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**The Issues of Cooperation and Conflict in American/European  
Relations and their Impact on the Future of the Transatlantic  
Relations**

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## **Abstract**

The present dissertation focuses on the issues of cooperation and conflict in American/European relations and its impact on the future of the transatlantic relations. Accordingly, the study highlights the history and subsequent development of the transatlantic relations or relations between the European Union and the United States, because this is what the EU/US relationship is generally called in both official and research discourse. The work denotes that the two sides have many common values and concerns, and have grown increasingly interdependent in terms of security and economic prosperity. It also reveals the many conflicting issues that led to an obvious split in US/EU ties. The dissertation concludes that despite the fact that the transatlantic relationship faces many dangers, there will be no question of permanent split because the issues that bring the two sides together ultimately carry much greater weight than those that might divide them. Besides, the two sides of the Atlantic still have many basic things in common and still need each other due to extensive cooperation on a wide range of issues.

## ملخص

تتناول هذه المذكرة اشكالية التعاون مقابل الصراع في العلاقات الأمريكية الأوروبية وتأثيرها على مستقبل العلاقات عبر الأطلسية. وبناء على ذلك، تسلط الدراسة الضوء على تاريخ العلاقات عبر الأطلسية أو العلاقات بين الاتحاد الأوروبي والولايات المتحدة وتطورها لاحقاً، لأن هذا ما يسمى عموماً بالعلاقة بين الاتحاد الأوروبي والولايات المتحدة في الخطاب الرسمي والبحثي على حد سواء. ويبين هذا العمل أن لدى الجانبين العديد من القيم والإهتمامات المشتركة، وأنهما أصبحا مترابطين بشكل متزايد من حيث الأمن والازدهار الاقتصادي. كما يكشف عن العديد من القضايا المتضاربة التي أدت إلى شرح واضح في العلاقات بين الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الأوروبي. وتخلص المذكرة إلى أنه على الرغم من أن العلاقة عبر الأطلسية تواجه العديد من المخاطر فلن يكون هناك أي شرح عميق لأن القضايا التي تجمع بين الجانبين تحمل في نهاية المطاف وزناً أكبر بكثير من تلك التي قد تفرق بينهما. بالإضافة إلى ذلك فإن جانبي الأطلسية مازالا يشتركان في الكثير من الأمور الأساسية ولا يزالان بحاجة إلى بعضهما البعض بسبب التعاون المكثف في عدة مجالات.

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## List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>CFSP</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy
<b>ECA</b>	Economic Cooperation Administration
<b>ECSC</b>	European Coal and Steel Community
<b>EEC</b>	European Economic Community
<b>ERP</b>	European Recovery Program
<b>ESDI</b>	European Defence and Security Identity
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EURATOM</b>	European Atomic Energy Community
<b>GATT</b>	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GMOs</b>	Genetically Modified Organisms
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>INF</b>	Intermediate Nuclear Forces
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NSC</b>	New Strategic Concept
<b>NTA</b>	New Transatlantic Agenda
<b>OEEC</b>	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
<b>SDI</b>	Strategic Defence Initiative SDI
<b>TAD</b>	Transatlantic Declaration
<b>TBD</b>	Transatlantic Business Dialogue
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>USD</b>	United States Dollars
<b>WMD</b>	Weapons of Massive Destruction

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## **Introduction**

The transatlantic relationship or the relationship between the European Union and the United States is nowadays one of the most powerful, and the most complete relationship in the world. Europe is of great importance to America, and America is of great significance to Europe, because of main common concerns, well-matched values and similar interests. They are each other's chief trading partner and source or beneficiary of foreign direct investment. The EU and the US are involved in almost all world major issues. The EU and the US also share mutual objectives relating to consistent policies for the promotion of peace, stability and economic development around the globe.

The US has historically been the EU's closest ally, with common interests and values as well as a shared view of the world leading bilateral relations and combined actions. Nevertheless, in the second decade of the new millennium, disagreements in several areas led to uncertainties about the continuity of transatlantic relations. The carrying out of the America First foreign policy resulted in US disapproval of, and retreat from, a number of multilateral initiatives, and reconsidering the American relations with traditional allies, including the EU. Most important areas of conflict in bilateral relations have included the Iran nuclear deal, trade, problem sharing within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and differing opinions about multilateralism.

Due to these disagreements, the transatlantic relationship looks nowadays as an unbalanced one. In the economic field, the Europeans cooperate with the US as an equal. In foreign and defence policy, the relationship continues to be one of dominant leader and subordinate. This means that Europeans still function largely on the Cold War basis that, in exchange for US protection, they must grant solidarity and backing to the US in foreign affairs.

The US and the EU have remarkably different perceptions and interests. Although each side defends different ideas and experiences, numerous areas of collaboration exist. The actual international order benefits both the US and the EU, and it requires their mutual support. The US and the EU remain leaders of the world economy. The way they approach issues of international trade and investment affects not only their own economic relationship but the global economy as well.

The US and Europe face many of the same challenges in fighting terrorism and other serious crimes. Eventually, transatlantic tensions in the post–Cold War era have deepened largely because Americans and Europeans believe in responding to threats in dissimilar ways. The differences in transatlantic understandings of threat and conflict resolve have developed over many decades, and have appeared durable into the immediate future.

Undoubtedly, major questions have been asked about all features and sides of the transatlantic ties. How has transatlantic relations developed? Will the United States remain involved militarily on the European continent? Will the transatlantic allies continue to benefit from high levels of trade? Will they establish additional barriers to one another's products amid reciprocal accusations? Will the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) be preserved and continue to play an important role in European security affairs? Will the United States and Europe work together to promote common interests, or will they gradually find themselves at further disagreements in the near future?

It is imperative to reveal that observers have offered a variety of answers to these questions. Some have assumed a doubtful posture, arguing that the end of the Cold War has forever fragmented the foundations of post-war transatlantic cooperation. Stephen M. Walt holds this view in his article "The Ties that Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart". Other analysts, like Kahler and Werner, in their book *Europe and America: A Return to History*, have upheld that those same basics remain largely unbroken.

Other scholars, such as Gompert and Larrabee in their book *America and Europe: A Partnership For a New Era*, contend that although severe splits have expanded, they can nevertheless be reduced through combined efforts on both sides of the Atlantic. In essence, this absence of agreement reflects conflicting views about the foundations of transatlantic cooperation during the Cold War and the nature of the post-Cold War world.

There are actually very few research works on the American-Western European relationship since 1945, as opposed to the many comprehensive surveys of countless characteristics of this relationship. The well-known one includes Alfred Grosser's *The Western Alliance: European American Relations Since 1945*. While containing a plethora of valuable information, this work is out-of-date. Therefore, a new and different study of the American-European relationship is greatly needed.

At this point, it is important to justify the rationale behind the choice of this research work. One of the reasons is that the American/Western European relationship was, and still is, a fundamental one. The United States and the countries of Western Europe had many common interests, the most important one being the need to contain Soviet influence. Yet, there were also many divergent interests in Atlantic relations. Even now, many signs of friction can be seen in Atlantic relations, and the equilibrium between cooperation and tension undeniably changed over time. Hence, this work assesses that balance in a vital relationship during the past, in the present, as well as in the forthcoming future.

This research work relies on a combination of methods namely the historical descriptive method, and the analytical approach. The historical descriptive approach is used to describe the evolution of the relationship between the United States and Europe. This method is chiefly employed to report the development and examine the vicissitudes of the transatlantic relations. The analytical method is adopted to analyze the reasons behind the difficulties or divergences that became obvious in US/EU ties. In short, both the historical descriptive

method and the analytical approach are deemed necessary to provide tangible facts in order to reach assumptions about past and present events and to anticipate the future course the transatlantic relations would take.

The research will use numerous reading materials related to the subject matter. Primary sources include legislation, statements and official papers of high authorities and policymakers on all aspects of the transatlantic relations. This work-study is also distinguished by the use of a significant number of secondary sources, including books, journal articles, and scholarly online publications.

To position this research within the existing knowledge, it is necessary to include other scholars' works. Some of them focused on the origins and development of the US/Western European relations. Others reported various aspects of these relations from different perspectives. Still other scholars talked about different security cooperation or economic or trade exchanges. Most of these scholars did not explore the issues of cooperation and conflict and their impact on the future course these relations will take, and this is what this dissertation seeks to explore.

In his *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift*, Geir Lundestad examines the dynamics of the American-European relationship since 1945, and shows how the relationship between the United States and Europe has become increasingly tense. Similarly, Heinz GÅrtner and Ian Cuthbertson's book, *European Security and Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War*, examines the post-9/11 and Iraqi War security situation. It especially stresses the impact on NATO and transatlantic relations as the European Union started to build a common foreign and defence policy that would enable Europeans to play a greater and independent role in the international arena.

In *Divided West: European Security and the Transatlantic Relationship*, Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme Herd, two scholars with far-reaching knowledge of European integration and US/European relations, deliver an insightful examination of recent developments. Europe and the United States, they reason, are involved in neither a strategic repositioning nor a split. Rather, recent disagreements represent a practical planned discord in which apparent conflict corresponds with constant and balanced interests.

In his *Transatlantic Divide: Comparing American and European Society*, Alberto Martinelli defines, explains, and evaluates the key features of European society and American society and major social trends in the United States and in the European Union in the last fifty years. He sees both the US and the EU as fruitful instances of economic development and of political and cultural renewal. He also reveals the different paths followed by both sides to reach such a position and considers them as two alternatives of Western modernism.

Thomas L. Ilgen's *Hard Power, Soft Power and the Future of Transatlantic Relations* debates how challenging security relations are likely to endure, discusses how well economic affairs will be coped with, and scrutinises the ongoing tensions in different affairs that should be easy to deal with if both European and American leaders labour vigorously to foster policy convergence.

Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson's book, *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations*, is a collection of prominent European and American analysts' works that deal with important questions that remain unresolved in the prevailing academic works about the transatlantic relationship. At bottom, the book identifies and closely examines the main continuities and changes in these transatlantic efforts since 9/11.

