S. military action in Libya contributed to removing all concerns and finally allowed the Obama administration to proclaim its participation in the Libyan operation.

The US's initial response to the Libyan situation may have begun in early February, when the U.S. evacuated its nationals in Libya. President Obama then called the carnage in Libya “outrageous”, and stated that America will use the full

range of tools to react to this situation (“Remarks by the President on Libya”).

However, while the president reaffirmed that the U.S. “would stand with (the Libyan people) in the face of unjustified bloodshed” (qtd.in Blomdahl), he did not specify what type of aid the U.S. was willing to give.

He also called for Gaddafi's resignation, but did not specify what actions the U.S. would take to achieve that conclusion. In reaction to the escalating bloodshed in Libya, President Obama signed Executive Order 13566 on February 25, imposing significant economic penalties on Gaddafi, by his administration, and close allies. On the same day, Hillary Clinton authorized a policy to revoke the visas of Libyan officials involved for recent human rights breaches, as well as a suspension of the U.S.'s extremely limited military cooperation with Libya. On the other hand, as one senior defense official stated on March 13, the U.S. military would not send soldiers into Libya, even for humanitarian reasons, until Gaddafi was removed from office (Tang and Ham).

The increasing U.S. pressure on Gaddafi was, according to senior official, “just the latest in a series of twists and turns in the relationship between Washington and Tripoli throughout his 42 years of power” (qtd.in “Clinton to Libya”). As a result, undeterred of the inadequate international response, Gaddafi proceeded to push his armed troops into opposition-held cities in eastern Libya, heightening the prospect of civilian casualties and a humanitarian disaster. Gaddafi demanded that civilians disarm in exchange for “universal amnesty” and “protection” or chose exile in a series of remarks broadcast on state television and radio (Solan).

He further stated, “We will not show mercy” to the city of Benghazi and its 700,000 inhabitants, and anyone who defied Gaddafi's demands were labeled as

“rats”, “apostates”, and “traitors”, and would suffer a “purge” that would take place “room by room” and “person by individual” (Pack and White).

Thousands of people were forced to flee Libya and stay in border transit camps in Tunisia and Egypt. Gaddafi denied intentionally targeting people, but his overreaction to protests revealed his plot to escalate the conflict to a humanitarian disaster, awakening America and the world community to the fact that “Qaddafi must go” (Song).

President Obama made more specific comments on the U.S. participation on 18 March in view of the 1973 Resolution that “a ceasefire must be implemented immediately” and “all attacks against civilians must stop” (Song). He further stated that “Gaddafi must stop his troops from advancing on Benghazi, pull them back from Ajdabiya, Misurata, and Zawiya, and establish water, electricity and gas supplies to all areas. Humanitarian assistance must be allowed to reach the people of Libya” (qtd.in Song).

The President stressed that the requirements were not negotiable, warning Gaddafi that the international community would impose the consequences if he failed to abide by the resolution, and that the Resolution would be implemented via military action. He made it clear that the United States' military objectives were restricted, demanding that all attacks on civilians cease; Gaddafi halt his soldiers from advancing on Benghazi and restore water, power, and gas supplies to all regions; and humanitarian aid be allowed to reach the people of Libya (“Remarks by the President on the Situation in Libya”).

The reasons for intervention in Libya were insufficient since there were no clear, first-order U.S. interests at risk. Despite recognizing that America's security was not jeopardized, President Obama emphasized that he had a responsibility to intervene

when the country's "interests and values" were jeopardized. "That is what happened in Libya during the previous six weeks" (qtd.in Travers and Wolf), he claims. Taking action in Libya was a critical step in demonstrating support for the Arab Spring and conveying a message that crackdown on democratic movements would not be allowed.

On the other hand, by stressing external demands from actors such as France, the United Kingdom, and the Arab League, the U.S. did not want to be perceived as being unable to act. The country had, for a long time, encouraged others to be more aggressive and accountable (Song).