In his *Transatlantic Security Cooperation: Counter Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, Wyn Rees evaluates transatlantic security cooperation, examining the origins as well as the future orientations of this strategic relationship in world affairs. The author contends

that many of the complications are due to different tactics of both sides of the Atlantic and the lack of a strong transatlantic security debate in which these issues could be tackled.

In their *EU-US Relations: Repairing the Transatlantic Rift*, composed of thirty papers from prominent international scholars, Nikos Kotzias and Petros Liacouras evaluate the state of EU-US relations after the war in Iraq. The book exhibits perspectives from both sides of the Atlantic, from scholars and politicians. It also presents the possible solutions as to the future of EU-US relations and the consolidation and establishment of the common foreign policy of the EU after the war in Iraq.

The dissertation is structured into three chapters. Entitled as “Transatlantic Relations: Past and Present”, chapter one examines the transatlantic relationship or the relationship between the European Union and the United States as one of the most powerful and the most complete relationship in the world. It focuses on the different phases the United States and the European Union crossed that give an explanation for their unique and special relationship.

“Conflicting Issues in Transatlantic Ties” is the title of the second chapter. It examines some challenging areas of EU/US co-operation and obvious differences between the United States and its European allies in defining, interpreting, and responding to threats in the international system. The aim is to examine issues reflecting the different responses to similar external challenges, like communism and terrorism that made this transatlantic relationship look more and more conflicting.

It also deals with divergences in United States and European security policies using two historical examples: the Cold War and counterterrorism. The distinct perceptions of and approaches to terrorism that followed were critical for explaining recent and ongoing transatlantic disagreements about the nature of and appropriate response to terrorism. Other divergences are related to the growth of US Unilateralism, the assumption by the EU of an ever-stronger role, and the economic disputes that are increasing.

Chapter three is entitled “Reflections on the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship”. It is devoted to examining and explaining the expected future course of US/EU relations. The aim is to see how these transatlantic relations have developed during previous years and what will be their future perspectives. The dissertation employs the analysis in previous chapters to suggest the probable future course of transatlantic relations.

## **Chapter One**

### **Transatlantic Relations: Past and Present**

To deal with the US/EU relationships with respect to of cooperation and conflict and their effects on transatlantic relations, it is necessary to provide not only a succinct overview on the beginning and development of these ties but also to give an overall assessment of the transatlantic relationship. It is also important to examine the ups and downs in the relationship between the Americans and the Europeans.

Both Americans and Europeans have always seen and continue to perceive the transatlantic relationships as extremely important. These links include the security relationship of the North Atlantic Alliance; the cooperation between the EU and the United States, originally economic but increasingly expanding into other areas; and bilateral relations between individual European countries and the United States.

In many ways, relations between the United States and major countries of Western Europe shape the content and make-up of the broader transatlantic relationship. In these relationships, Britain stands as an important player, and it has distinguished itself apart by its special relationship with the United States on the one hand, and its detached position to Europe on the other. The degree of transatlantic political and economic interdependence and the broad concept of security make it necessary to consider these ties.

#### **1.1. The United States and Western Europe before 1945**

The United States was born following a revolutionary war against one of the European powers, namely Great Britain, in cooperation with France, whose support was decisive in the winning of America's independence. In the war of 1812, the United States again fought against Britain and, since the British were at the same time deeply embroiled in the struggle against Napoleon (Palmer 155). This war also brought the United States into cooperation with the French.



After these two wars, however, the United States took note of the warnings against foreign interventions that George Washington, the first American President, had indicated in his farewell address. “Why,” Washington had asked, “by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humour, or caprice?” (Adler 137). Accordingly, in the nineteenth century, the United States concentrated on expanding its own territory, protecting it from division through the Civil War, and strengthening its position in the Western hemisphere and in the Pacific.

Economically and culturally, the links between the United States and Western Europe have been warm and close. The massive European immigration to the US was evidence of this; as were the millions of trips back and forth across the Atlantic Ocean. The military and political isolation towards Europe lasted until 6 April 1917 when the United States declared war against Germany. The United States, therefore, had become the ally of Britain, France, and, until the October 1917 Revolution, also of Russia in the last phase of the First World War (Graebner 69).

In his Fourteen Points plan of January 1918, President Woodrow Wilson suggested a framework to keep away from future wars, particularly in Europe. The United States Senate, however, did not approve Wilson’s designs and rejected his ideas for the membership of the United States in the League of Nations and for the reorganization of Europe (Adler 156).

In the interwar years, America’s involvement in the First World War came to be perceived as a blunder. The Americans reasoned that the Europeans had differed in the past; they argued again; and they would most likely persist in the same way in the future. On the basis of this reasoning, American officials saw no reason for the United States to involve itself again in the future European wars (Graebner 86).

In the 1930s, American isolationism translated into a range of Neutrality Acts to keep Washington out of future European struggles. In 1935, 95 percent of the American populace backed the idea that in case of another European war; the United States should not interfere. As late as September 1941, when the United States significantly supported Great Britain, 87 percent of the American people once again refused that their government should send American soldiers to fight in Europe (Cole 154-55).

The Europeans, conversely, wanted to involve them into their affairs and improve the friendship with the Americans. After the First World War, Europe's concern about maintaining warm ties with the United States could be seen in many fields. Both Britain and France wanted to preserve the many wartime shared bodies that during the war had regulated the supplies of armaments, raw materials, and shipping (Hogan 122). The initiative came from France, but the British, as Michael Hogan has argued, wanted to "transform the economic agencies of the wartime coalition into permanent reconstruction and relief councils" (123). However, because American economy and trade wanted to abandon regulation, the European proposal did not materialise.

On the cultural side, as early as 1901, British journalist William Thomas Stead had published his book *The Americanization of the World: or the Trend of the Twentieth Century* in which he reflected the early cultural influence of the US (156). He also denoted America's global cultural reach through "American Jazz, Hollywood Movies, American Slang, American Machines and patented products" (162). The cultural Americanisation of Europe started in the interwar years. Most of the movies watched in the 1920s and 1930s in Western Europe were produced in the United States. As Paul Claudel, French ambassador to Washington and man of letters, told the Americans in 1930:

Your movies and talkies have soaked the French mind in American life, methods, and manners. American gasoline and American ideas have circulated throughout France,

bringing a new vision of power and a new tempo of life. The place in French life and culture formerly held by Spain and Italy, in the nineteenth century by England, now belongs to America. More and more we follow the Americans (qtd. in Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation in the American Century” 193.)

Instead of turning its back on Europe as it had done after the First World War, after 1945 the US quickly assumed its new post-war political and economic roles. For the first time, the US emerged as a main peacetime military power, and under President Truman it assumed the leadership of the United Nations. In 1947, the Truman government devised a policy to contain Soviet expansionism in Iran, Greece and Turkey. American foreign aid was used as a diplomatic instrument in Europe’s and Japan’s defence. In 1948, with the help of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the US liberated world trade and finance; and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was founded in 1947 to free commerce (Leffler 156-59).

To round up, after the end of WWII, the American influence in Europe remained limited, and the European governments and the public at large stayed devoted to their own national interests. Still, none of these developments in US/Western Europe relations would have been possible without the Marshall plan, which further consolidated and strengthened the foundation of the European/American relations.

### **1.1.1. The Marshall Plan**

The Marshall plan was the needed help that enabled Western European countries to get back up on their feet. Officially called the European Recovery Program (ERP), the Marshall Plan matured in the period between April 1948 and September 1951. The US provided economic assistance to the Western European countries to help them recover their economies and achieve economic self-sufficiency.

Curt Tarnoff, a specialist in Foreign Affairs, has mentioned that when Secretary of State George Marshall first proposed the Marshall Plan in his speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, he did not propose a detailed and concrete programme. He only spoke in favour of the need of the US to plan and provide assistance. Marshall also suggested that the process should be a combined effort of the European countries and the United States (2).

Similarly, Theodore A. Wilson has argued that the American help was economic but it had geopolitical plans imbedded in it. It was economic because the United States wanted to expand its trade and to ensure that Europe keeps buying its raw materials, and geopolitical because the US had to urgently contain the Soviet threat against Western Europe (17).

Secretary of State Will L. Clayton had travelled in Europe, which allowed him to send reports about the economic and political situation of these European countries to the United States. He recommended that the US should grant Western Europe a huge economic help, as he expected an outbreak of a revolution because of the miserable situation there (Wilson 18-19). The American and the European efforts and initiatives led to the creation of the European Recovery Programme (ERP). The latter provided 13 billion United States Dollars (USD) as economic assistance for sixteen European countries, the equivalent of 143 billion USD in 2017 (20-21).

The implementation of the European Recovery Programme gave birth to two agencies that together ensured its successful execution. First is the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Run by the recipient European countries, its purpose was to ensure that the participants are committed to their obligations to set and adopt policies to enhance trade and production. Second is the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). Managed by the United States, it assisted the European purchases of food, fuel and machinery by providing US dollars. It also helped raising the funds for certain projects as those related to developing the infrastructure (Tarnoff 3).

The Marshall Plan was a success, first thanks to the American aid, and second because of the readiness of the Western European countries to cooperate with each other and with the United States towards shared goals of freedom and prosperity. The Marshall Plan did not only bring European countries together, but it also made the ties between Europe and the US very strong. Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK), praised the plan; and the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin described it as generosity beyond belief (Tarnoff 5-6).

### **1.1.2. The Transatlantic Declaration and the New Transatlantic Agenda**

According to Alfred Grosser, the cooperation between the US and EU depended on two pillar agreements: the Transatlantic Declaration (TAD) and the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA). Adopted in 1990 by the EU and the US, the Transatlantic Declaration set out the guidelines to improve cooperation and consultation in economics, education, science and culture. Following 1995, the EU and the US set the New Transatlantic Agenda (3). The partnership under the NTA had a great significance on the global level. With 150 points joint action plan, the NTA had four main goals: “Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world... Responding to global challenges... Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations... [and] Building bridges across the Atlantic” (qtd. in Grosser 4).