Stephen Flanagan, a senior political scientist at the Research And Development Corporation agreed, saying that allowing Gaddafi to carry out attacks against Benghazi and others in the West would send a message to other authoritarian leaders in the Middle East that the West would not worry if they could only murder enough people (Tonelson). In his speech on the Middle East and North Africa on May 19, 2011, Obama identified the Arab Spring as a "historical opportunity" to translate U.S. support for "political and economic reform in the Middle East and North Africa that can meet the legitimate aspirations of ordinary people throughout the region into concrete actions" (qtd.in Wright).

The French and British pressure expedited the U.S. decision on Libya. The U.S. may have previously realized that its friends had vested interests in danger. France and Britain, for example, were concerned about potential instability and rising violent extremism, while Italy was particularly concerned about prospective migrants. Without a question, when two very important U.S. allies, France and Britain, asked the U.S. to intervene in Libya, the likelihood of U.S. involvement in Libya increased (Chivvis).

“How could you stand by when France and the UK and other Europeans and the Arab League and your Arab partners were saying you have got to do something?” (qtd.in Miller) asks Hillary Clinton. Thus, the internal notion though the strategic interest was not direct in Libya, there was a strategic interest in helping U.S. allies’ to enable U.S. action in Libya (Lambakis et al.).

Libya provided a chance for the United States to offer aid in order to encourage its friends to contribute more to future duties. The good function of an alliance is based on all members’ respect for the principle that ‘you help me, I help you’. In the case of the United States, there is no exemption. On the subject of Libya, Washington was of course eager to see European cities volunteer to take on the burden, but it was also ready to give vital assistance when needed (Olson and Zeckhauser).

Last but not least, giving support to its friends helped to solidify the U.S.’ position as a leader in the global security architecture. Although Washington regularly urged European capitals to take on more responsibility, this did not imply that the U.S. expected a genuine change toward a more balanced alliance with Europe in which the U.S. would relinquish its dominating position (Paquin et al.).

3. The Obama Administration Foreign Policy

This case study is particularly relevant in examining Obama's administration in light of U.S. economic pressures, disagreements over NATO's military intervention since 9/11 events, and the apparent American desire for “leading from behind” in Libya (Song). All these circumstances have overshadowed the U.S.'s recent commitment to the Atlantic Alliance.

Libya is the first instance of a significant out-of-area NATO intervention in which the U.S. has ‘led from behind’. Despite the fact that the U.S. military stationed A-10 ‘tank buster’ aircraft and AC-130 gunships in the theater of operations, its

official involvement was primarily confined to aiding with command and control, refueling, intelligence assistance, and ammunition delivery. With members of the European NATO supposedly able to seize the military leadership, Obama administration regarded Libya as mostly European problem (Michaels).

However, the position conflicted with the long-standing expectation that the U.S. would be in the forefront of NATO's action, instead of supporting it, if NATO were ever to conduct another air war. Given the transatlantic capability disparity, there was never an expectation for a strategic air campaign by European air forces themselves: the overall agreement was that the U.S. would lead major fighting operations, with Europeans doing lower-end missions like as peacekeeping (Anrig).

It was a key shift of the idea that Europeans should now lead major military operations, and since the fall of Tripoli, this idea has acquired further momentum as a model on which to build possible future operations. But despite that, European countries would have had a hard time waging a successful air war or sustaining it without the backing of the United States (Song).

The important lesson to be drawn from Libya in this regard is that in order to operate independently of the U.S., European nations either spend more on defense, or spend it more effectively. However, it is extremely doubtful that European governments will spend more on defense; theory has been simpler than practically even to pool resources and creates 'niche' skills. Furthermore, considering Europe's geographical closeness to Libya and the pre-existing NATO infrastructure in the Mediterranean, this operation should not be seen as an example of major European force projection. Conflicts that occur further abroad will require more considerable American backing than Libya did (Michaels).

4. Operation Unified Protector: A General Overview

Towards 31 March 2011, NATO took leadership and coalition military operations in Libya under the UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973, after Libya's air defenses were damaged and Qaddafi's progress on the rebel city of Benghazi stopped. OUP was commanded by Canadian Air Force Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard (headquartered at the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy), who reported to Joint Force Commander U.S. General Sam Locklear, who, in turn reported to NATO Supreme Allied Commander U.S. Admiral James Stavridis (Ruxandra et al.).

OUP has grown to include three primary military objectives. Firstly, to enforce the UN arms embargo: Initially, nineteen NATO warships from nine NATO nations were engaged in international seas to assist the operation. Their primary mission is to monitor ships and planes approaching Libyan territory, and they have the authority to stop and search any vessel suspected of transporting banned cargo. Patrol planes and fighter jets are also stationed in the area of operations to offer long-range surveillance and intercept any flights suspected of transporting weapons into Libya. NATO ships will not sail into Libyan national seas (“Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR NATO-Led Arms Embargo against Libya”).

In case weapons or mercenaries are discovered, the ship and her crew will be taken to a safe port where international and national authorities will assume command. Suspect aircraft will be intercepted and escorted to a NATO-designated airfield. The Alliance is collaborating closely with the International Maritime Organization to guarantee that legal commercial and private shipping to Libya continues unabated (Taylor).

Secondly, to enforce the no-fly zone: as part of the mission, naval boats and surveillance planes monitored and coordinated aviation activities over Libyan

airspace in real time. They are also in charge of identifying any aircraft that enters the no-fly zone without prior authorization. NATO fighter planes are ready to intercept any aircraft that breaks the no-fly zone and engage it if it poses a threat. NATO has said unequivocally that force will only be used as a last resort in enforcing the zone. NATO fighters have the right to self-defense against air and ground attacks (“Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR NATO No-Fly Zone over Libya”).

Thirdly, to protect civilians and civilian centers, NATO undertook reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence collecting missions to identify troops that pose a threat to people and civilian-populated regions. NATO air and naval forces can engage targets on the ground or in the air based on this intelligence. Targets are chosen by NATO's operational commanders, and thus far, they have included tanks, armored personnel carriers, air defense systems, storage facilities, command and control centers, and artillery near and approaching critical civilian areas (Fitzpatrick et al.). Whenever concerns about the mission's length, these three objectives would be referenced to as NATO's “military goals” for the next several months, as long as OUP persisted.

NATO partners initially agreed to conduct operations for 90 days. Both the U.S. and NATO made it clear from the start that giving direct close air support to Libyan rebels was not part of the coalition's mission and that NATO had no intention of forming an occupying army in Libya (Fitzpatrick et al.). This would not only strain the participating nations' cohesion, but would also exacerbate disagreements about the mission's goals and outcome.

The original plan for OUP was for it to last up to 90 days. However, the mission was extended twice, once on June 1st and again on September 21st, 2011. Despite the fact that the Qadhafi regime had fallen by the end of August, NATO

continued its operation until Colonel Qadhafi and his son Mutassim were captured on October 20. After all, OUP in Libya came to an end on October 31, 2011. While confirming the NAC's decision to terminate OUP, on October 28, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen outlined:

We have fully complied with the historic mandate of the United Nations to protect the people of Libya, to enforce the no-fly zone and the arms embargo. Operation Unified Protector is one of the most successful in NATO history. We launched this complex operation faster than ever before. We conducted it effectively, flexibly and precisely with many partners from the region and beyond. And we are concluding it in a considered and controlled manner – because our military job is now done. (qtd.in Wester)

5. NATO Burden-sharing After Libya

NATO successfully completed its 7-month combat mission (OUP) in Libya on 31 October 2011. The air attacks of the Coalition have played a role in safeguarding people and expelling Gaddafi rule. The operation also looked to indicate a new paradigm for shared transatlantic burden in terms of alliance politics. The United States, NATO's most powerful military player, opted to play merely a supporting role and forced several European members, mainly France and Britain, to assume leadership (Hallams and Schreer).

As a result, several observers regarded Libya as a “historical milestone”, a potential model for NATO cost sharing in the future. This was the perspective of the U.S. administration. Leon Panetta, acting Secretary of Defense characterized Libya's mission as an example of a fairer transatlantic burden sharing agreement at the interim Defense Minister's Office in Brussels in October 2011. He also stressed that the

current level of the U.S. alliance commitment is unsustainable due to considerable strain on the U.S. defense budget (“Carnegie Europe (NATO)”). His predecessor as Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, asked for greater weight sharing in the Atlantic in June of that year. In particular, he attacked most European allies' lack of defense expenditure and warned that the alliance will be in a “weak, if not dark, future” unless that trend is changed. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen also urged on alliance members to strive for a fairer burden-sharing agreement under which European allies spend more in 'intelligent defense' with focus placed on pooling and sharing of military resources (Hallams and Schreer).