## **1.2. Cooperation between the US and Western Europe after the Second World War**

The American–European cooperation after the Second World War has been quite striking. This section explores the vicissitudes of that cooperation. In the years after 1945, the perception of the Soviet threat was the most important factor for the increasingly close cooperation between the United States and Western Europe. On the two sides of the Atlantic, there was considerable stability from the late 1940s to the mid-1980s deriving from the fact that Soviet threat was over.

### **1.2.1. Levels of EU and US Cooperation**

The UE and the US have a long history of cooperation. They cooperated on many levels. Claire Daley states that in terms of economy, the Transatlantic Economic Council was created in 2007 to boost transatlantic economic growth. Concerning peace and stability, as global powers the EU and the US promoted global peace and stability in conflict zones. The EU and the US also cooperated in times of conflict. As regards security, intensive discussions have taken place, particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, the 11-M bombings in Madrid and the 7/7 attacks in London to strengthen the EU-US cooperation on counter-terrorism and domestic security, including the sharing of electronic data. In 2009, when President Barack Obama sought to close the notorious Guantanamo Bay prison camp, several EU nations agreed to accept released inmates (201).

### **1.3. The Transatlantic Relationship during the Cold War**

During the Cold War, the transatlantic relationship acted a military-political alliance dominated by the United States, as the latter provided security for Western European countries, which made them security protectorates of Washington. In order to face the Soviet Bloc, the United States convinced some West Germany, France and Britain to enter a military alliance. However, the Western European countries had different motives to join the alliance, and it was not because they were not worried about the Soviet Union (Lieber 576).

For Germany, the alliance was a device to create and reconstruct the German capitalist state. France saw the alliance as an anchor to stop its historical rival, Germany. In addition, France saw the alliance as an opportunity to take advantage of the American support to proceed with its colonial and dominance plans. Similar for Britain, the alliance meant the end of Britain's financial and military commitment to the European theatre, which means redirecting these resources towards maintaining its empire. Soon, the Western European countries realised that they had no control over their survival against the Soviet Union as it

depended on the decisions taken in Washington regarding the US/Soviet relations. They became protectorates of the US for strategic purposes (Gowan 221-222).

The way the transatlantic relationship was presented during the Cold War, and the way it really was, are two different pictures. NATO was depicted as an alliance of equals where decision-making was made by consensus, while the reality was that the US was the dominant one, as it controlled the homeland defence function of the Western European countries. Besides, unifying Western European countries and making them look as a political unity, was only for the purpose of expanding American trade and opposing communism (Brown 211).

#### **1.4. Sources of Conflict in Transatlantic Relations after the Cold War**

Even if cooperation is emphasized, there have always been strains, frequently even crises, in American/European relations. While the elements of cooperation have generally outweighed those of conflict with regard to the Soviet threat, America's role and economic and cultural issues, elements of conflict were found along all these dimensions too.

Gärtner and Cuthbertson have argued that in the 1990s, the view of a deep, organic transatlantic unity was widespread. They have claimed that this view was misleading, as it extensively focused on the economic flows and the common ideological themes. However, during the Clinton administration, unity was apparent especially that governments, media organisations and leading academic centres agreed on some of the core ideological themes (182).

The war on Iraq added tensions on the transatlantic relations, as it was not a matter of miscommunication between the US and the EU, but it was that one side insisted on something that the other side clearly refused. The deeper cause of these tensions is the difference of views between the EU and US on the Atlantic Alliance. The European ideology views the alliance as "a force pacifying the world through supposedly cosmopolitan liberal law and the spread of human rights and democracy" (Gowan 229).

This view, however, does not meet with the structure of the American state shaped by the Cold War. In Gowan words, “The American state structure is arranged for asserting American Political dominance over the entire capitalist world by protecting global capitalism from threatening enemy states” (229). The American attempts to build a new European system against Russia failed as the Western European countries accompanied the US but worked on their objectives of more coherence and autonomy.

In addition, the attempt of the United States to induce and provoke the Arab and Islamic worlds was faced by some European countries ready to balance against American militarism, which would ruin the American plans. The differences between the European allies and Washington’s growing unilateralism have put more tensions on the transatlantic relations (Lindley-French 77).

The idea that globalization is an international process rather than an Atlantic project led to the idea that the only viable policy response to it was domestic neoliberalism. Besides, the prescriptions of the Washington consensus, the idea that there was something called an international community which happened to be centred on and led by the Atlantic powers and that this community had become so sensitive to human rights that it would, from now on, made sovereignty conditional upon states observing basic human rights (Gowan 219-220)

This ideological agreement was met by the integration of the American and West European economies by dynamic processes through large flows of foreign investment from both sides. This integration came because of the efforts shown from the Atlantic governments by agreeing on new frameworks of rights for capital against labour. These efforts were confirmed through bodies like the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TBD). Even politically, there were coordinated plans for the two enlargements in Europe, NATO and EU enlargements (Gowan 220).



However, this image of strong transatlantic unity quickly faded with the arrival of the George W. Bush administration to office. The Bush team has put aside the ideological formula of dominance and globalization that was agreed upon by both sides of the Atlantic previously in the 1990s, and the National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice denied the existence of something such as the international community. The Bush administration promoted the idea of a dominant America or “American hegemon imposing its will upon the rest of the world including its allies” (Woodward 66).

The shift in American policies was also clear when the George W. Bush administration decided to drop policy commitments of the west European states, and by giving privilege to the alliance with Israel in the Middle East over the alliance with Western Europe. The US also came out against its Western European allies’ security and economic interests, raising concerns and disagreements (Woodward 69).

Despite such differences, NATO was able to coordinate the aspect of change with regard to the Soviet Union. When the Soviet threat disappeared with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, many predicted the end of NATO. Allegedly, no alliance had survived the elimination of the threat against which it had been founded. Yet, NATO is still alive and many countries want to join it. Nevertheless, as we shall see in the final chapter, clear signs of transatlantic split now exist.

#### **1.4.1. The Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War**

The war on Iraq led by the United States began in 2003. This unilateral decision from the United States divided members of the European Union to two groups. Supporters of the war, included the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy; and opponents of the war were headed by France and Germany (Woodward 59). Most Western European countries opposed the US decision to wage war on Iraq, and they expressed it openly. The Iraq crisis left the Western European countries divided due to their different views. This division affected the European

unity and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Countries that supported the United States in its decision would later face problems in making relations within the EU (Brown 249).

### **1.5. Transatlantic Relations and NATO**

For many decades, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has played an important role in bringing the United States and the European Union together in security cooperation. NATO was also a tool for the Atlantic allies to promote their political aims in the world at large. However, NATO as an organization and its members have faced many challenges.

Eugeniusz Smolar has pointed at the events taking place in North Africa in 2011 and described the international situation in three words "insecurity and instability, leading to unpredictability" (128). For Washington, this feeling of insecurity is the result of the awareness that the US cannot face the increasing number of multiple threats as it lacks the adequate means for it, which is reinforced by the isolation that comes with addressing these threats (129).

Besides, the financial crisis and cuts in defence spending in its turn has deepened the insecurity. Lower defence spending meant lower capacity to neutralise threats around the world. Smolar claims that these fears were "directly related to the growing military influence of new powers, primarily China", he also mentions "as well as instability in Pakistan and the disruptive if not potentially deadly capabilities of state-sponsored or non-state actors through activities such as terrorism, organised crime or cyber-attacks" (128).

For the European side, uncertainty among European allies was the result of the growing awareness of the differences between Europe and the US. Mainly, Europe does not have enough ambition, but also shows reluctance, to bear responsibility for global security, "which in turn, decreases Europe's operational usefulness for Washington" (Brown 211). The

European uncertainty is justified by many reasons like the cuts in military spending due to the financial crisis, the non-existence of a direct threat, the negative experience of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.

NATO was still regarded as an important tool, but one that Europe would not rush towards it. Because of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, European elites have concerns about being military involved in a conflict by an American decision based on its own perceptions. Being involved in a war in such way, would give the European policymakers hard time to justify it to their public. During the presidency of George W. Bush, and because of his global war on terror, Europe had fears that this would provoke Muslim hostility towards it, and cause terrorist attacks (Brown 212-13).

This scepticism from Europe lasted even after the end of Bush's presidency. However, the election of Barack Obama and his promises of a more open and cooperative foreign policy, greatly improved the US image. In his speeches, Obama maintained the American attitude towards promoting global security to safeguard its own security and that of its allies. Even though he did not mention the need to sometimes take unilateral actions in the name of security or the interest of the US, many Europeans still remain cautious (Daley 204).

### **1.5.1. The Importance of NATO's New Strategic Concept**

The idea of discussing a New Strategic Concept (NSC) between divided NATO members was seen by many as a step towards deepening the existing division within NATO. However, despite tensions and differences in views, the discussions led all participants to reach a certain level of cohesion, which was necessary for future cooperation. The NSC was accepted at the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, and insisted on the following roles within the NATO framework, which Smolar has summed as follows:

In the new multipolar world, NATO is to remain a foundation of the allies' security, and important element of international security in the world. NATO is above all to

ensure the collective defence of all members. Threats require multi-level cooperation by the allies. Emphasis will be placed on a deeper integration of political, military and civilian forms of interaction together with a greater emphasis on non-military and preventive measures, including financial aid. The effectiveness of the Alliance depends on a number of regional partnerships based on shared interests and values, including cooperation with the UN, EU, OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and a number of regional actors, such as Japan, South Korea and Australia. NATO will build, in cooperation with the US, an Antibalistic Missile Defence system. The strategic partnership with Russia is also considered. (122-26)

About the NSC, Smolar has added “agreeing on the content of the NSC is a major achievement, since it has reintegrated and thereby strengthened the Alliance, leaving behind a period of political uncertainty” (131).

### **1.6. The Consequences of the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan**

The US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown how profound the disagreement is between the US and the members of the. The EU divided over US unilateral involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the fact that public opinion in almost every European country was so unconvinced toward the Bush administration in general and to its Iraq and Afghanistan policy in particular was an indication that basic change was under way in Atlantic relations.

About the American unilateral approach, Smolar says that it often comes from the deep convictions felt by America, that regardless of the political importance of the European allies, their role on the battlefield is minor, and they cannot be counted on. As the US appealed Europeans to invest more in defence for many years, and to strengthen their presence and involvement in Afghanistan, the US did not receive the positive responses it hoped for and was greatly disappointed in its allies (129).

European governments believed that if they did not take responsibility with the US for the Afghan operation, they would lose the privilege to partnership with the US. This made the European governments to appease public opinion in their countries, while they provided support to the new American strategy in Afghanistan. The operation was carried out by NATO, which was seen by European governments as an indispensable component of future security. Europe heavily relies on NATO when it comes to defence, as it is not able to defend itself. This fact does not concern Western Europeans as much as it does to the Eastern European countries, due to their different views and experiences (Skidelsky 79).

### **1.7. The US-British Special Relationship**

There was no special relationship between Washington and London before the Second World War. The expression ‘special relationship’ has been coined to depict the US/British relationship after the Second World War. On the contrary, the disputes between the United States and the United Kingdom at that time were many. As Robert Skidelsky has contended, the relationship only became exceptional when the United States became superior to the United Kingdom. In other words, only “as British power declined and the Soviet threat became paramount” was a special relationship founded (47-48). In that relationship the United States led from a position of strength.

In time of WWII, the special relationship was a thriving relationship, as thriving as the relationship between the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his America counterpart President Franklin D. Roosevelt was. Olivia B. Waxman says that Churchill and Roosevelt had to work with each other regarding the compelling circumstances (129).

The strong friendship of the two leaders, and the traces of a special relationship between the two countries, was very clear in the help and assistance that were present from both parties. After the Pearl Harbour attack, which was the event that led the US to war, the two leaders became even closer. Winston Churchill was the first wartime Prime Minister to visit

the United States. In his turn, President Roosevelt provided military help for Great Britain without any hesitation, when British troops in Libya were forced to surrender to German and Italian troops (Waxman 132).

During the Second World War, the United States and the United Kingdom often differed. The two nations had dissimilar views on Britain's imperial position, on military strategy, and on the post-war order. Still, during the war the two states closely collaborated compared to other developed nations in modern times. John Dumbrell has argued that during the Second World War and the first decades after the war the American/British relationship was in fact special (112).

Even leading American officials valued the special American/British relationship. According to Geoffrey Warner, President Eisenhower wrote that "Britain has not only been, but must be, our best friend in the world" (248). In the same way, Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy's devoted and faithful advisor, emphasised that "The Western leader whom he [Kennedy] saw first, liked best and saw most often . . . was British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan" (876).

Highly ranked administrators clearly asserted British thinking on the Anglo-American relations in January 1949 in the following words:

Since post-war planning began, our policy has been to secure close political, military and economic co-operation with the USA. This has been necessary to get economic aid. It will always be decisive for our security. . . . We hope to secure a special relationship with USA. . . . for in the last resort we cannot rely upon the European countries (qtd. in Burk 254).

### **1.7.1. The Special Relationship after World War II**

The special relationship that Churchill and Roosevelt started was continued and sustained by their successors. American diplomats have long expressed the significance of the special

relationship with Britain, as they defended the relationship and always thought of Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth to be their most reliable and useful allies.

The US, however, did not want to excessively highlight the particular relationship with Britain out of fear that other European nations would think that their relations with Washington are less important. At that time, it seemed that the UK took the concept of an American–British special relationship as a pretext to stay out of Europe. The Kennedy administration confirmed in the National Security Action Memorandum of 20 April, 1961, that “the UK should not be encouraged to oppose or stay apart from that movement [European integration] by doubts as to the US attitude or by hopes of a ‘special’ relation with the US...” (FRUS 286-7).

In many areas, Washington strongly cooperated with Britain than with any other European nations. However, the field of atomic weapons showed both the strength and the limits of the relationship. When the US Congress terminated the close nuclear cooperation of the Second World War, Britain developed its own atomic weapons (Aldrich 449). The reason behind this move was to boost independence from the US and to turn it into the direction of intimate cooperation with Britain.

Since Eisenhower and Kennedy wanted to cooperate with Britain, nuclear cooperation between Washington and London resumed under their rule (Aldrich 456). Washington and London also extensively cooperated in the intelligence field. Intelligence cooperation continued even after the end of the Second World War (460-61). With no other country did the United States have such deep, broad, and lasting relations as with Britain.

The special relationship in the time of President Ronald Reagan and the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was at its strongest since Churchill and Roosevelt. Thatcher was Reagan’s closest ally, as they placed nuclear missiles in Europe to counter the Soviet deployments in the 1980s (Lundestad, “The United States and Western Europe...” 42-3).

To sum up, starting from the end of the Second World War, the US and Western Europe developed warm relations. Since that time, they have been close partners. Their transatlantic relationship is built on a solid groundwork of common values. Close economic integration, shared interests in the world economy, and roles in major global and regional affairs. These links between the EU and the US included the security relationship of the North Atlantic Alliance; the cooperation between the EU and the United States, originally economic but increasingly expanding into other areas.

They cooperated on many issues. They fought terrorism and prevented the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and dealt with the world's many trouble areas. In the last decades, however, the foundation of American military force, technological excellence, and economic success have been severely shaken, as have the core beliefs of the European continued prosperity. As a result, Euro-American relations faced many conflicting episodes.



## **Chapter Two**

### **Conflicting Issues in Transatlantic Ties**

The history of the American and the European relations after the Second World War knew many instances of cooperation. Beneath the existing disagreements, obvious tensions could be perceived between the United States and Western Europe in terms of their reciprocal political evaluations. On the European side, there were frequent doubts as to the maturity of the United States in international relations. US policy could change significantly and was unpredictable. For instance, there were the shifts from isolationism during the period between the two world wars to sending over half a million soldiers to Vietnam.

The controversies between the United States and Europe were the result of the fact that these two parts of the world have different histories and different geographic locations. The two continents' experiences of war and peace have differed. Western Europe's geographic location made it vulnerable than the United States in the event of an East-West conflict (Cohen 328).

The United States and Western Europe do not have the same view of essential political ideologies such as socialism and capitalism. They also differ on religious questions. At the turn of the millennium, it became evident that the United States is losing much of its European makeup as the number of Hispanics, Asians, and African-Americans increased. (Jackson 149). The end result is that there is more and more talk on both sides of the Atlantic about divergences and split.

#### **2.1. Challenges Facing Transatlantic Ties**

The US and the European relations faced a continuous series of conflicts. Even after the formation of NATO, the crises appeared almost permanent. There was the Korean War in 1950, West Germany's rearmament in the early 1950s, the Suez crisis in 1956; General de Gaulle's coming to power in France in 1958 and his rejection of British membership in the

EEC, France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command structure in 1966; and the problems caused by America's war in Vietnam from 1955 to 1975.

In the Carter years, there were the disputes over the neutron bomb and Afghanistan. In the Reagan years there were Poland, the Soviet pipeline, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), and Libya. Under Herbert Bush, there were problems involving the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, and the search for new missions for NATO. Under Clinton, there were serious American/European disputes over Bosnia, over NATO enlargement, and over a European Defence and Security Identity (ESDI). Under George W. Bush, on the one hand, there has been Washington's growing unilateralism, its rejection of several important international agreements, and in many aspects of its response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, certainly including the war with Iraq.

The Europeans, on the other hand, while divided, responded negatively to America's growing unilateralism and have become increasingly ambitious in their integration, seeing it also as a way to reduce their dependence on the United States. Finally, there were American/European quarrels over the Middle East: the creation of Israel, Suez, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, relations with the oil states, and Europe's growing sympathy for the Palestinians while the United States remained Israel's primary supporter (Daalder 562).

The economic area has also been a troublesome factor in American/European relations. There have been many economic disputes between the United States and European countries over the Marshall Plan. These included the various arguments about the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EC/EU; the Soviet pipeline dispute under Reagan; the differences concerning many of the directives of the Single European Act (SEA); and clashes over the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) rounds (Freedman 402-3).

As the economic, political, and military position of Western Europe improved in the 1950s and 1960s and as the United States began to experience balance of payments deficits

and even trade deficits, the American–European relationship had to be redefined. The Europeans insisted on greater authority, the Americans on more responsibility. Such redefinitions of power and duty can split alliances.

In the military sphere, many Europeans criticised NATO's emphasis on nuclear weapons, but repeated US attempts to strengthen conventional defence met with little success. European governments demanded new US weapons for the defence of Western Europe, but when this gave rise to domestic debate, they simply withdrew, leaving the responsibility to the United States (Hahn and Pfaltzgraff 136).

Since the start of the 1990s, successive US administrations have pursued a counterstrategy to reimpose US Cold War hegemonic leadership over Western Europe. The resulting conflicts have become more open and deeply antagonistic under George W. Bush. The manifold sources of this disagreement make it difficult to get through in the short term.

In 2002, the European Union was divided between those who wanted closer and stronger integration, Germany in particular, and those led by France and Britain, who did not. The former hoped to found a Euro federation with more power and legitimacy given to the institutions of the union. They sought a new constitution, a common foreign and defence policy and a stronger European parliament (Joffe 838).

Finally, in the new millennium, the United States became more and more unilateralist in foreign policy orientation. The European allies seemed to have become insignificant as the US, so greater in its strength and so exposed after 11 September 2001, concentrated on the threats from many different kinds of rogue states and terrorist networks.

The remarkable shifts particularly in the relative economic strengths of the United States and Western Europe expressed themselves as tensions within the Western alliance. As Western Europe prospered, the continent became far more concerned about its voice being heard than before. The United States could no longer determine Western policy on its own.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Americans requested that Western Europe's new power would have to translate into greater contributions to Western defence.

## **2.2. The Changing Face of Transatlantic Foreign Policy**

The United States increasingly became global in its course of action, whereas Western European powers became more regional than they had previously been. The reason is that the Europeans feared a strong US involvement outside Europe while they were rarely afraid that the United States would commit itself too strongly in Europe. The United States on its part favoured the gradual ending the colonial empires.

Researchers say that on the creation of the European Union, members adopted a strategy that relies on the concept of "sticks and carrots" a combination of soft and hard powers; while, soft power is given priority in most cases, hard power is used only as a last resort. Given that, despite the US and EU partnership, they have disagreed on many occasions regarding foreign policy decisions (Pfaff 2-3).