Discussions on burden sharing were always part of NATO. In the past, debates regarding the 'fair' cost sharing and 'free riding' concerns by certain member states have typically turned to them. During the Cold War, these disagreements mostly centered on NATO defense against the Soviet Union nationally. The U.S. urged frequently throughout the Cold War that responsibility be shared more equally, but never threatened to leave from the alliance until that happened (Tonelson).

Calls for more burden-sharing were frequently an instrument of the U.S. administrations to handle a skeptical congress, rather than a statement of true strategic concerns. Economic alliance theories also argue that an alliance's largest member generally spends more of its income to defense than smaller Member States just because it serves its interests (Olson and Zeckhauser).

During the Cold War, the U.S. benefitted greatly from the hegemonic role of NATO in ensuring “a larger range of financial and political advantages” by utilizing its dominance in European security (Chalmers). The United States also had global interests that demanded a worldwide position of force. Furthermore, complaints by some allies, such as West Germany, about relatively low defense spending,

disregarded the specific limitations on German military power not only after 1945, but also ignored the fact that the Federal Republic contributed about 500 000 soldiers to the West Alliance's defense (Chalmers).

Quantitative measures, such as a share of a nation's gross domestic product (GDP), (an indicator now widely cited in the current discussion on transatlantic burden-sharing), were likewise of little usefulness. This specific metric, for example, ignores disparities in force efficiency. Pure quantification also ignores qualitative indications such as "strength of a nation's commitment to NATO as reflected in its willingness to support the alliance leader". During the Cold War, the alliance was regarded as representing a broader idea of an "Atlantic Community" (Hartley and Sandler).

Despite differences in resources and capacities, its member nations were inextricably linked by shared values and history, as well as a strong sense of collective purpose. Thus, the U.S. profited not just from its hegemonic position within the alliance, but also from the feeling of community that was established, reflecting and embodying its own liberalism and democracy principles. Although the alliance's emphasis on preventing the Warsaw Pact's existential threat unavoidably attracted "free-riding" by some alliance members, such conflicts were controlled inside the transatlantic community (Hartley and Sandler).

6. Analysis and Discussion

This analysis examines what has been learned from the case study concerning the hypothesis: The relation of U.S. and NATO apparently is a matter of leadership. The results are obtained from comparative historical method to provide an analytical and systematic approach for the subject under research. The comparative approach is

combined with the historical account of U.S. intervention with its allies in the Libyan crisis, in order to give an answer to the research question.

The demonstrations that have erupted across North Africa in 2011 over among other things, called for more democracy. This state draws our attention to how the U.S. has attempted to promote democracy in the area in past decades.

At the time of NATO-led implementation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973 authorizing force to be used to protect civilians at risk from Qaddafi's forces, Obama's administration has allowed the world to think that they were leading from behind. This enticing statement obscures the fact that U.S. diplomacy had a significant role in shaping the substance of the United Nations mission. In brief, the United States provided diplomatic leadership both inside and outside the United Nations to assist in resolving a humanitarian catastrophe that threatened to spin out of control (Lafferty and Yulisa).

To assess whether U.S. were leader or member, military interventions and capabilities in Libya have been analyzed. A focus on the distribution of costs and risks among members in the process of accomplishing a common goal is also required.

This study has shown that, in Libya, the American interest provided for the United States to take the lead on military actions was so clear. Interestingly, the analysis reveals that during the Libyan crisis, Washington took a stronger stance on issues with less political ramifications, such as calling on Qaddafi to respect Libyans' right to protest, condemning the regime's repression, and demanding that humanitarian aid reach the Libyan people.