European and American views have collided many times over political matters such as the conflict in the Middle East. On the one hand, Americans that are well disposed with Israelis, support the US foreign policy in the Middle East. On the other hand, "people in three of four major western European nations — France, Germany and Italy — have been mostly critical of US policies in the region, with the British public split on this question" (Kupchan 112).

They also disagreed on decisions by the President George W. Bush to place tariffs on imports of foreign steel, as Europeans strongly opposed the decisions, while Americans who have a saying in this subject matter agreed to them (Thies 57). Furthermore, despite most Europeans' support to the war on Afghanistan led by the US, they showed their discontent because the decision was made without their interests being considered, in addition to the President's unpopular rhetoric –axis of evil– among the EU's public (Patrick 7-8).

One matter they have agreed on regarding foreign policy is Bush's decision to increase foreign aid to poor countries. That Survey showed that despite the similarity and partnership of the Europeans and Americans, their views of foreign policy differed most of the time. More, the majority of the four European nations, which participated in the survey, supported independency in decision-making in regards to security and diplomatic affairs (Woodward 129).

### **2.3. Transatlantic Economic and Trade Relations**

The EU and US overall collaboration is based on the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration. This collaboration focused on many areas including economy, education, science and culture. Since then, it has been gradually developing through presidential summit meetings between the US, the European Commission and the head country of the EU.


In an attempt to intensify the EU-US relationship-commitment in a number of areas of cooperation, the NTA efforts reached an agreement in 1998 at the London summit to deepen and broaden the trade relations, bilaterally and multilaterally, which resulted in the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) (Joseph and Chandler 90-1). Subsequently, many other regular summit meetings in regards to the EU/US economic relations occurred.

After TEP, the Positive Economic Agenda (PEA) of 2002 followed, which focused on bilateral economic cooperation in a number of areas such as the regulatory cooperation in the insurance sector and electronic customs. In the EU/US summit of June 2004, the two parties agreed on the "Dromoland Declaration" –a declaration that aims to strengthen their economic partnership– in which stakeholders assess the partnership and attempt to reduce trade, regulatory and investment complications (Joseph and Chandler 93).

The June 2005 EU/US summit announced the "EU/US initiative to enhance transatlantic economic integration and growth". This declaration necessitates the two parties to commit on

the following points: “Regulatory cooperation, Capital markets, Innovation, Trade and transport security, Energy efficiency, Intellectual property rights, Investment, Competition, Public procurement, Services” (Zeiler 85). In order to guarantee that the declaration will be efficiently executed, parties were to report progress in the following summit meetings, in addition, a mutual work plan was developed in November of the same year.

**Figure 1.** EU Trade in Goods and Services with Regard to the USA, China, Russia, Japan and Canada (billion EUR)



**Source:** “The European Union and the United States Global Partners, Global Responsibilities.” *European External Action Service*, June 2006.

The figure above demonstrates the percentages of the European Union’s trade in goods and services with different large economies of the world in 2006, in billion Euros.


After many years of negotiations and several summit meetings on removing transatlantic trade barriers, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) was finally formed on 13 February 2013. It aimed to “remove trade barriers in a wide range of economic sectors, reduce barriers behind customs border such as differences in technical regulations, standards and approval procedures, open up trade and investment between the EU and the US and result in more jobs and more growth” (“Information Guide” 10).

According to a European External Action Service article, good trade relations between the European Union and United States mark their partnership. However, it also lays down many disputes because they are not only partners, but also rivals in the world trade open market and because of organizational systems that reflect the societal differences. For instance, genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are allowed in the US but are fought against by many European countries including France, Germany, and Italy. In addition, they also dispute on the subsidization of large civil aircraft industries. All these disputes comprise less than 2 percent of the overall bilateral trade (“The European...”).

**Figure 2.** EU-27 Trade in Goods with the United States, 2009-2019 (EUR billion)

### EU-27 trade in goods with the United States, 2009-2019


(EUR billion)



**Source:** “USA-EU International Trade in Goods Statistics.” EC, 12 Mar. 2020.

The graph above shows the imports, exports and the balance between the United States and the European Union from 2009 to 2019. The EU imports from the United States were highest in 2019 (around 230 billion Euro) and lowest in 2009 (around 125 billion Euro). Similarly, EU exports to the United States were highest in 2019 (around 380 billion Euro) and lowest in 2009 (around 170 billion Euro).

**Figure 3.** EU-United States Trade by Main Products (2019)



**Source:** “USA/EU International Trade in Goods Statistics.” EC, 12 Mar. 2020.

The figure above shows the EU top three imported categories of goods from and to the US, which are machinery and vehicles, chemicals and other manufactured goods.

#### **2.4. Brexit and Transatlantic Ties**

Since the beginning, the United Kingdom feared that joining the European Union would reduce its international role as a global power. The EU started after the Paris treaty in 1952 as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), then after the treaty of Rome in 1957, it became the European Economic Community (EEC). Commonly known, six original countries established it, which are France, Germany, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy and Belgium (Xydis 423).



In his article “The Failed Design: Kennedy, de Gaulle, and the Struggle for Europe”, Frank Costigliola opines that the UK found itself doing poorly in the economic area compared to neighboring countries that are members of the EEC. Accordingly, it decided to apply to join the European community, but the President of France, Charles de Gaulle, vetoed Britain’s membership application twice in the 1960s (238).

By the early 1970s, Britain’s performance in the economic scene was still poor. After Charles de Gaulle had passed away, and exactly in 1973 the UK, in addition to Denmark and Ireland, successfully joined the European Communities, the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), later known as the European Community (EC) (Gompert 149). Moreover, right after joining the EC, some members of the ruling Labour Party and Unions showed concern about the effect of joining the EC on British workers.

In 1975, the Labour government, led by Harold Wilson, organized a referendum in order to put an end to the internal debate and uncertainty. The Conservative party, led by Margaret Thatcher, supported the membership and was successful in influencing the British public. Further, the referendum resulted in 67 percent of British voters supporting the EC membership (Ries et al. 11).

In 1983, the Labour party, led by Michael Foot, ran its general election campaign against Thatcher with a manifesto promising to withdraw from the EC; however, they lost and that manifesto was called “the world’s longest suicide note” (Ries et al. 12). By the 1980s, despite that Margaret Thatcher supported the membership of the EC she made the Conservatives eurosceptical by her position in Brussels, in addition to, other events such as her 1988 speech, at the College of Europe in Burges, when she warned from a European “super-state”.

The year 1991 marked the confirmation of the Maastricht treaty, which called for changing the EC’s name to European Union, adding justice and home affairs as a common responsibility and providing a single common currency (euro). Britain, under Prime Minister


John Major, and Denmark refused to adopt a shared currency, while other member countries prepared to join the Euro zone (Hugo 114).

Furthermore, in 1997, Tony Blair's "New Labour" firmly supported the idea of the UK taking a leading role in Europe, signed up the UK for the EU's "social chapter", and joined France to support a European defense identity other than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Nevertheless, eurosceptical portions of the UK public kept growing mainly after the integration of ten new members in the EU in 2004, thus, flooding the UK with new citizens, from the newly integrated countries, and taking residence in it (Hugo 119).

In January 2013, in order to gain the public's support and compete with the rising UK Independence Party, David Cameron assured that if the Conservatives win the next elections, he would seek to negotiate new terms with the EU. When he won in 2015, the government was loyal to the renegotiation and the referendum. Later, according to Ries et al., "in February 2016, the other EU leaders agreed to make some minor, non-treaty commitments to Cameron regarding the applicability of the phrase 'ever closer union', ways the UK could constrain benefits to migrant families and other matters of concern" (39).

Despite that the campaign was heavily emotional and the "leavers" –people who supported Brexit– used equivocated statistics about the UK's budget to the EU, the British public did not change their mind. The 23 June 2016 referendum resulted in 52% voting for Brexit. Prime Minister David Cameron resigned the following day (Ries et al. 43). The following figure shows the results of the referendum in the different regions of the UK. For more details, see figure 4 below.

**Figure 4.** UK Voted to Leave the EU



Key:

■ Majority leave ■ Majority remain

■ Tie □ Undeclared

**Source:** “EU Referendum Results.” *BBC News*, BBC, 2016.

The figure above shows the areas that voted majority remain or leave. Scotland, Northern Ireland and the London area strongly voted remain, while the rest voted to leave.

The US relationship with the UK and the rest of Europe remains one defined by shared ideas, deeply entwined economic and security interests, institutional arrangements, common international problems. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the US government insisted that all the states of the European Union continue to work closely together on issues of international peace and security.

For the US, Brexit would complicate these relations. It is the UK that would lose the most from a Brexit, becoming a country whose unity could be put into question and who would have to work harder to affect changes in the wider transatlantic relationship. In such a situation, the US could find its closest ally become ill at ease between the two sides of the Atlantic.

As seen in this chapter, there is a significant cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic, and on the whole the United States and Western Europe remained closely united together. The main reason is that their partnership is characterised by one common Atlantic culture, by the same democratic principles, by the same free market system, and by one common religion. Yet, this cooperation has not prevented deep differences to emerge to the surface between the two sides in the past. Starting from the 1990s, these divergences were expected to seriously challenge the Atlantic cooperation in the future.

## Chapter Three

### Reflections on the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

Policymakers and scholars alike generally agree that European and American relations have constantly changed. However, it is unclear whether recent conflicts over foreign policies, military interventions and trade policies will lead to severe conflicting differences in transatlantic relations that will destroy longstanding and profound social, cultural, economic, and political ties.

Indeed, it is far from obvious that in the future conflict will entirely replace cooperation. In effect, a certain split seemed to clearly take place under George W. Bush. The period preceding the war against Iraq greatly accelerated the divide between the two sides of the Atlantic both at the leadership and the public opinion level. The divergences are related to numerous issues.

The future rarely represents simply an extension of the past and the present. However, one can take into account the many issues that characterised the transatlantic ties in the past and in the present to predict the future course of the UE/EU partnership. Many political scientists predicted the fall of the United States, including Paul Kennedy in his *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. What happened, in fact, was the collapse of the Soviet Union, not the United States. Many scholars have long expected that the close cooperation between the United States and Western Europe would inevitably end but these ties are still enduring.

Political scientists and policy observers built their prediction on two important premises. The first is that alliances do not last after the disappearance of the threat against which these relations were founded. Second, when one nation becomes much stronger than its adversaries, the latter will always unite against this dominating state (Mearsheimer 5-6). Related to the US/EU partnership, the Soviet menace has ceased to exist and the United States

became the powerful nation in the world. Inevitably, it was expected that many nations, including Europeans, would stand against the United States' hegemony.

However, given the fact that there have always been elements of tension in Atlantic relations, one may predict even more conflict in the future. Conversely, since the United States and the European Union rely on the same ideals of democracy and free markets and since they still need each other politically, economically, and culturally there is no convincing reason to believe that they will drift apart. As Joseph Nye has written about US/European relations, "it is more likely that they will fundamentally resemble the current state of relations rather than be radically different" ("Repairing the Transatlantic Drift..." 55-7).

### **3.1. The Future Direction of the United States and European Relations**

The chief reasons for concern about the future direction in the relationship between the United States and Western Europe are the end of the Cold War, the growth and strength of unilateralism in the United States, and the assumption of a stronger role by the European Union. Besides, there is the increasing difficulty to handle overseas clashes for the two sides of the Atlantic, the spread of economic arguments as well as the upsurge of numerous cultural disputes, and ultimately the demographic changes are occurring in America and that would likely challenge the ongoing relationship in the long run (Palmer and Forman 97-9).

In the history of Atlantic relations after 1945, there has almost always been a crisis of one kind or another. Not a year has passed without one conflict or another impairing these relations. In this sense, NATO rarely knew periods of peace and harmony. Nonetheless, in comparison to other alliances, NATO played a significant role to make the transatlantic cooperation very successful (Gordon 94-5).

The fact that the Cold War is over has taken some of the cohesion out of NATO. It is possible that terrorism or some other new threat could become as important in holding the two sides of the Atlantic together as the Soviet threat was during the Cold War (Thies 152). Major

terrorist incidents in Europe could lead to responses there similar to those the United States has seen after 11 September. However, while the United States emphasised military means in combating terrorism, most European governments wanted to address the political and economic causes of the problem. As Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev has stated, “The Americans feel they are engaged in a war, the Europeans feel they are engaged in preventing one” (qtd. in Kennedy and Bouton 70).

### **3.1.1. Is Cooperation still Possible?**

There are many reasons for the sustained strength of the Atlantic cooperation. One of these causes is that despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia still has abundant supplies of nuclear weapons. It may pose further threats in the near future. Hence, despite many American/European disagreements, the United States is compelled to remain an important partner in Europe (Young 93).

As Duffield put it, the US chief reason for remaining in Europe is the fact that in the future only the EU will have the economic strength to challenge the United States (32). In addition, there are also the new challenges that the NATO allies are confronting from international terrorism in ex-Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and the Gulf. This would threaten the vital and most important interests of the United States and the European (Blackwill 62).

Bruce Russett and John Oneal insisted on the strong relationship between democracy, trade, and peace, to endorse that real democracies do not go to war against each other, particularly when they trade heavily with one another (61). All this would strongly appear to suggest that the likelihood of US–EU rivalry and conflict is quite limited.

### **3.1.2. Reasons for more Conflict in UE/EU Ties**

Although unilateralism has always been part of America’s foreign policy, it has unquestionably known much vigour in previous decades. It would seem that the stronger unilateralism becomes, the greater are the chances of conflict with Washington’s European

allies (Forsberg and Herd 66-8). The motives for US unilateralism strength, which originates from America's supremacy, are numerous. It is difficult to predict what strength unilateralism will have in the future. The United States could come to see that many different global concerns, including terrorism, require broad international cooperation. If the US is to lead efficiently, it must reorient itself toward the global (Lindley-French 77).

The Soviet Union has disintegrated and the United States obviously emerged as the world's only military superpower following its military triumphs of the Gulf War, ex-Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan. America's military power is colossal. It now spends more on defence than the next fifteen to twenty industrialized countries together, or more than 40 percent of what the entire world spends (The Economist, 9 March 2002, 32.). Besides, in the late twentieth century, it knew stronger economic growth than other developed countries.

On the European side, as Xydis has written that integration progressed slowly but steadily. In the past, the EU has enlarged from the EEC of six to the EC of nine and then twelve to the EU of fifteen. In 2004, it added ten new members. It further evolved from the Coal and Steel Community to the treaties of Rome, to the single integrated market, the common currency, and the European Security and Defence Policy. He has added that the pattern has frequently been the same: Europeans established ambitious goals that were largely fulfilled (519-21).

Although the two Atlantic partners still confront the same threats, the new conflicts nowadays take place outside the traditional NATO area. Military collaboration in the Gulf War and even in Afghanistan after 11 September worked well. Yet, it has generally been easier for NATO to collaborate on matters close within the traditional NATO area compared to those far away. Out of the traditional NATO area frequently meant conflict within the alliance. Now, almost all conflicts occur in distant places where the United States is usually more activist than the Europeans are. This means that NATO is no longer the main structure



of cooperation for Washington, and what happened in Afghanistan and Iraq is a good example. In Afghanistan Uzbekistan's role was visibly more important than that of most NATO allies (Smith 59).

While the economic and even the military balance between the two sides of the Atlantic has changed since the Atlantic partnership was established, the relationship by itself has not been reviewed. In 1945, the United States produced as much as the rest of the world combined. At the present, the EU produces as much as the United States. In 1945, the United States was the world's largest creditor; now it faces balance of payments deficits. While militarily the EU is still dependent on the US, this dependence became smaller after the end of the Cold War. Actually, EU countries are assuming new tasks that will further lessen their dependence on the US (Kennedy and Bouton 70).

Repeated attempts have been made to redefine the Atlantic relationship. These efforts met with limited success. The Europeans have become influential and sooner or later there has to be a true redefinition of the American/European relationship. The United States has never had a truly balanced relationship with Western Europe. Even in the more balanced state of affairs today, America remains the undisputed leader. Hence, it is difficult for Europe to match the United States as long as it is militarily dependent on it. Therefore, the possibility for the US and Western Europe to have a truly balanced relationship is very questionable (Kennedy and Bouton 66).

There have always been economic arguments between the United States and various European countries but, with the end of the Cold War and the globalization of the world economy, such clashes became prominent. During the Cold War, military/political matters always preceded economic ones. With globalization, the separation between foreign and domestic matters disappeared. Thus, many Europeans at present see globalization and Americanization as the same fact ("Putting the Brakes on... 25-6).

A cultural divide is taking place between the United States and Western Europe, despite the fact that culture has been a ground of cooperation. Under the impact of America's cultural hegemony, Europeans became somewhat more like Americans. This could be easily seen in so many fields: movies, television, popular music, literature, and clothing. More and more English became the dominant language not only for scholars but for tourists and people in general (Joffe, "Who is Afraid..." 43).

Joffe has asserted that for Europeans, Americans do not value international law abroad, but at home, they exercise the death penalty while being fiercely against abortion and having a gun culture, most Europeans find irrational. American popular culture remains popular in Europe. Even in high culture, everything from American world-leading universities to literature and music, America remains (Joffe, "European-American Relations:..." 838-39).

Several of the points just discussed are ambiguous, and it is far from obvious in what ways they will actually develop. Undoubtedly, many other points will also be relevant in such a discussion. There will no direct confrontation between the United States and Western Europe as such, but rather a conflict with some European countries and a general continued slow drifting apart between the two continents.

### **3.2. The Future of Transatlantic Security Relations after 11 September**

The 9/11 "terrorist" attacks on the United States' twin towers was a shocking news for both the US and the EU. America's centerpieces that represented its globalization, economic power and prosperity were directly attacked. The September attacks showed that America is vulnerable and its security is not as it thought it was. In addition, it made the US reconsider its foreign and security policies (Burghardt 15).

According to Günter Burghardt, the European Union's Ambassador in Washington, DC, from 1999 to 2001, after few days of the 9/11 incident, the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission visited the President of United States, George W.

Bush, to show Europe's frank solidarity for America and suggest working together on a mutual program. George W. Bush confirmed that the 9/11 occurrence "provides us with a new opportunity to work together" (qtd. in Burghardt 16). Despite, the successful transatlantic relations in justice and home affairs between a wide range of EU's nations and Washington's Department of Justice and the newly formed Homeland Security Department, the United States unilaterally decided the agenda of launching the "war on terror" program, which divided the European Union's views (Rees 112).

The 11 September incident had the most important effect that led the George W. Bush administration to supplement an agenda; he called the "Bush doctrine," based on many reasons, known by presidential writers as:

The ideology of the neoconservative foreign policy school; the reliance on the military superiority of the world's sole hyper power with a defense budget bigger than all other countries' defense budgets combined; the religiously motivated missionary zeal of America as the chosen country called by history and divine providence to defend freedom and democracy, God's gift to mankind; the unconditional support for the policies of Israeli governments allied with the large 'reborn Christian' constituencies in the American 'bible belt'; an oversimplified and devastatingly polarizing distinction between right and wrong, good and evil; and a refusal to let 'others' have a say in determining America's course of action. (Woodward 85)

In addition to arguments such as the peaceful transition of Germany and Japan after the Second World War, bringing democracy and changing the regime in the Middle East.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the European Union failed to coordinate and rival the US power in implementing the "war on terror" agenda. The EU states split into two sides, one that supported and the other that opposed the Bush doctrine. Moreover, in post-1989 the EU adopted a peaceful agenda that relied on soft power; focusing on building nations and using

lawful hard power only as a last option. Even though, the transatlantic relations had politically worsened and despite EU's peaceful agenda in the late 80s, the EU did not stop from working with the US on Afghanistan and other areas of significant activity or danger (Woodward 89).

Furthermore, America stained its image to the world in the Iraq case; in addition, the Lebanon-Israel war proved that hard power alone is not enough in dealing with foreign affairs and assuring homeland security. Consequently, coordination between the United States' hard power and the European Union's soft power is necessary to fight terrorism, stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction, spread democracy and engage in nation building (Burghardt 22).