Obama handed Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, orders to get a resolution authorizing the use of military force against Qaddafi's soldiers, who

rejected the censure and pushed on more repression of protestors, including his removal from power (Paquin et al.). So, in collaboration with its diplomatic allies, the U.S. vigorously pushed to win wide international backing for the use of force and agreed to lead the international military operation.

NATO's Libya operations have cost millions and involved thousands of airmen and sailors, they give a picture of over 3000 targets hit in 14202 strike sorties, 100 tanks and 55 rocket launchers struck. NATO ships have also stopped over 3000 vessels and boarded another 250 while enforcing the arms embargo (Rogers). Data analysis helped to find out who was most involved, basing on the number of aircrafts, ships and military personnel, attacks and sorties that each country has been involved in Table 02 below:

Table 02. Military Contributions to NATO's Operation in Libya by Country

Country	Number of personnel	Number of aircraft	Number of sorties flown	Number of warships	Number of cruise missiles fired
US	8507	153	2000	12	228
UK	1300	28	1300	3	18
France	800	29	1200	6	0
Italy	0	12	600	4	0
Canada	560	11	358	1	0
Denmark	120	4	161	0	0
Norway	140	6	100	0	0
Sweden	122	8	78	0	0
Belgium	170	6	60	1	0
Spain	500	7	0	1	0
Turkey	0	6	0	6	0
Netherlands	200	7	0	1	0
Jordan	30	12	0	0	0
UAE	35	12	0	0	0
Qatar	60	8	0	0	0
Romania	205	0	0	1	0
Bulgaria	160	0	0	1	0
Greece	0	0	0	1	0

Source: Rogers, Simon. "NATO Operations in LIBYA: Data Journalism Breaks down Which Country Does What." *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 22 May 2011,

What is shown is that U.S. dominates operations with over 8507 personnel in the area, 153 aircraft, 2000 sortie flown from the beginning of war, 228 cruise missiles fired, and 12 warships.

Because of its identity as a liberal power, U.S. would play a supporting role in any military intervention using its unique military capabilities at the front end. U.S. military assets were engaged through the operation and were often indispensable for the success of individual missions as proved from previous researches. Overall, the U.S. remained the greatest individual military contributor; it provided more than half of the troops deployed by the allies; and 38% of the aircrafts engaged by the entire coalition, and account for close to 30% of the sorties during the Libyan intervention (Paquin et al.). Europe's ability to act without relying on the U.S. would have been proven.

However, Europe lacked the capability to launch a large-scale military intervention, and Britain, along with a number of other allies, including Canada, opposed a Franco-British military involvement. The NATO-led Libyan operation would not have been possible without U.S. involvement. The United States' support was critical to the mission's success. This was recognized by France and the United Kingdom (Légaré), both of which asked the United States not to remove its soldiers from Libya in early April on the grounds that they lacked the requisite capabilities for a long-term mission.

Moreover, the overall cost of the U.S. operation in Libya was estimated at \$1.1 billion, compared to 300-350 million Euros for France and 250 million Euros for Britain. Following France's initial air strike on Libya on March 19, 2011, the U.S. navy destroyed virtually all of Libya's air defense system in only few days. It launched 221 Tomahawk cruise missiles a hundred of which were launched within the

first 24 hours of the operation. This reveals that Europe's military capabilities fell far short of what was needed. This disparity is mostly explained by the United States' significant employment of cruise missiles and deployment of specialized military assets (Paquin et al.)

The U.S. also distinguished itself by its unique capabilities. The campaign as a whole remained largely dependent on the U.S. to provide three quarters of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) as well as target capacity, the bulk of the strategists and targeteers and was in charge of blocking the Qaddafi regime's communications and controlling the electronic warfare (Paquin et al.).

European nations in particular, had to rely on U.S. joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, with U.S. flying around 30 of the 40 air-refueling tankers (Hallams and Schreer). It also launched many offensives with its combat and bomber aircrafts, before pulling them back at the end of March 2011. These factors have shown that in more difficult missions, even though they desired, the European allies could just not take the lead, even UK and France who have the greatest military capabilities were targeted at the weak troops in Libya source.

The United States played a key role in allowing and setting favorable conditions for the European-led UN mission (Paquin et al.). As Tony Blinker, the U.S. Vice President's National Security Advisor put it: "we did lead- we cleared the way for the allies ...but real leadership is successfully encouraging others to step up to their responsibilities" (qtd.in Sanger). It turns out that the U.S. engagement in Libya lasted longer and accounted for a larger share of the cost than first expected.

7. Déjà Vu All Over Again

Since 1949, the U.S. has been leading NATO, and the Alliance members have never challenged its authority except for France in 1966 (“NATO Update - 1966”). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, America became the world’s sole military and economic superpower. As a result, it assumed the role of global leadership following the emergence of a unipolar system. Too, since the Cold War ended, the U.S. became the leading player of NATO in conducting out-of-area operations, and its military might became more advantageous for the security of European allies.

The Balkans interventions in the nineties were the first test for NATO's ability to conduct real world military missions. They were also the first test for the U.S. credibility as a leading member of the Alliance to demonstrate its capabilities in addressing European security issues. At first, the failure of European efforts to resolve the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina highlighted the importance of the U.S. role in addressing the region's security issues. Later, the “success” of the NATO's Kosovo intervention in the late 1990s strengthened the American leadership of the organization (Hallams and Scheer 316).

Nonetheless, the credibility of the U.S. leadership in NATO was damaged by the unilateralism of the Bush administration in its War on Terror, particularly in Afghanistan then in Iraq. To repair that damage, Washington pushed for the formation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) in order to generate greater burden sharing. Even though, right up until the end of George W. Bush presidency, the credibility of U.S. leading position was severely damaged and the military capabilities gap further widened. However, political efforts were made during Barack Obama’s term to re-legitimize America leading position, which were subsequently welcomed by its European allies (Hallms and Schreer 317).

During NATO's campaign in Libya, the U.S. continues to play a leading role in the Alliance and took the lead in a unique fashion by adopting "leading from behind" approach. However, it lessened the incentives for European allies to scale up their efforts. (Sperling 411) The U.S. handed over command of OUP to NATO, so the Alliance will act multilaterally and to end the unilateralism debate.

Despite Obama's efforts to repair the damage done by Bush's administration to intra-Alliance relations, yet again, Donald J. Trump exacerbated the damage to the legitimacy of American leadership after he took office in 2016. Especially after his political rhetorics which threatened NATO's integrity, as such, when he said: "NATO is as bad as NAFTA. It's much too costly for the U.S." (qtd.in Monov).

Regardless of NATO's leadership, Trump has repeatedly complained about imbalance of burden sharing within the alliance, due to the decline of European allies' defense spending. In fact, historically, throughout NATO's 72-year existence burden sharing has been a recurring issue in the Alliance, justified by the widening gap in military capabilities and the disparity in defense expenditures of allies' contributions to NATO's missions. More important, the U.S. is contributing far more than any other member in the Atlantic Alliance, which is about three times higher than the total contributions of all U.S.' European allies ("Atlantic Voices Special Issue").

The U.S. has continuously dedicated more of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense than any of the other 29 NATO countries. Accordingly, at the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO countries agreed to increase their 2 percent of GDP on defense spending by 2024, however, President Trump has pushed the allies to be hitting 4 percent of their GDP ("Nato Summit"). If NATO member states spend 4% of GDP on defense, the intra-Alliance debate about burden sharing will be over in the coming years.

President Joseph R. Biden after entering the Oval Office in January 2021 has both maintained and abandoned Donald Trump's foreign policy. Ahead of the NATO summit in Brussels in June 14, 2021, Joe Biden has reaffirmed U.S. commitments to the Alliance. He said that America considers Article 5 of the treaty as “a sacred commitment”. What was more, while the U.S. had retreated from global leadership Biden declared that “America is back” (Garamone and News). So, after four years of Trump’s “America First” foreign policy, Biden reaffirmed U.S.-EU partnership in addressing the emerging global threats under the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

To sum up, divergences across the transatlantic relations are as old as NATO, and the tensions within the Alliance are repeatedly occurring, these situations can be described as Yogi Berra an American baseball legend put it “It's déjà vu all over again”. Rather, despite disparities in resources and capabilities, NATO member states remain united by shared values, history, and a strong sense of common purpose.