### **3.3. Europe and the United States Face the Challenges of the New Century**

As any relationship, the transatlantic relations have been going through tensions and had their own ups and downs. Kemal Dervis sees that the major changes in the international system and the way the world is changing regarding the rapid pace of globalization, require the US and Europe to think and act according to the new changes. He attempts to define the new reality that faces the transatlantic relations through points that he called 'stylized facts' as follows:

Europe is no longer divided by the Iron Curtain and is no longer threatened from the East. It no longer needs American protection the way it did until the 1990s.

Nonetheless, the world remains a dangerous place, as was driven home to all of us by the terrible tragedy of 11 September. Globalization increases the potentially catastrophic dangers from terror, organized crime, contagious disease and environmental degradation. The world economy also remains fragile with a widening gap between the richest and the poorest and between expectations and actual achievements, even in the advanced countries. Global interdependence has increased

the potential benefits from the coordination and joint management of global public goods and bads. (138-9)

Dervis argues that the United States has, and for decades will continue to have, irresistible military superiority compared to any possible competitor. Europe's gross domestic product (GDP) will be larger than that of the United States, but the United States is united while Europe is debating the level of unity it wants to achieve in foreign and security policy. The United States will be in a position to exercise power worldwide and to prevent any development of which it does not approve in the domain of international security or economic policy (140).

Despite this strength, however, the world has become far too complex for the United States to be able to cope with globalization successfully on its own. To be effective, US leadership has to rely on the vigorous cooperation of other major players, because US economic resources alone cannot be sufficient and in today's world, there is need for a sense of moral and democratic legitimacy. Television, the internet and the progress of democratic and value-based politics constrain the use of power (Dervis 141).

Furthermore, Dervis suggests that the European economic, foreign and security policies' cohesion can play an important role in the international system. This role is to contribute in improving the world and keep an eye open for dangers, rather than trying to counter the United States. The EU made big efforts for more and better cohesion like electing the European Commission's President by the European Parliament and establishing the office of a European foreign minister (142).

Equally important is the fact that the European efforts towards a better common defence policy, should not replace NATO's role as a fundamental framework for the EU and the US. Also, NATO needs to have some flexibility to it in order to define the changes to the common

threats. Cooperation should be open to all countries willing to work towards making the world safer, even by backing up the UN's decisions.

### **3.4. EU/US Relations in a Multipolar System**

The transatlantic relations at the level of economic interaction show a high interdependency. These interactions are just slightly affected by state policies. However, when it comes to the political-security level, the relationship seem to not identical on both sides. Because of the EU good unification in trade matters, this asymmetry is not really apparent when the EU and the US have disagreements on that level. However, it is most apparent when it comes to matters linked directly or indirectly to security (Constas 57).

According to Dimitri Constas, any discussion that deals with the future of the transatlantic relations as a subject, has to answer the question of whether the US foreign policy of unilateralism is random and reversible or is it a trend that will persist in the future? In an attempt to answer this question, he proceeds as follows:

After the Cold War and the end of bipolarity, the US had the chance of stopping any threats or challenge to its hegemony, be that a single opponent or a combination of opponents. By the year 2000, the US unilateralism was demonstrated in many occasions like the International Criminal Court, the anti-ballistic missile treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, biological weapons conventions, landmines and others. (59-61)

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, the US policymakers considered the institutional framework of international relations as an obstacle. Terrorism have no respect for frontiers, therefore, the US was ready to ignore rules that restrict the use of force, including concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and rules of the international law. Even though the solidarity shown all over Europe to the US after the September 11 attacks, the US was still not satisfied.

The US adopted a new philosophy of 'the mission defines the coalition, not the reverse', and it was applied in the war in Afghanistan with the 'coalition of the willing' then in Iraq by disregarding the rules of the United Nations Security Council. Conostas ends up by confirming the persistence of the American foreign policy of unilateralism, due to the changes in the international system after the end of bipolarity and other reasons that came after like "the threat of international terrorism, even American military success in crises where multilateralism was disregarded, not to mention internal European divisions" (58). However, changing this American policy and attitude is still possible, as it depends on the EU acting effectively to gain the US reliability (59).

The relations between the EU and the US under the shadow of the American foreign policy of unilateralism can be improved progressively. This improvement can be reached via initiatives from the EU to gain the US respect. Conostas sees that the EU needs to protect the UN from any further destabilisation, and to limit it to urgent humanitarian operations. Further, he mentions issues of high priority for the EU that are being debated internally:

The final formulation of CFSP clauses in the draft European Constitution and the use of qualified majority voting; the better coordination of financial aid, external trade, environment, justice and home affairs policies with EU's foreign policy objectives; the creation of a European diplomatic service and possibly the merger of the posts and functions of the high representative and the commissioner for external relations; and a substantial increase in national defence spending, along with common policies strengthening the European defence industry and improving research and development.

(60)

In addition to the internal issues, the EU has to prove its ability of taking care of issues on its backyard. There are high expectations from Europeans and Americans for the EU to take over the problem of the West Balkans and deal with it without the US contribution. The

EU is expected to lead this unstable region to a better place and future (Constas 61). Constas also mentions that after the war of Iraq and its aftermath, the EU should be dealing with potentially dangerous situations; according to which is more urgent the final status of Kosovo; internal security in Serbia after Zoran Dindjic's assassination (62).

According to Constas, the European policymakers and the transatlantic cooperation face a difficult test, which is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During and after the war of Iraq, the coalition partners have assured to plan a roadmap preparing for a Palestinian statehood, and make this a top priority. Confirmed by the specialists that this is a no easy task, Constas mentions the potential benefits of such move:

But for the European side a consensus-building exercise on the conditions of a settlement along with the commitment of resources to facilitate the process, could at the very least have an intra-European healing effect. In turn, the formulation of concrete common policies toward that conflict could have some positive long-term spill over effects on other CFSP issues and benefit transatlantic cooperation. (63)

Accordingly, the European side should deepen and expand the New Transatlantic Agenda by paying more attention to the US and its foreign policy elites.

As mainstream American foreign policy analysts criticised the unilateralist policy and showed fears of it making the transatlantic relations even worse, the EU as one unit had to define its significance in foreign and security policy. Hence, it is imperative for Europeans to engage in an extensive dialogue with their American counterparts on the current state of transatlantic relations and their future.

### **3.5. Repairing the Transatlantic Divide**

Like any other bilateral relation, the United States and the EU too have known many disagreements in their relations. The United States' one-sided decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, created a rift that separated Europe from the transatlantic alliance and generated hot



debates about continental Europe in struggle against a unilateralist America (Nye, *The US and Europe: Continental...* 9).

Further, in order to repair the divide Nye has suggested ignoring such discussions because all countries in the European Union are associated with each other, but each country is autonomous (“Repairing the Transatlantic Rift” ...81). It is also a union of stability and attraction, thus, neighboring European countries need to join the union. Additionally, in 1999 the US and EU agreed to fight in Kosovo without any United Nations Security Council (UNSC) declaration (82).

Moreover, Joseph Nye, an American political scientist, has contented:

Those American who say that Europeans are from Venus while Americans are from Mars ignore recent polls by the Pew Research Center that show many Europeans with ‘American’ views on policy and many Americans with ‘European’ views. In fact, the polls show that nearly two-thirds of the American public prefer multilateral rather than unilateral approaches to diplomacy. (“Repairing the Transatlantic Rift” 83)

Besides that, America and the European Union are almost identical with respect to their culture and dedication towards democracy and human rights.

Moreover, Nye compares the twenty first century’s issues to a “three-dimensional chess game”; three boards, which represent an issue each. First, the military power issues, where the United States stands on top as a superpower with an expenditure more than what several countries spend on their national defense equipment. This latter is what those who doubt the European Union tend to focus on American hegemony, ignoring the EU influential power in keeping peace, for instance, in Afghanistan and countries of the Balkan (“Repairing the Transatlantic Rift.” 80-81). While the US surpasses ever other power in this dimension as a unipolar power, Europe has a similarly important influence through the NATO.

Second, the economic issues, unlike the first dimension of issues, the US cannot stand on top alone because it needs the second party to seal off trade agreements, like Europe or another economic power. Thus, on this board the world is multipolar in the balance of power. Moreover, the European Union is able to stop America's unilateral decision-making. For instance, the Commission of the European Community opposed the merge of two American companies, General Electric and Honeywell, and required the US to change its passport system to achieve the European privacy principles (Kubicek 324). Additionally, the EU and the US are each other's largest trading partner in goods and services.

Finally yet importantly, the transnational issues, those that cross the borders below the government's control such as drugs, crime, illegal migration, global climate change, infectious diseases and terrorist networks, are what harm countries and their people from the inside. In this dimension, being a superpower or a unipolar power is irrelevant, because not hard power nor any singular power can solve its issues on its own. Further, in order to solve such matters and protect their people from harm, efficient powers like the US and the EU need to cooperate (Nye, "Repairing the Transatlantic Rift" 80).

Moreover, the actual US President, Donald Trump and his administration, managed to deteriorate the transatlantic relations making it the worse than it has ever been in America's modern history. Even when the US unilaterally decided to go to war with Iraq in 2003, transatlantic relations were at a better state. According to a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace article, the European Ambassadors in Washington, DC, blame the Trump administration for creating another rift between the transatlantic parties (Brattberg and Whineray 2).

They list six factors, which steered the relationship downhill: serious policy disagreements, ideological drift between the transatlantic allies, basic lack of decorum, the struggle to navigate with the Trump administration, frequent mismatch between the

president's rhetoric and that of the foreign policy professionals in his administration, US engagement with Europe is isolated and transactional (Brattberg and Whineray 3).

### **3.6. The EU and the Future of Transatlantic Relations**

The Iraq war caused conflict and divide within the EU and between the two sides of the transatlantic partners. Christoph Bertram says that going back to the consensus from before the conflict will not happen, however, limiting the damage done by the conflict is necessary from both sides of the Atlantic. This can be done by "demonstrating mutual respect and exercising rhetorical restraint and pragmatic cooperation" (41).