In theory, “leading from behind” allowed the U.S. to limit its dominant role, yet in practice, it was still the U.S. military that provided the most capabilities during OUP in Libya. The U.S. was by far the most significant military contributor to the operation, providing all kinds of assets in order to make it possible.

After 10 day operation, the U.S. stepped back and NATO took over command. Thus, even in the second part of operation, Washington continued to play a significant role behind scenes, leaving the American Navy and Air force very much involved in enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya. For example, to minimize civilian casualties, it was required to obtain a high degree of surveillance, the vast majority of which was provided by the U.S. The U.S. support was absolutely essential, particularly in the area of the intelligence and surveillance, and also in air-refueling which Europeans had low capabilities of.

Basically, without the U.S. air- refueling and reconnaissance, there would have been little military effect from the NATO operations, given that the U.S. provided the best bulks of aircrafts to be on station to complete both the surveillance and strike missions. Although, Washington continued to provide significant and critical support even after transferring the Libyan mission to NATO, the signal came from the strategy of “leading from behind” was clear that the U.S. would not always play a dominant role and the European allies should shoulder more responsibilities. Therefore, the transatlantic success of OUP in Libya generated the “Libyan Model” of “leading from behind” which should serve as a template for future NATO’s interventions, while also confirming that the relation of U.S.-NATO is leadership.

One could argue that, American leadership of NATO is unquestionable, owing to its global prestige, political power, capabilities, and its ability to allocate military resources, all which prove U.S. hegemonic position in the Alliance. In this respect, the U.S. political leadership and military capabilities continue to remain a prerequisite for the Atlantic Alliance's effectiveness.

Conclusion

Following the nature of this research, the theme it treats, and on the basis of the obtained results, some inspiring points can be gathered concerning U.S.-NATO relations, whether it is equal membership or leadership.

The hypothesis of this study on which the whole research is organized suggest that the relation of U.S. and NATO apparently is a matter of leadership. Given the arguments in the previous three chapters, and after conducting the case study on the Operation Unified Protector in Libya throughout the third chapter, the gathered data confirmed the hypothesis put forward.

This research in its beginning assumes that there is no contender or alternative within the NATO framework, especially on the basis of security and defense issues to take the role of leadership aside from the United States. It is also hypothesized that the relation of U.S. and NATO apparently is a matter of leadership, seeking to extend its sphere of influence by inviting new members to join the Atlantic alliance.

To verify whether the hypothesis was confirmed or not, a comparative historical method is used to conduct the research. Maximum information related to the topic were gathered from many books, articles, magazines...etc. then it is clarified that NATO's leadership by the United States is firmly ingrained in the Alliance's culture and structure.

Through its occupancy of the SACEUR office at SHAPE, the larger U.S influence that pervades NATO's integrated military command and the Allied Command Transformation headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, it is securely rooted. NATO continues to give the U.S. with a substantial degree of valuable credibility and still considers the U.S. as an 'indispensable' nation inside the alliance by many officials in Washington, and even Brussels.

As discussed in the earlier parts, the American role as the leading state in creating NATO allowed it to achieve significant influence in the alliance. Because of its identity as a liberal power, U.S provides a sense of reassurance, and helps making political and economic relations within the alliance. Through its peacetime military presence, the U.S provides a reassuring degree of security that would otherwise be absent. However, no matter how much they disagreed with one another, no ally envisioned a NATO without an American military presence. It is quite clear that Washington was an indispensable military enabler of the coalition war effort in Libya, using its unique military capabilities which were indispensable for the success of missions.

However, as previously said, while the new burden-sharing model does not exclude U.S leadership or other allies of NATO to create a different type of leadership. As long as the U.S. maintains a dominating leadership position in the alliance, the incentives for European partners to step up their efforts will be diminished.

After addressing major questions through examining operations, particularly in Libya, it is now time to focus on the U.S.' commitment to NATO in the light of rising burden-sharing issues within the Alliance. This study aimed to establish the groundwork for future research on U.S. leadership and ally military cooperation.

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