Bertram sees that the Iraq consolidation is a chance for the EU and the US to work together and show mutual respect, as it is a task that requires joint efforts. However, this does not fix what was once ruined, because the reasons of the transatlantic rift are still there, which is about "the fundamental issue of how to promote international order in the twenty-first century, most if not all European countries no longer see eye-to-eye with their major security partner, the united states" (42).

After the Cold War, the world witnessed some changes in the international system. The United States, as the strongest state in the world, accepted the situation. However, after the September 11, 2001, it became time for the US to use and exercise its power to deal with the new challenges like "proliferating states, non-state actors with access to destructive weapons, and states which harbor them" (Bertram 41). This does not mean that the US will constantly start wars, but it means that the US will not hesitate to use military threat every time it demands so.

On the other hand, the EU is not a status quo power. Europe is subject to enlargements and integration, which provides stability and prosperity for the member states. However, as Bertram mentions, member governments of the EU either had no strategic ambitions at all outside of their union's boundaries, or they were just satisfied with promoting stability via

international agreement and inclusion, which is different from the American way that includes military interventions and outlawing problem states. Further, Bertram says that the European governments are acting out of conviction and partly by indifference and lack of means or even not able to take urgent strategic decisions at the Union's level. Both the EU and its governments are not good strategists and slow to react to urgent situations (45-6).

Bertram says that the EU weaknesses and differences from the US are enough reasons for the transatlantic rift to remain and continue to affect the transatlantic trust and institutions . This would remain so, until both sides decide to identify and debate their differences and limit them from poisoning other areas of cooperation, as the EU and the US have many (47).

He also suggests that the European political leaders need to have certain qualities in order to pursue a transatlantic cooperation. These qualities are "a high degree of mature pragmatism in dealing with the United States; and a major effort to instill in the respective publics support for the continued value of working with America on most issues, and respecting those areas where differences will persist" (48).

### **3.7. The US and the Future of Transatlantic Relations**

As the world has been witnessing changes, the latter affected the transatlantic relations as well as international relations. Scott Barrett claims that the cause for these changes are the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks alongside with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which made the US the first power in a unipolar world. However, it was quickly noticed that the institutions that were once developed, they do not fit in the new world, and that caused tensions. Europeans view some institutions, like the UN, as restrainers for the US power. However, for Americans, these institutions are harmful to US interests (43).

Barrett adds that any country that is put in a situation where it has to choose, it would be expected that it would place its interest first. Then, he mentions the case of the George W. Bush administration as a vivid example. The Bush administration identified the Iraq as a

threat to the American security, so it waged a war against Iraq in order to stop the threat. It is preferable for the US to go to war with the support of allies, but it can go by itself if necessary. After having the UN approval, and with the support of the UK and some other European countries, the US went to war (44).

About the Iraq War, Barrett affirms:

I opposed this war on the basis that Iraq was not an imminent threat to the united states, that Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the US could be deterred, and that a policy of pre-emption was destabilizing (the aim of regime change coupled with the policy of preemption, provides an incentive for countries like North Korea to acquire WMD in order to deter the US from attacking. (44)

Iraq refused international inspectors until the US gathered forces in the region (Barrett 43).

Barrett argues that regardless of the disagreements in the transatlantic relations, the US would not leave multilateralism, because there are many issues that need to be treated multilaterally like the fight against terrorism, surveillance of diseases like SARS, controlling the proliferation of WMD, and climate change mitigation. He also contends that the EU and the US would benefit from working with each other in these areas, and progress requires joint leadership from the EU and the US (45).

The absence of agreement about the Kyoto Protocol might appear like the EU and the US reached a dead end, but the matter is not choosing between the Kyoto Protocol and multilateralism. Barrett suggests that the EU and the US would benefit immensely from collective research, which in its turn may lead into further cooperation. "That is how the transatlantic relationship should be repaired: by making small achievements in particular areas of common concern" (45).

In spite of different foreign policy perspectives and different national priorities, the US and the EU did not only compete but also worked together. Although the relationship has

been at times relatively turbulent and at other times comparatively warm, according to the events of international politics and to the moods of leaders of the two sides, it frequently remained a friendly relationship.

Consequently, during the first decades of the twenty-first century, transatlantic relations have evolved within rather different frameworks. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union removed the first of these contexts. No longer must the United States and Europe coordinate their political/military affairs paying a constant attention to Moscow. Although the economic context remains important, its implications for transatlantic relations have become increasingly unclear as the West benefited greatly from its policies of economic openness and multilateralism.

Despite all these shifts and divergences, Americans and Europeans, in general, continued to like each other. When Americans were asked to measure their warmth toward various countries, the leading European countries came out significantly higher than countries in other parts of the world, with the exception of Canada. Europeans, as a general rule, continued to express warm feelings toward the United States.

## Conclusion

A new and powerful Europe came out of the ruins of the Second World War. Behind this quick revival was Europe's growing unity. The free movement of people, goods, financial resources and services, and the establishment of a common commercial policy facilitated European political integration. Despite this integration, Europeans recognised that the Atlantic community needed a model to follow and that there was no other substitute to the United States.

The logic behind this reasoning was that United States and Western Europe had so many basic interests and values in common which made transatlantic cooperation relatively easy. America's focus on common objectives and its disposition to cooperate on most other issues facilitated the success and endurance of the partnership. While this Atlantic organisation that was founded in the first years after the Second World War looked stable, this stability obviously changed over time in favour of the Europeans, and, even in the early years, the United States faced obstacles.

The countries of Western Europe and later on the European Union increasingly formed a single society with more and more converging directions and common features, and considered the differences among member countries as regional differences within the European society. Despite this tight rapprochement, Europeans did not always think or act as one united entity by the end of the twentieth century. They, nevertheless, constantly discussed and collaborated between them in foreign affairs than ever before.

Nowadays, the United States of America and the European Union are the two strongest economic powers in the world, approximately equivalent in terms of gross national product (GNP), market size, and scientific potential. They are, nonetheless, unequal in terms of political impact and military strength. The United States and the European Union have always

been considered as exceptional examples both of economic development and of political and cultural modernization. Nevertheless, they have followed different paths to reach such a position.

For about four decades after the end of World War II, transatlantic relations were mostly influenced by two common constraints. On the world scene, the necessity of containing Soviet power greatly helped to bring about harmony among the foreign policies of the United States and its West European allies. Internally, the need for creating jobs and promoting living standards led to the reduction of trade barriers, the liberalization of financial means across the Atlantic.

The collapse of the Soviet bloc gave birth to a dilemma to the Atlantic political and military coordination. This development, together with the need for a concerted West European policy towards East and Central Europe, encouraged powerful states in Western Europe to seek to renegotiate the transatlantic alliance and the nature of US leadership.

During the 1990s, there was a widespread belief on both sides of the Atlantic that transatlantic unity was strong and tight on almost every level. Nevertheless, with the arrival in office of the Bush administration, and especially after 11 September 2001, this 1990s depiction of a unified transatlantic alliance swiftly deteriorated. American officials promoted the idea of an American empire or American hegemon imposing its will on the rest of the world, including its Western allies. The split between the United States and its European allies was caused by the new foreign policy of the Bush administration and the war in Iraq. On the European side, the clash between Washington and Western Europe has not become an enduring sharp division.

The George W. Bush administration worked, in numerous policy areas, to neglect policy commitments to the Western European states. In the Middle East, for instance, it privileged its relationship with Israel over its partnership with Western Europe and concurrently took a



number of steps, which had adverse consequences on European security interests. In the economic side, the George W. Bush administration also operated against Western Europe and against a common method to WTO development. This US change of attitude confused those who had thought that the transatlantic partnership was strong and stable during the 1990s. Yet, none of the problems revealed was as remarkable as it appeared at the time, and even as late as the turn of the millennium the American role in Europe was still strong.

When at the end of the Cold War the United States reduced its presence in Europe, and despite growing assertiveness on the European side, the Western Europeans once again restated their need to the Americans since the United States could still satisfy important Western European needs. In newly liberated Central and Eastern Europe, the cooperation with and help of the United States was also much valued. Washington welcomed the European need for the Americans because through the Atlantic organisation the US could still achieve vital objectives there.

When the Cold War was over, the United States had evidently won. The pride and sense of victory was widespread among Americans. The coming to power of George W. Bush, and especially the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, motivated a more unilateralist move towards international relations. On the European side, the European Union (EU) was enlarging geographically and was progressively defining its own identity even in its relations with the US. These new orientations, as well as a series of political and cultural issues, raised a big question mark over the future of the close American/European relationship. In fact, in the beginning of the twenty-first century strong indicators of transatlantic split became obvious.

Despite extensive cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic, there were differences among the Western allies, differences that occasionally caused difficulties in allied relations. Regarding predictions about the future of the Atlantic partnership, and

concerning the questions whether the recent crises in relations between the United States and Europe are troublesome than those that have preceded it and whether or not there is a hopeful future for the Atlantic partnership, the answers are not evident. As regards the first, the conflicts facing EU-US relations, such as security relations, trade relations, and monetary affairs, are serious and more troublesome than any that the Atlantic partnership has faced in the past.

During the five decades that followed the end of World War II, the consequences of the Atlantic relationship have deeply impacted the fabric of peoples' lives on both sides of the Atlantic. While some of the most convincing reasons for the alliance have changed, evolved, declined or even ceased to exist, the prediction of a permanent divide is not very obvious. The next generation of American and European leaders will certainly renew the Atlantic partnership to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Economic relations are the most constant characteristic of the partnership in part because powerful businessmen on both sides are so completely invested in each others' economic affairs. Security relations both within the EU and between the Atlantic allies remain the most difficult to manage since the end of World War II and they will continue to be so because the security environment is in substantial change.

The actual difficult global economic environment together with the extremely opposed domestic politics both within the United States and in Europe will challenge the stability of Atlantic economic relationships and will make it difficult to safeguard what has been the most lasting and satisfying aspect of the partnership. In short, the chances for a renewed Atlantic relationship will certainly be improved by concentrating on the many shared interests rather than emphasising and highlighting perceived differences in cultural values and political beliefs.

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